VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS, District Judge.
This matter is before the court on Plaintiff's Motion To Remand (Doc. 5) (the "Remand Motion"), filed on May 30, 2012. Defendant responded to the Remand Motion on June 13, 2012. (Doc. 6). Plaintiff elected not to file a reply brief. Therefore, the Remand Motion is under submission and ripe for the court's decision.
Having carefully considered the removal papers (Doc. 1) and briefing by the parties, the court concludes that the requisite jurisdictional amount in controversy is not clearly established in the removal papers and, therefore, this case was improvidently removed. Thus, Plaintiff's Remand Motion is due to be granted, and the court will remand this case to the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Alabama.
Plaintiff Lola Griffith ("Ms. Griffith") originally filed her complaint in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Alabama, on February 23, 2012. (Notice of Removal, Doc. 1 at Ex. 4). Her complaint is styled in two counts, claiming negligence and wantonness against Wal-Mart in relation to a slip-and-fall accident that occurred on July 11, 2011, at Wal-Mart store # 762 in Birmingham, Alabama. Ms. Griffith did not allege the specific nature of her injuries, indicating only that she suffered "serious personal injuries and other damages." (Id. ¶ 5).
Moreover, Ms. Griffith did not allege a specific monetary value of her damages.
(Id. ¶ 10, Prayer for Relief).
On May 2, 2012, more than thirty days after receipt of the Complaint, but less than one year after commencement of this action, Defendant Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P. ("Wal-Mart") removed the case to federal court. (Notice of Removal, Doc. 1). The court's jurisdiction is premised on 28 U.S.C. § 1332, diversity of citizenship. (Id. ¶ 4). Wal-Mart avers that the parties are citizens of different states. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 4). Further, Wal-Mart contends that "the amount in controversy exceeds the sum of Seventy-Five Thousand Dollars ($75,000), exclusive of interest and costs, in compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 1332." (Id. ¶ 4). The Notice of Removal relies solely upon Ms. Griffith's responses to a set of requests for admission to establish that the amount in controversy requirement is satisfied. (Id. ¶¶ 7-14). Wal-Mart maintains that Ms. Griffith's responses to the requests for admission constitute "other paper" upon which removal can be based under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). (Id. ¶ 12).
The admissions Wal-Mart requested from Ms. Griffith on March 28, 2012, were stated as follows:
(Doc. 1 at Ex. 1).
Ms. Griffith's response to each request was stated as follows:
(Doc. 1 at Ex. 2) (emphasis added).
"It is by now axiomatic that the inferior courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They are `empowered to hear only those cases within the judicial power of the United States as defined by Article III of the Constitution,' and which have been entrusted to them by a jurisdictional grant authorized by Congress." Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 409 (11th Cir.1999) (quoting Taylor v. Appleton, 30 F.3d 1365, 1367 (11th Cir.1994)). "Accordingly, `[w]hen a federal court acts outside its statutory subject-matter jurisdiction, it violates the fundamental constitutional precept of limited federal power.'" Univ. of S. Ala., 168 F.3d at 409 (quoting Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 212, 92 S.Ct. 418, 425, 30 L.Ed.2d 383 (1971)). "Simply put, once a federal court determines that it is without subject matter jurisdiction, the court is powerless to continue." Univ. of S. Ala., 168 F.3d at 410.
"A necessary corollary to the concept that a federal court is powerless to act without jurisdiction is the equally unremarkable principle that a court should inquire into whether it has subject matter jurisdiction at the earliest possible stage in the proceedings." Id. "Indeed, it is well settled that a federal court is obligated to inquire into subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it may be lacking." Id. (citing Fitzgerald v. Seaboard Sys. R.R., 760 F.2d 1249, 1251 (11th Cir.1985) (per curiam)).
Moreover, "[t]he jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of a claim involves the court's competency to consider a given type of case, and cannot be waived or otherwise conferred upon the court by the parties. Otherwise, a party could `work a wrongful extension of federal jurisdiction and give district courts power the Congress denied them.'" Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 678 F.2d 992, 1000-01 (11th Cir.1982) (quoting American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 18, 71 S.Ct. 534, 95 L.Ed. 702 (1951)) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). Furthermore, "[b]ecause removal jurisdiction raises significant federalism concerns, federal courts are directed to construe removal statutes strictly." Univ. of S. Ala., 168 F.3d at 411 (citing Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09, 61 S.Ct. 868, 85 L.Ed. 1214 (1941)).
Lastly, Congress has decreed and the Supreme Court has confirmed that — with the express exception of civil rights cases that have been removed — orders of remand by district courts based upon certain grounds, including in particular those premised upon lack of subject matter jurisdiction, are entirely insulated from review. More specifically, § 1447(d) provides:
28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (emphasis added); see also Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 642, 126 S.Ct. 2145, 165 L.Ed.2d 92 (2006) (recognizing that "`[w]here the
The burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction for the purposes of removal to this court is on the removing defendant. See Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir.2001) ("Because this case was originally filed in state court and removed to federal court by Best Buy, Best Buy bears the burden of proving that federal jurisdiction exists."). "The court should determine its jurisdiction over the case `based upon the plaintiff's pleadings at the time of removal.'" Fowler v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 256 F.Supp.2d 1243, 1246 (N.D.Ala. 2003).
"[B]ecause the jurisdiction of federal courts is limited, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals favors remand of cases that have been removed where federal jurisdiction is not absolutely clear." Lowe's OK'd Used Cars, Inc. v. Acceptance Ins. Co., 995 F.Supp. 1388, 1389 (M.D.Ala. 1998) (citing Burns v. Windsor, 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir.1994)). "In fact, removal statutes are to be strictly construed, with all doubts resolved in favor of remand." Lowe's, 995 F.Supp. at 1389 (emphasis added) (citing Diaz v. Sheppard, 85 F.3d 1502, 1505 (11th Cir.1996)).
As stated above, Defendants premise their removal exclusively upon this court's diversity jurisdiction. "Diversity jurisdiction exists where the suit is between citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds the statutorily prescribed amount, in this case $75,000." Williams, 269 F.3d at 1319 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)). Therefore, removal jurisdiction based upon diversity mandates: (1) a complete diversity of citizenship between the plaintiff(s) and the defendant(s); and (2) satisfaction of the amount in controversy requirement.
Diversity jurisdiction "requires complete diversity — every plaintiff must be diverse from every defendant." Palmer v. Hosp. Auth., 22 F.3d 1559,1564 (11th Cir. 1994). "Citizenship, not residence, is the key fact that must be alleged in the complaint to establish diversity for a natural person." Taylor, 30 F.3d at 1367.
In their notice of removal, Defendants have effectively met the diversity of citizenship requirement based upon the residence of Ms. Griffith in Alabama (see Doc. 1 ¶ 1; see also id. Ex. 4 at Compl. ¶ 1 (stating Ms. Griffith "is a resident citizen of the City of Birmingham, County of Jefferson, State of Alabama")), and the states of citizenship for Wal-Mart in Delaware and Arkansas. (Doc. 1 ¶ 2). Additionally, Ms. Griffith does not dispute that complete diversity exists.
Ms. Griffith contests the amount in controversy prong. Regarding this quantitative requirement, "when Congress created lower federal courts, it limited their diversity
The removal procedure statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1446, contemplates two ways that a case may be removed based on diversity jurisdiction. The first way (formerly referred to as "first paragraph removals")
Here, Ms. Griffith has made an unspecified demand for damages in her complaint. Wal-Mart did not rely on the complaint alone to establish the requisite jurisdictional amount and remove within thirty days of its receipt.
Because Ms. Griffith made an unspecified demand for damages, Wal-Mart must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy more likely than not exceeds the requisite jurisdictional amount. Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 77 F.3d 1353, 1356-57 (11th Cir.1996) ("[W]here a plaintiff has made an unspecified demand for damages in state court, a removing defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy more likely than not exceeds the ... jurisdictional requirement."), abrogated on other grounds by Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc., 204 F.3d 1069, 1072 (2000); see also McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 182-83, 56 S.Ct. 780, 80 L.Ed. 1135 (1936); accord Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1210 ("Defendants must establish the jurisdictional amount by a preponderance of the evidence."). Moreover, the "other paper" (discovery responses) Wal-Mart relied on in its removal documents must "clearly" and "unambiguously" establish federal jurisdiction. Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1213 n. 63 (explaining that a defendant's removal documents "must contain an unambiguous statement that clearly establishes federal jurisdiction"); id. at 1218 ("[W]e are limited in our review to determining whether the pleadings or `other paper' included with the notice of removal provide an unambiguous statement that clearly establishes federal jurisdiction over this action.").
The key inquiry before the court, therefore, is whether Wal-Mart has clearly and unambiguously established the jurisdictional amount by a preponderance of the evidence. Wal-Mart relies solely on Ms. Griffith's denials of its requests for admission to establish the jurisdictional amount. (See Doc. 6 at 5 ("It is the position of Wal-Mart that Plaintiff's responses to Wal-Mart's requests for admissions establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Plaintiff is seeking in excess of the jurisdictional amount.")). Ms. Griffith, citing to several cases and a law treatise, argues that her denials of Wal-Mart's requests for admission do not constitute statements of fact; rather, they merely indicate that she is not willing to concede the fact or issue and, as a result, the fact or issue must be proven at trial. (Doc. 5 at 4-5 (citing Gutierrez v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 437 Mass. 396, 772 N.E.2d 552, 567 (2002) ("A denial of a request for admission is not a statement of fact; it simply
More specifically, Ms. Griffith contends that this case is nearly identical to Spears and Harmon, where other district judges in the Eleventh Circuit have squarely addressed the issue of whether a plaintiff's denials of defendant Wal-Mart's requests for admission sufficiently established the requisite amount in controversy. In Spears and Harmon, the courts found that the denials of the requests for admission (which were similarly, if not identically, worded to those propounded in the instant case) were not sufficient to establish jurisdiction. The court agrees with the persuasive reasoning of those cases,
Turning first to Harmon, the court finds this case highly persuasive because of its factual similarities and careful reasoning. In Harmon, the Honorable Mark E. Fuller, Chief District Judge of the Middle District of Alabama, thoroughly addressed whether denial of these same type of requests is sufficient to establish the amount in controversy. He persuasively reasoned:
Harmon, 2009 WL 707403, at *3-4 (footnotes omitted).
Similarly, in Spears, District Judge R. David Proctor, faced with similar facts, relied on Chief Judge Fuller's analysis in Harmon in concluding that the plaintiff's denials of Wal-Mart's requests for admission were not sufficient to demonstrate the requisite amount in controversy. Judge Proctor's analysis is set out as follows:
Spears, 2:09-CV-894-RDP, Doc. 8 at 3-5.
In this case, as in Spears, Wal-Mart relies on the same two cases to demonstrate that it has met its burden of demonstrating the jurisdictional amount. (Doc. 6 at 5 ("Wal-Mart contends that the district courts in Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 534 F.Supp.2d 1239 (M.D.Ala. 2008), and in Harden v. Field Memorial Community Hosp., 516 F.Supp.2d 600 (S.D.Miss.2007), correctly decided the issue which is presently before this Court.")). Like Judge Proctor in Spears, the undersigned finds that Williams and Harden are not persuasive to support Wal-Mart's argument because both cases are distinguishable: the Williams analysis centered on timeliness issues and did not reach amount-in-controversy analysis, and Harden presented different facts in that the plaintiff manifested her intent to seek more than $75,000.00. See Williams, 534 F.Supp.2d at 1242-45; Harden, 516 F.Supp.2d at 609 ("The plaintiff's evasive response to the defendants' requests for admission, combined with the plaintiff's manifestation of her intent to seek over $75,000.00, is tantamount to a denial of the defendants' requests for admission." (emphasis added)).
For these reasons, Williams and Harden materially differ from instant case, whereas Harmon and Spears are both relevant and instructive. Specifically, the court finds that Ms. Griffith's denials of Wal-Mart's requests for admission do not constitute "unequivocally clear and certain" evidence that she intends to see more than $75,000 in damages. Like Judge Fuller, the court concludes that Wal-Mart cannot "prove the positive by eliciting denial of the negative." Harmon, 2009 WL 707403, at *3. Stated differently, as put by Judge Proctor, "[t]he denial of the negative requests does not equal an affirmance." Spears, Doc. 8 at 5.
Moreover, in this case, Ms. Griffith's responses to Wal-Mart's requests for admission are the only evidence Wal-Mart relies on to support its position that the jurisdictional minimum is met. Cf. Martin v. Coventry Health Care Workers Comp., Inc., Case No. 4:12-cv-1057-VEH, Doc. 13 at 10-12, 2012 WL 1745580 (N.D.Ala. May 14, 2012) (finding that defendants met the preponderance-of-evidence standard on removal when it presented multiple grounds to support satisfaction of the jurisdictional minimum, including factors apparent on the face of the complaint, which the court considered in combination). The court cannot conclude that the "other paper" proffered by Wal-Mart in this case, standing alone, is sufficient to clearly and unambiguously establish the court's jurisdiction. Accordingly, like Spears and Harmon, this cause is due to be remanded.
Because the answers to the requests for admission do not amount to an unambiguous statement that clearly establishes this court's jurisdiction, Wal-Mart has not met its burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). As such, the "first paragraph removals" discussed in prior case law are now embodied in subsection (1), id. § 1446(b)(1), and the "second paragraph removals" are now encompassed in subsection (3), id. § 1446(b)(3).