MEMORANDUM OPINION

SHARON LOVELACE BLACKBURN, Chief Judge.

This case is presently pending before the court on defendant's Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 5.)1 Plaintiff, Steven S. Harris, Jr., has sued defendant, Brandon K. Falls, the District Attorney for Jefferson County, alleging that defendant violated his constitutional rights to due process and to be free from unreasonable seizure; his claims are based on a number of criminal complaints executed by defendant's investigators, which charged plaintiff with negotiating worthless checks in violation of Alabama law. Upon consideration of the record, the submissions of the parties, the arguments of counsel, and the relevant law, the court is of the opinion that defendant's Motion to Dismiss, (doc. 5), is due to be granted.

I. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD

Defendant has moved to dismiss plaintiff's Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The purpose of such a motion, authorized by Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is to test the facial sufficiency of the plaintiff's statement of a claim for relief. Brooks v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1367 (11th Cir.1997). "Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." American Dental Ass'n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1288 (11th Cir.2010) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

When addressing a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court accepts the allegations in the Complaint as true and construes those allegations in the light most favorable to plaintiff. Ironworkers Local Union 68 v. AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals, LP, 634 F.3d 1352, 1359 (11th Cir.2011) (quoting Am. Dental Ass'n, 605 F.3d at 1288). To survive a Motion to Dismiss, "the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter ... to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. (quoting Am. Dental Ass'n, 605 F.3d at 1289 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007))) (internal quotations omitted). A claim is "plausible" if the facts are sufficient "to allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). However, "courts are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986)) (internal quotations omitted). Also, the court does not assume that plaintiff can prove facts she has not alleged or that defendant has violated the law in ways that have not been alleged. Id. at 563 n. 8, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citing Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526, 103 S.Ct. 897, 74 L.Ed.2d 723 (1983)). "While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citations, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted). "[W]hile notice pleading may not require that the pleader allege a `specific fact' to cover every element or allege `with precision' each element of a claim, it is still necessary that a complaint `contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.'" Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 683 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting In re Plywood Antitrust Litig., 655 F.2d 627, 641 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981)).

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff's Complaint contains the following facts:

(Doc. 1 ¶¶ 4-5, 7-10, 14-28.)

According to plaintiff's Complaint, the criminal complaints at issue allege that, between December 1, 2009 and December 8, 2009, plaintiff wrote four worthless checks to Superdollar Discount Foods, totaling $397.45. (Id. at 24, 26, 28, 30.) On November 15, 2010, plaintiff gave a check to Jeffco Revenue for $18.50 that was worthless. (Id. at 36.) Plaintiff wrote two worthless checks to Forestdale Ace Hardware, one on June 4, 2011 and another on June 6, 2011, totaling $746.59. (Id. at 32 and 34.) Between July 18, 2011, and July 20, 2011, plaintiff wrote four worthless checks to Goodyear Tire Center, totaling $1,573.96. (Id. at 38, 40, 41, 43.) Plaintiff plead guilty to each criminal complaint. (See id. at 25, 27, 29, 31, 33, 35, 37, 39, 42, 44.) Moreover, plaintiff does not deny negotiating the worthless checks described in the criminal complaints or other allege any impropriety with the criminal proceedings after he was arrested.

III. DISCUSSION

A. FEDERAL CLAIMS

1. OFFICIAL CAPACITY CLAIMS

Defendant contends that he is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from plaintiff's claims against him in his official capacity. The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "The Judicial Power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI. This immunity applies to state officials, sued in their official capacity. Lancaster v. Monroe County, Alabama, 116 F.3d 1419, 1429 (11th Cir.1997). "Unless a State has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity or Congress has overridden it, ... a State cannot be sued directly in its own name regardless of the relief sought." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n. 14, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985)(citing Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 98 S.Ct. 3057, 57 L.Ed.2d 1114 (1978) (per curiam)). "[T]he Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state officials in federal court seeking retrospective or compensatory relief, but does not generally prohibit suits seeking only prospective injunctive or declaratory relief." Summit Medical Associates, P.C. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326, 1337 (11th Cir.1999) (citations omitted)

In Alabama, "[i]n exposing and prosecuting crimes, district attorneys are members of the executive branch of state government." Piggly Wiggly No. 208, Inc. v. Dutton, 601 So.2d 907, 910 (Ala.1992) (citing Dickerson v. Alabama, 414 So.2d 998, 1008 (Ala.Crim.App. 1982)) (emphasis added); see also doc. 12 (holding that defendant is a state official and not a county official). Because defendant, as District Attorney, is a state officer, the claims against him for money damages in his official capacity will be dismissed with prejudice as barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Also, the court finds that plaintiff cannot maintain a claim for prospective injunctive relief against defendant because, for the reasons set forth below, the criminal complaint forms, as completed by defendant's investigators, do not lack probable cause.2

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, (doc. 5), will be granted and plaintiff's claims against defendant in his official-capacity will be dismissed.

2. INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY CLAIMS

a. Absolute Immunity

Defendant argues that he is entitled to absolute immunity either as the prosecutor or as a witness. However, the Supreme Court has held that the "complaining witness" — the "party who procured an arrest and initiated a criminal prosecution" — is not entitled to absolute immunity. See Rehberg v. Paulk, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 1497, 1507, 182 L.Ed.2d 593 (2012) (citing, inter alia, Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 131, 118 S.Ct. 502, 139 L.Ed.2d 471 (1997); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 340-41, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986)). Justice Scalia, concurring in the Kalina decision, noted, "A conscientious prosecutor reading our cases should now conclude that there is absolute immunity for the decision to seek an arrest warrant after filing an information, but only qualified immunity for testimony as a witness in support of that warrant." Kalina, 522 U.S. at 131, 118 S.Ct. 502 (Scalia, J., concurring).

Therefore, to the extent defendant can be held liable for the affidavits/criminal complaints signed by his investigators,3 he is not entitled to absolute immunity.

b. Qualified Immunity

As a government official, the doctrine of qualified immunity may shield defendant in his individual capacity from liability for civil damages arising out of plaintiff's allegations of a Fourth Amendment violation.

Ray v. Foltz, 370 F.3d 1079, 1081-82 (11th Cir.2004). "Qualified immunity operates to ensure that before they are subjected to suit, officers are on notice their conduct is unlawful." Carr v. Tatangelo, 338 F.3d 1259, 1266 (11th Cir.2003) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001))) (internal citations and quotations omitted.).

The Eleventh Circuit uses a two-step analysis to determine whether a public official has qualified immunity: (1) the public official must establish that he was acting within the scope of his discretion; and (2), if the public official establishes that he was acting within his discretion, the plaintiff must show that the public official violated clearly established statutory or constitutional law. Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 877-78 (11th Cir.2003); Sims v. Metropolitan Dade County, 972 F.2d 1230, 1236 (11th Cir.1992). For purposes of the § 1983 claims, the court finds that defendant was acting within his discretion in creating the form criminal complaints and directing his agents to use the form; therefore, the issue for the court is whether his actions violated clearly established constitutional law.

Whether defendant's actions violated clearly established constitutional law also "consists of a two-part inquiry." Harris v. Coweta County, Ga., 433 F.3d 807, 812 (11th Cir.2005) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001)).

Id.

"The threshold inquiry a court must undertake in a qualified immunity analysis is whether plaintiff's allegations, if true, establish a constitutional violation." Hope, 536 U.S. at 736, 122 S.Ct. 2508.4 In a civil action brought pursuant to § 1983, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating a constitutional violation. Harris, 433 F.3d at 811 (citing Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1193-94 (11th Cir.2002)); Kesler, 323 F.3d at 877-78.

i. Fourth Amendment — Wrongful Arrest

A. Malicious Prosecution

The court notes that § 1983 claims based on an arrest based on a warrant is analogous to a common-law claim of malicious prosecution. Whiting v. Traylor, 85 F.3d 581, 585 (11th Cir.1996). And, like a claim for malicious prosecution, a § 1983 plaintiff — claiming a Fourth Amendment violation arising from his arrest pursuant to a warrant — must allege and prove that the legal proceedings terminated in his favor. Id.; Uboh v. Reno, 141 F.3d 1000, 1004 (11th Cir.1998) (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994); Kelly v. Serna, 87 F.3d 1235, 1240-41 (11th Cir. 1996)).

In this case, plaintiff was arrested pursuant to warrants. (Doc. 1 at 24, 26, 28, 30, 32, 34, 36, 38, 40. 41, 43.) He pled guilty to the criminal complaints at issue in this case. (Doc. 1 at 25, 27, 29, 31, 33, 35, 37, 39, 42, 44.) He alleges that he "suffered wrongful imprisonment, wrongful imposition of fees, costs of court, service charges, and fines," as a result of these prosecution, (id. ¶ 40); however, he does not allege that any of these prosecutions terminated in his favor. Therefore, he cannot pursue a § 1983 claims based on Fourth Amendment violations arising from his arrests pursuant to these warrants, and Count One of his Complaint is due to be dismissed.

B. Probable Cause

Assuming that plaintiff can pursue Fourth Amendment violations based on his arrests pursuant to these warrants, the court finds that probable cause exists for the warrants; therefore, plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claims are barred.

"Under the Fourth Amendment, an individual has a right to be free from `unreasonable searches and seizures[,]' and an arrest is a seizure of the person." Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1326 (11th Cir.2009) (quoting Skop v. City of Atlanta, GA, 485 F.3d 1130, 1137 (11th Cir.2007)) (alterations omitted). The existence of probable cause determines the reasonableness of an arrest under the Fourth Amendment. Id. "[T]he existence of probable cause at the time of arrest constitutes an absolute bar to a section 1983 action for false arrest." Id. at 1326-27 (quoting Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1226 (11th Cir.2004)) (quotations and alteration omitted); see also Von Stein v. Brescher, 904 F.2d 572, 579 (11th Cir.1990) ("[A]n arrest without probable cause to believe a crime had been committed violate[s] the Fourth Amendment.").

"Probable cause to arrest exists when law enforcement officials have facts and circumstances within their knowledge sufficient to warrant a reasonable belief that the suspect had committed or was committing a crime." Case, 555 F.3d at 1327 (quoting United States v. Gonzalez, 969 F.2d 999, 1002 (11th Cir. 1992)); see also Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1195 (11th Cir.2002) (requiring that arrest be objectively reasonable based on the totality of the circumstances). "When the constitutional validity of an arrest is challenged, it is the function of the court to determine whether the facts available to the arresting officers at the moment of the arrest support a finding of probable cause." United States v. Allison, 953 F.2d 1346, 1350-51 (11th Cir.1992).

In Count One of his Complaint, plaintiff alleges, "The Defendant deprived the Plaintiff, and those similarly situated, of their rights and immunities secured by the Fourth Amendment[] to the United States Constitution in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by subjecting them to an illegal seizure based upon the lack of probable cause, a proper probable cause determination, a void criminal complaint and an illegal warrant." (Doc. 1 ¶ 36.) He alleges:

(Id. ¶ 27.)

In this case, the facts set forth in the criminal complaints support a finding of probable cause to arrest plaintiff for negotiating worthless checks. In Alabama, "A person commits the crime of negotiating a worthless negotiable instrument if the person negotiates or delivers a negotiable instrument for a thing of value and with the intent, knowledge, or expectation that it will not be honored by the drawee." Ala.Code § 13A-9-13.1(a). Each criminal complaint in this case contains the statement that the district attorney's investigator "personally appeared" before a "Clerk/Magistrate of District Court" of Jefferson County, and swore that he had "probable cause for believing" that plaintiff had "negotiat[ed] or deliver[ed] a worthless negotiable instrument" to the victim. Each criminal complaint lists the date, amount, payee, drawee bank, and "complainant" for each dishonored check. With one exception, the court notes that, although each criminal complaint sets forth a single dishonored check, the investigators signed multiple criminal complaints on behalf of plaintiff's victims on the same day. On November 29, 2010, Steven Corvin signed four criminal complaints setting forth four different worthless checks given to Superdollar Discount Foods between December 1, 2009, and December 8, 2009. On August 1, 2011, John Carden signed two criminal complaints, setting forth two worthless checks given to Forestdale Ace Hardware on June 4, 2011, and June 6, 2011. And, on January 9, 2012, Carden signed four criminal complaints, setting forth four worthless checks given to Goodyear Tire Center between July 18, 2011, and July 20, 2011. Nothing in the record indicates that the Magistrate or Clerk issuing the warrant was unaware that the complaining witnesses were investigators and that their particular area of investigation was worthless checks. Moreover, nothing in the Complaint indicates that the Magistrate or Clerk issuing the warrants did not have a reasonable basis for concluding, as the investigators attested, that plaintiff passed the worthless checks as presented. These circumstances, set forth in the criminal complaints, are "sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the suspect had committed or was committing an offense." Knight v. Jacobson, 300 F.3d 1272, 1274 (11th Cir.2002) (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975)).

Plaintiff contends the criminal complaints in this case are bare bones and conclusory, like the one described in Crittenden v. State, "which consist[ed] solely of the affiant's conclusion that the named individual committed an offense, without setting forth the facts upon which the conclusion is based." Crittenden v. State, 476 So.2d 632, 634 (Ala.1985) (emphasis added). The court disagrees. The criminal complaints in this case, signed by investigators in the district attorney's WCU, specifically recite the facts of plaintiff's negotiation of worthless checks to the victims at issue — including the date, payee, and amount of each worthless check.

The court finds that the criminal complaints are supported by probable cause. Therefore, Count One of plaintiff's Complaint, alleging wrongful arrest in violation of plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights, is due to be dismissed.

Because the court finds the criminal complaints were supported by probable cause, the court need not address whether plaintiff has alleged that the law was clearly established. See Case, 555 F.3d at 1327 ("If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity." (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151)).

ii. Due Process Clause

Count Two of plaintiff's Complaint states:

(Doc. 1 ¶ 41.)

Defendant has moved to dismiss Count Two of plaintiff's Complaint on the grounds that (1) "[i]t is axiomatic that the District Attorney is a state actor representing the State of Alabama and the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause does not apply," (doc. 6 at 3 [citing Green v. Freeman, 434 F.Supp.2d 1172, 1176 (M.D.Ala. 2005)],5 and (2) plaintiff cannot allege a separate due process claim based on wrongful arrest "[b]ecause the Fourth Amendment specifically addresses the requirements for a lawful arrest [and] it exclusively governs allegations of arrest without probable cause, (id. at 4-6 [citing, inter alia, Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994)]); see also American Federation of Labor and Congress of Indus. Organizations v. City of Miami, 637 F.3d 1178, 1185 (11th Cir.2011).6 In response to defendant's Motion to Dismiss, plaintiff contends:

(Doc. 9 at 29.) Plaintiff has not moved to amend his complaint and he has not informed the court of the facts supporting a due process violation that is not based on his unlawful arrest.

Defendant's grounds for dismissal of plaintiff's due-process claim are well taken. Plaintiff may not base his due process claim on violations of his Fourth Amendment rights. Also, his allegations do not allege a violation of his substantive due process rights. Moreover, the court notes that plaintiff's Complaint fails to allege that the procedures available in state court were inadequate to resolve the alleged defects in the criminal complaints. "Since the [Alabama] courts possess the power to remedy any deficiency in the process by which [plaintiff] was [arrested and charged], [plaintiff] cannot claim that he was deprived of procedural due process." See McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1565 (11th Cir.1994). Indeed, plaintiff pled guilty to all eleven criminal complaints at issue. "The fact that [plaintiff] failed to avail himself of the full procedures provided by state law does not constitute a sign of their inadequacy." Kremer v. Chemical Const. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 485, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982), quoted in McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1565.

The Eleventh Circuit has held:

Bryant v. Dupree, 252 F.3d 1161, 1163 (11th Cir.2001). Based on the allegations in plaintiff's Complaint and the exhibits attached thereto, the court finds any amendment to reassert a § 1983/Fourteenth Amendment due process claim would be futile.

Therefore, defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count Two of plaintiff's Complaint will be granted and plaintiff's federal due process claims will be dismissed.

B. STATE-LAW CLAIMS

Plaintiff alleges that "Defendant violated his Constitutional rights under Article I, Sections 5 and 6 of the Constitution of the State of Alabama by wrongfully seizing the Plaintiff based upon a void criminal complaint and by not affording the Plaintiff his rights to substantive and procedural due process." (Doc. 1 ¶ 46.) He claims the court has jurisdiction over these claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. (Id. ¶ 1.)

Section 1367(c)(3) provides, "The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a [state-law] claim ... if ... the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction...." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). "Because no basis for original federal jurisdiction presently exists, the district court has the discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction." Cook ex rel. Estate of Tessier v. Sheriff of Monroe County, 402 F.3d 1092, 1123 (11th Cir.2005) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); Rowe v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 279 F.3d 1271, 1288 (11th Cir. 2002)). See also Baggett v. First Nat. Bank of Gainesville, 117 F.3d 1342, 1353 (11th Cir.1997).7 Indeed, "if the federal claims are dismissed prior to trial,[the Supreme Court] strongly encourages or even requires dismissal of state claims." Mergens v. Dreyfoos, 166 F.3d 1114, 1119 (11th Cir.1999) (quoting L.A. Draper & Son v. Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc., 735 F.2d 414, 428 (11th Cir.1984) (citing United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966) ("Needless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law. Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed as well." (footnotes omitted)))).

Because the Alabama state courts are in the best position to interpret and apply the provisions of the Alabama Constitution and state-agent immunity, this court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Count Three of plaintiff's Complaint. Therefore, the court pretermits discussion of defendant's Motions to Dismiss plaintiff's state-law claims. The court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these claims and they will be dismissed without prejudice.8

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court is of the opinion that Counts One and Two of plaintiff's Complaint are due to be dismissed with prejudice; Count Three will be dismissed without prejudice. An Order granting defendant's Motion to Dismiss, (doc. 5), will be entered contemporaneously with this Memorandum Opinion.