MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

The court has reviewed the pending Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 14) (the "Motion") filed by Piggly Wiggly Alabama Distribution Company, Inc. ("PWADC") on July 18, 2012, and the parties' respective supporting and opposing materials. (Docs. 15-19). In his complaint, Plaintiff James King ("Mr. King") has asserted two counts: one for race discrimination arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the second one for retaliation under Title VII and § 1981. (Doc. 1 at 3-4). The Motion seeks a dismissal of both counts, and for the reasons explained below, is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

Mr. King, a black male, was employed by PWADC as a casual truck driver from October 20, 2008, until October 1, 2009. AF No. 1.2 Pursuant to Department of Transportation regulations and company policy, PWADC's drivers are required to inspect their trailers before and after every run and to note any damage or safety issues on an inspection form. Drivers are also required to report any accident or damage immediately. AF No. 2.

On September 30, 2009, HS Trailer Repair, the company that maintains PWADC's trailers, reported significant damage to a trailer that had been parked at a PWADC warehouse door. AF No. 4 (first).3 As the Damage Report provided by HS Trailer Repair indicates, because the rails on trailer number 334 were pulled in, two cross members were damaged. (Doc. 16-1 at 6).4

PWADC investigated the damage and discovered that Mr. King had been the driver of the trailer in question. AF No. 4 (second). While Mr. King has admitted that he drove the trailer when it was loaded at Ventura Foods and also dropped it off at the yard, he maintains that someone else (i.e., a hostler) moved the trailer from the yard to warehouse door number 103. (Doc. 17 ¶ 23).

Mr. King, who never noticed any damage to the trailer, did not report any problems after conducting both his pre- and post-trip inspections. AF No. 5; (Doc. 17 ¶¶ 20, 30). The drivers who pulled the same trailer immediately prior to Mr. King confirmed that there had been no damage to this trailer before Mr. King drove it. AF No. 6.

The trailer had been inspected by a supplier (Ventura Foods) at Mr. King's last stop before he parked the trailer at the PWADC warehouse. AF No. 7.1. The report from that inspection confirmed that there was no damage to the trailer floor at that time. AF No. 7.2.

Dale Reynolds ("Mr. Reynolds"), PWADC's Director of Operations, interviewed Mr. King about the damage to his trailer. AF No. 8. Mr. Reynolds reported that Mr. King initially denied that anything was wrong with the trailer, but that after "describ[ing] the damage to him, [Mr. King] then told [him] that the trailer was already damaged when he picked it up that morning." (Doc. 16-3 at 2 ¶ 3).

The results of Mr. Reynolds's investigation are disputed by Mr. King. While Mr. King admitted that he had some difficulty separating the tractor from the trailer, Mr. King denied that there was any damage done to the trailer because of that and denied that he ever told Mr. Reynolds that he saw damage to the trailer when he dropped it off in the yard. (Doc. 17 ¶¶ 16, 20-21); AF No. 9. Mr. King also has sworn that Mr. Reynold told him that eight ribs on the trailer that he was driving had been repaired before. (Doc. 17 ¶ 22).

Based on the nature of the damage and the absence of any reports of prior damage to the trailer floor, David Bullard ("Mr. Bullard"), the then-Human Resources Director, concluded that Mr. King had in fact damaged the trailer by failing to properly extend the dolly legs prior to removing his truck. AF No. 11.

PWADC considers the failure to report damage to a truck or trailer a very serious offense; it considers dishonesty about the circumstances of an accident even more serious. AF No. 13. Because Mr. Bullard had determined that Mr. King damaged the trailer, that he had failed to report the damage, and that he was dishonest about the incident, Mr. Bullard decided to terminate Mr. King's employment. (Doc. 16-1 at 4 ¶ 7; id. at 13 (Mr. King's "EMPLOYEE'S DISCIPLINARY RECORD" dated October 1, 2009, indicating "DISHONESTY" and "FAILURE TO REPORT ACCIDENT" as "REASON FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS")).

The "EMPLOYEE'S DISCIPLINARY RECORD" dated October 2, 2009, which Mr. King has acknowledged receiving, reflects "VIOLATION OF COMPANY POLICY" as the reason for his discharge. (Doc. 17 at 10). Mr. Bullard appears to have been the person who signed these similar, but yet differently dated and worded documents, and PWADC has not offered any explanation for the variances in these termination records relating to Mr. King.

In August 2009, PWADC discharged Joe Blackwell, a white driver with 20 years experience, for failing to report an accident and then being dishonest about the circumstances of the accident. AF No. 14. When discharging Mr. Blackwell, a video was presented which confirmed that Mr. Blackwell was aware of the damaged vehicle prior to his denial. (Doc. 17 ¶ 27).

PWADC routinely makes video recordings of all areas of the yard at all times. (Doc. 17 ¶ 26). During his meeting with Mr. Bullard on October 1, 2009, Mr. King requested a video, but never received such a recording or "pictures of the trailer prior to the time it was moved by the hostler." (Id. at ¶¶ 27, 28).

On September 4, 2009, PWADC received a report about a verbal altercation between Mr. King and a white employee of the company which maintains PWADC's truck fleet, Penske. AF No. 15. Mr. King provided two written statements about the incident in which he admitted that he and the Penske employee engaged in a verbal altercation and that Mr. King threatened to "stomp a mud hole in [the Penske employee's] ass." AF No. 16.

In both statements, Mr. King provided a detailed account of the Penske employee's cursing at him, but did not claim that the Penske employee made any sort of racial statement. AF No. 17; (see Doc. 16-2 at 3 ¶ 6 ("Mr. King never reported to me that the Penske employee made any type of racial statement during the altercation."); id. at 4 (no reporting of racial slur); id. at 5 (same)).

However, in his affidavit offered in opposition to the Motion, Mr. King has sworn that, during the altercation, the white Penske employee referred to him "and Brandon, two African-American males, as `boy.'" (Doc. 17 at 2 ¶ 3). While Mr. King has indicated, in his opposition, that "he did not put the racial slur in his report of the incident, nor claimed race discrimination at that time due to fear of retaliation" (see Doc. 18 at 3 ¶ 4), his affidavit does not substantiate this particular statement. (Doc. 17 at 2 ¶ 5).

PWADC issued a written warning to Mr. King on September 9, 2009, about his role in the skirmish and requested that Penske similarly reprimand its employee for his involvement in the fight. AF No. 18; (see also Doc. 16-1 at 17 ("EMPLOYEE'S DISCIPLINARY RECORD" reflecting a written warning for "Inappropriate verbal statements/threats towards other employees/coworkers")).

III. STANDARDS

A. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is proper only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). All reasonable doubts about the facts and all justifiable inferences are resolved in favor of the nonmovant. See Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir.1993). A dispute is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "Once the moving party has properly supported its motion for summary judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to `come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" International Stamp Art, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Service, 456 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir.2006) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)).

B. Employment Discrimination Generally

A plaintiff in an employment discrimination case maintains the ultimate burden of proving that the adverse employment decision was made because of intentional discrimination. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509-12, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993); Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Comms., 738 F.2d 1181, 1184 (11th Cir.1984). Although the Supreme Court previously established the basic allocation of burdens and order of proof in a disparate treatment case, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003), that allocation scheme applies only in cases in which there is no direct evidence of discrimination. Grigsby v. Reynolds Metals Co., 821 F.2d 590, 595 (11th Cir.1987).5

Under the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine scheme, a plaintiff first has the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. Second, once the plaintiff proves a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision. Finally, if the defendant carries its burden, the plaintiff must either prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant are merely a pretext for discrimination or present sufficient evidence, of any type, for a reasonable jury to conclude that discrimination was a "motivating factor" for the employment action, even though the defendant's legitimate reason may also be true or have played some role in the decision. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-54, 101 S.Ct. 1089; Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 101-02, 123 S.Ct. 2148.

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Discriminatory Discipline on the Basis of Race

1. Written Warning for Altercation with Penske Employee

Regarding discriminatory disciplinary claims, the Eleventh Circuit has fashioned the following standard:6

Jones v. Gerwens, 874 F.2d 1534, 1540 (11th Cir.1989) (emphasis added); see also Green v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 612 F.2d 967, 968 (5th Cir.1980) ("With respect to discharge for violation of work rules, the plaintiff must first demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence either that he did not violate the rule or that, if he did, white employees who engaged in similar acts were not punished similarly") (emphasis added).7

Because Mr. King has admitted that he did get into an argument with the Penske employee and because he has not pointed to any examples of drivers outside of his protected class who received more favorable treatment than he by PWADC despite such employees' becoming involved in a verbal altercation while on the job (like Mr. King did), the court finds that summary judgment in favor of PWADC is due to be entered on this particular discriminatory discipline claim for lack of prima facie evidence.

To the extent that Mr. King has attempted to use the Penske employee as a comparator, there is no evidence in the record that Mr. King's supervisors at PWADC had any authority to discipline a non-employee, like the Penske worker. Cf. Silvera v. Orange County School Bd., 244 F.3d 1253, 1261 n. 5 (11th Cir.2001) ("[D]ifferences in treatment by different supervisors or decision makers can seldom be the basis for a viable claim of discrimination." (citing Jones, 874 F.2d at 1541)).

Moreover, Mr. King has not offered any other circumstantial evidence suggesting racial discrimination with respect to the decision to give him a written reprimand for the role that he played in the admitted altercation. Cf. Burke-Fowler v. Orange County, 447 F.3d 1319, 1325 (11th Cir. 2006) ("Because she failed to establish valid comparators and presented no other circumstantial evidence suggesting racial discrimination, Burke-Fowler did not establish a prima facie case of race discrimination." (citing EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1286 (11th Cir.2000)).

Alternatively, this discriminatory claim fails due to Mr. King's inability to demonstrate pretext. More specifically, because Mr. King lacks suitable comparator evidence and relies upon no other proof of pretext, the record lacks "`evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fairminded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions.'" MacPherson v. University of Montevallo, 922 F.2d 766, 776 (11th Cir.1991) (quoting Verbraeken v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 881 F.2d 1041, 1045 (11th Cir.1989)).

2. Discriminatory Discharge

The court reaches a different conclusion about Mr. King's discriminatory discharge claim. Here, Mr. King has shown a prima facie case under the alternative ways identified in Jones. First, Mr. King has created a material factual dispute over whether he caused the damage to his trailer that resulted in his dismissal due to his purported dishonesty and failure to report an accident.

Second, Mr. King requested (but never received) a video recording of what occurred in the yard after he parked his trailer on September 30, 2009. Moreover, Mr. King has pointed out that PWADC treated Mr. Blackwell more favorably (in its decision to fire him for failing to report an accident and being dishonest about the circumstances surrounding it) because PWADC concedes that its investigation into the incident involving Mr. Blackwell included video evidence confirming that Mr. Blackwell was aware of the damage done to his trailer.

In its reply, PWADC has not contested Mr. King's facts regarding its customary practice of videotaping the yard. (See generally Doc. 19 (absence of any factual reply)). PWADC also has not disputed that a holster is usually the person responsible for moving the trailer from the yard and dropping it off at the warehouse door. Id. PWADC also has not provided any explanation why it did not produce and review any videotapes (or pictures) of Mr. King's trailer like it did with respect to the incident involving Mr. Blackwell. Id.; cf. Morrison v. Booth, 763 F.2d 1366, 1374 11th Cir.1985) ("Departures from normal procedures may be suggestive of discrimination." (citing Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455, 1492 (11th Cir.1983)).

Additionally, Mr. King has adduced unchallenged evidence of two white drivers who admitted to Mr. King that they caused an accident when they were racing and collided with each other after one of the drivers stopped for a red light and the other did not. (Doc. 17 ¶ 35). While the white drivers acknowledged that they had been in an accident that resulted in damage, they dishonestly reported that it had occurred because of a third vehicle's pulling out in front of them. (Id.). Mr. King subsequently notified PWADC management about what he had learned from the white drivers, and PWADC did not fire either one of them. (Id. ¶¶ 35-36).

In its reply, PWADC does not dispute any of these facts presented by Mr. King regarding the white drivers who it retained despite their dishonest actions. Instead, PWADC contends that because they reported the accident (unlike Mr. King), the white drivers are not similarly situated to Mr. King, who was fired not only for being dishonest, but also for failing to report his damage. (Doc. 19 at 6).

"In determining whether employees are similarly situated for purposes of establishing a prima facie case, it is necessary to consider whether the employees are involved in or accused of the same or similar conduct and are disciplined in different ways." Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir.1997) (emphasis added).

As the Eleventh Circuit aptly explained in Anderson v. WBMG-42, 253 F.3d 561 (11th Cir.2001):

Alexander, 207 F.3d at 1334-35. To the extent that "unprofessional behavior" can be understood by the ordinary use of that term, we reject WBMG's position that the proffered evidence in this case was not relevant as comparator evidence because the conduct of Lockridge and Allen was not identical. See id.

Anderson, 253 F.3d at 565 (emphasis by underlining added).

Thus, within the Eleventh Circuit (and if and until the Supreme Court or the Eleventh Circuit en banc holds otherwise),9 the misconduct engaged in does not have to be identical or even nearly identical in order for another employee to be a valid comparator. Moreover, in this situation, an argument can be made that the admitted misconduct of the white drivers (i.e., recklessly racing each other, causing an accident, damaging two vehicles, and lying about the circumstances of the wreck) is not only similar in nature, but actually more serious than what Mr. King was found to have done.10 Cf. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273, 283 n. 11, 96 S.Ct. 2574, 2580 n. 11, 49 L.Ed.2d 493 (1976) ("Of course, precise equivalence in culpability between employees is not the ultimate question: as we indicated in McDonnell Douglas, an allegation that other `employees involved in acts against (the employer) of [c]omparable seriousness ... were nevertheless retained ...' is adequate to plead an inferential case that the employer's reliance on his discharged employee's misconduct as grounds for terminating him was merely a pretext.").

Additionally, while PWADC insists that Mr. King has offered inadequate comparators, as the Eleventh Circuit has clarified, the absence of acceptable comparator evidence will not always dispose of a discrimination claim:

Smith, 644 F.3d at 1327-28 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).

Therefore, even if the employees relied upon by Mr. King do not fully constitute valid comparators, there is still other circumstantial evidence suggesting racial discrimination in the decision to discharge him. See Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1538 (11th Cir.1997) ("The district court must evaluate whether the plaintiff has demonstrated `such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could find them unworthy of credence.'" (quoting Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1072 (3d Cir. 1996)). Such proof includes PWADC's apparent refusal to produce (or review) the video recordings of the yard (which the company regularly makes) to verify whether a hostler caused the damage to the trailer as well as the unexplained deviations in PWADC's records relating to the documentation of Mr. King's discharge. (Compare Doc. 16-1 at 13 (Mr. King's "EMPLOYEE'S DISCIPLINARY RECORD" dated October 1, 2009, indicating "DISHONESTY" and "FAILURE TO REPORT ACCIDENT" as "REASON FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS"), with Doc. 17 at 10 (Mr. King's "EMPLOYEE'S DISCIPLINARY RECORD" dated October 2, 2009, indicating "VIOLATION OF COMPANY POLICY" as "REASON FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS")); cf. Bechtel Const. Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 50 F.3d 926, 935 (11th Cir.1995) ("The pretextual nature of Bechtel's terminating Nichols is further demonstrated by Bechtel's shifting explanations for its actions."). Accordingly, because a reasonable jury could return a verdict for Mr. King, the Motion is DENIED with respect to his discriminatory discharge claim.

B. Retaliation

Mr. King premises his retaliation claim upon the internal complaint that he made to his supervisor, Shane,11 about a white employee from another company (i.e., Penske) calling him and one other African-American co-employee "boy" after Mr. King and the Penske employee had gotten into an argument. Mr. King also reported this same incident to Mr. Bullard, PWADC's Director of Human Resources, during a meeting that they had on October 1, 2009. Thus, Mr. King's Title VII retaliation claim is an opposition-based one.

Under binding Eleventh Circuit precedent:

Little v. United Technologies, 103 F.3d 956, 960 (11th Cir.1997) (emphasis added).

PWADC contends that Mr. King cannot prevail on his retaliation claim because he is unable to show that he engaged in statutorily protected conduct. (Doc. 19 at 1-2). More specifically, PWADC maintains that despite Mr. King's being subjectively offended by the use of "boy" in direct reference to him and another black employee and swiftly reporting such incident to his supervisor and subsequently to PWADC's Director of Human Resources, he cannot show objective reasonableness.

In making this argument, PWADC relies upon Little, Butler v. Alabama Dept. of Transp., 536 F.3d 1209 (11th Cir.2008), and Clark County School Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 121 S.Ct. 1508, 149 L.Ed.2d 509 (2001). Therefore, the court closely examines these decisions.

In Little, the court determined that the white plaintiff failed to satisfy the objectively reasonable prong in asserting retaliation relating to the alleged harassment that he endured after his reporting of a racially derogatory comment made by another white employee about some of their black co-workers: "Nobody runs this team but a bunch of niggers and I'm going to get rid of them." Little, 103 F.3d at 958 (internal quotation marks omitted). As the court reasoned in rejecting the plaintiff's Title VII retaliation claim:

Little, 103 F.3d at 960 (emphasis added).

Mr. King's retaliation claim differs from Little in at least two critical ways: one, the racial slur that he heard was directed at him, and, two, he immediately reported the incident to his supervisor and later to PWADC's Director of Human Resources. Therefore, Little does not clearly establish that no reasonable jury could conclude that Mr. King's "did not have an objectively reasonable belief that he was opposing an unlawful employment practice." Id.

In Butler, the black plaintiff maintained that she was retaliated against for reporting, to her immediate supervisor, a white co-employee's use of "racial epithets in her presence ... [during] a lunch break." Butler, 536 F.3d at 1213. More specifically, the white co-employee asked the plaintiff after the truck he was driving collided with another vehicle while he and the plaintiff were on their way to lunch: "Did you see that? Did you see that stupid mother fucking nigger hit me?" Id. at 1210 (internal quotation marks omitted). The white co-employee later stated to the plaintiff: "Look at him now. Now that stupid ass nigger down there is trying to direct traffic. I hope something come [sic] over that hill and run over his ass and kill him." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Eleventh Circuit relied upon Little in deciding Butler and explained:

Butler, 536 F.3d at 1213-14 (emphasis added).

The plaintiff in Butler is dissimilar to Mr. King in at least two significant ways. First (and like the plaintiff in Little), the epithets uttered were not directed at the plaintiff. Instead, the racial remarks were made about a stranger. Second, the incident occurred away from the workplace. Therefore, Butler's holding does not necessarily dictate that Mr. King is unable to satisfy the objectively reasonable retaliation standard.

However, Butler does provide a useful framework under which a court may evaluate objective reasonableness for the purposes of an opposition-based retaliation claim: "Where binding precedent squarely holds that particular conduct is not an unlawful employment practice by the employer, and no decision of this Court or of the Supreme Court has called that precedent into question or undermined its reasoning, an employee's contrary belief that the practice is unlawful is unreasonable." Butler, 536 F.3d at 1214.

Breeden involved an opposition retaliation claim premised upon the following facts:

Breeden, 532 U.S. at 269-70, 121 S.Ct. 1508.

In reversing the Ninth Circuit which had ruled in the plaintiff's favor on summary judgment, the Court explained:

Breeden, 532 U.S. at 271, 121 S.Ct. 1508 (emphasis added).

Therefore, Breeden dealt with a female plaintiff who complained about the joking behavior of her male supervisor and male co-worker while all three employees were reviewing job applications. Although the sexually-charged joking involved the plaintiff's supervisor, the Court nevertheless determined that the situation objectively lacked the level of severity necessary to meet Title VII's harassment standard. In contrast, Mr. King's complaint involves the use of a racial slur against him and another black co-employee in a non-joking manner in the workplace.

Against this backdrop, the court finds that while Little, Butler, and Breeden all strongly suggest that another company's white worker's calling Mr. King and another black worker "boy" on one occasion would not state a claim for actionable racial harassment, none of these decisions "squarely holds" that the particular conduct at issue is not an unlawful employment practice. Moreover, PWADC has not cited to any other controlling authority which "squarely" establishes such a legal precedent.

However, in McCann v. Tillman, 526 F.3d 1370 (11th Cir.2008), the Eleventh Circuit did squarely hold that the sporadic use of racially insensitive terms such as "girl" and "boy" by a white supervisor in the workplace when addressing subordinate black employees, including the plaintiff, without more, does not constitute actionable racial harassment. As the McCann court addressed the merits of the plaintiff's claim:

McCann, 526 F.3d at 1378-79 (footnote and citations omitted) (emphasis added).

Thus, the McCann decision squarely holds that a supervisor's sporadic use of racially insensitive terms directed at the plaintiff and her co-workers (in conjunction with other pieces of racially derogatory evidence that were not directed toward or heard directly by the plaintiff) is insufficient to support a claim of racial harassment. Moreover, the holding in McCann "squarely" confirms that Mr. King's complaint about an isolated racial utterance directed at him and one other black employee by a non-co-worker is, a fortiori, inactionable under Title VII. Furthermore, the court is unaware of any binding precedent which undermines the analysis utilized in McCann.

Finally, reading McCann and Butler together, because McCann "squarely holds that particular conduct [in form of the sporadically using racially insensitive terms such as "girl" and "boy" when addressing black employees] is not an unlawful employment practice by the employer, and no decision of this Court or of the Supreme Court has called that precedent into question or undermined its reasoning, the plaintiff's contrary belief that the practice is unlawful [for the purpose of asserting an opposition-based retaliation claim] is unreasonable." Butler, 536 F.3d at 1214. As a result, Mr. King's retaliation claim fails because to the extent that the complaint that he made about racial harassment satisfies the subjective retaliation standard, his belief regarding Title VII unlawfulness about the isolated racially insensitive conduct, consistent with McCann and Butler, lacks objective reasonableness. Accordingly, the Motion is GRANTED with respect to count two of Mr. King's complaint.

V. CONCLUSION

In accordance with the above analysis, the Motion is GRANTED in connection with Mr. King's claims for discriminatory written warning discipline and retaliation. Accordingly, those claims are both HEREBY DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

However, the Motion is DENIED as to Mr. King's discriminatory discharge claim. By separate order, the court will set this case for a final pretrial conference.