VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS, District Judge.
Plaintiff James Loren Foster brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act. He seeks review of a final adverse decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("Commissioner"), who denied his application for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI").
Mr. Foster was 51 years old at the time of his hearing before the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). Tr. 137. He has a marginal education,
On February 3, 2009, Mr. Foster protectively filed a Title II application for a period of disability and DIB. Tr. 10. He also protectively filed a Title XVI application for SSI on that date. Id. On April 23, 2009, the Commissioner initially denied these claims. Id. Mr. Foster timely filed a written request for a hearing on May 25, 2009. Id. The ALJ conducted a hearing on the matter on December 17, 2010. Id. On March 25, 2011, he issued his opinion concluding Mr. Foster was not disabled and denying him benefits. Tr. 18. Mr. Foster timely petitioned the Appeals Council to review the decision on May 18, 2011. Tr. 132. On October 15, 2012, the Appeals Council issued a denial of review on his claim. Tr. 1.
Mr. Foster filed a Complaint with this court on December 6, 2012, seeking review of the Commissioner's determination. Doc. 1. The Commissioner answered on March 6, 2013. Doc. 6. Mr. Foster filed a supporting brief on April 19, 2013, doc. 8, and the Commissioner responded on May 20. Doc. 9. On June 2, 2013, Mr. Foster replied. Doc. 10.
The court's review of the Commissioner's decision is narrowly circumscribed. The function of this court is to determine whether the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence and whether proper legal standards were applied. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002). This court must "scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence." Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. It is "more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance." Id.
This court must uphold factual findings that are supported by substantial evidence. However, it reviews the ALJ's legal conclusions de novo because no presumption of validity attaches to the ALJ's determination of the proper legal standards to be applied. Davis v. Shalala, 985 F.2d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 1993). If the court finds an error in the ALJ's application of the law, or if the ALJ fails to provide the court with sufficient reasoning for determining that the proper legal analysis has been conducted, it must reverse the ALJ's decision. Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991).
To qualify for disability benefits and establish his or her entitlement for a period of disability, a claimant must be disabled as defined by the Social Security Act and the Regulations promulgated thereunder.
The Regulations provide a five-step process for determining whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i-v). The Commissioner must determine in sequence:
Pope v. Shalala, 998 F.2d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing to formerly applicable C.F.R. section), overruled on other grounds by Johnson v. Apfel, 189 F.3d 561, 562-63 (7th Cir. 1999); accord McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986).
The sequential analysis goes as follows:
Pope, 998 F.2d at 477; accord Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir. 1995). The Commissioner must further show that such work exists in the national economy in significant numbers. Id.
After consideration of the entire record, the ALJ made the following findings:
Tr. 12-18.
The court may only reverse a finding of the Commissioner if it is not supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). "This does not relieve the court of its responsibility to scrutinize the record in its entirety to ascertain whether substantial evidence supports each essential administrative finding." Walden v. Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835, 838 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing Strickland v. Harris, 615 F.2d 1103, 1106 (5th Cir. 1980)).
Mr. Foster urges this court to reverse the Commissioner's decision to deny him benefits on several grounds. These include the significant weight the ALJ gave to the non-examining physician's opinion and the ALJ's decision to discredit Mr. Foster's credibility. Mr. Foster also notes, however, that he submitted new, clinical evidence to the Appeals Council ("AC") revealing arthritis in his knee. He complains that the Appeals Council ratified the ALJ's decision without adequately evaluating this evidence. The court agrees with Mr. Foster's last argument and accordingly will remand this case.
After the ALJ's decision, Mr. Foster submitted new evidence to the AC regarding his disability. In his brief, he elaborated:
Doc. 8 at 9-10 (internal record citations omitted).
Generally, a claimant may present new evidence at each stage of the administrative process. Ingram v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1261 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.900(b)). The AC has the discretion not to review the ALJ's denial of benefits. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.970(b), 416.1470(b). However, the AC must consider evidence that is (1) new (2) material, and (3) chronologically relevant. Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1261 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b)). The new evidence is material if "it is relevant and probative so that there is a reasonable possibility that it would change the administrative result." Hyde v. Bowen, 823 F.2d 456, 459 (11th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). It is chronologically relevant if "it relates to the period on or before the date of the [ALJ] hearing decision." 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b). If these conditions are satisfied, the AC must then review the case to see whether the ALJ's "action, findings, or conclusion is contrary to the weight of the evidence currently of record." Id.
In reviewing Mr. Foster's submitted evidence, this court must first therefore determine whether the evidence is new, material, and chronologically relevant. Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1261. The evidence consists of medical records dated between January 28, 2011, through November 29, 2011, from Mr. Foster's appointments with physicians at Central North Alabama Health Services. Tr. 319-329. These records are "new" in that they are not cumulative to any evidence before the ALJ. See Caulder v. Brown, 791 F.2d 872, 877 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that "new objective medical evidence" presented first to the AC was not cumulative to the evidence proffered to the ALJ that concerned the same underlying ailment). As Mr. Foster notes in his brief, his former treating physicians had recorded evidence of his knee pain. Doc. 8 at 9. Dr. John Lary, M.D., noted that Mr. Foster suffered from "knee arthralgia,
This evidence is also material because a finding that he had a "severe" impairment of knee arthritis could very well affect the Commissioner's determination regarding his functioning capacity. See Brady v. Heckler, 724 F.2d 914, 920 (11th Cir. 1984) ("An impairment is not severe if it is a slight abnormality which has such a minimal effect on the individual that it would not be expected to interfere with the individual's ability to work, irrespective of age, education, or work experience."). And the evidence is chronologically relevant because it concerns reports made within the window of his alleged disability. That is, the reports are all dated between January 28, 2011, and November 29, 2011 — within the time period between Mr. Foster's alleged onset date of May 15, 2009, and December 31, 2011, when he was last insured under the Social Security Act. See Tr. 12. True, some of the reports are dated after the ALJ's decision. See Tr. 18. But, that does not make them chronologically irrelevant. See Boyd v. Heckler, 704 F.2d 1207, 1211 (11th Cir. 1983) ("[A] treating physician's opinion is still entitled to significant weight notwithstanding that he did not treat the claimant until after the relevant determination date.") (citations omitted), superseded in part on other grounds by 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5). A diagnosis that Mr. Foster had knee arthritis shortly after the determination date could still bear on his condition during the relevant period between May 15, 2009, and March 25, 2011.
The AC did not adequately review this new evidence. In fact, it did nothing more than acknowledge that Mr. Foster had attached it to his application for review and that it would be incorporated into the record. Tr. 5. This is reversible error. When a claimant properly presents new evidence — and the AC denies review — the AC must show in its written denial that it has adequately evaluated the new evidence. Epps v. Harris, 624 F.2d 1267, 1273 (5th Cir. 1980). If the AC merely "perfunctorily adhere[s]" to the ALJ's decision, the Commissioner's findings are, by definition, unsupported by substantial evidence. Id. ("This failure alone makes us unable to hold that the Secretary's findings are supported by substantial evidence . . .") (emphasis added). In such cases, the court must remand the decision to the Commissioner "for a determination of [the claimant's] disability eligibility reached on the total record." Id. (citation omitted); accord Bowen v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 629, 634 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that AC perfunctorily adhered to the ALJ's decision and that it had previously "been unable to hold the Secretary's findings were supported by substantial evidence under circumstances such as these") (citing Epps, 624 F.2d at 1273); Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1263 (quoting Bowen to the same effect).
In this case, the AC plainly failed to review Mr. Foster's new evidence adequately. It described its treatment of his evidence in the following way:
Tr. 1-2. This review is purely conclusory, and it epitomizes "perfunctory adherence" to the ALJ's decision. Epps and its progeny thus dictate remanding the case. See Flowers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 441 F. App'x 735, 745 (11th Cir. 2011) (unpublished) (holding, under Epps, that AC inadequately evaluated new evidence presented by claimant); but see Mansfield v. Astrue, 395 F. App'x 528, 530 (11th Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (holding that Ingram removes requirement that AC provide a thorough explanation of its denial of review).
In this case, the court is bound by the clear holding of Epps, Bowen, and Ingram, which has not been overruled, abrogated, or otherwise undermined by any published decision issued by the Eleventh Circuit.
Based upon the court's evaluation of the evidence in the record and the parties' submissions, the court finds that the Commissioner did not apply proper legal standards in reaching her final decision. Accordingly, court will reverse and remand the decision by separate order.
