MEMORANDUM OPINION1

JOHN E. OTT, Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff Miranda Powell ("Powell") seeks review, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), § 205(g) of the Social Security Act, of a final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("Commissioner"),2 denying her application for a period of disability, Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB"), and Supplemental Social Security Income ("SSI"). Powell timely pursued and exhausted her administrative remedies. The case is therefore ripe for review under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). The undersigned has carefully considered the record and, for the reasons stated below, the Commissioner's decision is due to be reversed and remanded.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Powell was a twenty-nine year old female at the time of her hearing before the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") on January 26, 2011. (Tr. 30, 98, 115-16, 160). Powell has a high school education and has completed some "technical classes."3 (Tr. 16, 30-31). Powell previously worked full-time as a salesperson for K-Mart and Dollar Tree, as well as part-time for a staffing company. (Tr. 33).

Powell filed her applications on September 18, 2009, alleging an initial onset date of March 1, 2004. (Tr. 10). Powell's application was initially denied (Tr. 53-66) and Powell requested a hearing before an ALJ (Tr. 67). After a hearing, the ALJ denied Powell's claim on January 26, 2011. (Tr. 7-21). Powell sought review by the Appeals Council, but it declined her request on August 10, 2012. (Tr. 1-7). On that date, the ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. On October 10, 2012, Powell initiated this action. (See Doc. 1).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW4

The court's review of the Commissioner's decision is narrowly circumscribed. The function of this Court is to determine whether the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence and whether proper legal standards were applied. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1422 (1971); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002). This court must "scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence." Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. It is "more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance." Id.

This Court must uphold factual findings that are supported by substantial evidence. However, it reviews the ALJ's legal conclusions de novo because no presumption of validity attaches to the ALJ's determination of the proper legal standards to be applied. Davis v. Shalala, 985 F.2d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 1993). If the court finds an error in the ALJ's application of the law, or if the ALJ fails to provide the court with sufficient reasoning for determining the proper legal analysis has been conducted, it must reverse the ALJ's decision. Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991).

III. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

To qualify for disability benefits and establish his or her entitlement for a period of disability, a claimant must be disabled as defined by the Social Security Act and the Regulations promulgated thereunder.5 The Regulations define "disabled" as "the inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve (12) months." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a). To establish entitlement to disability benefits, a claimant must provide evidence of a "physical or mental impairment" which "must result from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which can be shown by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1508.

The Regulations provide a five-step process for determining whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i-v). The Commissioner must determine in sequence:

Pope v. Shalala, 998 F.2d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing to the formerly applicable C.F.R. section), overruled on other grounds by Johnson v. Apfel, 189 F.3d 561, 562-63 (7th Cir. 1999); accord McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986). "Once the claimant has satisfied steps One and Two, she will automatically be found disabled if she suffers from a listed impairment. If the claimant does not have a listed impairment but cannot perform her work, the burden shifts to the [Commissioner] to show that the claimant can perform some other job." Pope, 998 F.2d at 477; accord Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir. 1995). The Commissioner must further show such work exists in the national economy in significant numbers. Id.

IV. FINDINGS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE

After consideration of the entire record and application of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ made the following findings:

Act through March 31, 2008, and that Powell had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 1, 2004, the alleged onset date of her disability. (Tr. 12).

At Step Two, the ALJ found Powell has the severe impairments of anxiety disorder and dysautonomia.7 (Id.)

At Step Three, the ALJ found Powell does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 12-14).

Before proceeding to Step Four, the ALJ determined Powell's residual functioning capacity ("RFC"), which is the most a claimant can do despite her impairments. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). The ALJ determined Powell has the RFC to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a) with the restriction that Powell should never be required to climb a ladder, rope or scaffold or be exposed to unprotected heights or dangerous machinery and should only frequently be required to climb a ramp or stairs, balance, crouch, stoop or kneel; "only frequently" meaning no more than six hours of an eight hour workday. (Tr. 14). The ALJ also found Powell has mild difficulties with socialization and concentration, as well as persistence or pace. (Id.)

At Step Four, the ALJ determined Powell has no past relevant work. (Tr. 16).

At Step Five, the ALJ determined, based on Powell's age, education, work experience,8and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy Powell could perform. (Id.) Therefore, the ALJ denied Powell's claim. (Tr. 17).

V. ANALYSIS

A. Introduction

Although the court may only reverse a finding of the Commissioner if it is not supported by substantial evidence or because improper legal standards were applied, "[t]his does not relieve the court of its responsibility to scrutinize the record in its entirety to ascertain whether substantial evidence supports each essential administrative finding." Walden v. Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835, 838 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing Strickland v. Harris, 615 F.2d 1103, 1106 (5th Cir. 1980)). The court, however, "abstains from reweighing the evidence or substituting its own judgment for that of the [Commissioner]." Id. (citation omitted).

Powell contends the ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial evidence and should be reversed and remanded because:

B. The ALJ Erred by Classifying and Analyzing Dysautonomia as a Mental Impairment

Powell argues the ALJ erred in his analysis of whether her severe medical impairments, or combination thereof, meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments contained in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. (Doc. 7 at 10). Specifically, Powell argues the ALJ erred by classifying her severe medical impairments of anxiety disorder and dysautonomia as mental impairments subject to Listing 12.06. (Id.)

According to the National Institute of Health, dysautonomia is defined as "a disorder of autonomic nervous system function." NIH, National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke, Dysautonomia Information Page, at http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/dysautonomia/ dysautonomia.htm. The autonomic nervous system controls much of the body's involuntary functions; symptoms of dysautonomia can include problems with the regulation of heart rate, blood pressure, body temperature and perspiration, fatigue, lightheadedness, feeling faint or passing out (syncope), weakness and cognitive impairment. (National Dysautonomia Research Foundation, at http://www.ndrf.org; see Salter v. Astrue, Case No. 3:08-cv-189-RV-EMT, 2009 WL 1457125, *3-4 (N.D. Fla. 2009) (noting Plaintiff's dysautonomia is a dysfunction of the autonomic nervous system which controls heart rhythm, blood pressure, saliva glands, sweat glands, and the stomach; Plaintiff experienced blood pressure drops of 40 to 50 points without warning when she stood up, fainting palpitations, and fatigue), report and recommendation adopted with modification by 2009 WL 1457121 (N.D. Fla. 2009) (reversing and remanding the Commissioner's decision for further analysis).

Dysautonomia is not a listed impairment. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. Thus, an ALJ does not need to determine whether the combination of dysautonomia and anxiety disorder was medically equivalent to a listed impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926(b). A non-listed impairment may be medically equivalent to a listed impairment if it is at least equal in severity and duration to the criteria of a listed impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926(a). If a combination of impairments do not meet a listed impairment then the ALJ must compare the claimant's combination of impairments to the most closely analogous listed impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926(b)(3). See also Jones v. Dep't of Health & Human Services, 941 F.2d 1529, 1533 (11th Cir. 1991) ("when a claimant has alleged several impairments, the ALJ has a duty to consider the impairments in combination and to determine whether the combined impairments render the claimant disabled") (emphasis added).

The ALJ in this instance stated Powell's combination of impairments did not meet or specifically exceed a listing. (Tr. 12). The ALJ analyzed both of Powell's severe medical impairments under Listing 12.06. (Id.) Listing 12.06 is within the 12.00 Listing chapter on "mental disorders."10 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. The ALJ did not discuss any other listings. Instead he stated that, because there is no measurable test result evidence of the physical effects of either of Powell's impairments, it could only be a listed mental impairment. (Tr. 13). The undersigned interprets this statement to mean, based on the ALJ's review of the evidence, he concluded Listing 12.06 was the "most closely analogous listed impairment." 20 C.F.R. § 416.926(b)(3).

The concern with this analysis is that it begins from a faulty premise. The court disagrees with the ALJ's conclusion that the record does not contain "physical evidence of the [dysautonomia] diagnosis in the form of measurable test results." (Tr. 13). To the contrary, the record contains the following:

As another district court noted:

Because there is evidence in the record that Powell may be suffering from a severe medical impairment with physical characteristics, the ALJ failed to apply the correct legal standard when he only considered whether Powell met or medically equaled a mental listing. The ALJ's statement that he must only analyze Powell's severe medical impairments under the Listing 12.00 chapter for mental disorders is an incorrect statement of legal principles and also inconsistent with the record evidence of Powell's dysautonomia causing physical symptoms. Because the ALJ's opinion contains both an incorrect statement of the legal standards and an improper statement of evidence in the record, it is due to be remanded for further consideration.

VI. CONCLUSION

Based on the evidence in the record and the submissions of the parties, the Court finds the Commissioner's final decision is not support by substantial evidence the ALJ did not apply the proper legal standards. Accordingly, the Commissioner's decision will be reserved and remanded.

A separate order will be entered.