MADELINE HUGHES HAIKALA, District Judge.
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), claimant Bernard Hampton seeks judicial review of a final adverse decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
The scope of review in this matter is limited. "When, as in this case, the ALJ denies benefits and the Appeals Council denies review," the Court "review[s] the ALJ's `factual findings with deference' and [his] `legal conclusions with close scrutiny.'" Riggs v. Soc. Sec. Admin. Comm'r, 522 Fed. Appx. 509, 510-11 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001)).
The Court must determine whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ's findings. "Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004). In making this evaluation, the Court may not "reweigh the evidence or decide the facts anew," and the Court must "defer to the ALJ's decision if it is supported by substantial evidence even if the evidence may preponderate against it." Gaskin v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2013 WL 4081321, *1 (11th Cir. Aug. 14, 2013).
With respect to the ALJ's legal conclusions, the Court must determine whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards. If the Court finds an error in the ALJ's application of the law, or if the Court finds that the ALJ failed to provide sufficient reasoning to demonstrate that the ALJ conducted a proper legal analysis, then the Court must reverse the ALJ's decision. Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991).
On November 20, 2009, Mr. Hampton applied for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits. (Doc. 8-4, pp. 2-3;Doc. 8-6, pp. 2-13). Mr. Hampton filed an application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act and an application for supplemental security income benefits under Title XVI. Id.
The Social Security Administration denied Mr. Hampton's application on January 22, 2010. (Doc. 8-5, pp. 2-4). At Mr. Hampton's request, on June 6, 2011, an ALJ conducted a hearing concerning Mr. Hampton's application. (Doc. 8-3, p. 54). Mr. Hampton and an impartial vocational expert, Norma Jill Jacobson, testified at the June 6, 2011 hearing. (Doc. 8-3, p. 54). At the time of this hearing, Mr. Hampton was 30 years old.
The ALJ held a second hearing on January 3, 2012. Mr. Hampton, Donald Parsons, an impartial vocational expert, and Dr. James Anderson, an impartial medical expert, testified at the January 3, 2012 hearing. (Doc. 8-3, p. 76).
On March 19, 2012, the ALJ denied Mr. Hampton's request for disability benefits, concluding that Mr. Hampton did not have an impairment or a combination of impairments listed in, or medically equal to one listed in, the Regulations. (Doc. 8-3, p. 49). In his fifteen page decision, the ALJ described the "five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether an individual is disabled" and explained that "[i]f it is determined that the claimant is or is not disabled at a step of the evaluation process, the evaluation will not go on to the next step." (Doc. 8-3, p. 36).
The ALJ found that Mr. Hampton had not "engaged in substantial gainful activity since November 8, 2009, the alleged onset date." (Doc. 8-3, p. 37).
(Doc. 8-3, pp. 40-41). Based on these factual findings, the ALJ concluded that Mr. Hampton had the residual functional capacity to:
(Doc. 8-3, p. 43).
In reaching his conclusion, the ALJ considered a report from Dr. James Anderson. The ALJ stated that he agreed with Dr. Anderson's designation of Mr. Hampton's severe physical impairments based on his "thorough review of the record." (Doc. 8-3, p. 37). The ALJ noted that Dr. Anderson reported "minimal residual deficits from [Mr. Hampton's] wrist and knee injuries and [that Mr. Hampton] would be able to perform work at the light exertional level." (Doc. 8-3, pp. 46, 89). Mr. Hampton also indicated that "a sit/stand option could be included based solely upon the claimant's pain allegations as opposed to the objective medical evidence" and that "if the claimant were complaint [sic] with treatment, the restrictions would be less." (Doc. 8-3, pp. 46, 89). Dr. Anderson also "explained that the natural history of a wrist fracture normally would not impair reaching in any way." (Doc. 8-3, pp. 46, 90). The ALJ gave great weight to Dr. Anderson's opinion, as "it is consistent with and supported by the record as a whole." (Doc. 8-3, p. 46).
The ALJ also considered a psychological consultative evaluation performed by Dr. Mary Arnold. Dr. Arnold found that Mr. Hampton's "cognitive functioning, fund of information, abstract reasoning, thought processing, thought content, and judgment were within normal limits." (Doc. 8-3, p. 38; Doc. 8-8, p. 91). The ALJ also noted that Dr. Arnold "diagnosed adjustment disorder with anxiety (mild) and a Global Assessment of Functioning of 72, meaning that if symptoms are present, they are transient and expectable reactions to psycho-social stressors and no more than slight impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning." (Doc. 8-3, p. 39). The ALJ gave significant weight to Dr. Arnold's findings with respect to Mr. Hampton's mental functional capacity to the extent it is consistent with the ALJ's recorded residual functional capacity assessment. (Doc. 8-3, pp. 46-47).
The ALJ reviewed the results of Jack Bentley, Ph.D., who administered the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, Fourth Edition to Mr. Hampton. (Doc. 8-3, p. 38). Dr. Bentley reported that "[Mr. Hampton] has a high school education but is barely literate."
The ALJ also considered the opinion that Norma Jill Jacobson, a vocational expert, offered at Mr. Hampton's June 6, 2011 SSA review hearing. The ALJ noted that Ms. Jacobson testified that "[Mr. Hampton] is not able to perform his past relevant work under . . . [the reported] residual functional capacity assessment." (Doc. 8-3, p. 47; Doc. 8-3, p. 98).
The ALJ considered the medical opinion of Steven Dobbs, Ph.D., the State agency psychological consultant who completed a mental residual functional capacity assessment for Mr. Hampton. Dr. Dobbs concluded that Mr. Hampton "could understand and remember simple and detailed but not complex instructions . . . could sustain attention/concentration for two hour periods to complete a regular workday at an acceptable pace and attendance schedule. . . .[and] could respond to at least simple/infrequent changes in routine." (Doc. 8-3, p. 44; Doc. 8-8, p. 73). The ALJ gave significant weight to Dr. Dobbs' findings with respect to Mr. Hampton's mental functional capacity to the extent it is consistent with the ALJ's residual functional capacity assessment. (Doc. 8-3, pp. 46-47).
The ALJ gave great weight to the medical opinion of Dr. Younus Ismail, a physical consultative examiner.
(Doc. 8-3, p. 45; Doc. 8-9, pp. 48-53). Dr. Ismail also found that:
(Doc. 8-3, p. 45; Doc. 8-9, p. 53).
Ultimately, the ALJ determined that Mr. Hampton "is unable to perform any past relevant work." (Doc. 8-3, p. 47). The ALJ reasoned that, based on the testimony of the impartial vocational expert and Mr. Hampton's residual functional capacity assessment, Mr. Hampton "is not able to perform his past relevant work." (Doc. 8-3, pp. 47, 72-73, 93-97). This determination was made after considering each of Mr. Hampton's areas of past relevant work. (Doc. 8-3, p. 47).
Though the vocational expert, Donald Parsons, testified that Mr. Hampton has no transferrable job skills, the ALJ considered Mr. Hampton's "age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity," and decided that "there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that [Mr. Hampton] can perform." (Doc. 8-3, pp. 47-48). The ALJ explained that:
(Doc. 8-3, p. 48). Consequently, the ALJ decided that Mr. Hampton "is not disabled under sections 216(i) and 223(d) of the Social Security Act," or "under section 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act." (Doc. 8-3, p. 49).
On June 17, 2013, this became the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration when the Appeals Council refused to review the ALJ's decision. (Doc. 8-3, p. 2). Having exhausted all administrative remedies, Mr. Hampton filed this action for judicial review pursuant to § 205(g) and § 1631(c)(3) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §405(g) and § 1383(c)(3).
To be eligible for disability insurance benefits, a claimant must be disabled. Gaskin v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2013 WL 4081321, *1 (11th Cir. Aug. 14, 2013). "A claimant is disabled if he is unable to engage in substantial gainful activity by reason of a medically-determinable impairment that can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months." Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)). A claimant must prove that he is disabled. Id. (citing Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003). To determine whether a claimant is disabled, the Social Security Administration applies a five-step sequential analysis. Gaskin, 2013 WL 4081321 at *1.
Id. (citation omitted). "The claimant's residual functional capacity is an assessment, based upon all relevant evidence, of the claimant's ability to do work despite his impairments." Id. at *2 (citing Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1)).
Here, in assessing whether Mr. Hampton is disabled, the ALJ found that Mr. Hampton's status post right wrist perilunate dorsal carpal distal dislocation with chronic pain, status post gunshot wound to the right knee with chronic pain, adjustment disorder with anxiety, and borderline to low average intellectual functioning constitute severe physical impairments that "are considered to be more than slight abnormalities and have more than a minimal effect on the claimant's ability to perform basic work activities." (Doc. 8-3, p. 38). Nevertheless, the ALJ concluded that Mr. Hampton is not disabled because he can perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy.
The ALJ based his decision on the following substantial evidence: Dr. Anderson's report that Mr. Hampton suffered from "minimal residual deficits from. . . wrist and knee injuries," but that Mr. Hampton "would be able to perform work at the light exertional level"; Dr. Anderson's report that "a wrist fracture normally would not impair reaching in any way"; Dr. Arnold's finding that Mr. Hampton's "cognitive functioning, fund of information, abstract reasoning, thought processing, thought content, and judgment were within normal limits;" Dr. Arnold's "diagnos[is] [of] adjustment disorder with anxiety (mild) and a Global Assessment of Functioning of 72, meaning that if symptoms are present, they are transient and expectable reactions to psycho-social stressors and no more than slight impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning"; Dr. Bentley's report that Mr. Hampton "is barely literate," albeit "to the extent that it supports [the ALJ's] finding that [Mr. Hampton's] intellectual functioning is in the borderline to low average range"; Dr. Ismail's finding that Mr. Hampton is able to perform certain activities in spite of his impairments; and the vocational expert's opinion that a person of Mr. Hampton's age, education, and work experience with Mr. Hampton's residual functional capacity can perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy.
Mr. Hampton argues that despite this substantial evidence, he is entitled to relief from the ALJ's decision because the ALJ failed to properly evaluate Mr. Hampton's case pursuant to Listing 12.05C of the Regulations. (Doc. 10, pp. 6-8). The Court finds that this contention is without merit.
The applicable listing states the following:
20 C.F.R. § 404 app. 1, § 12.05. "To be considered for disability benefits under section 12.05, a claimant must at least (1) have significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning; (2) have deficits in adaptive behavior; and (3) have manifested deficits in adaptive behavior before age 22. Crayton v. Callahan, 120 F.3d 1217, 1219 (11th Cir. 1997). The requirements of 12.05C include:
20 C.F.R. § 404 app. 1, § 12.05C. In Crayton, the Eleventh Circuit explained:
Id. at 1219-20.
To decide whether Mr. Hampton meets the requirements for Listing 12.05C, the ALJ first examined the IQ score requirement. The ALJ noted that "[a]lthough the IQ scores obtained by Dr. Bentley initially appear to satisfy the criteria of paragraph C, the evidence clearly shows that [Mr. Hampton] is not mentally retarded." (Doc. 8-3, p. 42). The ALJ continued, "[Mr. Hampton] does not exhibit the degree of deficits of adaptive functioning needed to support a finding of mental retardation." (Doc. 8-3, p. 42). The Regulations state that "adaptive activities" include "cleaning, shopping, cooking, taking public transportation, paying bills, maintaining a residence, caring appropriately for your grooming and hygiene, using telephones and directories, and using a post office." 20 C.F.R. § 404 app. 1, § 12.00C(1).
With respect to Mr. Hampton's adaptive activities, the ALJ noted that:
(Doc. 8-3, p. 43). On this evidence, the ALJ concluded that Mr. Hampton does not meet the criteria for Listing 12.05 despite the semblance of a qualifying IQ test score. (Doc. 8-3, p. 42).
The record confirms that Mr. Hampton has a valid driver's license (Doc. 8-3, pp. 43, 60-61), drives (Doc. 8-3, pp. 43, 61; Doc. 8-8, p. 92), played football and ran track in high school (Doc. 8-8, p. 90), worked part-time in high school (Doc. 8-3, p. 62; Doc. 8-8, p. 90), grooms and dresses himself independently (Doc. 8-8, p. 92), is independent in his activities of daily living (Doc. 8-3, p. 42; Doc. 8-8, p. 92), does his own laundry (Doc. 8-8, p. 92), picks up after himself (Doc. 8-8, p. 92), has the ability manage funds (Doc. 8-8, p. 92), spends time at a friend's house watching television (Doc. 8-8, p. 92), and has maintained long-term relationships with significant others and his children (Doc. 8-3, pp. 42, 59-60, 82; Doc. 8-8, pp. 90, 92). Though Mr. Hampton points to responses to questions that may indicate some degree of intellectual challenge, he has not overcome the substantial evidence in the record that demonstrates that he is capable of performing a wide range of adaptive activities without assistance or supervision. (See Doc. 10, pp. 6-8). Thus, Mr. Hampton cannot establish a colorable claim under Listing 12.05.
Mr. Hampton argues that the ALJ relied on an outdated consultative report from Dr. Arnold to reach his conclusions. The argument is not persuasive. Section 12.05C requires claimants to demonstrate that deficits in adaptive functioning first manifested prior to age 22. Although Dr. Arnold issued her report four years before Mr. Hampton applied for benefits, Mr. Hampton was 25 years old when Dr. Arnold examined him. (Doc. 8-8, pp. 89-90). Consequently, Dr. Arnold's report sheds light on whether Mr. Hampton demonstrated deficits in adaptive behavior prior to age 22. Dr. Arnold's four-year-old consultative report does not undermine the ALJ's conclusions. See Hodges v. Barnhart, 276 F.3d 1265, 1266 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that "there is a presumption that mental retardation is a condition that remains constant throughout life").
Mr. Hampton also argues that the ALJ failed to assess Mr. Hampton's residual functional capacity properly. (Doc. 10, pp. 8-10). Mr. Hampton contends that under 20 CFR §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b), "the assessment of Dr. Ismail limits [Mr. Hampton] to sedentary work, not light work as indicated by the ALJ." (Doc. 10, p. 8). The Court notes that Dr. Ismail's medical assessment states that Mr. Hampton can occasionally lift up to 50 pounds, frequently lift up to 20 pounds, continuously lift up to 10 pounds, occasionally carry up to 20 pounds, and continuously carry up to 10 pounds. (Doc. 8-9, p. 48). Dr. Ismail's assessment also opines that Mr. Hampton, at one time without interruption, can sit for 2 hours, stand for 1 hour, walk for 30 minutes, and in an 8-hour work day can sit for 6 hours, stand for 2 hours, and walk for 1 hour. (Doc. 8-9, p. 49).
Under the regulations, "sedentary work" is:
20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a). "Light work," alternatively is:
20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b).
The ALJ did not conclude that Mr. Hampton can perform the full range of light work. Instead, the ALJ found that "[Mr. Hampton] has the residual functional capacity to perform light work . . . with . . . exceptions." (Doc. 8-3, p. 43). The exceptions are as follows:
(Doc. 8-3, p. 43).
SSR 83-10 explains that "the primary difference between sedentary and most light jobs" is that light jobs "require[] a good deal of walking or standing." SSR 83-10 at *5. Because Mr. Hampton is limited to standing/walking up to 3 hours in an 8-hour day, his RFC falls somewhere between the Regulatory definition of sedentary work and light work. In such a situation, the ALJ should rely on vocational expert testimony.
The ALJ examined the available evidence thoroughly and determined that Mr. Hampton is not disabled. That finding rests on substantial evidence. The Court will not reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner.
Consistent with the foregoing, the Court concludes the ALJ's decision was based upon substantial evidence and consistent with applicable legal standards. Accordingly, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. The Court will enter a separate order consistent with this memorandum of opinion.
(Doc. 8-3, p. 38).
