LYNWOOD SMITH, District Judge.
Claimant, Derwin Hubbard, commenced this action on September 8, 2014, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a final adverse decision of the Commissioner, affirming the decision of the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), and thereby denying his claim for a period of disability, disability insurance, and supplemental security income benefits. For the reasons stated herein, the court finds that the Commissioner's ruling is due to be affirmed.
The court's role in reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act is a narrow one. The scope of review is limited to determining whether there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the findings of the Commissioner, and whether correct legal standards were applied. See Lamb v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 698, 701 (11th Cir. 1988); Tieniber v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 1251, 1253 (11th Cir. 1983).
Claimant contends that the Commissioner's decision is neither supported by substantial evidence nor in accordance with applicable legal standards. Specifically, claimant contends that the ALJ improperly considered the opinion of John Goff, Ph.D., the consultative psychological examiner, and that he should have been found to be disabled under Listing 12.05C, addressing intellectual disability.
Listing 12.05C states as follows:
20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, appx. 1, § 12.05 (listings) (italics in original, ellipses supplied).
The ALJ stated that "claimant does not have a
Even so, the ALJ also found that claimant did not satisfy the prefatory criterion of the Listing, i.e., "deficits in adaptive functioning initially manifested during the developmental period." The court agrees with that conclusion and finds that it is supported by substantial evidence of record. Claimant's long work history, which apparently ended for reasons unrelated to his level of mental functioning, along with his ability to perform basic personal tasks like driving, paying bills, and performing self-care functions, indicate that he did not suffer from significant adaptive limitations that manifested during the developmental period. See, e.g., Garrett v. Astrue, 244 F. App'x 937, 939 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that the claimant's ability to cook simple meals, perform household chores, build model cars, attend church, watch television, play cards, and walk in the mall were inconsistent with a finding of significant impairment of adaptive functioning); Outlaw v. Barnhart, 197 F. App'x 825, 827 (11th Cir. 2006) (stating that the claimant's "long work history in semi-skilled positions and daily activities were inconsistent with his adult IQ scores," which were below 70); Humphries v. Barnhart, 183 F. App'x 887, 889 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's finding that the claimant did not have deficits in adaptive functioning when she worked in a school cafeteria for 21 years and served as the manager for about 15 years).
Claimant contends that the ALJ should have relied upon the assessment of Dr. John Goff, the consultative psychological examiner, because Dr. Goff found that claimant did experience deficits in adaptive functioning. Social Security regulations provide that, in considering what weight to give any medical opinion (regardless of whether it is from a treating or consultative physician), the Commissioner should evaluate: the extent of the examining or treating relationship between the doctor and patient; whether the doctor's opinion can be supported by medical signs and laboratory findings; whether the opinion is consistent with the record as a whole; the doctor's specialization; and other factors. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). See also Wheeler v. Heckler, 784 F.2d 1073, 1075 (11th Cir. 1986) ("The weight afforded a physician's conclusory statements depends upon the extent to which they are supported by clinical or laboratory findings and are consistent with other evidence as to claimant's impairments.").
Dr. Goff examined claimant on March 22, 2012, upon referral by his attorney, and reviewed claimant's medical records, although they were "very sparse."
During the examination, claimant reported having graduated from high school, but he did not know whether he received a regular diploma or a certificate of attendance. Claimant did recall repeating the seventh grade and being enrolled in special education classes "throughout the majority of his academic career."
Claimant denied any depression, delusions, hallucinations, apprehension, or anxiety. His recent and remote memory were intact, and he was fully oriented in all areas. He could recite the alphabet and count backwards from 20, but he made errors in performing serial three addition. His logical memory for verbal material was very poor.
Intelligence testing revealed a full-scale IQ score of 65, which was within the mild mental retardation range. Claimant also received a verbal comprehension score of 63/1, a perceptual reasoning score of 67/1, a working memory score of 69/2, and a processing speed of 84/14. Other than the processing speed score, which was low-average, all of those scores were within the mildly retarded range. An aphasia screening test revealed good drawings, but "extraordinarily bad" spelling, inability to read a sentence at the second grade level, and inability to perform simple mathematical calculations. The informal clock drawing test resulted in a "fairly well drawn clock," but claimant "did not place the hands correctly."
Dr. Goff concluded that claimant was functioning within the mildly mentally retarded range of psychometric intelligence. He had not reviewed claimant's school records, but he doubted that claimant would be able to pass a graduation exit examination due to his inability to read at a functional level. Claimant's academic achievements were at second grade and fourth grade levels. Claimant was functionally illiterate. He could drive, but he depended on his father for transportation because he lost his license as a result of failure to pay parking tickets. Dr. Goff did not assess any thought or mood disorders "or any other significant functional psychological disturbance," and claimant had no history of mental health treatment.
Finally, Dr. Goff stated: "This man's cognitive deficits represent severe impairment."
Dr. Goff also completed a "Mental Source Opinion Form (Mental)," although the form was neither signed nor dated. He indicated that claimant experienced mild limitations of his abilities to carry out and remember simple instructions, respond appropriately to supervision and co-workers, respond to customary work pressures, maintain activities of daily living, and maintain personal habits. Claimant would experience moderate limitations of his abilities to understand simple instructions, remember detailed or complex instructions, deal with changes in a routine work setting, respond appropriately to customers or other members of the general public, and use judgment in simple one-or-two-step work-related decisions. He would experience marked limitations of his abilities to understand and carry out detailed or complex instructions, use judgment in detailed or complex work-related decisions, maintain attention and concentration for periods of at least two hours, and maintain personal interests. All of those limitations had been present for at least twelve months, and they were expected to last the remainder of claimant's lifetime. Claimant would not be able to manage benefits in his own best interest. Finally, Dr. Goff indicated that claimant demonstrated deficits in adaptive functioning manifested prior to age 22 in three areas: i.e., self-direction; work; and functional academic skills. Other adaptive functioning areas (i.e., communication, health, self-care, safety, home living, leisure, social/interpersonal skills, and use of community resources) were listed on the form, but Dr. Goff did not indicate that claimant was impaired in those areas.
The ALJ afforded Dr. Goff's assessment only "limited weight" for three reasons: i.e., (1) because the opinion was "not consistent with the totality of the evidence"; (2) because "Dr. Goff was a one-time examiner who had no treatment relationship with the claimant"; and (3) because "Dr. Goff was `hired by the claimant's attorney to render an evaluation in preparation for litigation.'"
As an initial matter, the ALJ criticized "the speculative nature of Dr. Goff's estimating and approximating an IQ score of the claimant . . . ."
It appears that a major reason for the ALJ's rejection of Dr. Goff's opinion was that Dr. Goff's methods had been criticized in an opinion from another district court in this Circuit.
The remainder of the ALJ's observations require closer consideration. The ALJ stated:
Two of those statements are incorrect. First, claimant's hearing testimony was not that he could still perform his former job. Instead, he testified that, at the time the job came to an end in 2006, he could still have performed it. He testified that he would not be able to perform that job at the time of the administrative hearing, which was conducted on May 9, 2012.
Those errors aside, both of which appear to have been careless, this court concludes that the ALJ's decision to discredit Dr. Goff's opinions about claimant's adaptive functioning was supported by substantial evidence. As discussed above, Claimant's long work history, which apparently ended for reasons unrelated to his level of mental functioning, along with his ability to perform basic personal tasks like driving, paying bills, and performing self-care functions, support the ALJ's decision to reject Dr. Goff's opinion about claimant's adaptive functioning.
In summary, while the ALJ's administrative decision was not perfect and contained several incorrect observations about the record, his essential findings about claimant's disability were supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with applicable law. Accordingly, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. Costs are taxed against claimant. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this file.
Frame v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration, ___ F. App'x ___, 2015 WL 150733, *2 n.2 (11th Cir. Jan. 13, 2015) (alteration in original). Thus, even though the ALJ's decision was "issued before the change took effect," this court, like the Eleventh Circuit panel in Frame, will "follow the agency's new nomenclature." Id. at *2 n.2.