SHARON LOVELACE BLACKBURN, Senior District Judge.
Plaintiff Darryl Wayne Hobson brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking review of the Commissioner of Social Security's final decision denying his application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits ["DIB"]. Upon review of the record and the relevant law, the court is of the opinion that the Commissioner's decision is due to be affirmed.
Mr. Hobson filed an application for a period of disability and DIB on June 1, 2009, alleging disability beginning on April 28, 2009. (Doc. 6-3 at R.23.)
Mr. Hobson then requested the Appeals Council review the ALJ's decision. (Id. at R.19.) Thereafter, the Appeals Council "found no reason under [its] rules to review the Administrative Law Judge's decision. Therefore, [it] denied [Mr. Hobson's] request for review." (Id. at R.1.) The ALJ's decision is the final decision of the Commissioner. (Id.)
Following denial of review by the Appeals Council, Mr. Hobson filed an appeal in this court.
In reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act, this court's role is a narrow one: "[R]eview of the Commissioner's decision is limited to an inquiry into whether there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the Commissioner, and whether the correct legal standards were applied." Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Lamb v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 698, 701 (11th Cir. 1988). The court gives deference to factual findings and reviews questions of law de novo. Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145 (11th Cir. 1991). The court "may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner], rather [it] must scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence." Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cor. 1990)(quoting Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir.1983))(internal quotations and other citation omitted). "The Commissioner's factual findings are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence." Wilson, 284 F.3d at 1221 (citing Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990); Allen v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 600, 602 (11th Cir. 1987)). "Substantial evidence" is "more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Winschel v. Commissioner of Social Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011)(internal quotations and citations omitted)
Conclusions of law made by the Commissioner are reviewed de novo. Cornelius, 936 F.2d at 1145. "No . . . presumption of validity attaches to the [Commissioner's] conclusions of law." Wiggins v. Schweiker, 679 F.2d 1387, 1389 (11th Cir. 1982).
The regulations require the Commissioner to follow a five-step sequential evaluation to determine whether a claimant is eligible for a period of disability and DIB. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(1)-(2); see also Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 470 (1986). "The term `disability' means — (A) [the] inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); see also 42 U.S.C. § 416(i)(1). The specific steps in the evaluation process are as follows:
First, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant is engaged in "substantial gainful activity." Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 137 (1987). The regulations define "substantial gainful activity" as "work activity that is both substantial and gainful."
The ALJ found that Mr. Hobson had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 28, 2009, the alleged onset date, through January 12, 2011, the date of his decision. (Doc. 6-3 at R.25, R.31.)
If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the Commissioner must next determine whether the claimant suffers from a severe impairment or combination of impairments that significantly limits his physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), (c). "[A] `physical or mental impairment' is an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3). The regulations provide: "[I]f you do not have any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits your physical or mental ability to do basic work activities, we will find that you do not have a severe impairment and are, therefore, not disabled. We will not consider your age, education, and work experience." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). "An impairment can be considered as not severe only if it is a slight abnormality which has such a minimal effect on the individual that it would not be expected to interfere with the individual's ability to work, irrespective of age, education, or work experience." Brady v. Heckler, 724 F.2d 914, 920 (11th Cir. 1984); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(a). A claimant may be found disabled based on a combination of impairments even though none of the individual impairments alone are disabling. Walker v. Brown, 826 F.2d 996, 1001 (11th Cir. 1985); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523. A claimant has the burden to show that he has a severe impairment or combination of impairments. Reynolds-Buckley, 457 Fed. Appx. at 863.
The ALJ found that Mr. Hobson had the following severe impairments: "coronary artery disease; diabetes; and obesity." (Doc. 6-3 at R.25.)
If the claimant has a severe impairment, the Commissioner must then determine whether the claimant's impairment meets the durational requirement and whether it is equivalent to any one of the listed impairments, which are impairments that are so severe as to prevent an individual with the described impairment from performing substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), (d)-(e); see 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 [The Listings]. If the claimant's impairment meets or equals a Listing, the Commissioner must find the claimant disabled, regardless of the claimant's age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). The claimant has the burden of proving that his impairment meets or equals the criteria contained in one of the Listings. Reynolds-Buckley, 457 Fed. Appx. at 863.
The ALJ found that Mr. Hobson did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Doc. 6-3 at R.28.)
If the impairment does not meet or equal the criteria of a Listing, the claimant must prove that his impairment prevents him from performing his past relevant work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), (f). At step four, the Commissioner "will first compare [her] assessment of [the claimant's] residual functional capacity ["RFC"] with the physical and mental demands of [his] past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b). "Past relevant work is work that [the claimant has] done within the past 15 years, that was substantial gainful activity, and that lasted long enough for [her] to learn to do it. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)(1). If the claimant is capable of performing his past relevant work, the Commissioner will find he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(e). The claimant bears the burden of establishing that the impairment prevents him from performing his past relevant work. Reynolds-Buckley, 457 Fed. Appx. at 863.
The ALJ found that Mr. Hobson had the following RFC:
(Doc. 6-3 at R.28.) Based on this RFC and the testimony of the vocational expert [VE], the ALJ found that Mr. Hobson could not perform his past relevant work as a truck driver. (Id. at R.30.)
If the claimant establishes that he is unable to perform his past relevant work, the Commissioner must show that the claimant — in light of his RFC, age, education, and work experience — is capable of performing other work that exists in substantial numbers in the national economy. Reynolds-Buckley, 457 Fed. Appx. at 863; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c)(1). The regulation provides:
20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c)(1). If the claimant is not capable of performing such other work, the Commissioner must find the claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). If, however, the Commissioner finds that the claimant can perform other work, the claimant has the burden to prove he in not capable of performing such other work.
The ALJ found Mr. Hobson was 46 years old on the onset date and he had at least a high school education and could communicate in English. (Doc. 6-3 at R.30.) Based on his age, education, and RFC, the ALJ found Mr. Hobson could perform the requirements of representative occupations identified by a vocations expert [VE], which included "delivery person; service station attendant; night watchman; gate tender; assembler; oil filter inspector; bearing ring assembler; and packager." (Id.) Based on this finding the ALJ determined that Mr. Hobson had not been under a disability from the alleged onset date, April 28, 2009, through the date of his decision, January 12, 2011. (Id. at 31.)
Mr. Hobson raises two specific issues in appeal: (1) the ALJ erred in failing to find Mr. Hobson was limited in the manner set forth in his treating physician's office note, and (2) the ALJ's opinion is not based on substantial evidence because the hypothetical to the VE did not include the limitations set forth in his treating physician's office note. For the reasons set forth below, the court finds the Commissioner's decision is due to be affirmed.
On March 2, 2010, Mr. Hobson was seen by his treating physician, Wiley K. Livingston, Jr., M.D., "to have a form filled out for an application for disability." (Doc. 6-11 at R.332.) On this day, Dr. Livingston noted:
(Id. [footnote added].) Based on this treatment note, Mr. Hobson argues the ALJ's RFC should have included limitations on his ability to stand or walk in a eight-hour day, additional rest periods, limitations on his ability to climb stairs, and exclusion of work around hazardous machinery.
"The Secretary, and not the court, is charged with the duty to weigh the evidence, to resolve material conflicts in the testimony, and to determine the case accordingly." Wheeler v. Heckler, 784 F.2d 1073, 1075 (11th Cir. 1986) (citing Laffoon v. Califano, 558 F.2d 253, 254 (5th Cir.1977)). The ALJ considers medical opinions together with the rest of the relevant evidence received in making his determination. See C.F.R. § 404.1520b. The regulations provide specific criteria for evaluating medical opinions from acceptable medical sources: (1) examining relationship; (2) treatment relationship; (3) supportability; (4) consistency; (5) specialization; and (6) "other factors."
"[T]he ALJ must state with particularity the weight given to different medical opinions and the reasons therefor." Winschel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Sharfarz v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 278, 279 (11th Cir.1987) (per curiam)). "An acceptable medical opinion as to disability must contain more than a mere conclusory statement that the claimant is disabled. It must be supported by clinical or laboratory findings." Oldham, 660 F.2d at 1084. Accordingly, with good cause, the ALJ may disregard a treating physician's opinion "but [he] `must clearly articulate [the] reasons for doing so,'" because "[i]n the absence of such a statement, it is impossible for a reviewing court to determine whether the ultimate decision on the merits of the claim is rational and supported by substantial evidence." Id. (quoting Cowart v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731, 735 (11th Cir.1981)). However, the ALJ "will not give any special significance to the
The Commissioner notes that none of the jobs identified by the VE include work around hazardous machinery. Therefore, the court finds any error in the failure to include this limitation in the ALJ's RFC was harmless.
As with the other limitations, the court notes Dr. Livingston's other treatment notes do not indicate Mr. Hobson was functionally limited in his ability to stand/walk, climb stairs, and/or work around hazardous machinery. (See doc. 6-9 at R.244-45; doc. 6-11 at R. 329-30, R.338-39, R.343, R.346, R.348, R.350, R.353.) Some of these other treatment notes indicate that Mr. Hobson complained of fatigue, (see, e.g., doc. 6-9 at R.329, R.339); however, Dr. Livingston noted that "this may simply be due to the high sugars" resulting from Mr. Hobson's diabetes, which was poorly controlled, (see id. at R.329). The ALJ found that Mr. Hobson was noncompliant with "diet, exercise, and use of insulin." (Doc. 6-3 at R.29.) Moreover, the ALJ found Mr. Hobson's testimony regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his subjective symptoms, like fatigue, was "not credible to the extent [it was] inconsistent with [the ALJ's] residual functional capacity assessment." (Id. at R.28.) Mr. Hobson does not challenge this finding. Therefore, to the extent Dr. Livingston's opinion is based on Mr. Hobson's subjective complaints, the ALJ's determination of Mr. Hobson's credibility provides support for his limiting the weight accorded Dr. Livingston's opinion of Mr. Hobson's residual functional capacity. See Majkut v. Commissioner of Social Sec., 394 Fed. Appx. 660, 664 (11th Cir. 2010).
Based on the foregoing, the court finds the record contains substantial evidence in support of the ALJ's determination of Mr. Hobson's RFC. The court finds no reversible error in his decision not to include the limitations set forth in Dr. Livingston's treatment note of March 2, 2010.
(Doc. 8 at 9.)
In this case, the ALJ's hypothetical questions to the VE contained each and every limitation he found. (Compare doc. 6-3 at R.28 with id. at R.51-52.) At the hearing, after reviewing Mr. Hobson's past relevant work, the ALJ asked the VE:
(Doc. 6-3 at R.51-52.) In his decision, the ALJ found Mr. Hobson had the RFC "to perform light work . . . except he can never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds and [can] occasionally climb ramps or stairs. He can frequently balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. The claimant should avoid concentrated exposure to extreme heat or cold and humidity." Id. at R.28. All of these limitations and restrictions were included in the ALJ's hypothetical questions to the VE. Therefore, the court finds no reversible error.
For the reasons set forth above, the decision of the Commissioner is due to be affirmed. An Order affirming the decision of the Commissioner will be entered contemporaneously with this Memorandum Opinion.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1572; 20 C.F.R. § 416.972.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(6).