ABDUL K. KALLON, District Judge.
Plaintiff Artie Fay Boshell ("Boshell") brings this action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act ("the Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking review of the final adverse decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("SSA"). This court finds that the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") applied the correct legal standard and that her decision—which has become the decision of the Commissioner—is supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, the court
Boshell filed her applications for Title II disability insurance benefits and Title XVI Supplemental Security Income on November 17, 2010, alleging a disability onset date of January 30, 2009 due to back pain, a hernia, a bulging disc, and osteoporosis. (R. 131-37, 148, 152-54). After the SSA denied her applications on February 11, 2011, Boshell requested a hearing. (R. 80-81, 84-87). At the time of the hearing on December 31, 2012, Boshell was 46 years old, had completed the seventh grade, and had past relevant medium-skilled work as a fast food cook. (R. 45, 57). Boshell has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 30, 2009. (R. 153).
The ALJ denied Boshell's claim on February 19, 2013, (R. 9-11, 22), which became the final decision of the Commissioner on June 27, 2014 when the Appeals Council refused to grant review. (R. 1-3). Boshell then filed this action pursuant to section 1631 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3). Doc. 1.
The only issues before this court are whether the record contains substantial evidence to sustain the ALJ's decision, see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Walden v. Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835, 838 (11th Cir. 1982), and whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards, see Lamb v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 698, 701 (11th Cir. 1988); Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). Title 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c) mandate that the Commissioner's "factual findings are conclusive if supported by `substantial evidence.'" Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990). The district court may not reconsider the facts, reevaluate the evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner; instead, it must review the final decision as a whole and determine if the decision is "reasonable and supported by substantial evidence." See id. (citing Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983)).
Substantial evidence falls somewhere between a scintilla and a preponderance of evidence; "[i]t is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Martin, 849 F.2d at 1529 (quoting Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239) (other citations omitted). If supported by substantial evidence, the court must affirm the Commissioner's factual findings even if the preponderance of the evidence is against the Commissioner's findings. See Martin, 894 F.2d at 1529. While the court acknowledges that judicial review of the ALJ's findings is limited in scope, it notes that the review "does not yield automatic affirmance." Lamb, 847 F.2d at 701.
To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must show "the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 416(i)(I)(A). A physical or mental impairment is "an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrated by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3).
Determination of disability under the Act requires a five step analysis. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)-(f). Specifically, the Commissioner must determine in sequence:
McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986). "An affirmative answer to any of the above questions leads either to the next question, or, on steps three and five, to a finding of disability. A negative answer to any question, other than step three, leads to a determination of `not disabled.'" Id. at 1030 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)-(f)). "Once a finding is made that a claimant cannot return to prior work the burden shifts to the Secretary to show other work the claimant can do." Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).
Lastly, where, as here, a plaintiff alleges disability because of pain, she must meet additional criteria. In this circuit, "a three part `pain standard' [is applied] when a claimant seeks to establish disability through his or her own testimony of pain or other subjective symptoms." Holt v. Barnhart, 921 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991). Specifically,
Id. However, medical evidence of pain itself, or of its intensity, is not required:
Elam v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 921 F.2d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 1991) (parenthetical information omitted) (emphasis added). Moreover, "[a] claimant's subjective testimony supported by medical evidence that satisfies the pain standard is itself sufficient to support a finding of disability." Holt, 921 F.2d at 1223. Therefore, if a claimant testifies to disabling pain and satisfies the three part pain standard, the ALJ must find a disability unless the ALJ properly discredits the claimant's testimony.
Furthermore, when the ALJ fails to credit a claimant's pain testimony, the ALJ must articulate reasons for that decision:
Hale, 831 F.2d at 1012. Therefore, if the ALJ either fails to articulate reasons for refusing to credit the plaintiff's pain testimony, or if the ALJ's reasons are not supported by substantial evidence, the court must accept as true the pain testimony of the plaintiff and render a finding of disability. Id.
In performing the five-step analysis, the ALJ found that Boshell had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 30, 2009 and therefore met Step One (R. 14). Next, the ALJ found that Boshell satisfied Step Two because she suffered from the severe impairments of "degenerative disc disease, polyarthralgias, bronchitis, gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD), depression and anxiety." Id. The ALJ then proceeded to the next step and found that Boshell did not satisfy Step Three because she "does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments." (R. 15). Although the ALJ answered Step Three in the negative, consistent with the law, see McDaniel, 800 F.2d at 1030, she proceeded to Step Four, where she determined that Boshell:
(R. 17). In light of Boshell's RFC, the ALJ determined that Boshell "is unable to perform any past relevant work" as a fast food cook or furniture assembler. (R. 21). Lastly, in Step Five, the ALJ considered Boshell's age, education, work experience, and RFC, and determined that "there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that [Boshell] can perform." Id. Therefore, the ALJ found that Boshell "has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from January 30, 2009." (R. 22).
Boshell raises one main argument on appeal: she argues that the ALJ erred by finding "not entirely credible" her statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her pain symptoms.
When faced with a claimant who shows that a "medically determinable impairment . . . could reasonably be expected to produce [the alleged] symptoms," the ALJ must evaluate the "intensity and persistence" of the alleged symptoms to determine if they limit the claimant's capacity for work.
Boshell contests the ALJ's determination that her subjective pain testimony was inconsistent with Boshell's treatment records and examinations.
Boshell's objective medical imaging also discredits her assertions regarding the significance of her pain testimony. Although images have been taken of Boshell's neck, back, shoulder, or abdomen ten times, none of them returned significant findings. Images of Boshell's neck and spine returned findings of "facet arthropathy" and "minimal" bulging, but otherwise the findings were "negative" or "normal." (R. 314, 320, 322, 341, 342, 375). Abdomen scans similarly revealed no significant acute findings. (R. 313, 384, 389). An image of Boshell's right shoulder taken in October 2012 returned a finding of "mild AC joint arthropathy" but was otherwise negative. (R. 414).
Moreover, even though the ALJ did not find Boshell's subjective pain testimony entirely credible, she still accommodated for some of Boshell's asserted symptoms by imposing "a restriction to a reduced range [of] light work [that] would significantly reduce the impact of [Boshell's] impairments, particularly with respect to the limited rotation of her right shoulder, her upper respiratory issues, and the various pains in her neck, back and shoulder." (R. 20). This reduction would keep Boshell from "lift[ing] or carry[ing] much weight" and "limit[] . . . us[e of] her right upper extremity while . . . preclud[ing] . . . prolonged or repetitive rotation, flexion and hyperextension of her neck." (R. 20).
In light of the fact that Boshell's subjective pain testimony conflicts with her treatment notes and objective medical imaging, the ALJ's determination that her assertions were "not entirely credible" is supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, no basis exists for this court to grant Boshell the requested relief.
Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that the ALJ's determination that Boshell is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and that the ALJ applied proper legal standards in reaching this determination. Therefore, the Commissioner's final decision is