MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS, District Judge.

I. Introduction and Procedural History

Due to pendency of multiple related criminal cases against Defendant Eric Sloan Parker ("Mr. Parker"), this federal and state law civil action was stayed on May 4, 2015, by the prior judge to which it was assigned (Doc. 18), and has remained stayed upon reassignment to the undersigned. (Doc. 19). With Mr. Parker acquitted of any federal criminal civil rights charges earlier this year in United States v. Parker, No. 5:15-CR-0055-MHH-HGD,1 currently only a state criminal misdemeanor assault charge remains pending against Mr. Parker in the Circuit Court of Limestone County-State of Alabama v. Eric Sloan Parker, DC-15-253.

Pending before the court is Plaintiff Sureshbhai Patel's ("Mr. Patel") Motion To Lift Stay (Doc. 30) (the "Motion") filed on February 26, 2016. The Motion has been briefed by the parties with both defendants-Mr. Parker and the City of Madison-expressing their objections to lifting the stay. (Docs. 32, 33, 35, 36). Because several compelling factors as bolstered by binding as well as persuasive authorities favor keeping the stay in place, Mr. Patel's Motion is DENIED.

II. Standard

Nelson v. Grooms, 307 F.2d 76, 78 (5th Cir. 1962).2

III. Analysis

Mr. Patel articulates two grounds in support of his Motion. First, Mr. Patel asserts that the recent retirement of the state court judge presiding over the assault criminal case and an anticipated appeal of any conviction mean that Mr. Parker's "assault charge [] is unlikely to be resolved any time soon." (Doc. 30 at 1 ¶ 2); (see also Doc. 30-1 (attaching article announcing assigned judge's retirement and observing that before criminal case can proceed the governor will need to appoint someone to fill the judicial vacancy)).

Second, Mr. Patel contends that because Mr. Parker has testified twice during the pendency of the federal criminal case,3 no Fifth Amendment basis for continuing the stay in this civil case exists. Mr. Patel relies upon EMC Prop. & Cas. Co. v. 205 Customz, LLC, No. 2:15-CV-00293-RDP, 2015 WL 3554737, at *2-*3 (N.D. Ala. June 5, 2015),4 an insurance declaratory judgment action brought against a defendant with related arson and insurance fraud changes pending in state district court, id., at *1, to show that Mr. Parker has waived his Fifth Amendment privilege.

In EMC, the court "assumed without deciding that [the defendant] ha[d] waived the privilege against self-incrimination[,]" 2015 WL 3554737, at *2, because of his prior willingness "to sit for an extensive examination under oath" in an effort to collect proceeds under the same fire insurance policy that the insurance carrier, by way of the declaratory action, was contesting. Id., at *1. Thus, unlike the situation here which involves a purported waiver resulting from Mr. Parker's testimony during a related but, nonetheless, distinct criminal proceeding, the defendant's (assumed) waiver of his privilege in EMC sprang from his voluntary actions taken in furtherance of his contractual rights under the same insurance policy that was the subject of the civil suit. Cf. United States v. Fortin, 685 F.2d 1297, 1298 (11th Cir. 1982) ("While the rule [of waiver] being urged by the Government is a valid one, it is generally only applicable when the `disclosure of the details' is being sought in the same proceeding where the initial `criminating facts have been voluntarily revealed.'") (emphasis added).

As the City of Madison correctly points out (Doc. 32 at 2-4 ¶ 3), the Eleventh Circuit's rule regarding the scope of a witness's right to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege when that same person is called upon to testify in more than one case is much broader than Mr. Patel contends:

United States v. Fortin, 685 F.2d 1297, 1298-99 (11th Cir. 1982) (emphasis added) (quoting In re Neff, 206 F.2d 149, 152 (3d Cir. 1953)); see also Ballantyne v. United States, 237 F.2d 657, 665 (5th Cir. 1956) (citing with approval the holding from Neff that "waiver of the privilege before the Grand Jury did not carry through to the subsequent trial"). Mr. Patel offers nothing to refute these Fifth Amendment "hornbook"5 principles, and this court is bound by them. Therefore, Mr. Parker's privilege against self-incrimination remains intact in this civil lawsuit, despite his testimony provided in his defense during the federal criminal case.

Additionally, turning back to Mr. Patel's reliance upon EMC, even though that court found that the factor of defendant's waiver supported denying the request to stay, ultimately it determined that staying the case was the appropriate action to take. As the EMC court summarized its reasons for staying the civil litigation, "the significant overlap between this case and its criminal counterpart counsel in favor of conserving judicial resources and sparing the parties from potentially inconsistent rulings." EMC, 2015 WL 3554737, at *5. Here, the overlap between the assault criminal case (which apparently applies a recklessness standard (Doc. 33 at 1 ¶ 3))6 and this civil action which incorporates several state law claims, including an allegation that the City of Madison is liable for assault and battery "[t]o the extent that the conduct of PARKER was negligent or careless" (Doc. 2 at 7 ¶ 50)7 is similarly "significant" and favors keeping the stay in place to conserve judicial resources and avoid potentially inconsistent rulings.

IV. Conclusion

Therefore, while the court is not unsympathetic to Mr. Patel's efforts to lift the stay of this civil case on account of the still pending but indefinitely delayed state criminal proceeding against Mr. Parker, the weight of the authorities relied upon by the parties,8 the significant overlap between the criminal and civil proceedings, and Mr. Parker's still viable Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination lead this court to DENY his Motion.9