VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS, District Judge.
Petitioner, Kirk V. Maxwell, has filed a motion to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255. (Doc. 1).
On April 6, 2012, a grand jury sitting in the Northern District of Alabama returned a two-count indictment against Petitioner charging him with two counts of attempted enticement of a child who had not obtained the age of 18 years to engage in sexual activity for which the defendant can be charged with a criminal offense in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2422(b). (Doc. 4) On July 20, 2012, Petitioner plead guilty to Count One only. (Court Entry 7/20/2012). Petitioner filed with the court a signed Guilty Plea Advice of Rights Certification (doc. 34 and a signed Plea Agreement (doc. 35). Pursuant to the Plea Agreement, the Government agreed to move to dismiss Count Two at sentencing. (Id.).
On November 1, 2012, the undersigned sentenced Petitioner to a custodial term of 120 months. Following the imposition of sentence, Petitioner did not pursue a direct appeal.
On February 23, 2016, Petitioner filed the motion now pending before the court. Petitioner remains in custody at this time. (Doc. 52).
In his Petition, Petitioner asserts various "facts" relating to his status as "a private citizen of the United States of America by natural birth" (e.g. doc. 1 at 1), "depriv[ation of] substantive due process rights," (id. at 2), and fraud by the United States by "
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") was enacted on April 24, 1996, and, pertinent to this case, added a new subdivision to 28 U.S.C. 2255 providing for a one-year period of limitations within which federal prisoners must file their motions to vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255. Akins v. United States, 204 F.3d 1086, 1089 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 971, 121 S.Ct. 410, 148 L.Ed.2d 316 (2000).
28 U.S.C. 2255(f).
Petitioner makes no argument, and presents no facts, in favor of the court's application of subsections (2), (3), and (4) of 2255(f). Thus, the timeliness of the pending motion is calculated under 2255(f)(1) based upon the date on which a petitioner's judgment of conviction became final. In this case, the undersigned entered its Judgment of Conviction on November 1, 2012. (Doc. 43, case no. 2:12-cr-00210-VEH-JHE). Petitioner did not appeal, and therefore his conviction became final on November 15, 2012. FED. R. APP. P. 4(b). See Akins v. United States, 204 F.3d 1086. Because the pending petition fails to raise any issue that is not subject to this one-year limitation period, the petition is time-barred.
Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing 2255 Proceedings, the court finds that a certificate of appealability in this case is not well-founded, and any application for one is due to be denied. 28 U.S.C. foll. 2255, Rule 11(a) ("The district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant."). The habeas corpus statute makes clear that an applicant is entitled to appeal a district court's denial of his habeas corpus petition only where a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. 2253(c)(1). A certificate of appealability may issue only where "the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. 2243(c)(2). Where, as here, a habeas petition is being denied in its entirety on procedural grounds without reaching the merits of an underlying constitutional claim, "a COA should issue [only] when the prisoner shows . . . that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling." Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 1604, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000). Given the applicability of the one-year limitations period in this case, a reasonable jurist could not conclude that this Court is in error for dismissing Petitioner's motion to vacate, nor could a reasonable jurist conclude that Petitioner should be allowed to proceed further with respect to his claims. Id., 529 U.S. at 484, 120 S.Ct. at 1604 ("Where a plain procedural bar is present and the district court is correct to invoke it to dispose of the case, a reasonable jurist could not conclude either that the district court erred in dismissing the petition or that the petitioner should be allowed to proceed further."). Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to a certificate of appealability.
The instant Motion is dismissed as time-barred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255(f)(1). Petitioner is not entitled to a certificate of appealability and, therefore, he is not entitled to appeal in forma pauperis.