MEMORANDUM OPINION

R. DAVID PROCTOR, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

I. Introduction

This case is before the court on an appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Alabama's December 28, 2015 Memorandum Opinion and Order Granting Debtors' Motion for an Order Authorizing the Debtors to (A) Reject Collective Bargaining Agreements, (B) Implement Final Labor Proposals, and (C) Terminate Retiree Benefits; and Granting Related Relief (the "1113/1114 Order") (Doc. # 1-3).1 Appellants2 raise arguments regarding the reach of 11 U.S.C. §§ 1113 and 1114, and whether the Bankruptcy Court properly applied those statutes when ordering the termination and modification of Debtors-Appellees' collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") with non-party United Mine Workers of America ("UMWA"), and obligations to Appellants under the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 9701-9724 (the "Coal Act"). Specifically, this court must determine the following four issues:

This appeal is fully briefed, and the relevant record has been transmitted. (Docs. # 17, 28, 29, 34; see also Docs. # 35, 37). The court heard oral argument on February 1, 2016 concerning the request for a stay pending appeal in this and related appeals. Because the parties addressed many of the issues presented here at that argument, and the parties' briefs suffice in other regards, the court does not find it necessary to hold a hearing related to this appeal. After careful review, and for the following reasons, this court concludes that the Bankruptcy Court is due to be affirmed.

II. Background and Proceedings Below

The 1113/1114 Order terminated both the Debtors' CBA with the UMWA and obligations to make payments under the Coal Act and pursuant to four employee and retiree benefit plans established by CBAs. These terminations set an end date to Debtor's obligations under those liabilities, and would prevent the proposed purchaser (and interested party in this appeal), Warrior Met Coal, LLC, f/k/a Coal Acquisition LLC ("Warrior Met"), from assuming them.

A. The Coal Act

The Coal Act applies to Debtors. This court has previously addressed the origin and purpose of the Coal Act:

AJ Taft Coal Co., Inc. v. Barnhart, 291 F.Supp.2d 1290, 1295 (N.D.Ala.2003). In addition to the Combined Fund, the Coal Act established the 1992 Plan (together the "Coal Act Funds"). 26 U.S.C. § 9712. The 1992 Plan provides benefits to two groups of retired coal miners: (1) those otherwise eligible for Combined Fund benefits, but who retired after the cut-off date, and (2) those whose former employers have failed to provide benefits under individual employer plans ("IEPs"). Id. Any employer that provided healthcare benefits to retirees through an IEP as of February 1, 1993, must continue to do so for as long as the employer remains in business. Id. at § 9711(a).

The Coal Act Funds are funded primarily through statutorily required "premiums." 26 U.S.C. §§ 9704, 9711, 9712. Combined Fund premiums are assessed against "assigned operators," and those assigned operators' related persons and successors in interest are jointly and severally liable. See id. at §§ 9701(c), 9704(a), 9706. The amount of the Combined Fund assessment fluctuates annually, depending on the number of retirees and the premium rate set by the Commissioner of Social Security. Id. at § 9704(a)-(b), (g). Under the 1992 Plan, Premiums are assessed monthly against "last signatory operators" (defined as the most recent coal industry employers of the retirees, including "related persons" and their successors in interest) based on the number of 1992 Plan beneficiaries assigned to that last signatory operator. Id. at §§ 9701(c), 9711(g), 9712(d)(2)-(4). If these funding schemes prove insufficient, Congress has created means for addressing shortfalls in Coal Act Funds premiums to be paid. See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 1272, 1276-77 (11th Cir.2007) (explaining statutory backstop for retirees under Combined Fund); 26 U.S.C. § 9712 (allowing for transfer of moneys from other statutorily created Funds). Congress designed the Coal Act to protect against the "chance of the miners being denied their benefits" if an employer or signatory to a covered Plan goes bankrupt. Holland v. Williams Mountain Coal Co., 256 F.3d 819, 821 (D.C.Cir.2001).

B. Sections 1113 and 1114 of the Bankruptcy Code

Congress enacted Section 1113 in response to the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 104 S.Ct. 1188, 79 L.Ed.2d 482 (1984). Wheeling-Pittsburg Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 791 F.2d 1074, 1089 (3d Cir.1986). In Bildisco, the Supreme Court "held that a debtor may unilaterally reject a collective bargaining agreement under section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code by showing that the agreement `burdens the estate, and that after careful scrutiny, the equities balance in favor of rejecting the labor contract.'" In re AMR Corp., 477 B.R. 384, 405 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 526, 104 S.Ct. 1188). Congress then enacted Section 1113 "to replace the Bildisco standard with one that was more sensitive to the national policy favoring collective bargaining agreements...." Wheeling-Pittsburgh, 791 F.2d at 1089. It is intended "to ensure that well-informed and good faith agreements occur in the market place, not as part of the judicial process." N.Y. Typographical Union No. 6 v. Maxwell Newspapers, Inc. (In re Maxwell Newspapers, Inc.), 981 F.2d 85, 90 (2d Cir.1992). Section 1113 "requires that a debtor take a number of procedural steps prior to rejecting a [CBA]." AMR Corp., 477 B.R. at 406.

Section 1114 was adopted as part of the Retiree Benefits Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-334, 102 Stat. 610, 613 (1988), and applies to all Chapter 11 cases commenced after June 16, 1988. In re N.Y. Trap Rock Corp., 126 B.R. 19, 21 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1991). Congress enacted it in response to the termination of the health and life insurance benefits of approximately 79,000 retirees in the LTV Corporation Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Id.; see LTV Steel Co., Inc. v. United Mine Workers of Am. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 922 F.2d 86, 88-89 (2d Cir.1990). Pursuant to Section 1114, a Chapter 11 trustee or "a debtor in possession is required to continue to pay retiree benefits throughout reorganization under a `plan, fund, or program' and at the levels maintained prior to the filing of the bankruptcy case, until or unless a modification is agreed to by the parties or ordered by the court." N.Y. Trap Rock, 126 B.R. at 21-22. The term "retiree benefits" is defined in Section 1114. 11 U.S.C. § 1114(a). A court is required to appoint an "authorized representative" in accordance with Section 1114(c)(2) if a trustee or debtor in possession seeks to modify or terminate retiree benefits. N.Y. Trap Rock, 126 B.R. at 22. If no agreement results from negotiations between the trustee or debtor in possession and the retirees' authorized representative, the trustee or debtor in possession may move for a court-approved modification under Section 1114(g). Id.

The statutory "requirements for modification of retiree benefits are ... substantially the same as the requirements for rejection of collective bargaining agreements." In re Horizon Nat. Res. Co., 316 B.R. 268, 281 (Bankr.E.D.Ky.2004). Thus, courts (including the Bankruptcy Court here) routinely analyze motions for relief under Sections 1113 and 1114 simultaneously. See id. at 280-81; (Doc. # 1-3 at 22). In doing so, courts typically utilize a nine-part test which employs the statutory requirements in Sections 1113 and 1114 set forth in In re American Provision Co., 44 B.R. 907, 909 (Bankr.D.Minn.1984); see also Horizon Nat. Res. Co., 316 B.R. at 281 (finding American Provision test equally applicable to Sections 1113 and 1114).

C. The Walter Energy Bankruptcy and the 1113/1114 Order

Debtors — that is, Walter Energy and twenty-two affiliated companies (collectively, "Walter Energy") — produce and export metallurgical coal for the global steel industry, with mineral reserves in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. (Doc. # 1-3 at 3). "Debtors also extract, process, and market thermal and anthracite coal and produce metallurgical coke and coal bed methane gas." (Id.). The No. 4 and No. 7 mines at Jim Walter Resources, Inc. (one of Walter Energy's affiliated companies) were formerly "the heart of the Debtors' operations." (Id.).

On July 15, 2015, due to market forces, Walter Energy was compelled to file petitions for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. (Doc. # 1-3 at 3). After unsuccessfully attempting to restructure under Chapter 11, Walter Energy marketed its assets in anticipation of a sale pursuant to Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code.3 (Id. at 8-12). There was only one potential buyer. "After two months of negotiations,... Debtors executed an asset purchase agreement ... with Coal Acquisition, LLC, an entity owned by the First Lien Creditors" (the "Stalking Horse APA").4 (Id. at 8). (See also Doc. # 28-3 at A668-833). Coal Acquisition (now known as Warrior Met) agreed to purchase Walter Energy's core Alabama mining operations for certain consideration including a $1.15 billion credit bid by the lenders and an additional $185.5 million in cash, trust funding, and assumed liabilities. (Doc. # 1-3 at 8-9). But, under this "Proposed 363 Sale," Coal Acquisition would only purchase these assets if they were free and clear of legacy and current labor costs, and all claims, liens, interests and encumbrances, including the assumption of Coal Act payment responsibilities.5 (Id. at 9-11).

On July 30, 2015, the Bankruptcy Administrator for the Northern District of Alabama appointed members to the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors. (Doc. # 1-3 at 18). On that same date, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order authorizing the formation of a committee of retired employees pursuant to Sections 1114(c)(2) and 1114(d) of the Bankruptcy Code (the "Section 1114 Committee"). (Id.). The UMWA and the United Steel Workers were members of both committees.6 (Id.). The Bankruptcy Court did not appoint a trustee or examiner in the bankruptcy case. (Id.).

The UMWA, Debtors, the Section 1114 Committee, and the proposed core assets purchaser (that is, Warrior Met) undertook various negotiations on the CBAs and retiree benefits to which Debtors were beholden, but they reached no agreements before Debtors filed their 1113/1114 Motion in November 2015. (Doc. # 1-3 at 12-15). In fact, five days after entering into the Stalking Horse APA, Debtors withdrew their prior proposal to the UMWA and presented their final proposal. (Id. at 13-14). In pertinent part, the final proposal would have required Debtors to provide healthcare and other welfare benefits to laid-off employees up until the Proposed 363 Sale, allowed Debtors to terminate health and welfare benefits for retirees no later than the Proposed 363 Sale closing date, and required the UMWA and the UMWA 1992 Plan officials to coordinate "to arrange for the transition of retirees entitled to Coal Act Benefits to the UMWA 1992 Benefit Plan with no loss of benefits." (Id.). The UMWA rejected that final proposal, and countered that it would agree to facilitate the termination or modification of the UMWA CBA obligations "only upon" ratification of a new CBA with the proposed buyer that addresses healthcare, among other things. (Id. at 14).

After briefing, the Bankruptcy Court issued the 1113/1114 Order on December 28, 2015. It provides, in summary, as follows: Sections 1113 and 1114 contain substantially the same statutory requirements for modification or termination of CBAs and retiree benefits, thus the nine-part American Provision test applies to both; both Sections 1113 and 1114 apply in a liquidating Chapter 11 case and Debtors do not need to demonstrate an ability to confirm a liquidating Chapter 11 plan as a condition precedent; Coal Act benefits may be modified or terminated pursuant to Section 1114; Debtors satisfied the statutory requirements of Sections 1113 and 1114 (and satisfied the American Provision test); and the balance of equities favors rejection of the UMWA CBA and termination of retiree benefits. (Doc. # 1-3). Objections had been raised by Appellants (and others, including the UMWA and Section 1114 Committee), and were addressed and overruled in the 1113/1114 Order, concerning: (1) the applicability of Sections 1113 and 1114 to a Chapter 11 liquidation, and (2) the modification or termination of Coal Act benefits under Section 1114. (Id.). In its December 30, 2015 Order the Bankruptcy Court then amended paragraph 93 of the 1113/1114 Order based upon the Section 1114 Committee's motion to alter the 1113/1114 Order. (Doc. # 1-4).

On January 8, 2016, the Bankruptcy Court issued an Order approving the free and clear sale of Debtors' core assets (the "Sale Order").7 (Doc. # 28-3 at A632-667). Among other things, that Order granted Debtors the right to sell their core assets to Warrior Met free and clear of the UMWA CBA and Coal Act obligations. (Id.). The parties initially informed this court that the sale of Debtors' core assets (which is affected by both the Sale Order and, at least in part, the 1113/1114 Order) would occur sometime around the end of February or early March 2016. See United Mine Workers of Am. Combined Benefit Fund v. Walter Energy, Case No. 2:16-cv-64-RDP (Doc. # 29). The court was later told in early March 2016 that the sale date had been moved to around the end of March 2016. The core asset sale commenced as of March 31, 2016. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Walter Energy, Inc., Case No. 2:16-cv-56-RDP (Doc. # 28); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Walter Energy, Inc., Case No. 2:16-cv-65-RDP (Doc. # 33).

In the meantime, in mid-February 2016, the UMWA withdrew without prejudice its appeals. See Case Nos. 2:16-cv-56-RDP (Doc. # 27), 2:16-cv-65-RDP (Doc. # 32). Dismissal with prejudice of those appeals was contingent upon the closing of the core asset sale. See id. After the sale closed, the UMWA and Debtors filed joint stipulations of dismissal, and the court dismissed those appeals with prejudice on April 5, 2016. Case Nos. 2:16-cv-56-RDP (Docs. # 28, 29), 2:16-cv-65-RDP (Doc. # 33, 34).

III. Procedural History

Shortly after the Bankruptcy Court issued the Sale Order on January 8, 2016, Appellants unsuccessfully moved in that court for an emergency stay. (Doc. # 28-3 at A915-A921). Subsequently, both Appellants and the UMWA appealed the Bankruptcy Court's Sale Order and 1113/1114 Order, and moved for an emergency stay of the Sale Order. (Doc. # 1); Case No. 2:16-cv-64-RDP (Doc. # 16); see also Case Nos. 2:16-cv-56-RDP, 2:16-cv-65-RDP. This court denied a stay, see Case No. 2:16-cv-64-RDP (Doc. # 26), but granted an expedited briefing schedule for this appeal.8 (Doc. # 15). (After this court denied Appellants' and the UMWA's Motions for Stay, UMWA withdrew its appeals without prejudice, and those appeals have now been dismissed with prejudice. See Case Nos. 2:16-cv-56-RDP (Docs. # 27, 29), 2:16-cv-65-RDP (Docs. # 32, 34)). What remains is Appellants' present appeal. Appellants filed an opening brief and a reply brief. (Docs. # 17, 34). Debtors filed a responsive brief that Walter Met joined. (Docs. # 28, 29).

IV. Standard of Review

A district court reviews the Bankruptcy Court's decision for abuse of discretion. In re Hillsborough Holdings, 127 F.3d 1398, 1401 (11th Cir.1997); Steele v. Heard, 487 B.R. 302, 307 (S.D.Ala.2013). When a district court hears an appeal from a bankruptcy court, its job is not to make independent factual findings; rather, the task of fact finding is the purview of the bankruptcy court. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7052; In re Sublett, 895 F.2d 1381, 1384 (11th Cir.1990). This court will overturn the Bankruptcy Court's factual findings only if they are "clearly erroneous." Hillsborough Holdings, 127 F.3d at 1401. Factual findings are clearly erroneous if the court is "left with the definite and firm conviction that the [bankruptcy] court erred." In re Walker, 515 F.3d 1204, 1212 (11th Cir.2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Of course, this court reviews de novo a bankruptcy court's legal conclusions. In re Tennyson, 611 F.3d 873, 875 (11th Cir.2010) (citation omitted); Consumer Portfolio Servs. v. Coleman, 342 B.R. 817, 819 (N.D.Ala. 2006).

V. Analysis

This court has carefully reviewed the Bankruptcy Court's extensive factual findings and determines that they are not "clearly erroneous." Hillsborough Holdings, 127 F.3d at 1401. Accordingly, the court will not disturb those findings of fact.

The real issue in this case is whether the Bankruptcy Court had the authority under Sections 1113 and 1114 to order the termination of Debtors' CBA with the UMWA and obligations under the Coal Act. In re Tennyson, 611 F.3d 873, 875 (11th Cir. 2010). Debtors also raise jurisdictional challenges to Appellants' ability to bring this appeal.

A. This Court Has No Jurisdiction to Consider the Bankruptcy Court's Rejection of the CBA Under Section 1113; But, the Court Has Jurisdiction over the Termination of Coal Act Benefits Pursuant to Section 1114

Debtors argue that Appellants lack standing to appeal the 1113/1114 Order. (Doc. # 28 at 18-22). Alternatively, they argue that the Section 1113 aspects of the 1113/1114 Order rejecting the CBA are moot. (Id. at 22-25). Because standing and mootness are jurisdictional, the court must initially address these issues before addressing any aspect of the merits of the briefs filed by the parties. See CAMP Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 451 F.3d 1257, 1269 (11th Cir.2006) (standing); North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246, 92 S.Ct. 402, 30 L.Ed.2d 413 (1971) (mootness). The court agrees that Appellants lack standing to seek review of the Section 1113 portions of the 1113/1114 Order, and, in any event, disputes over that portion of the Order are moot. But, the court concludes Appellants have standing to challenge the termination of Coal Act benefits under Section 1114.

1. Appellants Do Not Have Standing Concerning Section 1113

The United States Constitution limits the subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts to "Cases" and "Controversies." U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. "[T]he core component of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). It "is the threshold question in every federal case, determining the power of the court to entertain the suit." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). "`In the absence of standing, a court is not free to opine in an advisory capacity about the merits of a plaintiff's claims,' and `the court is powerless to continue.'" CAMP Legal, 451 F.3d at 1269 (quoting Bochese v. Town of Ponce Inlet, 405 F.3d 964, 974 (11th Cir.2005); Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 409 (11th Cir.1999)).

The Supreme Court has instructed that "the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements." Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130. A plaintiff (or, as in this case, an appellant) bears the burden of showing "(1) an injury in fact, meaning that an injury is concrete and particularized, and actual or imminent, (2) a causal connection between the injury and the causal conduct, and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." Granite State Outdoor Advert., Inc. v. City of Clearwater, Fla., 351 F.3d 1112, 1116 (11th Cir.2003). Each element is "indispensable" and "must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the [appellant] bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation." Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130.

In the context of bankruptcy appeals, the "person aggrieved doctrine restricts standing more than Article III standing, as it allows a person to appeal only when they are `directly and adversely affected pecuniarily by the order.'" See Westwood Cmty. Two Assoc., Inc. v. Barbee (In re Westwood Cmty. Two Assoc., Inc.), 293 F.3d 1332, 1335 (11th Cir.2002) (quoting In re Troutman Enters., Inc., 286 F.3d 359, 364 (6th Cir.2002)). In other words, "the person aggrieved doctrine limits standing to appeal a bankruptcy court order to those individuals who have a financial stake in the order being appealed." Id. (citations omitted). A party has a financial stake in the bankruptcy court's order when that order "diminishes their property, increases their burdens or impairs their rights." Id. (quoting Troutman, 286 F.3d at 364).

Here, the court concludes Appellants lack standing to pursue an appeal of the Bankruptcy Court's rejection of the CBA agreement pursuant to Section 1113. First, as the party invoking this court's jurisdiction, Appellants bear the burden of establishing the three elements that would permit the existence of jurisdiction. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130. Yet they have offered no arguments in reply to Debtors' challenge to their standing to appeal the Section 1113 aspects of the 1113/1114 Order, and do not attack the Section 1113 portion of that Order in their reply. (See Doc. # 34). In this respect, Appellants have not demonstrated the three Lujan elements. Second, because Section 1113 allows for the modification or rejection of a CBA, and Appellants are funds providing retiree benefits pursuant to the Coal Act, the Bankruptcy Court's termination of the UMWA CBAs does not render Appellants "persons aggrieved." They have not shown any financial stake in the CBAs. Therefore, Appellants lack standing to appeal the Bankruptcy Court's Section 1113 determinations in the 1113/1114 Order.

The Section 1114 component of the 1113/1114 Order is a different matter, however. Appellants have standing to appeal the Section 1114 aspect of the 1113/1114 Order.9 To be sure, the Coal Act Funds were not members of the Section 1114 Committee.10 (See Doc. # 1-3 at 18). But, they assert, and have, a financial stake in the 1113/1114 Order. The Coal Act Funds rely on Coal Act premiums from various operators. Even if the Coal Act provides means for backstop funding in case of a diminished number of operators with Coal Act obligations, that statutory backstop does not deprive Appellants of their interest "directly and adversely affected pecuniarily by" the Bankruptcy Court here. Westwood Cmty. Two, 293 F.3d at 1335. Accordingly, the Coal Act Funds are "persons aggrieved" by the Section 1114 termination of Coal Act benefits in the 1113/1114 Order, and have standing to appeal it.

2. Alternatively, the Parties' Section 1113 Dispute Is Now Moot

Debtors contend that, in any event, Appellants cannot appeal the Section 1113 termination in the 1113/1114 Order because that issue is moot due to Debtors' settlement with the UMWA. The court agrees and addresses this issue below.

Under Section 1113, a "debtor in possession,... may assume or reject a collective bargaining agreement only in accordance with the provisions of this section." 11 U.S.C. § 1113(a). After filing its Chapter 11 petition, and before filing an application seeking rejection of a CBA, a debtor in possession must "make a proposal to the authorized representative of the employees covered by such an agreement...." Id. at 1113(b)(1)(A). In the bankruptcy proceedings underlying this appeal, the UMWA was the authorized representative of the employees covered by the now-rejected CBA.11 (See Doc. # 1-3 at 23) (citing In re American Provision Co., 44 B.R. 907, 909 (Bankr.D.Minn.1984)).

B. Section 1114 in Chapter 11 Liquidation

Appellants next contend that the plain language of Section 1114 expressly prohibits its application to a Chapter 11 liquidation like the one here. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1114(f)(1)(A), (g)(3) (stating "such modification is necessary to permit the reorganization of the debtor"); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(A) (same).12 The court disagrees.

Section 1114 provides in pertinent part as follows:

11 U.S.C. § 1114(emphasis added). Appellants argue that the use of the phrase "necessary to permit reorganization" means that Section 1114 cannot apply to Debtors, whose Chapter 11 plan is to liquidate its assets.13 (Docs. # 17, 34). In support of their argument, Appellants point to the Eleventh Circuit's instruction that "[i]t is well-settled that courts are required to apply the plain meaning canon of statutory construction in interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code." In re Am. Steel Prod., Inc., 197 F.3d 1354, 1356 (11th Cir.1999).

Indeed, "as long as the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent, there generally is no need for a court to inquire beyond the plain language of the statute." United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989). However, "a court should go beyond the literal language of a statute if reliance on that language would defeat the plain purpose of the statute." Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586, 103 S.Ct. 2017, 76 L.Ed.2d 157 (1983). "Interpretation of a word or phrase depends upon reading the whole statutory text, considering the purpose and context of the statute, and consulting any precedents or authorities that inform the analysis." Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486, 126 S.Ct. 1252, 163 L.Ed.2d 1079 (2006). Here, a Dolan analysis leads the court to conclude that "necessary to permit the reorganization of the debtor" applies when the debtor is liquidating under Chapter 11. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1114(f)(1)(A), (g)(3).

The statutory title of Chapter 11 is "Reorganization." See 11 U.S.C. ch. 11. But, "[a]lthough the central purpose of Chapter 11 is to facilitate reorganizations..., Chapter 11 expressly contemplates liquidations." Fla. Dept. of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 36 n. 2, 128 S.Ct. 2326, 171 L.Ed.2d 203 (2008); see also In re Holmes, 298 B.R. 477, 484 (Bankr.M.D.Ga.2003) (quoting United States v. Deer Park, Inc. (In re Deer Park, Inc.), 136 B.R. 815, 818 (9th Cir. BAP 1992), aff'd 10 F.3d 1478 (9th Cir.1993)) ("Although the word `reorganization' might commonly bring to mind ongoing operations, Congress explicitly placed language providing for liquidation within Chapter 11, which is titled "Reorganization."). Section 1129(a)(11) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a court shall confirm a Chapter 11 plan if "[c]onfirmation of the plan is not likely to be followed by the liquidation, or the need for further financial reorganization, of the debtor or any successor to the debtor under the plan, unless such liquidation or reorganization is proposed in the plan." 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11). See also 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(4) (a plan under Chapter 11 may "provide for the sale of all or substantially all of the property of the estate, and the distribution of the proceeds of such sale among holders of claims or interests"). "Had Congress not intended to include liquidation as an acceptable type of reorganization plan, then presumably all provisions dealing with liquidation would fall within Chapter 7.... We must therefore assume Congress placed this provision in Chapter 11 intentionally." Holmes, 298 B.R. at 484 (quoting Deer Park, 136 B.R. at 818). "A Chapter 11 plan, even though a liquidating plan, must still conform to the statutory requirements of any other Chapter 11 reorganization." Id. Therefore, this "court should go beyond the literal language of [Section 1114 because] reliance on that language would defeat the plain purpose of the statute." Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 586, 103 S.Ct. 2017.

Further, although there is not controlling case law on point, this court's interpretation is bolstered by case law from other courts concluding that Section 1114 applies to Chapter 11 liquidations. See Horizon Nat. Res., 316 B.R. at 281-82 ("Sections 1113 and 1114 apply in liquidation Chapter 11 cases.") (collecting cases). For example, the court in In re Garfinckels, Inc., determined that "Section 1114 simply was not written with a liquidating Chapter 11 plan in mind." 124 B.R. 3, 4 (Bankr.D.D.C.1991) (quoting statement of Senator Metzenbaum from 134 Cong. Rec. H3, 486 (May 23, 1988)). Nevertheless, the Garfinckels court, calling Section 1114 "inartfully written at best," held that "[t]he obvious congressional inattentiveness to liquidating Chapter 11 cases does not make § 1114 inapplicable to such cases." Id.

Likewise, after reaching the "inescapable" conclusion that Section 1114 cannot apply in Chapter 7 bankruptcies, the court in In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc. held that, legislative history aside, Section 1114 "is an unrestrained provision in Chapter 11 and cannot be ignored." 134 B.R. 515, 521 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1991). That court continued: "Since there are no material differences between the mechanics of liquidation in Chapter 11 or Chapter 7, Congress could not have intended the results of such liquidations to differ so markedly by enhancing the claim of retirees in one instances (a Chapter 11 liquidation) but not [in] the other (a Chapter 7 liquidation)." Id. at 523. And, this court agrees with the Ionosphere Clubs court's conclusion: "absent corrective or clarifying legislation [which has not been passed], [Section 1114]'s placement in Chapter 11 requires its application to liquidating Chapter 11 cases." Id. at 524.

Appellants' request for this court to hold that Section 1114's language means that it can never apply in a Chapter 11 liquidation, although passionately argued, ignores the Supreme Court's directives concerning statutory interpretation. Applying those directives, this court concludes that Section 1114 applies to Chapter 11 liquidations.

C. Section 1114 and Rejection of Coal Act Benefits

Section 1114(a) provides as follows:

11 U.S.C. § 1114(a).

Appellants argue that the "retiree benefits" defined by Section 1114(a) "are certain, private obligations a debtor may have contracted for." (Doc. # 17 at 22 (emphasis in original)). Appellants do not point the court to any law supporting this contention. Instead, they suggest that the court read the clause "maintained or established in whole or in part by the debtor" with an emphasis on the prepositional phrase "by the debtor." (Id.). Appellants contend that reading the clause in this manner implies that a debtor cannot maintain or establish a statutory obligation like Coal Act premiums. (Id.). The court disagrees.

"The starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the language itself." Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756, 95 S.Ct. 1917, 44 L.Ed.2d 539 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring); see also Am. Steel Prod., 197 F.3d at 1356. Appellants' suggested reading overlooks the plain language of Section 1114.14 The clause at issue reads "maintained or established in whole or in party by debtors"; it does not require that the plan, fund, or program be "established by and thereafter maintained by debtors." See 11 U.S.C. § 1114(a) (emphasis added). Although the Coal Act Funds may be established by statute, they are maintained by Debtors. Horizon Nat. Res., 316 B.R. at 276 ("even if the plan, fund, or program was `established' by statute, it is `maintained' by the debtors"). Cf. also Feinstein v. Lewis, 477 F.Supp. 1256, 1260 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (interpreting an ERISA provision concerning plans "established or maintained" by a government entity and holding that a plan funded by the government is "maintained" by it), aff'd, 622 F.2d 573 (2d Cir.1980); accord Rose v. Long Island R.R. Pension Plan, 828 F.2d 910, 920 (2d Cir.1987) (same). Congress's decision to use the disjunctive "or" is imperative to the conclusion here that Debtors must either establish or maintain (that is, fund) the Coal Act Plans. See Feinstein, 477 F.Supp. at 1259-60. Accordingly, because Debtors maintained in part the Coal Act Plans by funding them, the Plans are retirement benefits subject to Section 1114.15 See 26 U.S.C. §§ 9704, 9711, 9712.

Even accepting this construction, Appellants argue that the statutory context supports their litigation position. (Doc. # 17 at 22) (citing Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 563 U.S. 1, 7, 131 S.Ct. 1325, 179 L.Ed.2d 379 (2011) ("interpretation of this phrase `depends upon reading the whole statutory text, considering the purpose and context of the statute, and consulting any precedents or authorities that inform the analysis'" (quoting Dolan, 546 U.S. at 486, 126 S.Ct. 1252). Their argument goes something like this: because Section 1114 mandates that a debtor negotiate proposed changes to retiree benefits with the affected retirees' "authorized representative," Section 1114 cannot apply to Coal Act benefits since the language of the Coal Act implies they cannot be negotiated.16 (Doc. # 17 at 22-23) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1114(b), (f)(2), (f)(3)(1)(A), (g)(1)-(2); 26 U.S.C. § 9722).

Again, Appellants' argument overlooks the plain language of Section 1114, and over reads the language in the Coal Act. Although Appellants contend that "Congress specifically precluded companies from negotiating to avoid the Coal Act's requirements," they do not point the court to any language in the Coal Act or in Section 1114 supporting that contention.17 (Doc. # 17 at 23). They also do not cite any controlling or on-point case law for the proposition; instead, they merely point to the underlying purpose of the Coal Act.18 Even if Congress intended to protect retirees subject to benefits under the Coal Act Plans, the language of the statutes written by Congress simply does not support Appellants' specific-preclusion argument. Congress said nothing in that respect.

In areas where Congress has not spoken through the plain text of a statute, the court must use the rules of statutory construction. The Supreme Court has instructed that, "`when two statutes are capable of coexistence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective.'" J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Intl., Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 143-44, 122 S.Ct. 593, 151 L.Ed.2d 508 (2001) (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551, 94 S.Ct. 2474, 41 L.Ed.2d 290 (1974)).

Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 547-48, 108 S.Ct. 1372, 99 L.Ed.2d 618 (1988) (quoting Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153, 96 S.Ct. 1989, 48 L.Ed.2d 540 (1976); Mancari, 417 U.S. at 551, 94 S.Ct. 2474) (changes and quotations in original and internal citations omitted). Accordingly, and as applicable here, the analysis provided by the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky in In re Horizon Natural Resources is on point:

316 B.R. at 276.

Moreover, Section 1114 supports the same goal as the Coal Act Plans: "the protection of retiree benefits."19Horizon Nat. Res., 316 B.R. at 276 ("The intent of each statute is the same...."). Section 1114 does not allow a debtor to simply withdraw from maintaining retiree benefits. Again, as the court explained in Horizon Natural Resources,

316 B.R. at 277.

Id. at 279 (quoting In re Lady H Coal Co., 199 B.R. 595, 603 (S.D.W.Va.1996), aff'd, United Mine Workers of Am. 1992 Benefit Plan v. Leckie Smokeless Coal Co. (In re Leckie Smokeless Coal Co.), 99 F.3d 573 (4th Cir.1996)). But, Congress did none of these things. Therefore, the court concludes that Section 1114 allows the modification and termination of Coal Act retiree benefits. Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court's well-documented and reasoned decision demonstrating that the requirements of Section 1114 were met is due to be affirmed.

D. The Tax Anti-Injunction Act Does Not Bar the Bankruptcy Court's Jurisdiction

Finally, Appellants argue the Tax AIA precludes the Bankruptcy Court's jurisdiction and, thus, it did not have the power to terminate Debtors' Coal Act obligations. (Doc. # 17 at 25-26, Doc. # 34 at 10-11). Debtors counter that argument by asserting that Appellants have raised the Tax AIA argument for the first time on appeal, and, in any event, that the Tax AIA is inapplicable to Section 1114. (Doc. # 28 at 35-36). The court has previously addressed these questions in the context of the Sale Order, and concluded the Tax AIA does not operate as a bar to the Sale Order. See Case No. 2:16-cv-64-RDP (Doc. # 55 at 7-12). That reasoning is equally applicable here in addressing the parties' arguments concerning Section 1114 (instead of Section 363), and the court adopts it in this appeal.20 Accordingly, the court concludes that the Tax AIA did not deprive Bankruptcy Court of the jurisdiction necessary to enter the 1113/1114 Order.

VI. Conclusion

For all these reasons, the court concludes that the Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction and entered a valid termination of retirement benefits pursuant to Section 1114, and that this court lacks jurisdiction to consider Appellants' challenge to the Bankruptcy Court's ruling under Section 1113. Accordingly, the 1113/1114 Order is due to be affirmed. A separate order will be entered.

DONE and ORDERED this May 18, 2016.