Filed: Jul. 27, 2016
Latest Update: Jul. 27, 2016
Summary: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS , District Judge . This case comes before the court on the Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the Complaint, which was filed on July 5, 2016. (Doc. 31). The Defendant filed an opposition to the motion, arguing that the proposed amendment would be futile. (Doc. 32). The time for the Plaintiff's reply to his motion has expired 1 , and no reply has been filed. For the reasons stated herein, the motion will be DENIED. I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Thi
Summary: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS , District Judge . This case comes before the court on the Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the Complaint, which was filed on July 5, 2016. (Doc. 31). The Defendant filed an opposition to the motion, arguing that the proposed amendment would be futile. (Doc. 32). The time for the Plaintiff's reply to his motion has expired 1 , and no reply has been filed. For the reasons stated herein, the motion will be DENIED. I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY This..
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS, District Judge.
This case comes before the court on the Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the Complaint, which was filed on July 5, 2016. (Doc. 31). The Defendant filed an opposition to the motion, arguing that the proposed amendment would be futile. (Doc. 32). The time for the Plaintiff's reply to his motion has expired1, and no reply has been filed. For the reasons stated herein, the motion will be DENIED.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This is a civil action filed by the Plaintiff, James Strong, against the Defendant, Blue Bell Creameries. The Complaint alleges that the Defendant discriminated against Strong on the basis of his race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e, et seq. ("Title VII"), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. (Count One). The Complaint also alleges that the Defendant has discriminated against Strong due to his disability, and failed to reasonably accommodate his disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112, et seq. (the "ADA"), and the amendments thereto.2 Both counts arise out of the Plaintiff's employment with the Defendant.
On January 14, 2016, the Defendant filed a Partial Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 8). In particular, the Defendant sought to dismiss any potential "constructive discharge" claim. The Court granted the motion, writing, in pertinent part:
The Eleventh Circuit has noted:
"Constructive discharge occurs when an employer deliberately makes an employee's working conditions intolerable and thereby forces him to quit his job." Munday v. Waste Mgmt. of North America, Inc., 126 F.3d 239, 244 (4th Cir.1997); accord Young v. Southwestern Savings and Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140, 144 (5th Cir.1975) ("The general rule is that if the employer deliberately makes an employee's working conditions so intolerable that the employee is forced into an involuntary resignation, then the employer has encompassed a constructive discharge and is as liable for any illegal conduct involved therein as if it had formally discharged the aggrieved employee.").3 A plaintiff must show "the work environment and conditions of employment were so unbearable that a reasonable person in that person's position would be compelled to resign." Virgo v. Riviera Beach Assoc., Ltd., 30 F.3d 1350, 1363 (11th Cir.1994); see also Poole v. Country Club of Columbus, Inc., 129 F.3d 551, 553 (11th Cir.1997); Kilgore v. Thompson & Brock Mgmt., Inc., 93 F.3d 752, 754 (11th Cir.1996). Establishing a constructive discharge claim is a more onerous task than establishing a hostile work environment claim. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 968 F.2d 427, 430 (5th Cir.1992) ("To prove constructive discharge, the plaintiff must demonstrate a greater severity or pervasiveness of harassment than the minimum required to prove a hostile working environment."), aff'd, 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994); see also Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1316-18 (11th Cir.1989) (affirming district court's finding that plaintiffs established that they were subjected to a hostile work environment but were not constructively discharged); Huddleston v. Roger Dean Chevrolet, Inc., 845 F.2d 900, 905-06 (11th Cir.1988) (same).
Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1298-99 (11th Cir. 2009).
In the instant case, the Complaint explains the difficult conditions under which a Palletizer is expected to work, and explains that the Plaintiff "knew that he was not physically able to perform those duties and responsibilities." (Doc. 1 at 4). However, the Complaint lacks any factual allegations that the Defendant knew that the Plaintiff could not perform the functions of the position and deliberately placed him into that position to force him to resign. Although, as alleged in the Complaint, the Defendant knew the Plaintiff had diabetes, there are no allegations that the Defendant knew that that condition, which the Plaintiff alleges only required him to take frequent bathroom breaks, would make his working conditions so intolerable that he would be forced to quit.4 Too, there are no allegations that the position ultimately turned out to be intolerable. Although the Complaint alleges that two weeks after starting the job, the Plaintiff "suffered complications from his diabetes, to include neuropathy in his feet which required his hospitalization," there is no allegation that the Palletizer position caused the complications. While these allegations create the possibility of a constructive discharge, "[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are `merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it `stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Finally, the law in the Eleventh Circuit is clear that "[a] constructive discharge will generally not be found if the employer is not given sufficient time to remedy the situation." Kilgore v. Thompson & Brock Mgmt., Inc., 93 F.3d 752, 754 (11th Cir.1996). Even if the position ultimately turned out to be intolerable, there are no allegations in the Complaint that, after working in the position, the Plaintiff explained to the Defendant the nature of the problem, and gave the Defendant sufficient time to remedy it. Instead, exactly the opposite is true. The Complaint alleges that the Plaintiff resigned "[u]pon his release from the hospital." (Doc. 1 at 5, ¶ 15). See Robinson v. Koch Foods of Alabama, No. 2:13-CV-557-WKW, 2014 WL 4472611, at *3 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 11, 2014) (dismissing constructive discharge claim on motion for judgment on the pleadings where plaintiff resigned because of sexual harassment by a co-worker on the same day she reported the harassment; holding that "[the] constructive discharge claim fails as a matter of law because there is no possibility she can prove that she gave [the defendant] sufficient time to remedy the situation.").
For the foregoing reasons, the Court holds that the Plaintiff has failed to properly allege facts which plausibly support a claim for wrongful discharge. Accordingly, any such claim is DISMISSED.5 This dismissal is without prejudice, since the time for the Plaintiff to amend his Complaint has not yet expired.
(Doc. 29 at 10-13) (emphasis in original) (footnotes from original quote).6
The Plaintiff has proffered a proposed "Amended Complaint," the pertinent allegations of which are compared to the original Complaint in the following chart:
Allegations in the Original Changed (in Bold) Allegations in the
Complaint Proposed Amended Complaint
12. On May 16, 2014, the Defendant 12. On May 16, 2014, the Defendant
informed Strong that because of his informed Strong that because of his
overtime numbers he was being demoted overtime numbers he was being demoted
back to a [sic] stacking pallets in the back to a [sic] stacking pallets in the
warehouse (Palletizer). This work is warehouse (Palletizer). This work is
very labor intensive and requires the very labor intensive and requires the
employee to work in freezing employee to work in freezing
conditions. conditions. Strong weighs upward of
450 pounds, has trouble walking even
short distances, cannot work a fast
paced job, is unable to tell when his
feet are too cold due to diabetic
neuropathy, has heart trouble, and
severe joint pain.
13. Due to his diabetes, Strong knew that 13. Due to his diabetes and its
he was not physically able to perform attendant conditions, Strong knew that
the duties and responsibilities of a he was not physically able to perform
Palletizer. Strong expressed to the the duties and responsibilities of a
Defendant that working in the warehouse Palletizer. Strong expressed to the
would be deleterious to his health, but Defendant that he suffered from
his concerns were ignored. diabetes and the other
aforementioned health ailments and
that these conditions would not allow
him to work as a Palletizer.
Moreover, it was visible to the casual
observer that Strong was
ill-suited for any kind of labor
intensive work.
14. Strong did as he was told and began 14. The Defendant ignored Strong's
working in the warehouse. Upon warning that he could not perform
information and belief, the Defendant the labor intensive work of a
knew that Strong could no longer Palletizer. Therefore, Strong did as he
physically work as a Palletizer and was told and began working in the
hoped that he would resign his warehouse. Upon information and belief,
employment. the Defendant knew that Strong could no
longer perform the physically
demanding and labor intensive work of a
Palletizer. [ . . . ]
15. After about two-weeks of working as 15. After about two-weeks of working as
a Palletizer, Strong suffered a Palletizer, Strong suffered
complications from his diabetes, to complications from his diabetes which
include neuropathy in his feet which required his hospitalization. While
required his hospitalization. While hospitalized Strong contracted
hospitalized[,] Strong contracted pneumonia which exacerbated his
pneumonia which exacerbated his condition causing him to remain
condition causing him to remain hospitalized for an extended period. [. . .
hospitalized for an extended period. ]
Upon his release from the hospital,
Strong turned in his resignation.
16. Representatives from the
Company visited Strong in the
hospital and informed him that his
job as a Palletizer was still available.
Strong again expressed that his
physical condition would not allow
him to perform the duties associated
with that job. The Company never
reconsidered Strong for truck
driver's position. Therefore, upon his
release from the hospital, Strong
turned in his resignation because he
could no longer physically work in
the warehouse. The Defendant knew
that Strong could no longer
physically perform the warehouse
duties and refused to consider him
for a truck driver's position, thereby
constructively discharging him.
II. ANALYSIS
As the Eleventh Circuit has noted:
[A] district court may properly deny leave to amend the complaint under Rule 15(a) when such amendment would be futile. This court has found that denial of leave to amend is justified by futility when the complaint as amended is still subject to dismissal.
Hall v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 367 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
The Defendant argues that the proposed Amended Complaint would be dismissed if allowed because "[t]he Amended Complaint still fails to allege the basic elements of a constructive discharge claim." (Doc. 32 at 6). Importantly, "notice pleading [does] not require that the pleader allege a `specific fact' to cover every element or allege ` with precision' each element of a claim." Lee v. Caterpillar, Inc., 496 Fed. App'x 914, 915 (11th Cir. 2012) (internal citations omitted); Frazile v. EMC Mortgage Corp., 382 Fed. App'x 833, 836 (11th Cir. 2010); Fin. Sec. Assur., Inc. v. Stephens, Inc., 500 F.3d 1276, 1282 (11th Cir. 2007). It is however, "still necessary that a complaint contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory." Fin. Sec. Assur., Inc. v. Stephens, Inc., 500 F.3d 1276, 1282-83 (11th Cir. 2007) (internal quotations and citations omitted).7
In the Amended Complaint, like in the original Complaint, "there are no allegations that the Defendant knew that that condition [diabetes], which the Plaintiff alleges only required him to take frequent bathroom breaks, would make his working conditions so intolerable that he would be forced to quit." (Doc. 29 at 11-12). The only plausible inferences from the facts as now alleged are that, when it assigned the Plaintiff to the Palletizer position, the Defendant knew: that the Plaintiff had diabetes, needed frequent bathroom breaks, and that he was overweight. The Court finds conclusory and vague the allegation that "it was visible to the casual observer that Strong was ill-suited for any kind of labor intensive work."8 Similarly, the allegations that the Plaintiff, after he was assigned to the position, "expressed to the Defendant that he suffered from diabetes and the other aforementioned health ailments and that these conditions would not allow him to work as a Palletizer," do not establish that the Defendant knew that the Plaintiff could not perform the functions of the job when it assigned the Plaintiff to it. Further, as with the original Complaint, the Amended Complaint contains no allegation that the job as a Palletizer actually caused him to suffer the complications from his diabetes.
The Amended Complaint contains a new allegation that the Plaintiff, while in the hospital, told unnamed representatives from the Defendant that his physical condition would not allow him to perform the duties associated with the Palletizer position. (Doc. 31-1 at 5). The Plaintiff then states vaguely that "[t]he Company never reconsidered Strong for truck driver's position. Therefore, upon his release from the hospital, Strong turned in his resignation because he could no longer physically work in the warehouse." (Doc. 31-1 at 5, ¶16). Even assuming that this was sufficient notice of an "unbearable" condition9, the Amended Complaint lacks specific allegations regarding to whom this was told, whether the persons(s) who were told had the authority to assign the Plaintiff to a different position, and, most importantly, how long before the Plaintiff resigned they were told. Without that information, it is impossible to gauge whether the Defendant had sufficient time to remedy the allegedly unbearable conditions in which the Plaintiff was working. Further, other than to vaguely state that the Defendant "refused" to return the Plaintiff to his driver position, the Amended Complaint contains no facts as to what the Defendant's "representatives" did or did not do, or could or could not have done.10
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the Complaint is DENIED.
DONE and ORDERED.
