C. LYNWOOD SMITH, Jr., District Judge.
Claimant, Joyce Hargress, commenced this action on June 30, 2016, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a final adverse decision of the Commissioner, affirming the decision of the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), and thereby denying her claim for a period of disability, disability insurance, and supplemental security income benefits.
The court's role in reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act is a narrow one. The scope of review is limited to determining whether there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the findings of the Commissioner, and whether correct legal standards were applied. See Lamb v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 698, 701 (11th Cir. 1988); Tieniber v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 1251, 1253 (11th Cir. 1983).
Claimant contends that the Commissioner's decision is neither supported by substantial evidence nor in accordance with applicable legal standards. Specifically, claimant asserts that the ALJ: (1) failed to apply Social Security Ruling 16-3p; (2) improperly considered the opinion of her treating physician; (3) did not adequately state reasons for finding her subjective testimony not credible; (4) failed to properly consider newly submitted evidence; and, (5) based his finding of no disability on a residual functional capacity determination that was not supported by substantial evidence. Upon review of the record, the court concludes that these contentions are without merit, and the Commissioner's decision should be affirmed.
Claimant first asserts that the ALJ failed to appropriately address the intensity and persistence of her symptoms pursuant to Social Security Ruling 16-3p, which became effective on March 28, 2016.
Social Security Ruling 16-3p was intended to supersede former Ruling 96-7p, and was enacted for the purpose of providing "guidance about how we evaluate statements regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of symptoms in disability claims under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act." SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029 (March 16, 2013), at *1. Specifically, the Ruling
Id. at *1-2, 10 (alterations and ellipses supplied).
Claimant asserts that, even though SSR 16-3p was not adopted until after her claim was decided, it should be applied retroactively. The retroactivity of the Rule has not been directly addressed by any Circuit Court of Appeals, or by any district court within this Circuit. That issue also does not need to be addressed here, because, even if SSR 16-3p did apply retroactively, the ALJ did not violate it in this case. Even though the ALJ used the word "credible,"
Moreover, the ALJ's consideration of claimant's subjective symptoms was consistent with applicable law. To demonstrate that pain or another subjective symptom renders her disabled, a claimant must "produce `evidence of an underlying medical condition and (1) objective medical evidence that confirms the severity of the alleged pain arising from that condition or (2) that the objectively determined medical condition is of such severity that it can be reasonably expected to give rise to the alleged pain.'" Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting Landry v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1551, 1553 (11th Cir. 1986)). If an ALJ discredits subjective testimony of pain, "he must articulate explicit and adequate reasons." Hale v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1011 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001, 1004 (11th Cir. 1986); MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1054 (11th Cir. 1986)).
The ALJ in the present case properly applied these legal principles. He found that claimant's medically determinable impairments could reasonably have been expected to produce the symptoms claimant alleged, but that claimant's statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms were not entirely credible.
The ALJ also adequately articulated reasons to support his findings. He reasoned that claimant had not been hospitalized or sought emergent care for her diabetes, lumbar degenerative disease, or hip and leg osteoarthritis since her alleged onset date, and she suffered less than disabling restrictions whenever she was compliant with her diet and treatment plan.
Claimant also asserts that the ALJ failed to give sufficient weight to the opinion of Dr. Ochuko Odjegba, her treating physician. The opinion of a treating physician "must be given substantial or considerable weight unless `good cause' is shown to the contrary." Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240-41 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted). Good cause exists when "(1) [the] treating physician's opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) [the] evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3) [the] treating physician's opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor's own medical records." Id. (alterations supplied). Additionally, the ALJ is not required to accept a conclusory statement from a medical source, even a treating source, that a claimant is unable to work, because the decision on that issue is not a medical question, but is a decision "reserved to the Commissioner." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d) & 416.927(d).
Social Security regulations also provide that, in considering what weight to give any medical opinion (regardless of whether it is from a treating or non-treating physician), the Commissioner should evaluate: the extent of the examining or treating relationship between the doctor and patient; whether the doctor's opinion can be supported by medical signs and laboratory findings; whether the opinion is consistent with the record as a whole; the doctor's specialization; and other factors. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c) & 416.927(c). See also Wheeler v. Heckler, 784 F.2d 1073, 1075 (11th Cir. 1986) ("The weight afforded a physician's conclusory statements depends upon the extent to which they are supported by clinical or laboratory findings and are consistent with other evidence as to claimant's impairments.").
Dr. Odjegba completed a Physical Capacities Form on September 8, 2014. He indicated that claimant could sit for less than thirty minutes at a time, stand for less than fifteen minutes at a time, and walk for less than fifteen minutes at a time. During an eight-hour day, claimant would be expected to lie down, sleep, or sit with her legs propped up for a total of approximately six hours. Claimant could perform a task for less than thirty minutes without needing a rest or break. She could occasionally lift up to five pounds, but could never lift more than five pounds. Dr. Odjegba attributed claimant's limitations to her back and hip pain. Those limitations existed back to January 21, 2013, claimant's alleged disability onset date, and they were expected to last twelve or more months.
The ALJ afforded Dr. Odjegba's opinion only little weight, concluding that the opinion was
Those conclusions are in accordance with applicable law, see Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240-41, and they are supported by substantial evidence. Even though claimant consistently complained of and received treatment for back and hip pain, the record does not reveal any functional limitations resulting from that pain that are greater than the ones assessed by the ALJ. The record as a whole supports the ALJ's decision to afford only little weight to Dr. Odjegba's opinion.
Claimant also asserts that the Appeals Council failed to properly consider new evidence that was presented for the first time on appeal.
Smith v. Astrue, 272 F. App'x 789, 802 (11th Cir. 2008) (alterations supplied).
Here, the Appeals Council denied claimant's request for review of the ALJ's decision, stating:
Even if the Appeals Council erred in failing to consider the evidence listed in the paragraphs above, any such error would be harmless, because that evidence does not provide a basis for overturning the ALJ's decision. Dr. Teschner's notes indicate that she primarily treated claimant for her diabetes, and the symptoms resulting from that condition were not severe. With regard to claimant's musculoskeletal conditions, claimant consistently reported back and joint pain to Dr. Teschner, but Dr. Teschner consistently reported that claimant's range of motion was grossly intact, and she showed no signs of muscle atrophy.
The remainder of claimant's argument about why the ALJ's decision was not supported by substantial evidence is difficult to discern. It appears that claimant is arguing that the ALJ erred in not obtaining vocational expert testimony about the number of jobs existing in the national economy that would be available to an individual with her residual functional capacity. Vocational expert testimony was not necessary, however, because the ALJ found claimant to be able to perform a full range of sedentary, unskilled work,
Claimant also appears to assert that the ALJ's residual functional capacity finding was not supported by substantial evidence because, after the ALJ rejected Dr. Odjegba's assessment of disabling limitations, there was no longer a medical assessment to support the ALJ's decision. As an initial matter, it is the ALJ's responsibility — not that of a physician — to determine a claimant's residual functional capacity. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c) ("If your case is at the administrative law judge hearing level or at the Appeals Council review level, the administrative law judge or the administrative appeals judge at the Appeals Council (when the Appeals Council makes a decision) is responsible for assessing your residual functional capacity."). See also Robinson v. Astrue, 365 F. App'x 993, 999 (11th Cir. 2010) ("We note that the task of determining a claimant's residual functional capacity and ability to work is within the province of the ALJ, not of doctors."). It is true that the ALJ
Nation v. Barnhart, 153 F. App'x. 597, 598 (11th Cir. 2005) (emphasis supplied). Furthermore, claimant bears the ultimate burden of producing evidence to support her disability claim. See Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(a), (c)). The court concludes that the record in this case was sufficient to give substantial support to the ALJ's decision, even after the ALJ rejected Dr. Odjegba's assessment. The ALJ was not required to match his residual functional capacity finding to a form filled out by a treating or examining physician.
In summary, the court concludes the ALJ's decision was based upon substantial evidence and in accordance with applicable legal standards. Accordingly, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. Costs are taxed against claimant. The Clerk is directed to close this file.
