MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Great American Insurance Company ("Great American") filed a complaint for declaratory judgment (the "Complaint") on July 12, 2017. In the Complaint, Great American requests certain declaratory relief such as "an order from the Court declaring that Lloyd's is required to cover People's claim" (doc. 93 at 9-10), "an order from the Court declaring Great American's rights and obligations under the Great American Policy as to Peoples" (doc. 93 at 10), and other alternative relief (doc. 93 at 10).

Subsequently, Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's Subscribing Severally to Policy No. ULL20018 (the "Underwriters") filed a Motion To Dismiss (the "Underwriters Motion) on July 31, 2017. (Doc. 100). After that, Randy Jones & Associates ("Jones") and Jon Pair ("Pair") filed a Motion To Dismiss (the "Jones/Pair Motion") on August 3, 2017. (Doc. 102). Great American responded to the Underwriters' Motion on August 14, 2017. (Doc. 103). Great American responded to the Jones/Pair Motion on August 17, 2017. (Doc. 104).

The Motions have substantial overlap in arguments, and the Court will address both Motions together. Both Motions are ripe for this Court's disposition.

II. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

"Great American issued the Great American Policy to Peoples [Independent Bank]." (Doc. 93 at 6) (Peoples Independent Bank will be referred to as "PIB"). PIB had a mortgage on Ramuji's motel in Boaz, Alabama. (Doc. 46 at 3); see also (Doc. 93 at 6). Great American alleges that PIB's mortgage to Ramuji required Ramuji to have an insurance policy on which PIB was a named insured. (Doc. 93 at 6). Great American further alleges that Ramuji obtained that policy and named PIB "as a `mortgagee with `additional interest' on the Lloyd's Policy from as early as August 8, 2014, through the date of the April 2, 2016 fire loss at the Insured Property." (Doc. 93 at 6) (citing Doc. 12, ¶ 3, Exs. 2, 3). Great American claims that Jones and Pair acted for Lloyd's and gave information to PIB that "People's was a named mortgagee on the Lloyd's policy." (Doc. 93 at 6).

Ramuji's motel burned down on April 2, 2016. (Doc. 93 at 7). "On August 16, 2016, Lloyd's informed [Ramuji] that it was denying coverage for the loss." (Doc. 93 at 7). Afterwards, PIB filed a claim to recover on the Great American policy relative to the loss. (Doc. 93 at 7).1 That policy states:

(Doc. 93-1 at 3). The policy also states regarding additional hazard insurance:

(Doc. 93-1 at 12). Great American also claims its policy allows it to become a subrogee if it makes payment to PIB. (Doc. 93 at 8).

In its Complaint, Great American asks for the following:

(Doc. 93 at 9-10). Alternatively, Great American asks for the following:

(Doc. 93 at 10).

II. STANDARDS

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion attacks the legal sufficiency of the complaint. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) ("[A] party may assert the following defenses by motion: (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]"). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require only that the complaint provide "`a short and plain statement of the claim' that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 103, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957) (footnote omitted) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)), abrogated by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a) (setting forth general pleading requirements for a complaint including providing "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief").

While a plaintiff must provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief, Rule 8 does not mandate the inclusion of "detailed factual allegations" within a complaint. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. at 1964 (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47, 78 S. Ct. at 103). However, at the same time, "it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). "[O]nce a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563, 127 S. Ct. at 1969.

"[A] court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. "While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations." Id. "When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id. (emphasis added). "Under Twombly's construction of Rule 8 . . . [a plaintiff's] complaint [must] `nudge[] [any] claims' . . . `across the line from conceivable to plausible.' Ibid." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680, 129 S. Ct. at 1950-51.

A claim is plausible on its face "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. "The plausibility standard is not akin to a `probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. at 1965).

B. Standing

"[T]he core component of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). The Constitution has three requirements for standing:

Id. at 560-61 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). "The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these three elements." Id. at 561 (citing another source). "At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we `presum[e] that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim." Id.

The Declaratory Judgment Act states as follows:

28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). "The main purpose of a declaratory judgment action is to have coverage issues decided in advance." American Bankers Ins. Co. of Florida v. Mitchell, 2008 WL 2634368 at *2 (S.D. Ala. July 3, 2008).2 The Eleventh Circuit, in Emory v. Peeler, spoke to the issue of declaratory judgments and the "actual controversy" requirement:

Emory v. Peeler, 756 F.2d 1547, 1552 (11th Cir. 1985) (internal footnotes omitted).The Fifth Circuit stated:

Seguros Tepeyac, S.A. v. Compania Mexicana de Seguros Generales v. Jernigan, 410 F.2d 718, 729 (5th Cir. 1969) (italics added).3

C. Ripeness

The Supreme Court stated the following regarding declaratory judgments and ripeness:

Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941). "Ordinarily, a controversy is not sufficiently immediate or real where the parties' dispute is only hypothetical and not yet ripe, has been rendered moot, or where the court's resolution of the matter would be purely academic." Mt. Hawley Insurance Co. v. Tactic Security Enforcement, Inc., 2017 WL 2172187, at *2 (M.D. Fla. May 17, 2017) (citing another source).

"[A] court should permit a claim for declaratory judgment to proceed where declaratory relief would (1) "serve a useful purpose in clarifying and settling the legal relations in issue," and (2) "terminate and afford relief from the uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy giving rise to the proceeding." Id. at *2 (quoting another source).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Whether Great American has standing to assert a declaratory judgment against the Underwriters

The Underwriters argue that because "Great American has not alleged that it is a party to or an intended third-party beneficiary of Underwriters' Policy," Great American lacks standing to sue. (Doc. 100 at 4). In support, the Underwriters cite to two federal district courts, one in New Jersey and the other in the District of Columbia. (Doc. 100 at 3-4).4 They argue that the "Court should dismiss . . . [the] declaratory judgment count concerning the Underwriter's Policy under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)." (Doc. 100 at 4) (underlining in original).

In response, Great American points to the Provident Life case. See (Doc. 103 at 3) (relying on Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Transamerica-Occidental Life Ins. Co., 850 F.2d 1489 (11th Cir. 1988)). Great American relies on the following passage from Provident Life:

Provident Life, 850 F.2d at 1493; see (doc. 103 at 3).

Great American further quotes from the Provident Life case. (Doc. 103 at 3-4).

Their brief states:

(Doc. 103 at 3-4). Although Provident Life disagreed with United Service's conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit expressly stated that it would have agreed if the insured had been a party in the case before it. Provident Life, 850 F.2d at 1492-93.

Great American characterizes the suit a bit differently than Underwriters. (Doc. 103 at 3). Instead of focusing on the relationship between Great American and the Underwriter's policy, Great American re-directs the Court's attention to the "`relative rights and duties' of Underwriters and Great American with respect to a common insured, PIB." (Doc. 103 at 3) (quoting another source). Great American further claims that "if Underwriters succeeds on its claim that PIB is not due coverage under the Underwriters' policy, then Great American intends to cover PIB under the Great American policy, subject to and without waiving the conditions of the Great American policy." (Doc. 103 at 4). Great American further argues that "if Underwriters' position were correct, and Great American had to litigate the question of PIB's coverage under the Underwriters' policy in a separate action against PIB only, PIB would be subject to a risk of inconsistent adjudications of whether it has `other coverage' under the Underwriters' policy." (Doc. 103 at 4).

On balance, and persuaded by the guidance of Provident Life, the Court finds that Great American has the better argument. The basis of the present action is to determine the rights and obligations of various insurers to a common insured. See (doc. 93 at 9-10). The presence of all the insurance companies and the insured creates an actual controversy.5 The Declaratory Judgment Act serves to declare the "rights and other legal relations of any interested party" in an "actual controversy." See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). Adjudicating these actions together best accomplishes that goal and avoids what Great American terms "inconsistent adjudications." See (doc. 103 at 4). For the aforementioned reasons, the Underwriters' Motion To Dismiss Great American's Complaint based on standing is hereby DENIED.

B. Whether Great American has standing to assert a declaratory judgment against Jones and Pair

Jones and Pair argue that "[s]ubrogation is not appropriate under the current circumstances, since Great American has not made any payments to PIB, and therefore has no present interest to be subrogated to." (Doc. 102 at 2). In support, Jones and Pair cite to two Supreme Court of Alabama cases describing the general law of subrogation. (See doc. 102 at 2-3).

In response, Great American admits that "generally `an insurance company acquires no subrogation interest in the claim of an insured until payment to the insured is made.'" (Doc. 104 at 4) (quoting Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kaiser Engineers, 804 F.2d 592, 593-94 (10th Cir. 1986). However, Great American points out that "the interest required to sue for damages as subrogee is not the same as the `actual controversy' requirement of the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201." (Doc. 104 at 4) (citing Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 804 F.2d at 593-94).6,7 Great American posits that "[b]ut for the availability of a declaratory judgment action in circumstances like these, piecemeal and potentially inconsistent adjudication of the same issues in multiple actions, each involving some but not all of the parties, would be the only resort." (Doc. 104 at 5). Great American further states:

(Doc. 104 at 5).

Also, Great American argues that they were "allowed to intervene" and "the `circumstances reveal a need for present adjudication.'" (Doc. 104 at 6). The Court permitted Great American's intervention on June 28, 2017. (Doc. 87 at 3). The Motion To Intervene was unopposed. (Doc. 29 at 2) ("Great American has now conferred with attorneys for all of the Parties, and those attorneys have indicated that they do not opposed Great American's Motion to Intervene.").8, 9 In its Motion To Intervene, Great American argued:

(Doc. 29 at 7). Also in the Motion To Intervene, Great American stated that it wanted declaratory relief and that it was a "contingent subrogee." (Doc. 29 at 11).

Finally, Great American asks that, if the Court rules for Jones and Pair, the Court stay, not dismiss, the action. (Doc. 104 at 7).

Under Alabama law, there are two categories of subrogation. See International Underwriters/Brokers, Inc. v. Liao, 548 So.2d 163, 165 (Ala. 1989) ("We recognize two distinct types of subrogation-"`[l]egal subrogation', arising by operation of law where a surety having a legal liability pays a claim primarily owing by his principal, and `[c]onventional subrogation', grounded upon a lawful contract between the parties.") (quoting another source). "`[T]he general rule is that subrogation, whether arising from equity or contract, will be denied prior to full recovery. That is, absent express contract terms to the contrary, subrogation will not be allowed where the insured's total recovery is less than the insured's actual loss.'" Id. (quoting another source) (emphasis omitted).

Further, unless the contract says differently, equitable subrogation principles control. Id. ("`Since subrogation is an offspring of equity, equitable principles apply, even when the subrogation is based on contract, except as modified by specific provisions in the contract.'") (emphasis omitted) (quoting another source). This means that the default rule is that "`the insured is entitled to be made whole before the insurer may recover any portion of the recovery from the tortfeasor.'" Id. (quoting another source) (emphasis omitted).

In this case, the Court finds that Great American failed to plead a right to equitable subrogation against Jones and Pair because they failed to plead that they paid PIB (the insured) anything. See (doc. 93 at 6-8). After reviewing the policy, the Court finds no language inconsistent with equitable subrogation principles. See (doc. 93-1 at 11).10 For the aforementioned reasons, the Jones and Pair Motion To Dismiss Great American's Complaint based on standing is hereby GRANTED.

C. Whether Great American's subrogation claim against Jones and Pair creates a justiciable controversy

Jones and Pair contend that:

(Doc. 102 at 3). Instead of further explaining this argument as it applies to Great American, Jones and Pair refer the Court to another document (doc. 95). (Doc. 102 at 3-4). Document 95 is a motion to dismiss that makes arguments on why Ramuji's and PIB's third-party complaints should be dismissed. (Doc. 95 at 1-2).11 However, the Court distills that Jones and Pair are making two arguments that could be applicable here. The first argument is that the Complaint is "not fit for judicial decision." (Doc. 95 at 8). The second argument is that "there is no indication that dismissing this action without prejudice results in hardship." (Doc. 95 at 10). In addition, Jones and Pair argue that "forcing the Agency Defendants to participate in burdensome, multi-party litigation that the very parties suing them claim should be decided in such a manner that their Third-Party Complaints would be rendered moot has very real, immediate, and significant financial consequences for the Agency Defendants." (Doc. 95 at 10).

Great American responds by claiming that its claims against Jones and Pair are alternative pleadings that come into effect if the Underwriter's policy does not cover PIB. See (Doc. 104 at 6). Great American states that if "PIB is not covered, Great American will pay PIB, subject to and without waiving the terms and conditions of the Great American policy and Great American's subrogation rights, and, Great American will be subrogated to the claims of PIB against the Agents." (Doc. 104 at 6-7).

The Court does not have to resolve the issue of a justiciable controversy because it already ruled for Jones and Pair on standing. For this reason, the Court TERMS as MOOT the Jones/Pair motion to the extent it is based on this alternative argument.

D. Whether Great American stated a claim upon which relief can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

Citing the statutory language from the Declaratory Judgment Act, the Underwriters argue that "Great American has failed to allege any facts to show that it is an `interested party' to the Underwriters Policy, or that there is an `actual controversy' between Underwriters and Great American as to that insurance policy." (Doc. 100 at 4). In response, Great American relies heavily on a case from the Tenth Circuit. (Doc. 103 at 4-5). The relevant portion of that case is as follows:

Industrial Underwriters Ins. Co. v. P&A Constr. Co., 382 F.2d 313, 315 (10th Cir. 1967). In this case, the common insured, PIB is a party to the action:

(Doc. 93 at 6-7). Further, Great American pled that there was a loss to the insured property. (Doc. 93 at 7) ("16. The Insured Property suffered a loss due to fire on or about April 2, 2016."). Great American pled that, after the fire, Lloyd's denied coverage, and [PIB] made a claim to Great American. (Doc. 93 at 7). According to the Complaint, the Great American policy nonetheless does not go into effect if the loss is "covered by `acceptable hazard insurance.'" See (doc. 93 at 7); see also (doc. 93-1 at 3); (doc. 93-1 at 11-12).

Great American also claimed a right to subrogation in its declaratory judgment:

(Doc. 93 at 8).12 To the extent that Great American attempts to claim a right of subrogation against the Underwriters, the Court notes the subrogation deficiencies detailed above in sub-section B. Great American did not plead that they have paid their insured anything. See generally (doc. 93).

Other than the subrogation issue, the Court finds that Great American's pleading meets at least the minimum requirements under Rule 8, Rule 12(b)(6), and Supreme Court precedent. Further, the common insured, PIB, is a party to the larger action before the Court, making this situation different from that in Provident Life.13 Contrary to the Underwriter's contentions (doc. 100 at 4), Great American's pleadings show the existence of a real controversy between Great American, the Underwriters, and PIB. (Doc. 93 at 8-10). The existence of all three parties, and the disputes over coverage, leads to a claim the Court can adjudicate.

For the aforementioned reasons, the Underwriters' Motion To Dismiss for failure to state a claim is hereby DENIED in part and GRANTED in part. Specifically, it is GRANTED only to the extent that Great American asserts a subrogation claim.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS the following:

DONE and ORDERED.