STACI G. CORNELIUS, Magistrate Judge.
The court has before it the March 5, 2018 motion to dismiss and compel arbitration filed by Defendant American Family Care, Inc. ("AFC"). (Doc. 13). In response, Plaintiff filed a motion to stay pending arbitration. (Doc. 20). Pursuant to the court's March 7, 2018 order (Doc. 17), the motions are fully briefed and under submission as of March 27, 2018 (Docs. 14, 20-22). For the reasons explained below, Defendant's motion to dismiss and compel arbitration is due to be granted in part and denied in part, and Plaintiff's motion to stay is due to be granted.
Plaintiff Adrian Robinson, on behalf of himself and other similarly situated current and former employees, filed the instant complaint on January 23, 2018, alleging a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act. (Doc. 1). Specifically, the complaint states Plaintiff and other similarly situated current and former employees were misclassified as "exempt" employees and denied overtime wages. (Id.). Subsequently, Plaintiffs Kenner (Doc. 4), Gladney (Doc. 7), Hess (Doc. 8), and Weddington (Doc. 9) all "opted in" and agreed to be plaintiffs in this lawsuit. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on February 19, 2018, and in response, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss and compel arbitration. (Docs. 12, 13).
AFC owns and operates AFC clinic locations in several states, including Alabama, Georgia, Tennessee, and Florida. (Doc. 12 at 3-7). Robinson worked for AFC in various positions at various locations from 2015 until January 2018. (Doc. 12 at 11-13; Doc. 14-1 at 2). Kenner, Gladney, Hess, and Weddington all worked for AFC in various positions at various locations at different points in time between 2012 to 2017. (Docs. 4, 7, 8, 9; Doc. 14-1 at 2-3).
At or around the time of their hire, Robinson, Gladney, Hess, Weddington, and Kenner all individually agreed to comply with AFC's arbitration agreement and procedures. (Doc. 14-3 at 2; Doc.14-4 at 2; Doc. 14-5 at 2; Doc. 14-6 at 2; Doc. 14-7 at 2). By signing the arbitration agreement and beginning employment with AFC, Plaintiffs agreed all claims, as defined by the arbitration agreement, would be submitted to binding arbitration and not to litigation. (Id.). Specifically, the arbitration agreement states:
(Id.).
The amended complaint alleges violations of the FLSA. (Doc. 12). The arbitration agreement applies to "any controversy, dispute or claim arising out of or relating to [employee's] employment with AFC", which includes claims regarding disputes over wages and employment classifications. (Doc. 14-3 at 2; Doc.14-4 at 2; Doc. 14-5 at 2; Doc. 14-6 at 2; Doc. 14-7 at 2).
The parties agree the claims at issue are subject to arbitration. (Doc. 21 at 3). The parties do not agree as to whether the court should dismiss the instant action or stay it during the arbitration proceedings. (Id.).
Section 3 of the FAA states
9 U.S.C. § 3. The Eleventh Circuit strictly adheres to the language of the statute and has held a district court generally does not have discretion to dismiss a case under 9 U.S.C. § 3.
971 F.2d at 699.
That being said, Defendant contends the last phrase of 9 U.S.C. § 3 applies and argues Plaintiff "is in default in seeking the stay since Plaintiff first invoked the court's jurisdiction rather than proceed to arbitration when he was aware a dispute existed between the parties." (Doc. 22 at 6). The statute states the court shall stay the litigation unless "the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration." 9 U.S.C. § 3. "A default occurs when a party `actively participates in a lawsuit or takes other action inconsistent with' the right to arbitrate." N & D Fashions, Inc. v. DHJ Industries, Inc., 548 F.2d 722, 728 (8th Cir. 1976) (quoting Cornell & Co. v. Barber & Ross Co., 360 F.2d 512, 513 (D.C. Cir. 1966)); see also American Sugar Refining Co. v. The Anaconda, 138 F.2d 765, 767 (5th Cir. 1943); Radiator Specialty Co. v. Cannon Mills, 97 F.2d 318, 319 (4th Cir. 1938). The court cannot find, and Defendant did not supply, any case law stating the mere filing of a complaint equates with a default under 9 U.S.C. § 3. Instead, case law suggests something more is required. See Parcel Tankers, Inc. v. Formosa Plastics Corp., 569 F.Supp. 1459, 1467 (S.D. Texas 1983) ("[a]ctions constituting waiver may include . . . the applicant's engaging in some combination of filing an answer, setting up a counterclaim, pursuing discovery, and moving for continuance prior to moving for a stay pending arbitration."); Cornell & Co., 360 F.2d at 513; Radiator Specialty Co., 97 F.2d at 319.
For these reasons, Defendant's motion to dismiss and compel arbitration is