T. MICHAEL PUTNAM, Magistrate Judge.
The plaintiff, Glory Jean Deloney, appeals from the decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("Commissioner") denying her application for a period of disability and Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB"). Deloney timely pursued and exhausted her administrative remedies and the decision of the Commissioner is ripe for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). The parties have consented to the exercise of dispositive jurisdiction by a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Doc. 12).
Deloney was 54 years old on the date of the ALJ's opinion. (Tr. at 27, 59). Her past work experiences include employment as a dye automation operator and crew leader. (Tr. at 39-40). Deloney claims that she became disabled on October 29, 2013, due to reflex sympathetic dystrophy
When evaluating the disability of individuals over the age of eighteen, the regulations prescribe a five-step sequential evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; see also Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). The first step requires a determination of whether the claimant is "doing substantial gainful activity." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If she is, the claimant is not disabled and the evaluation stops. Id. If she is not, the Commissioner next considers the effect of all of the physical and mental impairments combined. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). These impairments must be severe and must meet the durational requirements before a claimant will be found to be disabled. Id. The decision depends on the medical evidence in the record. See Hart v. Finch, 440 F.2d 1340, 1341 (5th Cir. 1971). If the claimant's impairments are not severe, the analysis stops. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). Otherwise, the analysis continues to step three, which is a determination of whether the claimant's impairments meet or equal the severity of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant's impairments fall within this category, she will be found disabled without further consideration. Id. If they do not, a determination of the claimant's residual functional capacity will be made and the analysis proceeds to the fourth step. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). Residual functional capacity ("RFC") is an assessment, based on all relevant evidence, of a claimant's remaining ability to do work despite her impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.945(a)(1).
The fourth step requires a determination of whether the claimant's impairments prevent her from returning to past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant can still do her past relevant work, the claimant is not disabled and the evaluation stops. Id. If the claimant cannot do past relevant work, then the analysis proceeds to the fifth step. Id. Step five requires the court to consider the claimant's RFC, as well as the claimant's age, education, and past work experience, in order to determine if she can do other work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). If the claimant can do other work, the claimant is not disabled. Id. The burden is on the Commissioner to demonstrate that other jobs exist which the claimant can perform; and, once that burden is met, the claimant must prove her inability to perform those jobs in order to be found disabled. Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999).
Applying the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found that Deloney meets the insurability and duration requirements for a period of disability and DIB and was insured through December 31, 2019. (Tr. at 22). She further determined that Deloney has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the amended alleged onset of her disability of April 1, 2015. Id. According to the ALJ, the plaintiff has the following impairments that are considered "severe" based on the requirements set forth in the regulations: reflex sympathetic dystrophy of the lower right limb. Id. However, she found that this impairment neither meets nor medically equals any of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. at 23). The ALJ did not find Deloney's allegations of pain to be entirely credible, and she determined that Deloney has the following residual functional capacity:
(Tr. at 23). According to the ALJ, Deloney "is capable of performing past relevant work as a dye automation operator."
This court's role in reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act is a narrow one. The scope of its review is limited to determining (1) whether there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the findings of the Commissioner, and (2) whether the correct legal standards were applied. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 401 (1971); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002). The court approaches the factual findings of the Commissioner with deference, but applies close scrutiny to the legal conclusions. See Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996). "Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Mitchell v. Commissioner, Soc. Sec. Admin., 771 F.3d 780, 782 (11th Cir. 2014). The court may not decide facts, weigh evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Miles, 84 F.3d at 1400. "The substantial evidence standard permits administrative decision makers to act with considerable latitude, and `the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency's finding from being supported by substantial evidence.'" Parker v. Bowen, 793 F.2d 1177, 1181 (11th Cir. 1986) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (quoting Consolo v. Federal Mar. Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966)). Indeed, even if this court finds that the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner's decision, the court must affirm if the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Miles, 84 F.3d at 1400. No decision is automatic, however, for "despite this deferential standard [for review of claims] it is imperative that the court scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the reasonableness of the decision reached." Bridges v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 622, 624 (11th Cir. 1987). Moreover, failure to apply the correct legal standards is grounds for reversal. See Bowen v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 629, 635 (11th Cir. 1984).
The plaintiff argues that the ALJ's decision that she can perform past relevant work is not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, the plaintiff contends that that ALJ erroneously concluded that the plaintiff's subjective complaints of pain were not entirely credible in contravention of the pain standard.
The Eleventh Circuit established a pain standard to direct ALJs in evaluating claimant's subjective allegations of disabling pain. Subjective testimony of pain and other symptoms may establish the presence of a disabling impairment if it is supported by medical evidence. See Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1561 (11th Cir. 1995). To establish disability based upon pain and other subjective symptoms, "[t]he pain standard requires (1) evidence of an underlying medical condition and either (2) objective medical evidence that confirms the severity of the alleged pain arising from that condition or (3) that the objectively determined medical condition is of such a severity that it can be reasonably expected to give rise to the alleged pain." Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Holt v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991)); see also Landry v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1551, 1553 (11th Cir. 1986).
The ALJ is permitted to discredit the claimant's subjective testimony of pain and other symptoms if she articulates explicit and adequate reasons for doing so. Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1225 (11th Cir. 2002). Under Social Security Ruling ("SSR") 16-3p,
SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *10 (2017).
The ALJ determined that the plaintiff met the first step of the pain standard; that is, the plaintiff provided evidence of an underlying medical condition. See Dyer, 395 at 1210. The ALJ found that "the claimant's medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause some of the alleged symptoms. . . ." (Tr. at 24). However, the ALJ determined that the plaintiff did not meet the second or third step of the pain standard. See Dyer, 395 at 1210. The ALJ held that "the claimant's statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and the other evidence in the record for the reasons explained in this decision." (Tr. at 24). The ALJ elaborated:
March 2015, the claimant underwent a lumbar spinal block. Most of the claimant's records show reported pain on a good day at 3/10 and on a bad day at 9/10. At the time of the amended onset date, the claimant reported she was starting back to school because the government would pay 100% since the plant closed that she was working for. Notably, the claimant testified she has to lie down frequently to elevate her leg; however, her treating physician, Dr. Morgan did not give such orders in the treatment records. She also did not mention to Dr. Morgan that she was lying down frequently and elevating her leg. In May 2015, she underwent another lumbar block. A few weeks later, she presented to the clinic requesting pain medication to help her sleep. She stated she had good response from the lumbar block until she started school. She had some distal weakness in the right leg but no edema was noted. She had another lumbar block in August 2015. In September 2015, she reported low back pain radiating to the right hip at 6/10 on the pain scale. At this time, she reported the medication allows her to go to school and take care of her kids. She had another block in October 2015. In December 2015 there is a note stating she is no longer prescribed narcotic pain medication because her past two urine drug screens were negative for narcotics. She had another block in January 2016.
(Tr. at 24-26).
The plaintiff argues that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ's findings regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her pain because she "was intensively treated for her low back pain and reflex sympathetic dystrophy of the lower limb . . . [Tr. at 501-609, 636-808, 872-883]." (Doc. 17, p. 7). She asserts that the records are consistent with her testimony, specifically alleging that the medical records reflect that she "more often than not reported pain levels . . . 7-10 out of 10 on the pain scale" and that her pain levels were aggravated by activity such as bending, standing, and walking. (Id.). Furthermore, the plaintiff contends that the ALJ mischaracterized the relief that she received from approximately 15 lumbar spinal blocks, explaining that the relief typically lasted only three to four weeks. (Doc. 17, pp. 7-8).
Despite the evidence supporting the plaintiff's arguments, substantial evidence supports the ALJ's findings that the plaintiff failed either to show objective medical evidence that confirms the severity of the pain or that the medical condition is of such a severity that it can be reasonably expected to give rise to the alleged pain. See Dyer, 395 at 1210. The ALJ explained that the plaintiff's subjective testimony of pain was inconsistent with the medical record. As set out above, the ALJ cites both the medical records as well as the plaintiff's own testimony to support her determination that the plaintiff's subjective pain testimony is not credible.
Specifically, substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision as it relates to the plaintiff's credibility regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her pain. Despite reporting pains levels at seven or greater during her clinic visits, the ALJ noted that Dr. Roberts, a physician employed by Tennessee Valley Pain Consultants, discontinued the plaintiff's prescription for narcotic pain medications in either April or May 2014 because the plaintiff's two previous urine drug screens were negative for the controlled medications prescribed by Dr. Roberts, indicating that the plaintiff no longer needed narcotic pain medication to manage her pain. (Tr. at 538-39, 548-49). From May 2014 to the present, the plaintiff has managed her pain with a combination of Neurontin,
Additionally, substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision as it relates to the claimant's activity levels, which undercuts the plaintiff's credibility regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her pain. Despite complaints about the ability to sit, stand, or walk, Dr. Roberts repeatedly noted that the plaintiff ambulated independently and that she had a steady gait. (Tr. at 502-03, 515-16, 525, 529-30, 536-37, 546, 561, 568-69, 579, 586, 602, 647-48, 661, 672, 685, 696, 710, 721, 735, 745-46, 759-60, 771-772, 785-86, 797-98, 812-13, 823-24, 874-75). Admittedly, Dr. Roberts makes varying notations that the plaintiff reported that activity, such as standing and walking, aggravated her level of pain. (Tr. at 502, 515, 524, 529, 536, 546, 561, 568, 579, 586, 661, 685, 710, 759, 785, 812, 823, 874; see also id.). However, Dr. Roberts still noted that she ambulated independently and that her gait was steady despite repeatedly reporting these alleged aggravations and pain levels of seven or greater during clinic visits. (Id.). He also advised her to stretch and swim regularly as part of her treatment. Furthermore, her function report indicated that she prepared food or meals two to three times a week, in addition to completing light cleaning and laundry for eight to ten hours each day and going shopping for about fifteen minutes to one hour twice a week. (Tr. 186-87). Moreover, the plaintiff reported that she was looking for a job in 2014 and attending school in 2015. (Tr. at 505, 664, 688, 713-14, 737, 762). Her current medications, which included Neurontin, ibuprofen, aspirin, and a compounded cream, permitted her to attend school and take care of her children. (Tr. at 762).
The determination of credibility is left to the ALJ, and the ALJ is entitled to discredit the plaintiff's assertion of the severity of her pain so long as she articulates explicit and adequate reasons for doing so. Here, the ALJ has done so.
Upon review of the administrative record, and considering all of Deloney's arguments, the Court finds the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence. A separate order will be entered.
