VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS, United States District Judge.
This is a civil action filed by the Plaintiff, Kristie Seale, against the Defendant, Target Corporation, which alleges that the Defendant's negligence and wantonness were the proximate cause of injuries to the Plaintiff when she slipped and fell on the Defendant's premises. (Doc. 1-1 at 2).
The case comes before the Court on the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (the "Motion"). (Doc. 20). For the reasons stated herein, the Motion will be
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ("[S]ummary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The party requesting summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings or filings that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Once the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56(e) requires the non-moving party to go beyond the pleadings in answering the movant. Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. By its own affidavits — or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file —
The underlying substantive law identifies which facts are material and which are irrelevant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). All reasonable doubts about the facts and all justifiable inferences are resolved in favor of the non-movant. Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000). Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A dispute is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. If the evidence presented by the non-movant to rebut the moving party's evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may still be granted. Id. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
How the movant may satisfy its initial evidentiary burden depends on whether that party bears the burden of proof on the given legal issues at trial. Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993). If the movant bears the burden of proof on the given issue or issues at trial, then it can only meet its burden on summary judgment by presenting affirmative evidence showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact — that is, facts that would entitle it to a directed verdict if not controverted at trial. Id. (citation omitted). Once the moving party makes such an affirmative showing, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to produce "significant, probative evidence demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of fact." Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
For issues on which the movant does not bear the burden of proof at trial, it can satisfy its initial burden on summary judgment in either of two ways. Id. at 1115-16. First, the movant may simply show that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-movant's case on the particular issue at hand. Id. at 1116. In such an instance, the non-movant must rebut by either (1) showing that the record in fact contains supporting evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion, or (2) proffering evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion at trial based on the alleged evidentiary deficiency. Id. at 1116-17. When responding, the non-movant may no longer rest on mere allegations; instead, it must set forth evidence of specific facts. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 358, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996). The second method a movant in this position may use to discharge its burden is to provide affirmative evidence demonstrating that the non-moving party will be unable to prove its case at trial. Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d at 1116. When this occurs, the non-movant must rebut by offering evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict at trial on the material fact sought to be negated. Id.
On February 18, 2015, Kristie Seale was shopping at the Target store in Homewood,
The video shows that during the approximately thirty minutes leading up to Seale's fall, many people walked near and through the area where the fall occurred. Approximately twelve minutes prior to Seale's fall, a female shopper is observed on the surveillance video apparently dropping a bottle of some kind in the area where Seale fell. (Doc. 20-4 at 1:47:49). The video does not show whether any liquid actually spilled from the bottle. The female shopper stops and appears to pick up the bottle and then the lid, then appears to walk down a nearby aisle and place the bottle on a low shelf. (Doc. 20-4 at 1:47:50-1:48:31). There is no evidence that the female shopper or any other Target customer alerted any Target employee of any liquid on the floor in that area.
Approximately ten minutes later, Target employee Eric Kidd is seen on the video walking through the area near where Seale fell. (Doc. 20-4 at 1:48:50). He can be seen in the video turning his head towards the area of the floor where the female shopper dropped the bottle, but he continues walking. In his deposition, Kidd testified as follows:
(Doc. 20-5 at 6(18-20)).
Seale testified in her deposition that the floor was wet. The following exchange took place:
(Doc. 20-3 at 9(30-31)).
The video shows that after Seale fell, multiple Target employees responded to the location of the fall and, after Seale had been helped up, the employees began cleaning up the substance on the floor with paper towels and putting out caution cones. (Doc. 20-4 at 1:59:24-2:03:08). During this time, one of the responding Target employees reaches down and touches the substance on the floor, smells the substance, and then flicks her hand several times to try and get the substance off. (Doc. 20-4 at 1:59:43-1:59:52).
A Target employee named Lance Self was the first employee to respond to the accident scene. In his written "Team Member Witness Statement," Self wrote that there was "a big pool of water present," "probably a gallon." (Doc. 26-5 at 2). Similarly, Target employee Adrianna Warren completed a "LOD Investigation Report," in which she states that she observed "water, 5-6 inches in length." (Doc. 26-6 at 2). Warren also completed a "Guest Incident Report," in which she noted that there was "water, [a] pretty big puddle." (Doc. 26-7 at 2).
Kidd testified that Target requires all employees to be aware of potential spills or other hazards in their area and to take immediate action if a spill or other hazard is detected. Target employee Eric Kidd testified regarding Target's standard procedure for responding to spills,
(Doc. 20-5 at 4(11-12)). Mr. Kidd further testified that an employee will direct customers in the area away from the spill until it is cleaned up. (Doc. 20-5 at 4(12)). The employees will also place a caution cone or sign in the area to warn customers. (Doc. 20-5 at 4(12)-5(13)). The following exchange also occurred in Kidd's deposition:
(Doc. 20-5 at 5(14-16)).
In Alabama, in order to prove negligence in a slip and fall case, the Plaintiff must show:
Ex parte Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 806 So.2d 1247, 1249 (Ala. 2001).
(Doc. 20-1 at 9). However, there is evidence that a large amount of water, up to a gallon, spread out over a three foot area, was present where the Plaintiff fell. Furthermore, a reasonable jury could conclude, based on the video evidence, that Kidd, a Target employee, looked directly at all of this water and did nothing. Although Kidd testified that there was no liquid, the facts, cast in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, demonstrate that there was a large amount of liquid there. A reasonable jury could determine that Kidd must have seen it. If that is so, Target had actual knowledge of the spill.
The Defendant also argues that it did not have constructive notice of the spill, citing Tidd v. Wal-Mart Stores, 757 F.Supp. 1322 (N.D. Ala. 1991) (Guin, S.J.), where Judge Guin granted summary judgment, writing:
Tidd, 757 F.Supp. at 1323-24. The instant case is distinguishable from Tidd, as there is video evidence showing not only the possible cause of the spill but also that the spill may have been present for 12 minutes before the Plaintiff fell
Furthermore, based on the facts of this case, the Court determines that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether, assuming Target did not have actual or constructive notice, it was delinquent in discovering and removing the substance.
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion is