LILES C. BURKE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Plaintiff Chelsea Gentry alleges discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, 42
"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). To demonstrate that there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact that precludes summary judgment, a party opposing a motion for summary judgment must cite "to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).
When considering a defendant's motion for summary judgment, a district court must view the evidence in the record and draw reasonable inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Asalde v. First Class Parking Sys. LLC, 898 F.3d 1136, 1138 (11th Cir. 2018). Accordingly, the Court presents the facts in this opinion in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See also Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707 F.3d 1244, 1252 (11th Cir. 2013) ("[W]hen conflicts arise between the facts evidenced by the parties, [courts] must credit the nonmoving party's version."). "The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).
Plaintiff began her employment with the Russellville Police Department (RPD) in December 2011, at the age of 21. (Doc. 28-1 at 12). Plaintiff has a bachelor's degree in criminal justice. (Id. at 6). She attended the police academy in January 2012. (Id. at 12).
Plaintiff worked as a police officer during the first three years of her employment. (Id. at 12, 17). Between October 2012 to September 2013, the RPD disciplined Plaintiff due to some problems, but on December 2, 2014, the RPD gave Plaintiff a good annual review. (Doc. 28-1 at 70-71; Doc. 28-4 at 11; Doc. 28-5 at 11-12; Doc. 39-13).
In the summer of 2015, Defendant's Civil Service Board (CSB) posted a sergeant position at the RPD. (Doc. 28-1 at 17; Doc. 28-4 at 6). The RPD instructed officers to sign their name to a list if they were interested in applying for the position. (Doc. 28-4 at 6). Plaintiff was the only officer who signed the list. (Doc. 28-1 at 18). Despite reservations based on her prior work history, Chief Hargett recommended Plaintiff to the CSB for promotion. (Doc. 28-4 at 6, 10-11). In August 2015, the CSB promoted Plaintiff to sergeant and gave her a pay raise. (Doc. 39-65; Doc. 28-7, ¶ 4). The CSB has a policy that newly promoted employees are placed on a six-month probation. (Doc. 28-1 at 31-32, 72; Doc. 28-4 at 13; Doc. 28-5 at 22-23).
Upon her promotion, Chief Hargett and Cpt. Prince told Plaintiff that RPD would
Initially, the RPD paired Plaintiff with Sgt. Miller. (Doc. 28-1 at 19). Sgt. Miller evaluated Plaintiff stating that she failed to exhibit command presence, failed to demonstrate an ability to control situations when responding to calls, had difficulty organizing officers and distributing calls for service, appeared to lose track of service calls and whereabouts of her officers, and appeared to be unfamiliar with certain department policies and procedures. (Id. at 19-20, 120).
Plaintiff admitted to occasionally sleeping during a shift. (Id. at 21-22). She also testified that she questioned the qualifications of the training officers assigned to her. (Id. at 20-21). Plaintiff admitted defending or justifying her actions when receiving criticism from her supervisors. (Id.).
Sgts. Miller and Franks recommended that Plaintiff not continue as sergeant (Doc 28-1 at 121-24). On October 29, 2015, Chief Hargett demoted Plaintiff to patrol officer after reviewing her evaluations and speaking to Sgts. Miller and Franks and Cpt. Prince. (Doc. 28-1 at 27; Doc. 28-7, ¶ 5; Doc. 28-5 at 26; Doc. 39-22).
At the time of Plaintiff's demotion, Mickey Gentry, Plaintiff's husband, served as a volunteer reserve officer at the police department. (Doc. 28-7, ¶ 9). Since 2004, Defendant had also employed Mr. Gentry as a firefighter. (Doc. 28-3 at 16). Mr. Gentry went to Mayor Grissom to discuss his wife's demotion. (Doc. 28-1 at 41, 78). Among other things, Mr. Gentry told the mayor that Chief Hargett demoted Plaintiff because Plaintiff was not one of Chief Hargett's "drinking buddies." (Doc. 28-3 at 9, 23-26).
Chief Hargett removed Mr. Gentry from the reserve officer program and told him not to come to the police station. (Doc. 28-7, ¶ 9). Cpt. Prince told Plaintiff that Mr. Gentry was not allowed at the police station. (Doc. 39-83, recording).
In late January 2016, Plaintiff informed Chief Hargett that she was pregnant and requested that he keep the information private. (Doc. 28-1 at 83).
On March 5, 2016, during the night shift, Sgt. Franks observed Plaintiff sitting in her patrol vehicle in the police station parking lot. (Id. at 132-33). Sgt. Franks believed Plaintiff was sleeping and took a picture of her. (Id. at 134, photograph). Plaintiff testified that she was not asleep, but she does not dispute that Sgt. Franks believed she was asleep. (Id. at 22, 35-36).
On March 7, 2016, Mr. Gentry and Plaintiff went to the police station to speak to Chief Hargett about Sgt. Franks. (Doc. 28-1 at 36-37, 41). The RPD's General Order No. 100 I. (O.) provides that employees are required to follow the chain command to report department related issues unless an employee has a complaint of sexual harassment. (Doc. 28-1 at 135-36, 141; Doc. 28-7, ¶ 10). Plaintiff testified that she was not reporting sexual harassment. (Doc. 28-1 at 40).
On March 10, 2016, Plaintiff interviewed for another sergeant position. (Id. at 84). That same day, Chief Hargett suspended Plaintiff for five days without pay for sleeping on duty and an additional five days without pay for bypassing the chain of command. (Doc. 39-39).
Plaintiff gave Chief Hargett a note from her doctor, dated March 21, 2016, requesting that she be placed in the office, preferably on a day shift. (Doc. 39-43). Chief Hargett requested clarification from Plaintiff's physician as to the extent of her medical limitations, which he received on April 1, 2016. (Doc. 28-2 at 35; Doc. 28-4 at 24, 39, 42). The physician's note stated that Plaintiff could not wear her utility belt,
On March 24, 2016, Plaintiff filed a second charge of discrimination with the EEOC. (Doc. 39-9 at 8).
The RPD did not have a "light duty" position. (Doc. 28-1 at 88). Therefore, the RPD placed Plaintiff on a medical leave and required her to use sick or personal leave to take time off. (Doc. 28-1 at 88; Doc. 28-4 at 39; Doc. 28-8 at 7). Plaintiff could request leave donations from other employees if she exhausted her own leave time. (Doc. 28-8 at 7). Several Fire Department employees donated sick leave time to
During her medical leave, the RPD offered Plaintiff dispatch shifts when available so she would not have to use her own leave time or donated leave time. (Doc. 28-1 at 42-43; Doc. 28-4, at 40). On June 18, 2016, while Plaintiff was working a dispatch shift, Mr. Gentry came to the police station and went inside the dispatch room with Plaintiff. (Doc. 28-1 at 42-43). Lt. Shackelford observed the incident and reported it to Cpt. Prince. (Doc. 28-4 at 27; Doc. 28-5 at 19). Plaintiff was suspended for 14 days without pay. (Doc. 28-1 at 44-45).
In September 2016, Plaintiff's child was born. (Id. at 6, 94). On October 12, 2016, the RPD disciplined Plaintiff for taking her sick leave donation forms to City Hall, rather than turning them in to Chief Hargett. (Doc. 28-1 at 45, 95; Doc. 39-52; Doc. 39-53). On November 4, 2016, Plaintiff filed a third charge of discrimination with the EEOC related to her demotion. (Doc. 39-8 at 12).
On November 7, 2016, Plaintiff returned to full-time duty. (Doc. 28-1 at 95). Plaintiff told Cpt. Prince that she needed to pump breast milk for her child. (Id.). The RPD told Plaintiff she could use the break room or go home during breaks to pump breast milk. (Id. at 50). Plaintiff chose to go home during her paid breaks. (Id.). The RPD required Plaintiff to remain on duty while traveling home until she went out of her service area, at which time she was required to call or text. (Id.).
The RPD instructed Plaintiff to make up extra time at the end of her shift because her breaks took longer than the allotted hour and Plaintiff sometimes arrived at work late. (Doc. 28-4 at 30; Doc. 39-55). On December 12 and 27, 2016, the RPD counseled Plaintiff and gave her a written directive regarding her breaks, but the RPD did not discipline her. (Doc. 28-1 at 82, 96; Doc. 28-2 at 51; Doc. 28-5 at 21-22; Doc. 39-55; Doc. 39-56).
At some point, Plaintiff's physician instructed her to breastfeed her baby instead of pumping milk. (Doc. 28-1 at 49-50, 97; Doc. 39-84, recording).
Around this time, a shooting occurred in Russellville, Alabama, during which the suspect was injured and required medical care. (Doc. 28-1 at 47). The RPD transported the suspect to Huntsville Hospital in Huntsville, Alabama. (Doc. 28-4 at 32). The RPD scheduled Plaintiff to guard the suspect at the hospital in Huntsville. (Id.) Plaintiff raised concerns about breastfeeding while guarding the suspect. (Doc. 28-1 at 47). The RPD told Plaintiff to take her concerns up the chain of command, which she did. (Id.). The RPD rearranged the schedule and reassigned Plaintiff that day. (Id.). The RPD scheduled Plaintiff for a night shift that evening in Russellville. (Doc. 28-1 at 97-99; Doc. 28-4 at 33-34).
A few weeks later, Cpt. Prince made a schedule change and reassigned some officers, including Plaintiff to the night shift. (Doc. 28-5 at 27; Doc. 28-1 at 46; Doc. 30, Ex. L, recording). Plaintiff complained to her lieutenant and then to Cpt. Prince about the schedule change. (Doc. 30, Ex. L, recording). Cpt. Prince told her it was a temporary assignment until the new sergeants gained experience. (Doc. 28-1 at 49; Doc. 30, Ex. L, recording). Plaintiff submitted a written request to speak to the
The City Council held a regularly scheduled meeting, and at Plaintiff's request, the City Council spoke to her in a private executive session. (Doc. 28-4 at 30). Plaintiff hoped the City Council would "step in and just tell my supervisors to back off a little bit and just let me do my job." (Doc. 28-1 at 46). Plaintiff spoke to the City Council about the assignment to guard the suspect at Huntsville Hospital. (Id. at 47-48). The City Council questioned Chief Hargett about this matter and others issues related to Plaintiff. (Doc. 28-4 at 30). Based on the questions, Chief Hargett understood that Plaintiff had led the City Council to believe that the RPD required Plaintiff to travel to Huntsville to guard a suspect. (Doc. 28-4 at 30, 32, 34; Doc. 28-6 at 4). The next working day, the RPD placed Plaintiff on paid administrative leave. (Doc. 28-1 at 55; Doc. 28-4 at 32, 34).
The following day, the RPD instructed Plaintiff to come to the station with her police equipment. (Doc. 28-1 at 56; Doc. 28-4 at 34). Plaintiff testified that she thought the RPD would terminate her employment and spoke to her father, who was with her at the time in Birmingham, about her anticipated termination. (Doc. 28-1 at 56).
On April 27, 2017, Plaintiff filed a third charge of discrimination with the EEOC. (Doc. 39-59).
On September 6, 2016, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit — (Doc. 1, No. 3:16-cv-01466-MHH),
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant retaliated against her in violation of Title VII. (Doc. 1 at 18-21, ¶¶ 141-45, No. 3:17-cv-01127).
To establish a prima facie case for retaliation, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she engaged in statutorily protected activity, (2) she suffered a materially adverse action, and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the materially adverse action. Howard v. Walgreen Co., 605 F.3d 1239, 1244 (11th Cir. 2010).
As to the first element, Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff's filing of three EEOC charges and two lawsuits constitute statutorily protected activity. (Doc. 50, p. 35).
Under the next prong of the prima facie case, Plaintiff alleges that she suffered 13 different materially adverse actions:
(Doc. 52 at 39-40) (citations omitted). With respect to these actions, the Court considers each of the alleged adverse actions in turn.
Plaintiff argues that Mr. Gentry's ban from the police station and removal from officer reserves was "because of [Mr. Gentry's] discussion with the Mayor threatening a lawsuit." (Doc. 52 at 40). Defendant's argument focuses on Plaintiff not having engaged in a statutorily protected activity yet because Mr. Gentry's accusations occurred "the very day [Plaintiff] was demoted." (Doc. 53 at 8). However, Plaintiff's argument of a statutorily
First, Plaintiff cites a recording to support her statement that Mr. Gentry threatened a lawsuit when talking to the mayor. (See Doc. 39-83). However, this recording does not support her assertion that Mr. Gentry actually threatened a lawsuit. (Id.). Second, Plaintiff generally cites to Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 131 S.Ct. 863, 178 L.Ed.2d 694 (2011) without any discussion. In Thompson, the defendant fired the plaintiff three weeks after his fiancée, who was also an employee of the defendant, filed an EEOC charge alleging sex discrimination. The plaintiff in Thompson then filed an EEOC charge based on retaliation. Id. at 172, 131 S.Ct. 863. The facts in Thompson are clearly distinguishable from the facts in the instant case. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff's reliance on Thompson is misplaced, and Thompson is inapplicable. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not established a prima facie case.
Assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff could establish a prima facie case, Defendant has asserted a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for restricting access, i.e., Chief Hargett had "discretion as police chief to restrict access to the police station due to [Mr. Gentry's] baseless accusation." (Doc. 53 at 8).
During Mr. Gentry's conversation with Mayor Grissom, Mr. Gentry told the mayor that one of the reasons Plaintiff was demoted was because she was not one of Chief Hargett's "drinking buddies." (Doc. 28-3 at 24).
Plaintiff asserts that "she was not given the right to appeal her demotion contrary to policy" (Doc. 52 at 39), and that "[a]ny permanent employee, which [she] was, can appeal disciplinary decisions, and demotion is disciplinary." (Id. at 42-43). Defendant argues that pursuant to City policy, "only permanent (i.e., not probationary) employees are permitted to appeal demotions" and Plaintiff was not a permanent employee. (Doc. 53 at 9). In other words, Defendant argues that it had a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for not allowing Plaintiff to appeal her demotion.
City policy grants a permanent employee "the right to appeal any disciplinary action. . . ." (Doc. 39-38, Rule X — Rights of Review and Appeal). Plaintiff acknowledges that she was on "promotional probation" when she became a sergeant. (Doc. 28-1 at 104). Thus, Plaintiff was not a permanent employee with respect to the sergeant position. Defendant argues that Plaintiff "has presented no evidence to invalidate the City's showing that she was not permitted to appeal her demotion due to her probationary status." (Doc. 53 at 9).
Plaintiff asserts that she suffered an adverse action when "her co-workers were told not to associate with her." (Doc. 52 at 39). Plaintiff does not discuss the action or provide any evidence in support thereof. Plaintiff testified that when she and her husband had a conversation with Officer Brett Evans about not returning phone calls or texts, he responded that he was "told just to kind of keep my distance from you, that I — until all your stuff is over, I can't really talk to you." (Doc. 28-1 at 66). Mr. Gentry also testified that Officer Evans told him he was "no longer allowed to talk to us" and that he did not want to lose his job. (Doc. 28-3 at 11).
Plaintiff asserts that she suffered an adverse action when she was "followed" and "verbally harassed." (Doc. 52 at 39). Specifically, Plaintiff states, "Supervisor Franks told [her] she was disgruntled and needed to quit,
Even if Plaintiff could establish a prima facie case, Defendant asserts that Sgt. Franks's actions in monitoring Plaintiff's whereabouts and activities were legitimate and nonretaliatory because his actions were consistent with his job duties. (Doc. 53 at 11). Sgt. Franks was Plaintiff's supervisor and thus was responsible for keeping track of her, as well as other officers under his supervision. (Doc. 28-1 at 37). Plaintiff agreed that she had a GPS for that purpose and had no evidence of how much supervision was being given to other officers. (Id. at 37-38). Plaintiff's questioning of how Sgt. Franks could be doing his job properly if he was constantly following her around does not establish pretext. (Doc. 28-1 at 37). Plaintiff does not show that Defendant's reason was a pretext for retaliation. Accordingly, summary judgment is granted on this claim.
Plaintiff asserts that "she was written up on March 10, 2015, wherein she was
The RPD's Rule of Conduct 100, IV(C)(i)(d) states that "sleeping on duty" is considered a serious violation. (Doc. 28-1 at 138). Plaintiff argues that she was not asleep, but that Sgt. Franks "thought that I was sleeping." (Id. at 35).
Plaintiff also argues that "the Chief made it clear [sleeping] is okay for safety purposes and admitted everyone does it." (Doc. 51 at 42).
Plaintiff asserts that she was suspended without pay for five days because she complained to Chief Hargett about Sgt. Franks's alleged harassment. Defendant argues that Plaintiff violated the chain of command by taking her complaints about Sgt. Franks straight to the Chief. Thus, Defendant asserts it had a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for suspending Plaintiff. Defendant does not address whether Plaintiff has established a prima facie case. Accordingly, for purposes of this motion, the Court will assume that Plaintiff has satisfied her burden and will now determine whether Defendant had a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for suspending Plaintiff.
Plaintiff states that because her complaints involved harassment, "she can go straight to the Chief, which she did," and that her "actions were consistent with the department and City sexual harassment policies." (Doc. 52 at 42-45).
The policy states in pertinent part:
(Doc. 39-40). A plain reading of the policy at issue does not support Plaintiff's interpretation.
Defendant responds that Plaintiff's complaints did not involve complaints of a sexual nature and relies on the recording of her conversation with Chief Hargett in support. (Doc. 30, Ex. H).
Furthermore, when asked if she went to see Chief Hargett to talk about sexual harassment, Plaintiff testified, "No. I never said anything about sexual harassment. I said that I went to the Chief of Police with my husband when he went to talk to the Chief, and also myself complained about harassment that I was facing." (Doc. 28-1 at 40).
Plaintiff claims that "on March 31 Chief [Hargett] [refused] [her] doctor's excuse" in retaliation for filing a charge of discrimination on March 24, 2016. (Doc. 52 at 40, 44). Defendant asserts that Plaintiff's claim is "unsupported by the factual record," presumably arguing that the action never occurred. (Doc. 53 at 12).
Plaintiff gave Chief Hargett a doctor's note requesting that she be placed in the office with day shift hours. (Doc. 39-43). Chief Hargett requested clarification regarding the extent of her limitations. (Docs. 28-2 at 35; Doc. 28-4 at 24, 39, 42).
In connection with her March 24, 2016, charge of discrimination, Plaintiff asserts that on March 28, 2016, "no one from the police department is donating time." (Doc. 52 at 44). Defendant asserts that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case because she has "zero evidence connecting [no donation of time] to any retaliatory motive or action by the City." (Doc. 53 at 13). Defendant's argument focuses on Plaintiff's lack of a causal connection.
Plaintiff obtained approval from Chief Hargett to request donations of sick leave and then emailed officers requesting donated leave. (Doc. 39-68; Doc. 28-1 at 87-89). She did not receive any donations from employees at the RPD. (Doc. 28-1 at 87-89).
Plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case because she cannot establish a causal connection. Accordingly, summary judgment is granted on this claim.
Plaintiff asserts that she was retaliated against when "she was only given half of the hours donated to her." (Doc. 52 at 40). Defendant argues that "she presents no evidence to challenge the legitimate explanation regarding the calculation of her donated sick leave or any evidence that other employees received more favorable treatment." (Doc. 53 at 14). Thus, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff cannot establish an adverse action, and even if she could, Defendant had a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason.
Plaintiff relies on a recording of Mr. Gentry talking to City Councilman Arthur Elliot as factual support for her assertion. (Doc. 39-97). However, the Court finds no support for her assertion in this recording. City Clerk Hamilton, who processed the sick leave donations for Plaintiff, explained that "some donated leave is processed as a day-to-day exchange while other donations are processed as a straight hourly exchange," depending on the length of the employee's shift. (Doc. 28-8, ¶ 5).
Based on the evidence above, Plaintiff has failed to show that the way donated sick leave was calculated for her amounted to an adverse action. Thus, Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case. Accordingly, summary judgment is granted on this claim.
Plaintiff argues that "she was written up for pump/breastfeeding breaks." (Doc. 52 at 40). Specifically, she claims that on "November 7, [she] tells them she is breastfeeding, then on December 12 and 27 she is being counseled about her pump breaks." (Id. at 44). In response, Defendant argues that "[t]here is nothing materially adverse about the written counseling here because all it did was explain to [Plaintiff] how she should be handling her pumping breaks." (Doc. 53 at 15).
On December 12, 2016, Sgt. Miller completed a "Written Directive," informing Plaintiff that if she needed to take longer than her allotted one-hour break, the RPD would accommodate her, but she needed to let her supervisor know and make up the time at the end of her shift. (Doc. 39-55). Sgt. Miller also reminded Plaintiff to go "out of service" and "in service" from her car radio when she went on break. (Id.). No disciplinary action was taken against Plaintiff. On December 27, 2016, Sgt. Miller completed a "Counseling Form," reminding Plaintiff to add additional time to the end of her shift if her breaks exceeded one hour. (Doc. 39-56).
Plaintiff does not show that a materially adverse action occurred with respect to the written directive and counseling and thus cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation. Assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff could establish a prima facie case, Defendant has produced a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the counseling, i.e., that the RPD must know "whether [Plaintiff] was available to take calls while on patrol, . . . make sure necessary shifts were covered without incurring too much overtime costs," and be able to "[e]xpect[ ] an employee to work an entire shift." (Doc. 53 at 15). Plaintiff has failed to show that Defendant's reasons are a pretext for retaliation. For the reasons discussed above, summary judgment is granted on this claim.
Plaintiff asserts that on June 18, 2016, "she was written up and docked 14 days' pay because her husband came to the department to bring her lunch." (Doc. 52 at 40; Doc. 39-51). Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot "overcome the City's showing that there was a legitimate reason for the June 18, 2016 discipline." (Doc. 53 at 17). Defendant does not address whether
First, Chief Hargett had instructed Plaintiff that Mr. Gentry could not come to the police station, even to have lunch with her, after the incident with the mayor. (Doc. 28-1 at 44; Doc. 28-3 at 36). Second, the dispatch room, where Plaintiff was working that day, contained computers with confidential information. (Doc. 28-1 at 43; Doc. 28-3 at 34-35).
Plaintiff argues that Defendant's reason is a pretext for retaliation because Mr. Gentry "was not in violation of policy as he was not in view of computers" and that "others were allowed to have their lunches brought to them while working dispatch." (Doc. 52 at 45). This argument is without merit as Plaintiff has failed to show that other employees' family members went in the dispatch room and were not disciplined. Plaintiff testified that she observed Patty Lumpkin's husband and father "[d]ropping off food" for Ms. Lumpkin when she was working in the dispatch room. (Doc. 28-1 at 67-68). However, there is no evidence that the family members went inside the dispatch room.
Chief Hargett testified that he was not aware of employees' family members being inside the dispatch room. He stated that he had seen spouses "bring food up there and stand out in the hallway at the window." (Doc. 28-4 at 27). There is no evidence that Chief Hargett had not disciplined other employees for the same violation committed by Mr. Gentry.
Plaintiff asserts that "she was written up . . . because her husband did not come to the department to turn in [donation] forms." (Doc. 52 at 40). Defendant argues that Plaintiff "was not disciplined or otherwise punished for her failure to follow instructions." (Doc. 53 at 17).
Cpt. Prince verbally told Plaintiff to bring any sick leave donation forms to him, which she did for three months. (Doc. 28-1 at 45; Doc. 39-52). When the forms were later dropped off at City Hall, Cpt. Prince prepared a counseling form, reminding Plaintiff that the forms should be turned in to Chief Hargett. (Doc. 39-52). Although Cpt. Prince noted that a recurrence would result in disciplinary action (id.), Plaintiff turned in leave donation forms to City Hall again, and Cpt. Prince prepared another counseling form. (Doc. 28-2 at 50). Cpt. Prince explained on the form that "[t]urning in your Sick Leave form to us helps us ensure that you are not short hours on
The two instances of counseling do not constitute discipline. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to show a materially adverse action in this instance and thus cannot establish a prima facie case.
Even if Plaintiff somehow could establish a prima facie case, Defendant asserts that it "had a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for Captain Prince wanting to receive the sick leave donation forms in order to keep track of [Plaintiff's] hours." (Doc. 53 at 17-18). Plaintiff presents no evidence that Defendant's legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for counseling her about her sick leave forms was a pretext for retaliation. Accordingly, summary judgment is granted on this claim.
Even though Plaintiff asserts that she was retaliated against when "she was not promoted to Sergeant" (Doc. 52 at 40), she devotes no discussion whatsoever to this claim.
Plaintiff asserts that she was retaliated against when "she was involuntarily terminated." (Doc. 52 at 40). Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation because she cannot show that she suffered a materially adverse action since she voluntarily resigned. (Doc. 53 at 19).
Plaintiff argues that her resignation was not voluntary and relies on Rodriguez v. City of Doral, 863 F.3d 1343 (11th Cir. 2017), in support. (Doc. 52 at 52). In Rodriguez, the Eleventh Circuit noted that a resignation is voluntary unless the employee can establish that the resignation was (1) forced by coercion or duress or (2) was obtained by deceiving or misrepresenting a material fact. Id. at 1352. Plaintiff relies on the first of these means to establish that her resignation was not voluntary.
In analyzing a claim of coercion or duress, the Eleventh Circuit noted that it must consider the "totality of the circumstances" and identified a non-exhaustive list of five factors to guide the analysis:
Rodriguez, 863 F.3d at 1352 (citing Hargray v. City of Hallandale, 57 F.3d 1560, 1568 (11th Cir. 1995)).
The Rodriguez Court noted that the first factor focuses on an analysis of whether the employee had any "real alternatives," which is determined by an objective standard. Id. "[T]he other enumerated
The Eleventh Circuit has recognized that "resignations can be voluntary even where the only alternative to resignation is facing possible termination for cause. . . ." Id.; see also Jones v. Allstate Ins. Co., 707 F. App'x. 641, 646 (11th Cir. 2017) (stating that "Plaintiff's decision to voluntarily resign in the face of a possible termination is not a constructive discharge," and thus, Plaintiff failed to establish an adverse action as part of her retaliation claims brought under the ADA, FMLA, and Title VII). However, the "one exception to this rule is where the employer actually lacked good cause to believe that grounds for the termination . . . existed." Hargray, 57 F.3d at 1568.
The record in this case supports Defendant's contention that Plaintiff was provided with a real alternative to resignation and understood the nature of her choices. As an initial matter, the Court notes that the record includes the audio recording of the meeting between Chief Hargett and Plaintiff. (Doc. 39-79). The meeting lasted about 20 to 25 minutes. (Id.). Chief Hargett started the meeting by informing Plaintiff that she had violated the chain of command again and that he had previously told her that a reoccurrence would result in disciplinary action. (Id.). Chief Hargett then told her that he was treating her like everyone else and giving her the opportunity to resign, so she is "leaving on her own free will" and will not be terminated. (Doc. 39-79; Doc. 28-1 at 57). Plaintiff responded that if she had a choice between resigning and being terminated, she would rather resign. (Doc. 39-79).
Plaintiff asked whether she should turn in a resignation letter that afternoon. Chief Hargett responded that the resignation would be effective immediately. (Doc. 39-79). Plaintiff responded again that she wanted to write a letter, and Chief Hargett told her that was fine "if that's what she wanted to do." (Id.). She asked if she should type it and bring it back, and he said she could write it at the office "if you want." (Id.). Parts of the recording are inaudible, but according to Plaintiff's testimony, Chief Hargett told her that there was a computer in the room and that she was "welcome to use the supervisor computer." (Id.; Doc. 28-1 at 58). Chief Hargett did not stay in the room while Plaintiff wrote her resignation letter. (Doc. 28-1 at 61).
Based on the evidence, Plaintiff had advance notice of her impending termination. The day after the City Council meeting in which Plaintiff voiced her complaints, she reported to work. (Doc. 28-1 at 55). But Chief Hargett sent her home early, informing her that she was being "placed on administrative leave based on [her] going to the Council meeting." (Id.) The next day, while Plaintiff was in Birmingham with her father, the RPD called Plaintiff and told her to come to the station to meet with Chief Hargett and to bring all of her equipment and materials. (Id. at 56). Plaintiff acknowledged that she "assume[d] since I had to bring in all of my equipment, that I was being fired." (Id.). Plaintiff had at least two hours between the
While it is true that Plaintiff was not permitted to select the effective date of resignation and did not have the advice of counsel during the meeting, the circumstances under which Plaintiff signed her resignation were not coercive. The recording indicates that the tone and environment of the meeting was relaxed. Plaintiff implies that somehow pressure was exerted because "[t]hey even held the baby while she typed [her resignation] up on their computer." (Doc. 52 at 52). However, the recording reveals friendly conversation between Plaintiff and her co-worker about the baby while Plaintiff typed her resignation. (Doc. 39-79). Furthermore, Plaintiff testified that there was nothing coercive or threatening about the situation. (Doc. 28-1 at 59-60). See Hargray, 57 F.3d at 1570 (transcript revealed that "interview was conducted under a casual atmosphere, during which [Plaintiff] at times even laughed with the police").
The Hargray Court also recognized that "cases finding a resignation to be involuntary based on coercion or duress involve circumstances much more coercive than those in the instant case." Hargray, 57 F.3d at 1570. Those cases involved situations in which the employee's repeated requests for additional time and to speak to counsel were ignored, the employee was not informed of the charges or grounds for termination, and threatening tactics were used. The facts in Rodriguez are also inapposite to the facts in the instant case. In Rodriguez, the employer refused to tell the plaintiff why he was being fired, the plaintiff only learned of his termination at the moment he received his letter of termination, the employer refused to give him a reason for his termination, the plaintiff had five minutes to agree to submit his resignation, and the resignation letter was written by the employer, not the plaintiff. 863 F.3d at 1353-54.
Finally, Defendant had good cause to believe it had grounds to terminate Plaintiff. Defendant told Plaintiff she had violated the chain of command again. Rather than speak to Chief Hargett about the temporary schedule change to night shift (which had not yet been implemented), Plaintiff decided to go to City Council without telling anyone at the RPD. (Doc.
Based on the evidence in this case and authority discussed above, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not overcome the presumption that her resignation was voluntary. Plaintiff fails to prove an adverse action, necessary to establish a prima facie case. Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment on this claim.
Plaintiff asserts claims of gender discrimination under Title VII and Section 1983. Discrimination claims under both statutes are analyzed under the same legal framework. Quigg v. Thomas Cty. Sch. Dist., 814 F.3d 1227, 1235 (11th Cir. 2016). Discrimination claims can be established based on direct or circumstantial evidence. Id. Plaintiff has not produced direct evidence of gender discrimination, relying instead on circumstantial evidence. Thus, Defendants assert that the burden-shifting analysis set forth in McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 803, 93 S.Ct. 1817, applies to Plaintiff's claims.
Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that she does not have to adhere to a strict McDonnell Douglas framework and that the "appropriate framework for examining mixed motive claims" is the standard set forth in Quigg, 814 F.3d at 1232-33. (Doc. 52 at 46). Under Quigg, a plaintiff need only offer "`evidence sufficient to convince a jury that: (1) the defendant took an adverse employment action against the plaintiff; and (2) [a protected characteristic] was a motivating factor for the defendant's adverse employment action.'" Id. at 1239 (citation omitted). "In other words, the court must determine whether the `plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that [her protected characteristic] was a motivating factor for [an] adverse employment decision.'" Id.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff asserts a mixed-motive theory for the first time in her summary judgment response, in contrast with her complaints and overall argument which focus on a single-motive theory. (Doc. 53 at 21). The Eleventh Circuit held that "a plaintiff should not be required to label her complaint `as either a `pretext' case or a `mixed motives' case'. . . `because `[d]iscovery often will be necessary before the plaintiff can know whether both legitimate and illegitimate considerations played a part in the decision against her'." Babb v. Sec'y. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 743 F. App'x 280, 286-87 (11th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted). The Babb Court held that the plaintiff "sufficiently raised her mixed-motive theory . . . by arguing it in response to the [defendant's] summary judgment motion." Id. at 287. Accordingly, the Court applies the Quigg mixed-motive framework to Plaintiff's discrimination claims of demotion, disparate treatment, and constructive discharge.
Plaintiff alleges a discriminatory demotion on the basis of gender in violation of Title VII (Doc. 1, ¶ 16, No. 3:16-cv-01466). Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff's demotion constitutes an adverse employment action.
The Court turns to the second factor. To show gender was a motivating factor, Plaintiff argues that "Chief [Hargett] and [Cpt.] Prince told [her] in the beginning
Furthermore, Chief Hargett and Cpt. Prince explained that the training program was being implemented for all officers and that someone had to be the first officer to go through the program. (Doc. 53 at 23-24; Doc. 39-17, part 2 recording). Chief Hargett and Cpt. Prince stated that although she was the first, it had nothing to do with her being female, or white, or because she had red hair. (Id.).
Plaintiff also argues that Defendant "backdated the [training] policy to appear it was in effect before her demotion, then removed the day when producing it in this lawsuit so [Plaintiff] would not be able to establish it was enacted after her demotion." (Doc. 52 at 50-51). Cpt. Prince testified that he did not backdate the policy, the department had been working on the policy for some time, and the policy was published for employees to see on October 29, 2015. (Doc. 28-5 at 18-19). The RPD implemented the training program "to compensate for the relative inexperience of officers, including [Plaintiff], who would hold supervisory positions." (Doc. 53 at 23; Doc. 39-17, part 2 recording). The parties do not dispute that the RPD required "every officer promoted to sergeant since [Plaintiff] . . . to successfully complete the program." (Doc. 50 at 8, ¶ 14; Doc. 52 at 6, ¶ 14). These officers included males and a female. (Doc. 50 at 8, ¶ 14; Doc. 52 at 6, ¶ 14; Doc. 28-1 at 30). Plaintiff agreed that whether the new supervisor training policy was officially published or not, failing to successfully complete the training would be a valid reason to demote her. (Doc. 28-1 at 31). Accordingly, Plaintiff's conclusory arguments, without more, are without merit.
Plaintiff also argues that because her last evaluation prior to her promotion to sergeant was "glowing and contradicted everything in the field training evaluations," she was "qualified for the position." (Doc. 52 at 48). However, even if Plaintiff's evaluation as a patrol officer was "glowing," it is irrelevant in determining her performance as a sergeant. The field training evaluations measured her abilities as a sergeant, and these evaluations reflected Plaintiff's failure to exhibit command presence and control situations, difficulty organizing officers and distributing calls, unfamiliarity with policies and procedures, sleeping on duty, and insubordination. (Doc. 28-1 at 19-20, 120-26). The Court has already addressed above the issue of sleeping in a patrol car while on duty. As for insubordination, Plaintiff merely responds that "[s]he was criticized for explaining her actions and trying to engage with her superiors." (Doc. 52 at 50). She also asserts that Defendant did not sit down with her daily and give her the opportunity to correct criticisms. (Id.). However, Chief Hargett made clear to Plaintiff during their meeting that he had instructed the field
Finally, when Plaintiff was asked, "having you go through that training had nothing to do with your gender, correct?" Plaintiff replied, "No." (Id.). Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to show by a preponderance of the evidence that her gender was a motivating factor in the decision to demote her. Thus, the Court grants summary judgment on Plaintiff's demotion claim.
Plaintiff alleges disparate treatment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 159-63, No. 3:17-cv-01127). Specifically, she argues that she received discriminatory assignments and discipline. (Doc. 52 at 48).
Regarding discriminatory assignments, Plaintiff asserts that the RPD scheduled her to guard an inmate overnight in Huntsville (id.) and she did "not hav[e] the option or the accommodation of how [she] was supposed to express milk or have [her] child brought up to [her] to the hospital without being able to turn [her] back on the suspect." (Doc. 28-1 at 47). Defendant, however, reassigned Plaintiff to a night shift in Russellville. (Id.).
Plaintiff asserts that her reassignment to a night shift in Russellville was discriminatory because a "rookie male was assigned to day shift." (Doc. 52 at 49). Claims involving reassignments are "especially important" because in most cases, "an employee alleging a change in work assignments, without any tangible harm, will be outside the protection provided by Title VII's anti-discrimination clause." Hall v. Dekalb Cty. Gov't, 503 F. App'x 781, 787 (11th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). The Court does not "sit as a `super-personnel department,' and it is not [the Court's] role to second-guess the wisdom of [the defendant's] business decisions—indeed the wisdom of them is irrelevant—as long as those decisions were not made with a discriminatory motive." Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Developers, 610 F.3d 1253, 1266 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc)).
Cpt. Prince explained to Plaintiff that the reassignment to night shift was temporary until new supervisors gained more experience. (Doc. 30, Ex. L, recording). Male officers were also reassigned to night shifts. (Id.). Cpt. Prince also explained to Plaintiff that she and Officer Josh Thompkins could not be on the same shift because they both had the most disciplinary problems. (Id.). It is undisputed that Plaintiff left the RPD before the temporary reassignment actually took effect. Based on this evidence, not only does
As for discriminatory discipline, Plaintiff argues that "[s]he was docked pay for sleeping on the job. Everyone slept on the job. There is no evidence of anyone else being written up for sleeping on the job." (Doc. 52 at 51). She also argues that "[s]he was docked pay and terminated for violating the chain of command when clearly she did not violations [sic] of the chain of command as her complaints of discrimination were governed by a different policy." (Id.).
The Court discussed both of these allegations above under Plaintiff's retaliation claim, using the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas. Under a mixed-motive theory, Plaintiff has met her burden of establishing an adverse employment action as she suffered a loss in pay with respect to both disciplinary actions.
However, Plaintiff's assertion that everyone slept on the job but was not disciplined is inaccurate. Plaintiff identified one officer, Lt. Shackelford, who was asleep at his desk, but she provides no evidence that Chief Hargett was aware of the incident and failed to discipline him. Furthermore, Plaintiff fails to acknowledge that Lt. Shackelford was in the police station and not in his patrol car at the time of the incident. See supra, at 1243-44. As to the second allegation of discipline, Plaintiff's assertion that her complaints were governed by a "different" policy — and, therefore, she did not violate the chain of command — is simply erroneous. See supra, at 1244-45. Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot show that her gender was a motivating factor in Defendant's decision to discipline her.
Plaintiff also raises the issue of being "treated different from similarly [sic] males who had been promoted." (Doc. 52 at 47). This different treatment includes not being "moved from patrol to Sergeant in the system," being placed on a one year probation instead of six months,
Some of these incidents have been addressed above. As to the other incidents, Plaintiff has not shown that they rise to the level of an adverse employment action, i.e., "a serious and material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment." Howard, 605 F.3d at 1245 (citation omitted). Finally, this evidence, even accepted as true, simply does not amount to "sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that [gender] was a motivating factor" (Quigg, 814 F.3d at 1239) in Defendant's decision to demote her. Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment on these claims.
Plaintiff alleges a discriminatory discharge claim in violation of Title VII. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 146-51, No. 3:17-cv-1127). As noted above under the Court's discussion of retaliation, Plaintiff cannot establish that she suffered an adverse employment action because she voluntarily resigned from her position. Accordingly, summary judgment is granted on this claim.
Plaintiff alleges a hostile work environment claim on the basis of gender discrimination under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1, ¶ 15, No. 3:16-cv-1466; Doc. 1, ¶¶ 164-69, No. 3:17-cv-1127). To establish a hostile work environment claim, Plaintiff must show: (1) that she belongs to a protected group; (2) that she was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) that the harassment was based on her gender; (4) that the harassment was severe or pervasive enough to alter the terms and conditions of her employment and create a hostile or abusive working environment; and (5) that the employer is liable. Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283, 1292 (11th Cir. 2012).
A violation occurs when "the workplace is permeated with `discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult' that is `sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment.'" Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993) (citations omitted). In evaluating the sufficiency of the severe or pervasive aspect of the conduct, the Court must consider subjective and objective components. Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1246 (11th Cir. 1999). Four factors should be considered in analyzing whether the conduct objectively altered the conditions of the employee's employment:
Id. Furthermore, "courts should examine the conduct in context, not as isolated acts, and determine under the totality of the circumstances whether the harassing conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms or conditions of the plaintiff's employment and create a hostile or abusive working environment." Id.
Plaintiff devotes over two pages to the legal standard and case law to apply to her hostile work environment claims. However, she states in a single sentence that "[t]he defendant's conduct argued in Subsections I, II, III and IV was so severe and pervasive it materially altered [her] job." (Doc. 52 at 56). The totality of the conduct identified by Plaintiff and discussed above was not sufficiently severe or pervasive enough to alter her employment and create a hostile or abusive workplace. See McQueen v. Ala. Dep't. of Transp., 769 Fed.Appx. 816, 823 (11th Cir. 2019) (finding that the "mistreatment considered cumulatively was too sporadic and isolated to be considered pervasive"). Also, there are no allegations of sexual harassment, and none of the conduct she complains about was physically threatening or humiliating or unreasonably interfering with her job performance. Plaintiff has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact with regard to her hostile work environment claim.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated her rights under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) with respect to expressing
29 U.S.C. § 207(r)(1).
Plaintiff argues that she was not provided a private room to express breast milk and had to go home. (Doc. 52 at 53-54). Defendant asserts that it did provide Plaintiff with a private room—the break room. (Doc. 53 at 4). Plaintiff does not dispute the fact that the break room had a door that could be locked from the inside (Doc. 28-1 at 50; Doc. 28-5 at 20). Plaintiff argues that the room was not private because Chief Hargett and Cpt. Price had a key to the break room. (Doc. 52 at 53).
Plaintiff acknowledges that she had the option to go home to express breast milk. (Doc. 28-1 at 50-51). Plaintiff testified that she took two to three breaks during each shift. (Id. at 50). Because her breaks exceeded 60 minutes, which was her total allotted break time, she was counseled and required to make up any excessive time at the end of her shift. (Doc. 28-1 at 82, 96; Doc. 28-5 at 21-22; Doc. 39-55; Doc. 39-56).
For the reasons discussed above, the Court
