KRISTI K. DuBOSE, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff BP Products North America Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 31), brief and evidentiary materials in support (Docs. 32, 33 & 41), Defendant Merritt Oil Co., Inc.'s Response (Doc. 36), Defendant R. Fred Walding's Response (Doc. 37), and Plaintiff's Reply (Doc. 38). Upon consideration, and for the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is due to be
On November 12, 2010, Plaintiff BP Products North America Inc. ("BP Products") filed a complaint in this Court against Defendants Merritt Oil Co., Inc. ("Merritt Oil"), Richard Blow ("Blow"), Richard Merritt ("Merritt"), and R. Fred Walding ("Walding"), alleging breaches of various contracts and seeking enforcement of certain personal guaranty agreements. (Doc. 1). Defendants Merritt Oil and Merritt answered the Complaint on December 3, 2010. (Doc. 8). On December 17, 2010, Defendant Walding filed his answer and simultaneously asserted three cross-claims against his two individual co-defendants. (Doc. 10). Defendant Blow filed his answer on December 22, 2010 but did not respond to the cross-claims. (Doc. 12). On January 7, 2011, Merritt answered the allegations of Walding's cross-complaint. (Doc. 13).
On July 21, 2011, BP Products filed a Motion for Summary Judgment against Merritt Oil and Walding.
Summary judgment should be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). If a party asserts that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed, that party must
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A)-(B).
BP Products, as the party seeking summary judgment, bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir.1991) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). If a non-moving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of its case with respect to which it has the burden of proof, the moving party is entitled to summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. In reviewing whether a non-moving party has met its burden, the court must stop short of weighing the evidence and making credibility determinations of the truth of the matter. Instead, the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in its favor. Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen, 965 F.2d 994, 998-99 (11th Cir.1992) (internal citations and quotations omitted), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911, 113 S.Ct. 1259, 122 L.Ed.2d 657 (1993).
In this case, Defendants Merritt Oil and Walding have not challenged any of BP Products' proposed findings of fact. (Docs. 36 & 37). Merritt Oil expressly concedes BP Products' entitlement to summary judgment (Doc. 36 at 1), and Walding professes an inability to offer a "thorough" response to BP Products' motion, claiming he was denied access to Merritt Oil's records between his March 2009 resignation from Merritt Oil and the December 2010 commencement of this action. (Doc. 37 at 2-3, ¶¶ 9-11). In accordance with Local Rule 7.2(b), the Court considers Merritt Oil and Walding's failures to "point out the disputed facts" as admissions that no material factual dispute exists. See Mann v. Taser Int'l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1302-03 (11th Cir.2009) (giving deference to district court's interpretation of local rule providing that, if a party responding to a summary judgment motion does not directly refute a material fact set forth in the movant's statement of material facts with specific citations to evidence or otherwise fails to state a valid objection to the material fact, such fact will be deemed admitted).
By failing to contest BP Products' proposed facts, Merritt Oil and Walding have not met their burden to present evidence upon which the Court could find that there is a genuine issue of material fact. However,
BP Products is a Maryland corporation engaged in the business of selling gasoline, diesel fuel, and other petroleum products to independent jobbers and dealers. (Doc. 1 at 2, ¶ 3).
(Id.).
Merritt Oil's obligations to BP Products arose out of various contracts—a Branded Jobber Contract; a Jobber Re-Image Program ("JRP") Contract and a JRP Assignment and Assumption agreement; two Jobber Outlet Incentive Program ("JOIP") Contracts and two JOIP Assignment and Assumption agreements; and an Electronic Point of Sale ("EPOS") Contract—each of which is discussed briefly below.
BP Products and Merritt Oil entered into a Branded Jobber Contract dated June 14, 2006 pursuant to which BP agreed to sell, and Merritt Oil agreed to purchase, BP-branded petroleum products
By letter dated July 29, 2009, BP Products terminated its relationship with Merritt Oil under the Branded Jobber Contract, alleging that, in violation of the parties' agreement and certain state and federal laws, Merritt Oil had comingled motor fuels at a number of its stations. (Doc. 1-3 at 1-3). The termination was to take effect on August 7, 2009, but BP Products granted Merritt Oil a one-week extension. (Doc. 1-3 at 4).
Between July 30, 2009 and August 11, 2009—as Merritt Oil's contractual relationship with BP Products was coming to an end—BP Products delivered $683,464.67 of petroleum products to Merritt Oil. (Doc. 32-2). During that same time period, Merritt Oil made seven wire payments to BP Products totaling $591,000.00, resulting in a remaining balance of $92,464.67. (Doc. 32-3).
On October 27, 2009 and September 1, 2010, counsel for BP Products sent letters to Merritt Oil demanding, inter alia, payment of the unpaid fuel balance (
Though a fully executed and dated copy of their agreement has not been placed in the record, the parties do not dispute that they entered into a JRP Contract pursuant to which BP Products made funds available to Merritt Oil for the purpose of re-imaging its stations. (Doc. 1-2 at 1-4; Doc. 32 at 5, ¶ 22; Doc. 36 at; Doc. 37 at 2-3, ¶¶ 10-11). Additionally, on January 11, 2006, Merritt Oil assumed responsibility for re-imaging a BP-branded station operated by Chattahoochee Oil Co., Inc. ("Chattahoochee") by entering into an Assignment and Assumption of Jobber Re-Image Program Contract with Chattahoochee.
(Doc. 1-2 at 3, ¶ 7(a)). The repayment provisions of Merritt Oil's Assignment and Assumption agreement with Chattahoochee was substantively similar. (Id. at 9, ¶ 6(a)). Applying amortization rates set forth in the JRP Contracts, BP Products has calculated and made a sufficient, undisputed showing that Merritt Oil owed
Additionally, the JRP Contracts required Merritt Oil to reimburse BP Products for certain costs related to the "Mystery Shop" audit program. (Doc. 1-2 at 2, ¶ 4(c); id. at 8, ¶ 4(c)). BP has calculated the undisputed amount due to be
On May 23, 2005 and June 8, 2007, Merritt Oil entered into JOIP Contracts with BP Products. (Doc. 1-4 at 1-11). Those contracts provided that, as incentive to build, modernize, or acquire retail locations, BP Products would pay Merritt Oil either a lump sum or a rebate on gasoline purchased from BP Products. (Id.). The JOIP Contracts further provided that, in the event that a retail location covered by the contract was debranded, Merritt Oil would return all or some of the incentive payments pursuant to an amortization schedule. (Id. at 3-4 ¶¶ 5, 7; id. at 8-9, ¶¶ 5, 7).
Merritt Oil also accepted assignment of two JOIP Contracts involving other jobbers. Specifically, on May 1, 2001, Merritt Oil accepted assignment of a JOIP Contract between Sterling Oil Company ("Sterling") and Amoco Oil Company, and, on February 15, 2007, Merritt Oil accepted assignment of a JOIP Contract between Prince Oil Company, Inc. ("Prince") and BP Products. (Id. at 12-23). Sterling and Prince's JOIP Contracts were each substantially similar to Merritt Oil's JOIP Contracts, and both required the return of unamortized incentive payments should a covered location be debranded. (Id. at 14-15, ¶¶ 5-6; id. at 20-21, ¶¶ 5, 7).
By virtue of BP Products' termination of Merritt Oil's Branded Jobber Contracts, all of the Merritt Oil, Sterling, and Prince locations receiving JOIP payments debranded on August 15, 2009. (Doc. 32-6). Applying amortization rates set forth in the JOIP Contracts, BP Products has calculated and made a sufficient, undisputed showing that the unamortized portion of
Sometime between September 25, 2005 and October 31, 2007,
BP Products has identified 14 Merritt Oil locations that that debranded before the expiration of the five-year amortization period. (Doc. 32 at 13-14, ¶¶ 69 & 72). Applying the amortization rates set forth in the EPOS Contract, BP Products has calculated and made a sufficient, undisputed showing that the unamortized portion of reimbursable equipment and installation costs is equal to
"[A] federal court in a diversity case is required to apply the laws, including principles of conflict of laws, of the state in which the federal court sits." Manuel v. Convergys Corp., 430 F.3d 1132, 1139 (11th Cir.2005) (citing Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941)). Alabama courts hold that contract claims are governed by the laws of the state where the contract was made, unless the contracting parties chose a particular state's laws to govern their agreement. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland v. Brown, 582 So.2d 502, 506 (Ala.1991). Though the parties have neither briefed the question of which state's law should apply to BP Products' contract claims nor put forward any evidence as to where the Branded Jobber, JRP, JOIP, and EPOS Contracts were made, BP Products' memorandum in support of its motion cites to Alabama case law, and the Unlimited Guaranties were executed in Alabama. (Doc. 1-6 at 1, 3-5).
Counts I, III, IV, and V of BP Products' complaint allege against Merritt Oil breaches of its Branded Jobber, JRP, JOIP, and EPOS Contracts. (Doc. 1 at 10-14, ¶¶ 44-77). Under Alabama law, the essential elements of a cause of action for breach of contract are the existence of a valid contract binding the parties; plaintiff's performance under the contract; defendant's nonperformance; and damages. See, e.g., Jones v. Alfa Mut. Ins. Co., 875 So.2d 1189, 1195 (Ala.2003).
In this case, each of the elements is met. BP has put before the Court the contracts themselves (Docs. 1-1, 1-2, 1-4 & 41), a sworn affidavit and supporting documentation that attests to payments and deliveries made by BP Products and receipt of the same by Merritt Oil (Docs. 32-1, 32-2, 32-3 & 32-4), and spreadsheets calculating BP Products' damages (Docs. 32-5, 32-6 & 32-7).
Count VI of BP Products' complaint is pled against Defendants Merritt, Blow, and Walding as an action on guaranty. In Alabama, "[e]very suit on a guaranty agreement requires proof of the existence of the guaranty contract, default on the underlying contract by the debtor, and nonpayment of the amount due from the guarantor under the terms of the guaranty." Delro Indus., Inc. v. Evans, 514 So.2d 976, 979 (Ala.1987). If the guaranty is a continuing guaranty (such as the Unlimited Guaranties at issue in this case), an additional element of notice to the guarantor of the debtor's default must also be proven. Sharer v. Bend Millwork Sys., Inc., 600 So.2d 223, 226 (Ala.1992). However, notice need not be given when the terms of the guaranty expressly dispense with the need for it. Id. Furthermore, when a contract is one of "absolute" or unconditional guaranty (as in this case), a creditor may pursue its remedy against the guarantor without first seeking to collect from the principal debtor. Pilalas v. Baldwin Cnty. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 So.2d 92, 94 (Ala.1989).
In this case, the uncontroverted evidence shows that Walding executed no fewer than four Unlimited Guaranties (Doc. 1-6 at 1-3 & 5); that Merritt Oil defaulted on its Branded Jobber, JRP, JOIP, and EPOS Contracts; that Walding never paid the amounts owed to BP Products by Merritt Oil; and that BP Products notified Walding of Merritt Oil's default, even though Walding had expressly waived such notice. Walding's untimely and unsigned response to BP Products' motion for summary judgment is silent as to the elements of an action on guaranty and offers no defense to BP Products' claim.
In light of the foregoing, BP Products' motion for summary judgment is
According to BP Products, Merritt Oil owes various amounts under each of its contracts. (And, as noted above, whatever Merritt Oil owes, Walding also owes by virtue of his Unlimited Guaranties.) Specifically, BP Product claims $13,882.66 for audit fees, $92,464.67 for unpaid fuel charges, $1,613.91 for Mystery Shop program fees, $271,735.30 for JRP, JOIP, and EPOS fees, funds, and costs, and contractual interest in the amount of
Additionally, once this Court issues a Judgment, BP Products will be entitled to postjudgment interest at a rate equal to the weekly average 1-year constant maturity Treasury yield for the calendar week preceding the date of judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (2006); Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Lexow, 937 F.2d 569, 572 n. 4 (11th Cir. 1991) ("[I]n awarding postjudgment interest in a diversity case, a district court will apply the federal interest statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a), rather than the state interest statute.").
The terms of each of the contracts at issue in this case—including the Unlimited Guaranties—provide for the reimbursement of BP Products' "reasonable" costs and attorneys' fees.
Though BP Products' entitlement to reasonable attorneys' fees is uncontested, the Court cannot award such fees at the present time. Ms. Voss' barebones affidavit states only that BP has paid $30,000 to the Greensfelder firm and another $2,231.66 to local counsel. (Id. at 1, ¶ 4). The affidavit does not provide any detail as to the rates charged for legal work on this case, the number of hours expended, or the tasks performed. Compounding the affidavit's insufficiency is that fact that it is unsupported by any documentary evidence whatsoever (e.g., itemized statements, billing records, invoices, information as to hourly rates for attorneys, etc.).
Because a party's request for fees may be disallowed where the party fails to itemize or explain what the fees represent or how they were incurred, see, e.g., Vision Bank v. Hill, No. 10-0333-WS-N, 2011 WL 250430, at *4 n. 6 (S.D.Ala. Jan. 25, 2011), BP Products is
In accordance with the foregoing, it is