ORDER

CALLIE V. S. GRANADE, District Judge.

This matter is before the court on the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge (Doc. 18), Plaintiff Thomas Williams' ("Williams") objection (Doc. 19), and Defendant Raymond & Associates, LLC's ("Raymond & Associates") response thereto (Doc. 23). Also before the court are the motions to amend the complaint filed by Williams (Docs. 20 & 21) and Raymond & Associates' response in opposition (Doc. 22).

The Magistrate Judge recommended that Raymond & Associates' motion to dismiss (Doc. 6) be granted. Specifically, the Magistrate Judge determined that dismissal was appropriate because Williams failed to file his complaint within 90 days of receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC as required by the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(1) & 12117(a).

After due and proper consideration of all portions of this file deemed relevant to the issue raised, and a de novo determination of those portions of the recommendation to which objection is made, the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge made under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) is ADOPTED as the opinion of this Court, with the following additional discussion.

DISCUSSION

Williams "stipulates that any Title VII claims would be subject to the ninety-day filing period, but maintains that his ADA claims may be filed within two-years." See Doc. 19 at 2. To support his argument, Williams relies on the case of Everett v. Cobb, 138 F.3d 1407 (11th Cir. 1998). In Everett, the plaintiff brought claims of disability discrimination pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act, Title II of the ADA and state law against several public entities. Id. at 1408. The court held that because Title II of the ADA does not contain a limitations period, the analogous state personal injury statute should apply. Everett, 138 F.3d at 1409.

Unlike in Everett, however, Williams did not file a disability-discrimination claim pursuant to Title II of the ADA against a public entity.1 Rather, Williams filed a claim for disability discrimination under Title I of the ADA against his employer. The Magistrate Judge set forth the law regarding the timeliness of filing a claim pursuant to Title I in his report and recommendation as follows:

(Doc. 18 at 5).

Here, Williams did not file within the 90-day limitations period set forth in Title VII and the ADA. See Miller v. Georgia, 223 F. App'x 842, 844 (11th Cir. 2007) ("Under Title VII, a plaintiff must file [his] complaint in district court within 90 days of [his] receipt of a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC . . . The ADA provides the same statute of limitations, as it expressly incorporates the enforcement mechanisms contained in Title VII[.]"). It is undisputed that the EEOC mailed the right-to-sue letter on December 31, 2012, (Doc. 7, Ex. 2) and Williams did not file his complaint until almost a year later on December 24, 2013 (Doc. 1). The right-to-sue letter specifically informed Williams that "Your lawsuit must be filed WITHIN 90 DAYS of your receipt of this notice[,] or your right to sue based on this charge will be lost." See Doc. 7, Ex. 2. Williams has not offered any evidence that demonstrates he is not to blame for the untimely filing of the suit. Accordingly, the court finds that dismissal of Williams' disability-discrimination claim is appropriate. O'Donnell v. Punta Gorda HMA, LLC, 2011 WL 3168144, *2 (M.D. Fla. Jul. 27, 2011) ("Under the Americans with Disabilities Act [ ] and Title VII, a plaintiff must bring a suit within 90 days of receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC . . . When the plaintiff fails to do so, dismissal is appropriate, unless [ ] he shows that the delay was through no fault of [his] own.").

It appears that Williams filed his motion to amend the complaint in an attempt to circumvent this result. Williams seeks to amend his complaint to assert claims against the "Defendant pursuant to the civil rights statute 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which does not contain the same Title VII requirements as the original claims alleged by the Plaintiff."3 See Doc. 21-1 at 1. Raymond & Associates argue that granting Williams' leave to amend will result in prejudice, undue delay, and further burden on the judicial system because the amended claim is meritless. The court agrees. Section 1981a does not provide discrimination plaintiffs with a separate cause of action. King, 2009 WL 1322341, *2. It merely "authorizes the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages to remedy intentional employment discrimination" in addition to the "equitable relief provided under Title VII." Id. Because Williams' claim asserted pursuant to Title I of the ADA is dismissed, the allegations contained in the amended complaint will also be dismissed, as § 1981a does not provide an independent cause of action for claims of disability discrimination. Thus, the court finds that Williams' motion to amend the complaint is due to be denied.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation (Doc. 18) is ADOPTED. It is ORDERED that Raymond & Associates' motion to dismiss (Doc. 6) is GRANTED. Williams' motions to amend the complaint are DENIED (Docs. 20 & 21).

DONE and ORDERED.