KRISTI K. DUBOSE, District Judge.
This action is before the Court on the motion for summary judgment, brief in support of the motion, suggested determinations of undisputed facts and conclusions of law, and evidentiary material filed by defendants Guyoung Tech USA, Inc. and Jin Rae Cho (the defendants) (docs. 32-35); the response in opposition to the motion and brief in support, the response to the suggested determinations of undisputed facts and conclusions of law, and evidence in support filed by plaintiff Tanisha Stallworth (doc. 41-44;) and the defendants' reply (doc. 45). Upon consideration, and for the reasons stated herein, the defendants' motion for summary judgment is
On April 18, 2013, Stallworth filed her complaint against defendants Guyoung Tech USA, Inc. (Guyoung Tech) and Jin Rae Cho (Cho). (Doc.1) Stallworth brought Count I for hostile environment based on sex and Count II for retaliation alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Stallworth also brought state law claims of negligent supervision (Count III) and wanton supervision (Count IV) against defendant Guyoung Tech only and state law claims for invasion of privacy (Count V), outrage (Count VII), and assault and battery (Count VII) against defendants Cho and Guyoung Tech. The parties stipulated to the dismissal of Stallworth's claim for retaliation as pled in Count II. (Doc. 31) Defendants have now filed their motion for summary judgment as to Stallworth's remaining claims.
Guyoung Tech operates a welding facility and automotive parts supplier in Castleberry, Alabama. At all relevant times, Guyoung Tech included its "Policy Against Harassment" in the Employee Handbook. (Doc. 34-1, p. 6-7) The Policy defines sexual harassment and includes in that definition, "verbal or physical conduct perceived as sexual in nature . . . when . . . [s]uch conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with the individual's job performance or creating an unfriendly or offensive work environment." (Id., p. 7) As to reporting, the Policy provides as follows:
(Id., p. 8)
In May 2012, Guyoung Tech hired Stallworth to work as an operator on the small press line. Stallworth received a copy of the Employee Handbook when she was hired and knew that she could report harassment to her supervisor or the Human Resources Manager. On or about June 21, 2012, she transferred to the A&C frame line, a welding line where headrest parts are made. At all relevant times, Cho was Vice-President of Guyoung Tech and a supervisor. Stallworth did not frequently interact with Cho, but had seen him walk through the plant.
On Thursday, June 28, 2012, Stallworth was working on the A&C frame line loading parts into the welding machine. "Cho came up behind Stallworth and began to explain how the parts should be on her machine and took one of his hands and placed it on Stallworth's right butt cheek." (Doc. 43, p. 8, Stallworth's Suggested Findings of Fact) "Stallworth backed away from Cho and she asked her co-worker, Alejandra, to go over to Cho and see what he was saying." (Id., p. 9) "Cho begged Stallworth to come back to the machine, so she did, and he began again to explain about the parts on her machine." (Id.) "When Cho finished his explanation he took his hands and patted both of Stallworth's butt cheeks, smiled, and put his thumb up." (Id.)
On Saturday, June 30, 2012, Stallworth reported this incident to Brad Dees who took over as team leader when Robert Bowman, the plant production manager, was not there. He told her "that's their culture; that ain't the first time Mr. Cho did that and won't be the last." "Dees then laughed and told Stallworth to pray about it" and "if she still felt uncomfortable that she should talk to HR when they got back that Monday." (Id., p. 10)
In contrast, Dees testified that this conversation occurred on Friday, July 6, 2012. (Doc. 41-3, p. 4) Dees denied telling Stallworth "that that is their culture, that ain't the first time Mr. Cho did that, and that won't be the last." (Id. p. 7) He admitted he "briefly laughed" but Stallworth "still seemed upset" and he told her that if she was still feeling uncomfortable, to talk with Human Resources when they returned on Monday. (Id.) Dees did not know of any other person who complained about having their butt grabbed by the South Korean managers. (Id.)
"During the week of the line shutdown, Stallworth saw Cho grab Ashley Kyles' butt." (Doc. 43, p. 11) Stallworth does not specify when the line was shutdown but it appears to have occurred during the week of July 4, 2012.
"On July 3, 2012, Stallworth went through the main offices to look for numbers to call to complain. Stallworth saw only numbers and Korean writing that she did not understand. Stallworth went into Bowman's office, but Bowman was not there. Stallworth saw Courtney Riley, the supervisor for Quality Control, and asked him where she could find a phone number to file a complaint about Cho sexually assaulting her. Riley asked whom Stallworth needed to call. Stallworth said either Leigh Ross in Human Resources or Robert Bowman. Riley told Stallworth that he could not give out cell or home numbers and that she would have to wait until everybody came back on July 9, 2012." (Doc. 43, p. 11)
Riley testified that Stallworth approached him stating that "[s]he felt that she was brushed up against by one of our office employees" but they "didn't go over the specifics". Riley then directed "her to the chain of command, which would be a supervisor and the HR manager." Riley had no knowledge of any of the South Korean managers grabbing anyone's butt. (Doc. 41-8, p. 8-10)
"On Friday, July 6, 2012, Stallworth asked Greg Gray, a team leader/manager, if they ever had a problem with Cho touching women's butts. Mr. Gray told her yes, `you ain't the first and you won't be the last.'" (Id., p. 11-12) "On July 7, 2012, Stallworth asked co-worker Tamara McIntosh if she knew whether Cho had ever touched any women's butts before. Tamara told Stallworth that Mr. Cho had grabbed her butt before." (Id. p. 12).
On July 9, 2012, Stallworth went to Human Resources and told Leigh Ross, Human Resources Manager, about the incident and filled out an incident report. Stallworth reported as follows:
(Doc. 43, p. 12-13)
Guyoung Tech had never received any report or complaint either prior to the June 28, 2012 incident or afterward that Cho had touched anyone in a sexually inappropriate manner or otherwise engaged in any unwelcome sexually inappropriate conduct toward anyone. (Doc. 34-1, Ross declaration, p. 3)
Bowman heard from Riley, that Cho may have touched Stallworth's buttocks and conveyed this information to Ross who had already spoken with Stallworth. (Doc. 35, p. 5) The same day, Bowman, Ross, Cho, and Moo Chan Lee who was the President of Guyoung Tech at that time, met in Lee's office and discussed the incident. Cho stated he "might have touched" Stallworth while he "was passing her in a narrow area." (Doc. 41-2, Cho deposition, p. 21) Ross ultimately determined that Cho had touched Stallworth accidentally and not in a sexually inappropriate manner. (Doc. 34-1, Ross declaration, p. 3)
Later that day, Bowman
After the meeting, Cho returned to the plant floor, "looked at Stallworth, made an ugly face, started hitting himself on his head, and then walked off." (Doc. 43, p. 17) The next day, July 10, 2012, Stallworth spoke to Bowman about Cho's behavior and explained that "she was half scared to come into work this morning." (Id.) Bowman assured Stallworth that Cho was not angry and that he would not harm her. (Id.)
On July 10, 2012, Cho was directed by Ross to complete retraining on the company's anti-harassment policy, to reiterate, reaffirm, and remind him of the Policy Against Harassment and what could be considered sexual harassment, such as an inappropriate touching. Cho was reminded that he was not to touch anyone on the buttocks or otherwise touch anyone in a sexually inappropriate manner. (Doc. 34-1, Ross Declaration) That same day, Cho signed an acknowledgement that he had received the training on sexual harassment in the workplace. (Doc. 34-1, p. 8)
On July 11, 2012, Stallworth left work at 11:00 a.m. because her son was ill. She made a doctor's appointment for her son for the next day and also made an appointment for herself because of stress, fatigue and "nightmares of Mr. Cho coming to get her." (Doc. 43, p. 18) The doctor gave her a "prescription to go home, get some rest and return to work on July 15, 2012." (Id.) Stallworth did not return to work but called in several times. Then, on July 24, 2012, during a telephone conversation with Bowman, she was told that her services were no longer needed. Stallworth conceded that she was subject to a 90-day probation period during which unexcused absences and tardies could be grounds for termination.
Summary judgment should be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). If a party raises the assertion "that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed", the party must
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A)(B).
Defendants, as the parties seeking summary judgment bear "the initial burden to show the district court, by reference to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at trial." Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). The party seeking summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Clark, 929 F.2d at 608 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986)).
Once the defendants have satisfied their responsibility, the burden shifts to Stallworth, as the non-movant, to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. "In reviewing whether the nonmoving party has met its burden, the court must stop short of weighing the evidence and making credibility determination of the truth of the matter. Instead, the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen, 965 F.2d 994, 999 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (1986)); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-159, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608-1609 (1970). However, "[a] moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the nonmoving party has `failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.'" In re Walker, 48 F.3d 1161, 1163 (11th Cir. 1995) (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S. Ct. at 2552). Overall, the court must "resolve all issues of material fact in favor of the [non-movant], and then determine the legal question of whether the [movant] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law under that version of the facts." McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1288 (11
However, the mere existence of any factual dispute will not automatically necessitate denial of a motion for summary judgment; rather, only factual disputes that are material preclude entry of summary judgment.Lofton v. Secretary of Dept. of Children and Family Services, 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11th Cir. 2004). "An issue of fact is material if it is a legal element of the claim under the applicable substantive law which might affect the outcome of the case. It is genuine if the record taken as a whole could lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party." Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 594 F.3d 798, 807 (11th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).
Defendants argue that Stallworth cannot make her prima facie case to establish a sexually hostile work environment because the alleged incidents if proven were not sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of her employment and create a discriminatorily abusive working environment. Defendants argue that Cho's alleged conduct on June 28, 2012 was not pervasive in that only two touchings occurred that day and that the touchings were not severe. Defendants point out that Cho's conduct did not alter Stallworth's working conditions and that she worked without incident or further complaints regarding Cho. They also argue that Stallworth's alleged evidence that she saw Cho touch Ashley Kyle's butt does not bolster her claim that Cho's conduct was severe or pervasive.
Stallworth argues that she has shown that Cho grabbed her butt, that Cho has grabbed other female butts, and that the South Korean managers at Guyoung Tech have a problem with grabbing female employee's butts. She argues that the series of incidents by Cho or by other South Korean managers were sufficiently continuous and concerted to alter the conditions of her working environment and for all female employees at Guyoung Tech.
"Title VII prohibits employers from sexually harassing employees and thereby creating a hostile work environment." Arafat v. School Bd. of Broward County, 549 Fed. Appx. 872, 874 (11th Cir.2013) (citing Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 594 F.3d 798, 807 (11th Cir.2010) (en banc)). To sufficiently plead her prima facie case, Stallworth "must allege that (1) she belongs to a protected group, (2) she has been subject to unwelcome harassment, (3) the harassment was based on her gender, (4) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of employment and create a discriminatorily abusive working environment, and (5) there is a basis for holding the employer liable." Arafat, 549 Fed. Appx. at 874-875 (citing Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1245 (11th Cir.1999) (en banc)). "[T]he evidence of harassment is considered both cumulatively and in the totality of the circumstances." Reeves, 594 F.3d at 808. Also, "[e]ither severity or pervasiveness is sufficient to establish a violation of Title VII." Id. (italics in original).
The fourth element requires Stallworth to prove her "environment was both subjectively and objectively hostile." Id. at 809. In that regard, she must "`subjectively perceive' the harassment as sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter the terms or conditions of her employment, and her subjective perception must be objectively reasonable." Id. (citation omitted). "[T]he objective severity of harassment should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position, considering `all the circumstances.'" Id. (citation omitted). "In evaluating allegedly discriminatory conduct," the district court considers "its `frequency . . .; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance.'"Id., at 808-809 (citation omitted) Overall, the test is whether "members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed." Id., at 808.
On motion for summary judgment, the Court must accept Stallworth's "version of the facts as true," Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1227 (11th Cir.2004), and draw all reasonable inferences in her favor. Thus, the Court finds that there is no dispute of fact that Stallworth is a member of a protected group, that Cho touched her buttocks twice and this conduct was unwelcome, and that his harassing conduct was based on her gender.
However, the Court finds that Stallworth is unable to establish the fourth element of her prima facie case. As to Stallworth's subjective perception, she alleges that her doctor prescribed two days of home rest for the stress and fatigue resulting from nightmares that Cho was "coming to get her." (Doc. 43, p. 18) Stallworth was upset by the incident and spoke to Bowman about Cho's behavior, explaining that "she was half scared to come into work", the morning of July 10, 2012. Thus, she subjectively perceived that the harassment was severe enough to alter the terms and conditions of her employment. However, "a plaintiff's subjective feelings and personal reactions are not the complete measure of whether conduct is of a nature that it interferes with job performance. If it were, the most unreasonably hypersensitive employee would be entitled to more protection than a reasonable employee, and the standard would not have an objective component." Gupta v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 586 (11th Cir. 2000) overruled on other grounds by Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006)).
Analyzing the severity of the incidents from the perspective of a reasonable person in Stallworth's position, and considering the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that she has failed to establish the objective component. Arguably, Cho touching Stallworth's butt in front of her co-workers may have been humiliating. However, the June 28, 2012 touching incident and the incident where Stallworth saw Cho hit himself in the head and make an ugly face toward her on July 10, 2012, are not conduct that was frequent, severe, or physically threatening, or of a nature that would unreasonably interfere with Stallworth's work performance. Additionally, Stallworth left work at 11:00 a.m. on July 11, 2012 and did not return. Thus, she had no further contact with Cho.
Between June 28, 2012 and July 9, 2012, Stallworth saw Cho touch Kyles' butt, heard from McIntosh that Cho had grabbed her butt, was told by Dees and Gray that Cho and other Korean managers engaged in butt grabbing, was told by Dukes that Cho had rubbed her back and touched her butt, and was told by Bowman that years ago, Cho had grabbed his crotch.
Stallworth cannot establish the fourth element of her prima facie case for hostile work environment based on sex. Therefore, defendant Guyoung Tech is entitled to summary judgment as to Count I.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the Court has jurisdiction to decide Stallworth's claims under Title VII in Count I. Section 1331 provides the district courts with original jurisdiction over civil actions "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." The Court is also given the additional authority to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Stallworth's state law claims in Counts III through VII if they are "are so related to claims in the action . . . that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
Although § 1367(a) gives the Court supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), provides that "the district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction." In that regard, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit "ha[s] encouraged district courts to dismiss any remaining state claims when . . . the federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial." Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1089 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam). See also United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) ("Needless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law. Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed as well."); Mergens v. Dreyfoos, 166 F.3d 1114, 1119 (11th Cir. 1999) ("[T]his Court has noted that `if the federal claims are dismissed prior to trial, Gibbs strongly encourages or even requires dismissal of state claims.'" (quoting L.A. Draper & Son v. Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc., 735 F.2d 414, 428 (11th Cir. 1984) (citing Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726))); Dockens v. Dekalb Cnty. Sch. Sys., 441 Fed. Appx. 704, 709 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) ("Once the district court properly granted summary judgment for the School System on the FMLA claims, no federal claims remained. It was not abuse of discretion for the court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim.").
The Court has now granted summary judgment in favor of defendant Guyoung Tech as to Count I, which formed the basis for the Court's original jurisdiction. Therefore, upon consideration, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims against defendants Guyoung Tech and Cho. Accordingly, Counts III through VII are
Upon consideration of the evidence and for the reasons set forth herein, the Court finds that defendant Guyoung Tech is entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to Stallworth's claim of hostile environment based on sex under Title VII as alleged in Count I. See McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1288 (11
Judgment shall be entered by separate document as provided in Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
