BERT W. MILLING, Jr., Magistrate Judge.
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's Attorney's Application for Attorney Fees Under the Equal Access to Justice Act (hereinafter EAJA), with supporting Documentation (Doc. 199), and Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Application for Attorney Fees (Doc. 20). After consideration of the pertinent pleadings, it is
Plaintiff filed this action on March 25, 2014 (Doc. 1). On October 8, the undersigned Judge entered a Memorandum Opinion and Order, reversing the decision of the Commissioner, and remanding this action for further proceedings (Doc. 17). Judgment was entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant on that same day (Doc. 18).
On December 16, 2014, Byron A. Lassiter, Counsel for Plaintiff, filed an Application for Attorney Fees Under the EAJA, in which he requested a fee of $3,901.15, computed at an hourly rate of $190.30 for 20.5 hours spent in this Court (Doc. 19). Defendant, in her Response filed on December 29, stated that she had no objection to the award of fees, but noted that payment should be made to Plaintiff rather than to his Attorney (Doc. 20).
The EAJA requires a court to
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The EAJA further requires that a prevailing party file an application for attorney's fees within thirty days of final judgment in the action. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). The court's judgment is final sixty days after it is entered, which is the time in which an appeal may be taken pursuant to Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292 (1993).
As set out above, there are three statutory conditions that must be satisfied before EAJA fees may be awarded under 28 U.S.C. § 2412. See Myers v. Sullivan, 916 F.2d 659, 666 (11
Defendant apparently concedes that Plaintiff became the prevailing party when the Court remanded this action, Schaefer, 509 U.S. 300-302, that the fee motion was timely filed, and that the original administrative decision denying benefits was not substantially justified (Doc. 20).
Having found that the three prerequisites have been satisfied, the Court will now discuss the fee to be awarded in this action. The EAJA, like 42 U.S.C. § 1988, is a fee-shifting statute. The Supreme Court has indicated that "`the most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.'" Watford v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 1562, 1586 (11
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 (citations omitted). Counsel must use professional judgment in billing under EAJA. A lawyer should only be compensated for hours spent on activities for which he would bill a client of means who was seriously intent on vindicating similar rights. Norman v. Housing Authority, 836 F.2d 1292, 1301 (11
The Court, after examination of Plaintiff's Attorney's Application and supporting documentation, and after consideration of the reasonableness of the hours claimed, finds that Plaintiff's Counsel's time expended in prosecuting this action for a total of 20.5 hours is reasonable.
With respect to a determination of the hourly rate to apply in a given EAJA case, the express language of the Act provides in pertinent part as follows:
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (Supp. 1997).
In Meyer v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 1029 (11
Meyer, 958 F.2d at 1033-34 (citations and footnote omitted).
Since 2001, the prevailing market rate in the Southern District of Alabama has been $125.00 per hour. See, e.g., Smith v. Massanari, Civil Action 00-0812-P-M (S.D. Ala. October 25, 2001); and Square v. Halter, Civil Action 00-0516-BH-L (S.D. Ala. April 12, 2001). However, in 2007, in an action before U.S. Magistrate Judge Cassady, a formula was approved and used to adjust the prevailing market hourly rate to account for the ever-increasing cost of living. Lucy v. Barnhart, Civil Action 06-0147-C (S.D. Ala. July 5, 2007 (Doc. 32)). As set out in Lucy, the formula to be used in calculating all future awards of attorney's fees under the EAJA is: "`($125/hour) × (CPI-U Annual Average "All Items Index," South Urban, for month and year of temporal midpoint
The temporal midpoint in this action was July 2, 2014, the complaint having been filed on March 25, 2014 (Doc. 1), and the Court having entered its Memorandum Opinion and Order and Judgment on October 8, 2014 (Docs. 17-18). The CPI-U for July 2014 was 232.013. Plugging the relevant numbers into the foregoing formula renders the following equation: $125.00 x 232.013/152.4. Completion of this equation renders an hourly rate of $190.30. This hourly rate for 20.5 hours equals $3,901.15.
The Court notes that, in the application for Attorney's Fees, Counsel for Plaintiff requests that any award of attorney's fees be paid to Plaintiff's Attorney rather than to Plaintiff (Doc. 19). The Government argues that payment should only go to the Plaintiff (Doc. 20).
As noted earlier, EAJA allows a Court to make an "award to a prevailing party." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). In Panola Land Buying Ass'n v. Clark, 844 F.2d 1506, 1509 (11
In this action, McDonnell has specifically given Lassiter a limited power of attorney to receive checks on his behalf (Doc. 19, Exhibit 2). Nevertheless, under the reasoning of Reeves and Ratliff, the Court finds that the award should be paid to Plaintiff and not to his Attorney.
In conclusion, it is