ORDER

WILLIAM H. STEELE, Chief District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 80) with respect to the claims of plaintiff Cedric Goodloe. The Motion has been briefed and is now ripe for disposition.1

I. Relevant Background.

Cedric Goodloe is one of three plaintiffs who brought this action alleging race-based employment discrimination by defendant, Daphne Utilities.2 As pleaded in the Amended Complaint, Goodloe, who is African-American, has asserted causes of action against Daphne Utilities for wage discrimination, alleging that he was paid less than white employees, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 ("Count VI"); and for retaliation, alleging that Daphne Utilities fired him "due to his complaints of racial unfairness on the job," again in violation of §§ 1981 and 1983 ("Count VII"). (See doc. 6, at 10.) Daphne Utilities contends that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect to both of these claims.

The relevant record facts are as follows:3 Goodloe began working at Daphne Utilities as a Payroll/Benefits Coordinator/Trainer in 2006. For some period of time, he was assigned to defendant's workplace by a temporary employment agency; however, Daphne Utilities hired him as a full-time employee in December 2012, subject to a six-month probationary period. (Goodloe Decl. (doc. 90), at 1.) Goodloe's duties included payroll, benefits, interviewing, training/development, terminations, safety, and conflict resolution, among others. (Id. at 2.) His direct supervisor was Danny Lyndall, the Operations Manager for Daphne Utilities. (Goodloe Dep. (doc. 82, Exh. 1), at 21.) Neither Goodloe's job title nor his duties changed when he became a full-time, direct Daphne Utilities employee. (Id.; Goodloe Decl., at 2.)4

Paradoxically, the seeds of discontent were sown when Goodloe received Daphne Utilities' offer of full-time employment on December 21, 2012. That offer included compensation of $17.31 per hour; however, Goodloe, Lyndall, and Deloris Brown (Human Resources Manager) had previously agreed that $23.00 would be a fair hourly rate "based on [Goodloe's] contributions to the organization." (Goodloe Decl., at 2; Goodloe Dep., at 41-43.) Goodloe promptly objected to Lyndall that the stated compensation did not comport with the prior agreement, and indicated that he thought it was "unfair" and "seemed to be discriminatory." (Goodloe Dep., at 44, 46.) Goodloe suggested to Lyndall that there was a "pay disparity" between himself and a white employee named David Sadberry, who was hired at around the same time. (Goodloe Decl., at 2.) Goodloe balked that he was being hired at the low end of the pay scale for his job, while Sadberry had been hired at the top of his corresponding pay scale, despite Goodloe's superior education (master's degree versus high school diploma) and experience (several years versus none). (Id. at 2-3.)5

Notwithstanding this hiccup on the date of Goodloe's hire, the next three months passed without incident. Goodloe's "attitude and disposition" in the workplace did not change; indeed, he "worked well with everyone" at Daphne Utilities. (Goodloe Decl., at 3.) At no time between December 21, 2012 and March 26, 2013 did Lyndall or anyone else at Daphne Utilities discipline, reprimand or counsel Goodloe (either orally or in writing) for subpar performance, disrespectful conduct, a poor attitude or any other work-related deficiency. (Id.) To the contrary, Lyndall "often" stated that Goodloe was "a great employee." (Id.)6 No upper manager at Daphne Utilities expressed concerns to Goodloe about his job performance during this period. (Id. at 5.)

The events culminating in Goodloe's termination began, innocuously enough, at 6:29 a.m. on March 25, 2013, when he sent an email to Lyndall and two other Daphne Utilities employees. The message read as follows: "I will be out of the office today 3/25/13. However, I can be reached on my cell if you require my assistance. Thanks." (Doc. 82, Exh. 5.)7 Two days later, on the morning of March 27, 2013, Lyndall summoned Goodloe to his office. (Goodloe Dep., at 49.) When Goodloe arrived, Lyndall asked why he had not called to report his absence, to which Goodloe responded that he had sent an email. (Id.) Goodloe then pointed out what he perceived to be disparity in Lyndall's treatment of black and white employees. He mentioned that a white employee named Tim Jones (whom Lyndall also supervised) routinely failed to call in to report absences, and in some cases did not even send emails; however, Jones had never been disciplined for this infraction. Meanwhile, Lyndall had called Goodloe into his office to rebuke him for reporting in via email rather than telephone. (Goodloe Decl., at 4-5; Goodloe Dep., at 50.) Continuing with the theme of perceived disparate treatment, Goodloe again expressed objection to Lyndall that Goodloe had been treated differently than Sadberry as to compensation. (Goodloe Decl., at 5; Goodloe Dep., at 50.) He also complained that Daphne Utilities was not paying African-American employees at the same level as white employees. (Goodloe Decl., at 5.) He noted that a black employee named Carlos Butler had filed a grievance alleging race discrimination as to annual raises in the Wastewater Field Services Department. (Id.) Lyndall became "visibly angry" as Goodloe voiced these concerns. (Goodloe Dep., at 53.) However, plaintiff's evidence is that Goodloe conducted himself in a calm, controlled manner at all times. The discussion never became "heated," and neither Goodloe nor Lyndall raised their voices. (Goodloe Dep., at 53-54; Goodloe Decl., at 4.) Ultimately, Goodloe indicated that he wished to present his concerns about "unethical things going on within the organization" to the Board of Daphne Utilities. (Goodloe Dep., at 53.) At that remark, Lyndall became "enraged" and stated, "This meeting is over." (Id. at 53-54.)8

A short time later, Lyndall discussed the situation with Deloris Brown, defendant's Human Resources Manager. (Lyndall Dep. (doc. 82, Exh. 4), at 21.) Lyndall informed Brown that he considered Goodloe's behavior to be "inappropriate." (Id.) Lyndall and Brown decided to meet with Goodloe later that day to terminate his employment. (Id. at 22-23.) Lyndall prepared a Termination Notice, reading in relevant part as follows:

(Doc. 90, Exh. B.) Later in the day on March 27, 2013, Goodloe was called into Brown's office. (Lyndall Dep., at 32.) When Goodloe walked in, Lyndall handed him the Termination Notice. (Id. at 32-33; Goodloe Dep., at 56.) Other than the vague text of that document, Goodloe was given no explanation for this personnel action. (Goodloe Dep., at 56.) Goodloe asked whether he could initiate an appeal or grievance, to which Brown replied that such mechanisms were unavailable to probationary employees. (Lyndall Dep., at 116.)

Daphne Utilities' only record evidence as to specific reasons for Goodloe's termination is Lyndall's averment that Goodloe "was only marginally effective in his payroll and benefits duties" and that "[d]ue to his probationary status, combined with his argumentative attitude and mediocre performance, he was terminated." (Lyndall Aff., ¶ 4.) On summary judgment, Daphne Utilities endorses Lyndall's words almost verbatim as the purportedly "legitimate business reasons for Goodloe's termination." (Doc. 81, at 29.)9

II. Summary Judgment Standard.

Summary judgment should be granted only "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(a), Fed.R.Civ.P. The party seeking summary judgment bears "the initial burden to show the district court, by reference to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at trial." Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). Once the moving party has satisfied its responsibility, the burden shifts to the non-movant to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. "If the nonmoving party fails to make `a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof,' the moving party is entitled to summary judgment." Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)) (footnote omitted). "In reviewing whether the nonmoving party has met its burden, the court must stop short of weighing the evidence and making credibility determinations of the truth of the matter. Instead, the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen, 965 F.2d 994, 999 (11th Cir. 1992) (internal citations and quotations omitted). "Summary judgment is justified only for those cases devoid of any need for factual determinations." Offshore Aviation v. Transcon Lines, Inc., 831 F.2d 1013, 1016 (11th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted).

The Eleventh Circuit has expressly rejected the notion that summary judgment should seldom be used in employment discrimination cases because they involve issues of motivation and intent. See Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079 (11th Cir. 2004). Rather, "the summary judgment rule applies in job discrimination cases just as in other cases. No thumb is to be placed on either side of the scale." Id. at 1086 (citation omitted); see also Williamson v. Clarke County Dep't of Human Resources, 834 F.Supp.2d 1310, 1318 (S.D. Ala. 2011) (recognizing and applying rule that summary judgment standard is applied equally in employment discrimination cases as in other kinds of federal actions).

III. Analysis.

A. The McDonnell Douglas Standard.

Absent direct evidence of discrimination or retaliation, Goodloe must make a showing of circumstantial evidence that satisfies the test set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).10 Under this familiar burden-shifting analysis, plaintiff is required to make out a prima facie case of race discrimination and/or retaliation. If he does so, that showing "creates a rebuttable presumption that the employer acted illegally." Underwood v. Perry County Com'n, 431 F.3d 788, 794 (11th Cir. 2005). At that point, "the burden shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. . . . If the employer does this, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer's stated reason was a pretext for discrimination." Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 976 (11th Cir. 2008) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1566 (11th Cir. 1997) (outlining similar procedure for Title VII retaliation claims). A plaintiff may establish pretext "either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." Brooks v. County Com'n of Jefferson County, Ala., 446 F.3d 1160, 1163 (11th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted). "The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff." Springer v. Convergys Customer Management Group Inc., 509 F.3d 1344, 1347 (11th Cir. 2007).

B. Wage Discrimination Claim.

In Count VI of the Amended Complaint, Goodloe asserts a claim of compensation discrimination against Daphne Utilities pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, made actionable through 42 U.S.C. § 1983.11 Defendant now moves for summary judgment on Count VI, reasoning that Goodloe cannot make out a prima facie case of wage discrimination. Specifically, Daphne Utilities argues that Goodloe has failed to meet his burden of identifying an appropriate comparator in support of this claim. (See doc. 81, at 23-25.)12

To establish a prima facie case of intentional compensation discrimination based on race, Goodloe must show that: (i) he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) he received low wages; (iii) similarly situated comparators outside the protected class received higher compensation; and (iv) he was qualified to receive the higher wage. See Cooper v. Southern Co., 390 F.3d 695, 735 (11th Cir. 2004); Hill v. Emory University, 346 Fed.Appx. 390, 395 (11th Cir. Aug. 25, 2009). "The comparators must perform jobs similar to the plaintiff's; thus, the plaintiff must show that, in her job, she shared the same type of tasks as the comparators." Cooper, 390 F.3d at 735 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).13 Thus, a black plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of wage discrimination by showing that he "received lower wages than a white co-worker despite performing substantially the same work." Lindsey v. Board of School Com'rs of Mobile County, 491 Fed.Appx. 8, 10 (11th Cir. Sept. 25, 2012).

As noted, defendant's Rule 56 Motion asserts that Goodloe's prima facie claim fails because he "has simply not provided an appropriate comparator." (Doc. 81, at 25.) Plaintiff's summary judgment brief fails to address this issue (or his wage discrimination claim) at all. Indeed, Goodloe's brief does not identify who his comparators are, why he contends those individuals satisfy the relevant legal standard, or how he has established a prima facie case of wage discrimination. He neither references nor addresses Count VI, much less Daphne Utilities' asserted ground for summary judgment as to that cause of action. Such an omission is at his peril. To be sure, "the district court cannot base the entry of summary judgment on the mere fact that the motion was unopposed, . . . but must ensure that the motion itself is supported by evidentiary materials." United States v. One Piece of Real Property Located at 5800 SW 74th Ave., Miami, Fla., 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11th Cir. 2004). It is also true, however, that "district courts cannot concoct or resurrect arguments neither made nor advanced by the parties." Fils v. City of Aventura, 647 F.3d 1272, 1284 (11th Cir. 2011).14

Upon careful review of Goodloe's brief (doc. 88), the undersigned concludes that the only possible comparator identified therein as to the Count VI wage discrimination claim is a white employee named David Sadberry, whom Daphne Utilities hired a few months before employing Goodloe on a full-time basis. (Doc. 88, at 4, 12.) Plaintiff objects in his brief that Daphne Utilities compensated Sadberry at a higher point on the pay scale than it did Goodloe, despite the latter's greater education and experience. (Id.) Thus, it appears (although Goodloe never said as much on summary judgment) that Sadberry is the comparator anchoring his prima facie case of wage discrimination.

The record does not support any contention that Sadberry is a similarly situated comparator to Goodloe for a prima facie case of wage discrimination. Sadberry was hired as Maintenance Manager, responsible for maintaining Daphne Utilities' facilities and infrastructure, with supervisory authority over at least seven employees in the maintenance division. (Goodloe Dep., at 47-48.) By contrast, Goodloe was hired as Payroll/Benefits Coordinator/Trainer, whose duties were "to assist the Human Resources Manager in administering human resources programs and functions and to coordinate payroll administration, benefits administration, training and related functions." (Klumpp Aff. (doc. 82, Exh. 2), ¶ 2 & Exh. A.) Goodloe did not supervise any employees. (Goodloe Dep., at 48.) In the Daphne Utilities 16-grade pay scale, Sadberry's position was assigned Grade 11, while Goodloe's was assigned Grade 6. (Klumpp Aff., ¶ 8 & Exh. D.) On their face, these facts demonstrate that Sadberry and Goodloe performed vastly dissimilar tasks, such that Sadberry is not a viable comparator to Goodloe for purposes of establishing a prima facie case of wage discrimination. Again, Goodloe has not responded to such an argument, much less explained why (or even if) he believes Sadberry falls within the legal parameters of a comparator for his prima facie case.

Because the lone potential comparator mentioned in his summary judgment brief is not viable, and because he has articulated no other argument through which he might prevail, Goodloe has failed to satisfy the "similarly situated comparator" prong of his prima facie burden.15 Perhaps other arguments could have been made as to potential comparators; however, plaintiff has not voiced them, and has not explained why, given defendant's unrebutted evidence of dissimilarity, any of those persons would be properly deemed comparators. Likewise, perhaps other arguments could have been made for establishing plaintiff's case without comparators. See generally Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011) ("the plaintiff's failure to produce a comparator does not necessarily doom the plaintiff's case" on summary judgment). Again, plaintiff made no such assertions. This Court will not "fill in the blanks" to make plaintiff's arguments for him as to which white employees might pass as comparators, how and why they might meet the "similarly situated" test (notwithstanding defendant's evidence to the contrary), or how he might overcome summary judgment without comparators. See Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1329 (11th Cir. 2009) (noting that a litigant "cannot readily complain about the entry of a summary judgment order that did not consider an argument they chose not to develop for the district court at the time of the summary judgment motions") (citation omitted).

For all of these reasons, defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as to Goodloe's wage discrimination claim found at Count VI of the Amended Complaint. That claim will be dismissed for failure to establish a prima facie case.

C. Retaliation Claim.

Goodloe's other cause of action is Count VII, a retaliation claim brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. This claim is framed in the pleadings as follows: "By terminating . . . Goodloe's employment due to his complaints of racial unfairness on the job the defendant has violated 42 U.S.C. Section 1981, and the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution made actionable by 42 U.S.C. Section 1983." (Doc. 6, ¶ 55.)16

As an initial matter, Daphne Utilities seeks dismissal of Count VII by reasoning that (i) a § 1981 retaliation claim is actionable only through § 1983 as to Daphne Utilities, (ii) no constitutional right to equal protection is implicated by the alleged retaliation, and (iii) absent a viable constitutional claim, Goodloe cannot proceed under either § 1981 or § 1983 on his retaliation theory. (See doc. 81, at 25-26.) The Court disagrees. To be sure, it appears that Daphne Utilities, as a municipal utility, qualifies as a "state actor," such that Goodloe must use the § 1983 mechanism to pursue relief for a § 1981 violation. See, e.g., Butts v. County of Volusia, 222 F.3d 891, 893 (11th Cir. 2000) ("§ 1983 constitutes the exclusive remedy against state actors for violations of the rights contained in § 1981").17 It is also true, however, that § 1981 and Title VII claims have the same elements, and that "Title VII and section 1983 claims have the same elements where the claims are based on the same set of facts." Rioux v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 520 F.3d 1269, 1275 n.5 (11th Cir. 2008). Daphne Utilities would have this Court disregard that principle and engraft additional elements on § 1981 retaliation claims brought against state actors. Under Daphne Utilities' theory, a plaintiff complaining of § 1981 retaliation by a state actor could not prevail without establishing both a § 1981 violation and an additional constitutional violation. The Court is aware of no authority embracing such an onerous, counterintuitive requirement, and Daphne Utilities has cited none.18 Rather, it has long been recognized that a violation of § 1981 is all that is necessary for a plaintiff to succeed on a § 1983 claim against a state actor. See, e.g., Whiting v. Jackson State University, 616 F.2d 116, 121 (5th Cir. 1980) ("Section 1983 serves as a basis for relief for violations of federal law under color of state law. Insofar as it is used as a parallel remedy for transgression of section 1981 . . ., the elements of the causes of action do not differ . . . ."). For all of these reasons, the Court rejects as contrary to law defendant's argument that Goodloe must prove something more than an ordinary § 1981 retaliation claim in order to hold Daphne Utilities liable pursuant to § 1983.19

Next, Daphne Utilities urges dismissal of Count VII for failure to make out a prima facie case. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under § 1981, Goodloe must show that "(1) he engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) he established a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse action." Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1307-08 (11th Cir. 2009); see also Butler v. Alabama Dep't of Transp., 536 F.3d 1209, 1212-13 (11th Cir. 2008) ("To establish a claim of retaliation under Title VII or section 1981, a plaintiff must prove that he engaged in statutorily protected activity, he suffered a materially adverse action, and there was some causal relation between the two events.") (citation omitted). Defendant does not challenge Goodloe's ability to satisfy the second and third prongs.20 However, Daphne Utilities does maintain that Goodloe did not engage in protected activity (as required by the first prong), inasmuch as "he cannot show an objectively reasonable perception he was opposing an unlawful employment practice." (Doc. 81, at 28.)

A Title VII/Section 1981 plaintiff complaining of retaliation need not prove that he opposed an employment law practice that was actually unlawful; rather, the plaintiff need only show "that he had a good faith, reasonable belief that the employer was engaged in unlawful employment practices. . . . A plaintiff must not only show that he subjectively (that is, in good faith) believed that his employer was engaged in unlawful employment practices, but also that his belief was objectively reasonable in light of the facts and record presented." Dixon v. The Hallmark Companies, Inc., 627 F.3d 849, 857 (11th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted); see also Howard v. Walgreen Co., 605 F.3d 1239, 1244 (11th Cir. 2010). Thus, the critical question is whether Goodloe had a subjectively and objectively reasonable basis for complaining of race discrimination at Daphne Utilities on the morning of March 27, 2013, so as to constitute protected activity.

The sum total of Daphne Utilities' summary judgment argument that Goodloe cannot satisfy this element is a conclusory statement that it "was not objectively reasonable" for Goodloe to believe that Daphne Utilities was engaged in unlawful employment practices. (Doc. 81, at 28-29.) This contention is not persuasive. After all, binding precedent leaves no doubt that "the plaintiff's prima facie burden is not onerous." Vessels v. Atlanta Independent School System, 408 F.3d 763, 769 (11th Cir. 2005); see also Turlington v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 135 F.3d 1428, 1432 (11th Cir. 1998) ("a plaintiff's burden in proving a prima facie case is light"). Goodloe's evidence shows that, on the morning of his discharge, he presented Lyndall with specific, detailed examples of circumstances in which he believed Daphne Utilities treated black employees less favorably than their white counterparts, including (i) differential enforcement of call-in notification policies, (ii) differential compensation of Goodloe as compared to a white employee (Sadberry), and (iii) co-worker Carlos Butler's grievance alleging widespread racial disparities in annual raises in the Wastewater Field Services Department. Irrespective of whether such matters actually constituted racially discriminatory employment practices, the record reveals a sufficient factual basis for concluding that Goodloe harbored a good-faith, reasonable belief that they were. These record facts (which are not countered by any persuasive argument from Daphne Utilities that Goodloe lacked an objectively reasonable basis for his remarks) satisfy the "statutorily protected activity" prong of plaintiff's prima facie case. Simply put, it was protected activity for Goodloe to notify Lyndall of what he believed to be systematic differences in how Daphne Utilities compensated and disciplined employees of different races, and to place Lyndall on notice of Goodloe's intention to raise such concerns to the Board.

Goodloe having met his initial burden of showing a prima facie case of retaliation in violation of § 1981 (through § 1983), the burden of production shifts to Daphne Utilities to set forth a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for terminating Goodloe's employment. Daphne Utilities has done so, via Lyndall's averments that Goodloe was fired because he "was only marginally effective in his payroll and benefits duties," he had "probationary status," and he had displayed an "argumentative attitude and mediocre performance." (Lyndall Aff., ¶ 4.)

Where, as here, the employer articulates legitimate reasons for the challenged actions, the plaintiff must "show that the employer's proffered reasons for taking the adverse action were actually a pretext for prohibited retaliatory conduct." McCann v. Tillman, 526 F.3d 1370, 1375 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). "In order to avoid summary judgment, a plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to conclude that each of the employer's proffered nondiscriminatory reasons is pretextual." Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1037 (11th Cir. 2000). To show that the stated reason is pretext for unlawful retaliation, the plaintiff "must reveal such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its actions that a reasonable factfinder could find them unworthy of credence." Vessels, 408 F.3d at 771 (quotation omitted).21

Weaknesses, implausibilities and inconsistencies in Daphne Utilities' proffered explanations abound. Lyndall's statement that Goodloe was fired for "mediocre performance" because he was "only marginally effective" at his job encounters stiff headwinds in the record. If Goodloe was "mediocre" and "marginally effective" in performing payroll and benefits duties, then why did Daphne Utilities hire him on a full-time basis in December 2012 (three months before he was fired) when he had been performing those same duties for approximately six years in a contract/temp capacity? Defendant does not say. Also, Daphne Utilities has not pointed to a scrap of paper or an iota of testimony that Goodloe had ever been disciplined, reprimanded, counseled, coached or spoken to by Lyndall or anyone else concerning alleged performance deficiencies during that three-month period, or indeed the five years that preceded it.22 To the contrary, Lyndall emphatically testified that Goodloe "was a great employee" and remained so "[i]n all the times" that Lyndall had known him. (Lyndall Dep., at 76.) There is an obvious tension between Lyndall's statement that Goodloe was fired for being a "marginal" or "mediocre" performer, on the one hand, and Lyndall's deposition testimony that Goodloe had always been a "great employee," on the other. What's more, Lyndall testified that he considered Goodloe to be a "friend." (Id.) If a supervisor's "friend" were underperforming, one might reasonably expect the supervisor to alert that "friend" to the problem before summarily showing him the door. Yet plaintiff's evidence is that Lyndall did not. These kinds of inconsistencies and implausibilities support a pretext determination on summary judgment.

More generally, Daphne Utilities' proffered explanation is so vague that it essentially amounts to a label devoid of underlying factual content that might lend credence to it. The Termination Notice stated only that Goodloe "has not met the required performance standards" (doc. 90, Exh. B), without offering any inkling as to how and in what respects Goodloe's performance had been substandard. Similarly, Lyndall's use of the terms "mediocre" and "marginal" conveys virtually nothing about what he maintained Goodloe was doing wrong. The cursory, shadowy, nonspecific nature of the explanation itself calls into question its credibility in the pretext analysis.23

The bottom line is this: Goodloe's version of the evidence is that he was a well-liked employee who had successfully performed payroll and benefits work for Daphne Utilities for years, with such diligence and acumen that Daphne Utilities rewarded him with a full-time job in December 2012, performing the same duties. Goodloe was on friendly terms with his supervisor, who characterized him as a "great employee," and had not been alerted to any performance deficiencies by anyone at Daphne Utilities since 2007. Then, one day, Goodloe complained to his supervisor of multiple instances of what he believed to be race-based disparities in how the company treated black and white employees. He notified his supervisor that he intended to bring these matters up to the Board. Hours later, Daphne Utilities summarily fired Goodloe, citing "marginal" and "mediocre performance." A reasonable finder of fact could conclude that Daphne Utilities' stated reasons for terminating Goodloe's employment were pretextual, and that the real reason was his statutorily protected activity, to-wit: complaining of alleged racially discriminatory employment practices at Daphne Utilities.

For all of these reasons, defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied as to the retaliation claim brought by Goodloe pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, by and through the procedural vehicle of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in Count VII of the Amended Complaint.24

IV. Conclusion.

For all of the foregoing reasons, it is ordered as follows:

DONE and ORDERED.