KATHERINE P. NELSON, Magistrate Judge.
Social Security Claimant/Plaintiff Carlos D. Norwood ("Norwood") has brought this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Defendant Commissioner of Social Security ("the Commissioner") denying his protective applications for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401, et seq., and supplemental security income ("SSI") under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381, et seq. By the consent of the parties (see Doc. 13), the Court has designated the undersigned Magistrate Judge to conduct all proceedings and order the entry of judgment in this civil action, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73. (See Doc. 14).
Upon consideration of the parties' briefs (Docs. 15, 18), the administrative record (Doc. 12) (hereinafter cited as "(R. [page number(s)])"), and the arguments of counsel made at the hearing held January 21, 2015, the Court finds that the Commissioner's decision is due to be
On August 17, 2011, Norwood protectively filed with the Social Security Administration ("SSA") applications for DIB and SSI.
On February 13, 2013, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on Norwood's applications. (See R. 17-34). Norwood requested review of the ALJ's decision by the Appeals Council for the SSA's Office of Disability Adjudication and Review. (R. 15-16). On April 3, 2014, the Appeals Council issued its decision denying Norwood's request for review. (R. 1-5).
On June 3, 2014, Norwood filed this action under §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) for judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision. (Doc. 1). See Ingram v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1262 (11th Cir. 2007) ("The settled law of this Circuit is that a court may review, under sentence four of section 405(g), a denial of review by the Appeals Council."); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) ("Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such decision or within such further time as the Commissioner of Social Security may allow."); 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) ("The final determination of the Commissioner of Social Security after a hearing [for SSI benefits] shall be subject to judicial review as provided in section 405(g) of this title to the same extent as the Commissioner's final determinations under section 405 of this title.").
"In Social Security appeals, [the Court] must determine whether the Commissioner's decision is `"supported by substantial evidence and based on proper legal standards. Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion."'" Winschel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439 (11th Cir. 1997))). However, the Court "`may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute our judgment for that of the [Commissioner].'" Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178 (quoting Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983))). "`Even if the evidence preponderates against the [Commissioner]'s factual findings, we must affirm if the decision reached is supported by substantial evidence.'" Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)).
"Yet, within this narrowly circumscribed role, [courts] do not act as automatons. [The court] must scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence[.]" Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239 (citations and quotation omitted). "In determining whether substantial evidence exists, [a court] must...tak[e] into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the [Commissioner's] decision." Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). Moreover, "[t]here is no presumption...that the Commissioner followed the appropriate legal standards in deciding a claim for benefits or that the legal conclusions reached were valid. Instead, [the court] conduct[s] `an exacting examination' of these factors." Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (citing Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)) (internal citation omitted). In sum, courts "review the Commissioner's factual findings with deference and the Commissioner's legal conclusions with close scrutiny." Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). See also Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) ("In Social Security appeals, we review de novo the legal principles upon which the Commissioner's decision is based. Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). However, we review the resulting decision only to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence. Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158-59 (11th Cir. 2004)."). "`The [Commissioner]'s failure to apply the correct law or to provide the reviewing court with sufficient reasoning for determining that the proper legal analysis has been conducted mandates reversal.'" Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991)).
Thornton v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 597 F. App'x 604, 609 (11th Cir. Feb. 11, 2015) (per curiam) (unpublished).
Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v); Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1237-39).
"These regulations place a very heavy burden on the claimant to demonstrate both a qualifying disability and an inability to perform past relevant work." Moore, 405 F.3d at 1211 (citing Spencer v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 1090, 1093 (11th Cir. 1985)). "In determining whether the claimant has satisfied this initial burden, the examiner must consider four factors: (1) objective medical facts or clinical findings; (2) the diagnoses of examining physicians; (3) evidence of pain; and (4) the claimant's age, education, and work history." Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001, 1005 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (citing Tieniber v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 1251, 1253 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam)). "These factors must be considered both singly and in combination. Presence or absence of a single factor is not, in itself, conclusive." Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1240 (citations omitted).
If, in Steps One through Four of the five-step evaluation, a plaintiff proves that he or she has a qualifying disability and cannot do his or her past relevant work, it then becomes the Commissioner's burden, at Step Five, to prove that the plaintiff is capable—given his or her age, education, and work history—of engaging in another kind of substantial gainful employment that exists in the national economy. Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999); Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 836 (11th Cir. 1985). Finally, but importantly, although "the [plaintiff] bears the burden of demonstrating the inability to return to [his or] her past relevant work, the Commissioner of Social Security has an obligation to develop a full and fair record." Shnorr v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 578, 581 (11th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted).
When, as here, "no new evidence is presented to the Appeals Council and it denies review, then the administrative law judge's decision is necessarily reviewed as the final decision of the Commissioner..." Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1262.
(Doc. 15 at 2).
At Step One, the ALJ determined that Norwood had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his alleged disability onset date. (R. 22). At Step Two, the ALJ determined that Norwood had the following severe impairments: obstructive sleep apnea, atypical chest pain, lumbago, morbid obesity, hypertension, tumid lupus, arthropathy, osteoarthritis, degenerative changes of the left knee, and chronic fatigue. (R. 22-23). At Step Three, the ALJ found that Norwood did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or equals the severity of the specified impairments in the Listing of Impairments. (R. 23). Norwood does not challenge any of the ALJ's decisions at Steps One through Three. His claims of error concern the ALJ's analysis in Step Four.
Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1238-39 (footnote omitted).
The ALJ assigned Norwood an RFC of "light work," as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b),
"`Medical opinions are statements from physicians and psychologists or other acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of [the claimant's] impairment(s), including [the claimant's] symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what [the claimant] can still do despite impairment(s), and [the claimant's] physical or mental restrictions.'" Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178-79 (quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)(2), 416.927(a)(2)). "In assessing medical opinions, the ALJ must consider a number of factors in determining how much weight to give to each medical opinion, including (1) whether the physician has examined the claimant; (2) the length, nature, and extent of a treating physician's relationship with the claimant; (3) the medical evidence and explanation supporting the physician's opinion; (4) how consistent the physician's opinion is with the record as a whole; and (5) the physician's specialization. These factors apply to both examining and non-examining physicians." Eyre v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 586 F. App'x 521, 523 (11th Cir. Sept. 30, 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c) & (e), 416.927(c) & (e)). "[T]he ALJ must state with particularity the weight given to different medical opinions and the reasons therefor." Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179 (citing Sharfarz v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 278, 279 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam)). However, the ALJ "may reject the opinion of any physician when the evidence supports a contrary conclusion." Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1240. Accord, e.g., Anderson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 427 F. App'x 761, 763 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (unpublished).
"A `treating source' (i.e., a treating physician) is a claimant's `own physician, psychologist, or other acceptable medical source who provides[], or has provided[],[ the claimant] with medical treatment or evaluation and who has, or has had, an ongoing treatment relationship with [the claimant].'" Nyberg v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 179 F. App'x 589, 591 (11th Cir. May 2, 2006) (per curiam) (unpublished) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502). "Absent `good cause,' an ALJ is to give the medical opinions of treating physicians `substantial or considerable weight.'" Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179 (quoting Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1440). "Good cause exists `when the: (1) treating physician's opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3) treating physician's opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor's own medical records.' With good cause, an ALJ may disregard a treating physician's opinion, but he `must clearly articulate [the] reasons' for doing so." Id. (quoting Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240-41) (internal citation omitted).
Norwood argues that the ALJ erred in rejecting the medical opinions of treating physician Dr. Mark Pita ("Dr. Pita") — specifically, those expressed in a Clinical Assessment of Symptoms ("CAS") on July 12, 2012. (R. 275-276 [Ex. 9F]). The ALJ summarized Dr. Pita's CAS as follows:
(R. 26-27).
The ALJ "assign[ed] less weight to Dr. Pita's assessment, because his physical findings revealed no significant abnormalities that would keep the claimant from performing light level work." (R. 27). The Court interprets this as a determination that Dr. Pita's opinion was not supported by his own medical records, which constitutes "good cause" for giving less weight to a treating physician's opinion. See Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179; Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1240 ("[T]he opinion of a treating physician may be rejected...where it is unsubstantiated by any clinical or laboratory findings.").
The ALJ summarized Dr. Pita's objective medical findings as follows:...[O]n July 20, 2011, the claimant presented to internist, Dr. Mark A. Pita complaining of right shoulder pain. He also complained of chest pain. He said the pain was pressure-like pain which occurred at anytime, lasted a few minutes, occurred in the middle of the chest, non-radiating, and not associated with nausea, vomiting, or sweating. Physical findings were weight gain of 9 pounds and blood pressure 154/94. Musculoskeletal exam revealed pain with passive movement of right shoulder and he was not able to lift right arm past 90 degrees but no other abnormalities. His general appearance was normal and no skin lesions. Dr. Pita's assessments were chest pain or discomfort, arthropathy, combined systolic and diastolic elevation observed, and morbid obesity. The claimant consulted with a specialist for evaluation of possible gastric bypass. He was prescribed Mobic, Ultram, Nitroquick (as needed for chest pain), and Lisinopril-HCTZ (Exhibit 2F).
(R. 25-27).
None of these objective findings contradict the ALJ's determination that Norwood could perform light work as defined in the Social Security regulations, with some restrictions.
Additionally, the Court notes that Dr. Pita's CAS consists primarily of conclusory "check the line" answers in evaluating Norwood's impairments. (See R. 275-276). Dr. Pita left blank the section reserved for "Comments" explaining his opinions. (R. 276), and no other reference is made to treatment notes or other objective medical evidence to support Dr. Pita's answers. This Court and the Eleventh Circuit have upheld an ALJ's decision to reject a treating physician's form opinion where it was not supported by reference to objective medical evidence. See Burgin v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 420 F. App'x 901, 903 (11th Cir. Mar. 30, 2011) (per curiam) (unpublished) (The adjudicator "was free to give little weight to the conclusory assertions contained in the questionnaires because they merely consisted of items checked on a survey, with no supporting explanations."); Sanders v. Astrue, Civil Action No. 11-0491-N, 2012 WL 4497733, at *6 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 28, 2012) ("Plaintiff challenges the existence of `good cause' and the ALJ's determination that the opinions contained in[ treating physician] Dr. Aktar's Physical Capabilities Evaluation (`PCE') and Clinical Assessment of Pain forms were `conclusory, providing very little explanation of the evidence relied on in forming that opinion' and that `the opinion in question departs substantially from the rest of the evidence of record.'... It is the nature of the forms used by Social Security practitioners that the answers are in a check-the-box format with no explanation for the opinions reflected. Dr. Aktar's records contained few objective medical observations. Consequently, the ALJ's determination that Dr. Aktar's opinions on the Physical Capacities Exam (`PCE') and Pain forms were conclusory is supported by substantial evidence, and the opinions were not entitled to controlling weight." (internal citations omitted) (citing Brown v. Comm'r of Social Sec., 442 F. App'x 507, 512 (11th Cir. Oct. 6, 2011) (per curiam) (unpublished) ("[T]he ALJ had good cause not to give controlling weight to Kennedy's opinions. Kennedy's opinions were conclusory, as the forms that he completed in 2007 and 2009 regarding Brown's limitations did not reference his treatment records or adequately explain his opinions." (citing Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1241))).
The ALJ adequately articulated good cause to assign less weight to Dr. Pita's opinion, and that decision is supported by substantial evidence.
Caces v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 560 F. App'x 936, 939-40 (11th Cir. Mar. 27, 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished).
"Although this circuit does not require an explicit finding as to credibility, the implication must be obvious to the reviewing court. The credibility determination does not need to cite particular phrases or formulations[,]" Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1210 (citation and quotations omitted), and "`there is no rigid requirement that the ALJ specifically refer to every piece of evidence in his decision, so long as the ALJ's decision ... is not a broad rejection which is not enough to enable [a reviewing court] to conclude that the ALJ considered [the claimant's] medical condition as a whole.'" Mitchell v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 771 F.3d 780, 782 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1211 (quotation and brackets omitted)). "[C]redibility determinations are the province of the ALJ, Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1212 (11th Cir. 2005), and [a court] will not disturb a clearly articulated credibility finding supported by substantial evidence, Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1562 (11th Cir. 1995)." Mitchell v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 771 F.3d 780, 782 (11th Cir. 2014).
Here, the ALJ determined that Norwood's "medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant's statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely credible for the reasons explained in this decision." (R. 27). First, the ALJ found that Norwood's testimony concerning his daily activities did not support the level of severity he claimed due to his impairments:
(R. 24).
Later in her opinion, after discussing both Norwood's subjective testimony and the medical evidence of record, the ALJ set forth additional determinations affecting credibility:
(R. 27-28).
The ALJ's finding that Norwood "had experienced chest pain for 20 years — many of which he was able to work" does not appear to adequately account for the fact that Norwood amended his disability onset date to July 1, 2011, and testified that "in the last couple of years, [his chest pain] has gotten different" and "hurt worser [sic]" such that he couldn't "over-exert [him]self that much anymore." In addition, the ALJ also based her credibility determination on Norwood's non-compliance with doctors' recommendations that he lose weight. The Commissioner may deny benefits "when a claimant, without good reason, fails to follow a prescribed course of treatment that could restore her ability to work." McCall v. Bowen, 846 F.2d 1317, 1319 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.930). However, the Eleventh Circuit has held that "a physician's recommendation to lose weight does not necessarily constitute a prescribed course of treatment, nor does a claimant's failure to accomplish the recommended change constitute a refusal to undertake such treatment." Id. (citing Johnson v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 794 F.2d 1106, 1113 (6th Cir. 1986)). The ALJ's unadorned observation that Norwood has continued to gain weight is not, in and of itself, sufficient to justify finding noncompliance. See id. ("In the instant case, the Secretary has not made the express findings mandated by 20 C.F.R. § 416.930 prior to denying McCall's application for SSI disability benefits. Admittedly, plaintiff's physicians advised her to lose weight, and the record clearly indicates her condition would improve if she did so, but no evidence has been presented suggesting that plaintiff has refused to follow a plan of prescribed treatment...Further findings of fact and conclusions of law are required before the Secretary may determine that a claimant has refused treatment.").
The ALJ noted certain inconsistencies in Norwood's testimony that appear to have influenced her credibility determination. For instance, she noted that Norwood testified his limitations included "not doing any household chores" and "not cooking," but then admitting that he "was able to pick up after himself, make a sandwich, and cook on occasions." (R. 24). The ALJ noted that, while Norwood initially reported that "he was terminated from his [last ]job due to an inability to stand outdoors for long periods[,]" at the hearing Norwood "clarified...that he was actually terminated for failing to follow his supervisor's orders." (R. 24). Such observations indicate that, "in making h[er] credibility finding, the ALJ also relied upon h[er] observation of [Norwood]'s demeanor at the hearing, which is proper under [this Circuit's] case law." Jarrell v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 433 F. App'x 812, 814 (11th Cir. July 8, 2011) (per curiam) (unpublished) (citing Norris v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 1154, 1157-58 (11th Cir. 1985)). See also Majkut, 394 F. App'x at 663 ("Substantial evidence supported the ALJ's conclusion that Majkut's subjective complaints of disabling pain and other symptoms were not entirely credible. She was inconsistent in stating that she could not do any chores or drive, but telling other physicians that she drove her husband to work and did some chores."); Pierce v. Astrue, Civil Action No. 2:11-00080-N, 2012 WL 3309717, at *8 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 13, 2012) ("The ALJ also noted several inconsistencies in the record. For instance, while Pierce denied performing activities such as cooking or doing household chores (asserting that these activities were performed by his sister and elderly aunt), he at other times acknowledged that he cooked, did housework, and took care of his aunt... This inconsistency provided another reasonable basis for discounting Pierce's subjective statements. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(4) (stating an ALJ must consider whether there are any inconsistencies in the evidence); Moore, 405 F.3d at 1212 (finding an ALJ reasonably discounted a claimant's subjective statements due to inconsistencies between her statements and the record)."). Nevertheless, while "the ALJ may consider the claimant's `appearance and demeanor during the hearing' as a basis of credibility, [s]he cannot impose h[er] observations in lieu of a consideration of the objective medical evidence." Jarrell, 433 F. App'x at 814 (quoting Norris, 760 F.2d at 1157-58).
The ALJ also appears to have placed significant weight on Norwood's ability to live alone and do simple household chores in discrediting the impact of his impairments on his ability to work. However, while "[t]he ALJ may consider the claimant's daily activities when evaluating his subjective symptoms, ... a claimant's admission that he participates in daily activities for short durations does not necessarily disqualify him from a disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i); see Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1441 (11th Cir. 1997) (noting that the claimant's successful completion of a six-minute treadmill exercise was not necessarily indicative of his ability to work, and that the fact that he did housework and went fishing was not inconsistent with the limitations recommended by his treating physicians)." Crow v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 571 F. App'x 802, 807 (11th Cir. July 7, 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished). See also Majkut v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 394 F. App'x 660, 663 (11th Cir. Aug. 30, 2010) (per curiam) (unpublished) ("Although a claimant's admission that she participates in daily activities for short durations does not necessarily disqualify the claimant from disability, Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1441 (11th Cir.1997), that does not mean it is improper for the ALJ to consider a claimant's daily activities at all. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(i), 416.929(c)(3)(i) (specifically listing the claimant's daily activities as one of the factors to consider in evaluating the claimant's symptoms).").
Though the ALJ's stated reasons for discrediting Norwood's testimony, at least considered individually, may seem weak, at the end of the day, this Court may not substitute its judgment for the Commissioner's and must affirm the Commissioner's final decision so long as it is supported by substantial evidence, even if the evidence preponderates against it. The Eleventh Circuit has affirmed an ALJ's credibility determinations, even in the absence of explicitly stated reasons for discrediting, when the record adequately reflects that the ALJ considered the claimant's allegations in light of the record as a whole. See Brown v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 442 F. App'x 507, 513-14 (11th Cir. Oct. 6, 2011) (per curiam) (unpublished) ("Here, the ALJ sufficiently assessed Brown's testimony as to her limitations. The ALJ was not required to make any explicit credibility finding because the decision includes a thorough discussion of Brown's allegations in light of the record as a whole. See Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1210. Specifically, the ALJ found that Brown had moderate limitations in daily living activities, social functioning, and concentration based on her testimony that she had trouble completing chores and getting along with others, the fact that she had not had any `serious incident[s]' with others, and the fact that she had not been hospitalized during the relevant period. Based on these factors, the ALJ determined that Brown was able to work, despite her depression and anxiety, so long as she had no interaction with the general public and only occasional interaction with coworkers and supervisors. The implication of the ALJ's credibility finding—that Brown's complaints were `not fully credible'—is thus clear to us. See Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1210. That is, it is clear that the ALJ found Brown's complaints credible, but that he found her complaints as to the severity of her limitations not credible. Therefore, the ALJ considered Brown's subjective complaints in light of the record as a whole and adequately explained his decision not to fully credit Brown's alleged limitations on her ability to work. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(4), 416.929(c)(4)."); Weekley v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 486 F. App'x 806, 809 (11th Cir. Aug. 13, 2012) (per curiam) (unpublished) ("Here, the ALJ did not err by failing to explicitly cite to our three-part standard because the record reflects that the ALJ considered and cited to the regulations on which the standard is based and applied the standard correctly. Furthermore, substantial evidence supports the ALJ's determination that Weekley's subjective complaints of pain were not credible. When making a credibility determination, the ALJ must show that he considered the claimant's `medical condition as a whole,' and in this case, the ALJ's analysis of the objective medical evidence and other evidence in the record complies with this requirement. See Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1210.").
Here, the ALJ's detailed discussion of the objective medical evidence of record sufficiently indicates that she considered Norwood's medical condition as a whole in making her credibility determination. Considered in conjunction with her express reasons for discrediting Norwood, at least some of which are valid, see supra, the Court finds that the Commissioner's decision in this regard is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Commissioner's decision is due to be affirmed as to the error alleged in Claim 2.
Norwood's arguments at Claim 3 that the ALJ's RFC assessment is not supported by substantial evidence appear to be based primarily on the assumption that the Court would agree with his claims of error in Claim 1 and/or 2. Because the Court has not, see supra, Claim 3 also fails. Though Norwood asserts, in conclusory fashion, that the ALJ "did not explain how she concluded Mr. Norwood would be capable of doing limited light work on a sustained basis[,]" (Doc. 15 at 14), the Court again points out that "`there is no rigid requirement that the ALJ specifically refer to every piece of evidence in his decision, so long as the ALJ's decision ... is not a broad rejection which is not enough to enable [a reviewing court] to conclude that the ALJ considered [the claimant's] medical condition as a whole.'" Mitchell, 771 F.3d at 782 (quoting Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1211 (quotation and brackets omitted)). "The ALJ's decision in this case was not a broad rejection and was sufficient to enable...this Court to conclude the ALJ considered [Norwood]'s medical condition as a whole" in formulating her RFC, id., and Norwood has offered no persuasive argument to the contrary. Accordingly, the Commissioner's decision is due to be affirmed as to the error alleged in Claim 3.
In accordance with the foregoing analysis, it is
Final judgment shall issue separately in accordance with this Order and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58.
It is also true that "the report of a non-examining doctor is accorded little weight if it contradicts an examining doctor's report; such a report, standing alone, cannot constitute substantial evidence." Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 (11th Cir. 1991). However, here the ALJ also considered objective evidence from examining medical officials and determined that the non-examining consultant's assessments were "consistent with the record as a whole" (R. 28), which included the reports of examining physicians. Norwood has offered no argument against this finding.
