KRISTI K. DuBOSE, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Partial Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 29), and the Defendants'
Plaintiff Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. ("Joe Hand") is a Pennsylvania corporation engaged in the closed circuit distribution "of sports and entertainment programming." distributes sports and entertainment programming to commercial establishments." (Docs. 1 at 6 and 29-3 at 2). "[Joe Hand] purchased and retained the commercial exhibition rights to the `UFC 148: Silva v. Sonnen II' broadcast including all undercard bouts and the main prizefight, broadcasted on July 7, 2012." (Docs. 29-3 at ¶3, 29-4). This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1331 (federal question), as this action was brought pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §§ 553, 605.
On July 24, 2014, Plaintiff Joe Hand commenced this action by filing suit against War Bama by Chris d/b/a War Bama LLC ("War Bama"), Eula Sheffield Neal ("Neal"), and Christopher Sherman ("Sherman") alleging violations of 47 U.S.C. §§ 553, 605, based on the unauthorized broadcast of UFC 148 at the War Bama. (Doc. 1). War Bama is an establishment located in Silas, Alabama. (Doc. 36 at 1). Neal and Sherman are the only members of War Bama, with Neal owning 60% and Sherman owning 40%. (Id.).
Neal and War Bama answered the complaint on November 3, 2014. (Doc. 19). On April 30, 2015, Joe Hand timely filed its motion for partial summary judgment. (Doc. 29). Though not styled as such, Joe Hand's motion is partial due to the fact that it has not been brought against all defendants in this matter.
On October 6, 2014, Joe Hand made an application for entry of default against Sherman and on October 8, 2014, the Clerk entered a default against Sherman. (Docs. 14,15). Plaintiff has not filed a motion for entry of default judgment.
As noted by the Defendants, "The UFC event was [] broadcast at the War Bama Club in Silas, Alabama. The UFC event was not authorized for broadcast at the War Bama." (Doc. 36 at 1). UFC 148 was obtained via a residential satellite account registered to Neal at her home address, which was in use at the War Bama. (Docs. 29-7 at 7-8 and 36-1 at 2).
On July 7, 2012, auditor Walter Childress went to the War Bama while UFC 148 was being broadcast. (Doc. 29-5). As evidenced by Childress' affidavit, UFC 148 was displayed via a projector screen and a television at the establishment. (Doc. 29-5). Childress paid a $10.00 cover charge to enter the War Bama. (Id. at 2). While there, Childress took three head counts of patrons present during the exhibition of UFC 148. The first, second, and third head counts were 6, 32, and 40, respectively. (Id.).
"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). Rule 56(c) provides as follows:
FED.R.CIV.P. Rule 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment bears the "initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). If the nonmoving party fails to make "a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof," the moving party is entitled to summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. "In reviewing whether the nonmoving party has met its burden, the court must stop short of weighing the evidence and making credibility determinations of the truth of the matter . . . the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen, 965 F.2d 994, 998-999 (11th Cir. 1992).
Defendants have moved to strike the affidavits of Joe Hand, Jr. and Walter Childress (Docs. 29-3 and 29-5, respectively) based on "a lack of personal knowledge, facts, competence, relevance and conclusory allegations and statements." (Doc. 34 at 1). Joe Hand, Jr. is the president of the Plaintiff Joe Hand Promotions. (Doc. 29-3). The Court finds Mr. Hand is competent to testify concerning about Joe Hand's business given his position as its president. Childress' affidavit was based upon his personal visit to the War Bama on the date of UFC 148. To the extent either affidavit contained any irrelevant information, conclusory allegations, or inadmissible evidence, such was not considered by the Court. Thus, the motion to strike is
Joe Hand brought suit against Neal individually, as well as the establishment itself for exhibiting UFC 148 to War Bama patrons without Joe Hand's authorization. Joe Hand seeks relief under two different statutory provisions—47 U.S.C. § 605 (The Communications Act of 1934), or, alternatively, 47 U.S.C. § 553 (The Cable & Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992).
47 U.S.C. § 605(a). This section "prohibits the unauthorized third party reception of satellite transmissions intended for fee-paying subscribers." Showtime/The Movie Channel, Inc. v. Covered Bridge Condo. Ass'n, 881 F.2d 983, 988 (11th Cir. 1989), vacated on other grounds by 895 F.2d 711 (11th Cir. 1990). "Satellite signals are considered `radio communication.'" J & J Sports Prod., Inc. v. Allen, 2011 WL 941502, *2 at n. 3 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 14, 2011).
Section 553 provides that "[n]o person shall intercept or receive or assist in intercepting or receiving any communications service offered over a cable system, unless specifically authorized to do so by the cable operator or as may otherwise be specifically authorized by law." 47 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1). As the Northern District of Georgia has recently explained:
J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Indigo Bar & Lounge, Inc., 2014 WL 1347065, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 3, 2014).
The Court finds this reasoning persuasive. A review of the Record indicates that the Defendants received and broadcast the fight via satellite, not cable. Further, there is no evidence whatsoever that cable was employed by the Defendants in obtaining the broadcast. Thus, the Defendants are liable under § 605 rather than § 553. Accordingly, Count Two, brought under § 553, is
Liability under § 605 "does not require a knowing violation." Kingvision Pay Per View, Ltd. v. Williams, 1 F.Supp.2d 1481, 1484 (S.D.Ga.1998). To establish a violation of § 605, a plaintiff "must establish that (1) the Defendants intercepted the program, (2) Defendants did not pay for the right to receive the transmission, and (3) Defendants displayed the program to patrons of their commercial establishment." Zuffa, LLC v. Al-Shaikh, 2011 WL 1539878, at *4 (S.D.Ala. Apr.21, 2011) (citing J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Just Fam, LLC, 2010 WL 2640078, at *2 (N.D.Ga. June 28, 2010)). Joe Hand has moved for summary judgment against both the establishment, War Bama, and Eula Sheffield Neal, in her individual capacity.
In its response to Joe Hand's motion for summary judgment, War Bama concedes the violation of § 605. ("The UFC event was [] broadcast at the War Bama Club in Silas, Alabama. The UFC event was not authorized for broadcast at the War Bama." Doc. 36 at 1). Thus, Defendant War Bama is liable for the unauthorized broadcast of the UFC fight. Accordingly, Joe Hand's motion for summary judgment as to War Bama's liability on Count One, brought under 47 U.S.C. §605, is
In order to hold Neal vicariously liable in her individual capacity and as officer, director, shareholder and/or principal of the War Bama under § 605, Joe Hand must show that Neal had a "right and ability to supervise the violations, and that [s]he had a strong financial interest in such activities." J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Arboleda, 2009 WL 3490859, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 27, 2009). Though Neal is a member of the War Bama LLC, she states,
(Doc. 36-1 at 1, Aff. Neal). With regard to the events of July 7, 2012 Neal states:
The Court finds that genuine issues of fact exist as to the nature and extent of Neal's control over the establishment and its activities are in dispute. Thus, Neal's vicarious liability for the violation of § 605 cannot be determined on summary judgment. See Zuffa, LLC v. Taapken, 2012 WL 3980169, at *2 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 11, 2012) (denying summary judgment on similar grounds). Accordingly, Joe Hand's motion for summary judgment as to Eula Sheffield Neal is
Under § 605, a court may grant injunctive relief, award damages, and direct the recovery of full costs, including reasonable attorney's fees. 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(B). An aggrieved party may then elect to recover actual or statutory damages. 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(C).
As discussed herein, Defendants' motion to strike (Doc. 34) is