ORDER

WILLIAM H. STEELE, Chief District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on defendant's Motion to Dismiss or Stay Class Action Complaint (doc. 2). The Motion has been briefed.

Plaintiff, William A. Davis, brought this putative class action against Central Alabama Electric Cooperative ("CAEC") by filing a Complaint in the Circuit Court of Dallas County, Alabama, on January 26, 2015. The gist of Davis's Complaint is that CAEC, a rural electric cooperative providing services to customers/members in Dallas County and elsewhere in Alabama, violated Alabama Code § 37-6-20 and breached its contractual obligations by improperly retaining excess revenues rather than distributing them to members via patronage refunds or rate reductions. Davis purports to bring these claims on his own behalf, and also as representative of a class consisting of "[a]ll current and former members of Defendant who (1) currently reside in Alabama; and (2) have not been distributed all excess revenue rightfully owed to them under Ala. Code § 37-6-20." (Doc. 1, Exh. A at ¶ 17.) CAEC subsequently removed this action to this District Court pursuant to the federal officer removal provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1).

On January 23, 2015, some three days before Davis filed his class action complaint against CAEC, a separate group of plaintiffs consisting of Pamela Caver, Christine Grandison and Dexter Grandison filed a Class Action Complaint of their own (the "Caver Complaint") against CAEC in Dallas County Circuit Court. The Caver Complaint was strikingly similar to that filed by Davis, inasmuch as it alleged that CAEC had violated Alabama Code § 37-6-20 and breached a contract with its members by failing to refund excess revenues to its members on an annual basis. Caver and the Grandisons purported to bring their action on their own behalf, as well as two proposed member classes, one consisting of current members of CAEC who "(1) currently reside in Alabama, and (2) have not been paid all excess revenues (in the form of `Patronage Capital' or `Capital Credit') owed to them," and the other consisting of former members of CAEC who meet the same criteria. (See Civil Action 15-0129-WS-C, at doc. 1, Exh. A, ¶ 14.) CAEC subsequently removed the Caver Action to this District Court pursuant to § 1442(a)(1). Like the instant Davis case, the Caver Action ultimately found its way to the undersigned's docket.

The net result of the foregoing is that there are now two virtually identical class action complaints pending against CAEC on the undersigned's civil docket. The alleged wrongdoing by CAEC is the same in both cases. The relief sought against CAEC is the same (or substantially the same) in both cases. And the proposed classes are the same (or substantially the same) in both cases. The only difference lies in the identities of the named plaintiffs and, perhaps more importantly, their counsel.

Understandably frustrated at the prospect of waging the same war on two different fronts, CAEC has filed a Motion to Dismiss or Stay in this action, the central point of which is that Davis's Complaint should be dismissed or stayed as a second-filed class action. Alabama courts adhere to a "well established" rule that "a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an action containing class allegations, as long as there is pending in another court a prior-filed action involving substantially identical class allegations." Ex parte First Nat'l Bank of Jasper, 717 So.2d 342, 350 (Ala. 1997). This rule "is enforced to prevent unseemly, expensive, and dangerous conflicts of jurisdiction and of process." Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). By all appearances, Alabama courts have consistently applied this rule in the wake of First Nat'l Bank of Jasper.1 CAEC contends that this rule requires that Davis's lawsuit be dismissed or stayed pending a determination of whether class certification will be granted in the Caver Action.

In response to the Motion to Dismiss or Stay, Davis candidly admits that the rule enunciated in First Nat'l Bank of Jasper "is the current law in Alabama." (Doc. 18, at 3.) Plaintiff's only objection to application of that rule here is his belief that the rule is "ill-advised" and that pre-First Nat'l Bank of Jasper decisions were "better-crafted." (Id. at 3-4.) This contention is unpersuasive. If Alabama law governs this question, then this Court does not have the luxury of jettisoning a well-established, unambiguous, black-letter Alabama rule simply because it might favor a different approach. That "if" qualifier is important, however, and the parties' submissions are silent on this critical point. Stated differently, if CAEC had not removed this action from Dallas County Circuit Court, then First Nat'l Bank of Jasper would plainly mandate that this action be dismissed or stayed pending a class certification determination in the Caver Action. But CAEC did remove this action to federal court. It is far from clear — and not explored by the parties at all — why a federal court would be bound by the state-law procedural rule embraced by First Nat'l Bank of Jasper. At least one Alabama Supreme Court justice has forcefully opined that federal courts are not so bound. See First Tennessee Bank, N.A. v. Snell, 718 So.2d 20, 25-26 (Ala. 1998) (First Nat'l Bank of Jasper rule "does not apply in a federal court at all ... because the courts of the United States are courts of another sovereign, over which the courts of Alabama have no supervisory control or jurisdiction.... The rule set forth in FNB of Jasper III is a state law that is `contrary' to federal class-action law.... Not only is FNB of Jasper III `contrary' to federal law, but its application would literally oust a United States district court of jurisdiction — a legal impossibility under the Supremacy Clause.") (Cook, J., concurring in result).

In light of these concerns, the parties' failure to address them in their court filings to date, and to ensure that both sides get a fair opportunity to be heard on what may be a pivotal legal question raised sua sponte, additional briefing is required. To that end, the parties are ordered to file supplemental briefs — confined to the narrow issue of whether the rule of First Nat'l Bank of Jasper applies in federal court — on or before August 24, 2015. No further replies or additional briefs on issues relating to the Motion to Dismiss or Stay Class Action are authorized or permitted at this time.2

DONE and ORDERED.