ORDER

WILLIAM H. STEELE, Chief District Judge.

This matter came before the Court for a Final Pretrial Conference on October 21, 2015. The stated purposes of the conference were not only to make final preparations for the November 2015 non-jury trial setting of plaintiffs' claims against defendant Michael R. Huffman,1 but also to resolve certain representation issues raised by defendants' counsel of record's Renewed Motion to Withdraw (doc. 60), which set forth in detail defendants' history of non-responsiveness and failure to pay invoices of both counsel and third-party vendors (such as court reporters and videographers).

In order to resolve all of these issues fairly and efficiently without disrupting the current trial setting, the Court concluded that Michael Huffman's presence at the Final Pretrial Conference was necessary, along with one or both of his lawyers. Through a series of court orders, Huffman was directed to attend the conference personally. On October 1, 2015, Magistrate Judge Cassady entered an Order stating as follows: "[T]he Court ORDERS MICHAEL R. HUFFMAN to attend the final pretrial conference scheduled before Chief Judge Steele on October 13, 2015, at 9:30 a.m., in Mobile, Alabama to participate in the discussion of the issues highlighted in this Order." (Doc. 56, at 4.) On October 2, 2015, the undersigned entered an Order resetting the Final Pretrial Conference for October 21, 2015 at 2:00 p.m., to accommodate scheduling conflicts with the undersigned's criminal trial docket. The October 2 Order specifically noted that Huffman had been ordered to attend the Final Pretrial Conference, and directed the Clerk of Court to mail a copy of such Order to him to ensure his awareness of the new setting. (See doc. 57.) On October 14, 2015, the undersigned entered another Order carrying defendants' counsel's Renewed Motion to Withdraw to the pretrial conference and explaining as follows:

(Doc. 61, at 1-2.) Again, the Clerk of Court mailed a copy of the October 14 Order to Huffman at his address of record.

Michael Huffman did not contact court personnel concerning these orders until the morning of October 20, 2015 (the eve of the pretrial conference), when he personally called chambers and asked to speak with the undersigned. Chambers staff correctly informed Huffman that no such direct communication was permissible under applicable rules. Staff further explained that if Huffman sought any relief or wanted to submit any information or requests to the Court, he must do so via written filing made through the Clerk's Office. At no time during this brief telephone call did Huffman reveal any facts or circumstances that might justify his non-attendance at the Final Pretrial Conference, much less warrant a continuance of same. To be clear, Huffman did not intimate during the call that he was requesting a continuance or asking to be relieved of the obligation to attend the Final Pretrial Conference.

On the morning of October 21, 2015 (less than five hours before the Final Pretrial Conference), Huffman filed a short, one-paragraph email message with the assistance of his estranged counsel of record. In its entirety, the body of that email consisted of the following text (typographical errors in original):

(Doc. 63.) Neither the undersigned's staff nor Clerk's Office personnel have had further contact or interactions with Huffman following his submission of that email. At no point did the undersigned rule — much less any court official notify Huffman — that he was excused from attending the Final Pretrial Conference.

At the appointed hour of 2:00 p.m. on October 21, 2015, the undersigned convened the Final Pretrial Conference in this matter as scheduled. Plaintiffs' counsel of record (John P. Kavanagh, Jr. and Brian McEwing) attended, the latter having flown in from out of state to participate in the conference. One of Huffman's attorneys of record (A. Clay Rankin, III) was also present, albeit with the hope of being relieved of all further duties and responsibilities in this matter at the earliest possible time. Huffman was nowhere to be seen, despite his actual knowledge of both the Final Pretrial Conference and the Court's unambiguous rulings mandating his personal appearance. Via his unexcused absence, Huffman effectively prevented any meaningful discussion from occurring at the conference with regard to final trial preparations. The result is that, by electing not to comply with court orders, Huffman needlessly caused both judicial and litigant resources to be squandered, and derailed a trial setting that was fixed back in September 2014. In other words, Huffman's disobedience reduced the Final Pretrial Conference to a colossal waste of time for all concerned.

Insofar as Huffman intended for his October 21 email message to excuse his participation in the Final Pretrial Conference, that submission is unsatisfactory. Again, three separate written judicial directives had placed Huffman squarely on notice that he was ordered to attend the conference himself. The Orders dated October 1, October 2 and October 14 were not phrased as invitations for Huffman to attend, nor as conferring upon him a discretionary, aspirational option to do so if it suited his fancy. These Orders were framed in unambiguous, mandatory terms. And there is no question that Huffman was aware of those judicial directives; after all, both the October 20 telephone call and the October 21 email evince Huffman's subjective understanding that he was expected to appear in court for the pretrial conference. Nonetheless, the gravamen of his message was that Huffman had elected to stay at a job site in lieu of coming to court. Nothing in the October 21 email suggested that Huffman was physically unable to leave his work station, that doing so would expose him to severe financial or personal hardship, or that there were emergencies or exigent circumstances in play. Instead, Huffman simply indicated that he was going to stay at work and breezily concluded, "Sorry if this an enconvieniance for anyone." Mandatory court appearances are not a matter of convenience, to be waved off casually by one who would rather be somewhere else. Rarely does this Court encounter a litigant who would not prefer to be somewhere else carrying on his or her normal workaday affairs, rather than coming to federal court in response to a court order. And yet, every single day, myriad case participants, witnesses and others set aside their professional and personal obligations and come to court when commanded to do so. The orderly, efficient administration of justice depends on it. Not Huffman. For those who do not appear in court when ordered to do so, there are — and must be — significant adverse consequences. This Order delineates those consequences.

In light of the foregoing, it is ordered as follows:

DONE and ORDERED.