REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

KATHERINE P. NELSON, Magistrate Judge.

This action is before the Court on the Motions to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and supporting memoranda (Docs. 7, 18, 26, 27) filed by Defendants Stan Wilson, Richard Stringer, Aaron Carpenter, and Clarke-Washington Electric Cooperative (hereinafter, "the Cooperative"). Plaintiff Mickel Shepherd has filed an omnibus response (Doc. 32) and affidavit (Doc. 35) in opposition to the motions, to which the Defendants have filed replies (Docs. 40, 41, 43). Defendant Richard Stringer has also filed a motion to strike Shepherd's response affidavit (Doc. 42), and Shepherd has filed a motion for leave to amend his complaint (Doc. 47).

Under S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(b), the motions to dismiss and related matters have been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for entry of a report and recommendation as to the appropriate disposition, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)-(C), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(1), and S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(a)(2)(S). Upon consideration, and for the reasons stated herein, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the motion to strike (Doc. 42) and the motion for leave to amend (Doc. 47) be DENIED, that the motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) (Docs. 7, 18, 26) be GRANTED as to Shepherd's federal claims, that Shepherd be DENIED further leave to amend his Complaint or to engage in discovery, and that Shepherd's state law claims be sua sponte DISMISSED without prejudice.

I. Legal Standards

In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted," the Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, "accepting all well-pleaded facts that are alleged therein to be true." Miyahira v. Vitacost.com, Inc., 715 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Bickley v. Caremark RX, Inc., 461 F.3d 1325, 1328 (11th Cir. 2006)). However, "`the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.'" Am. Dental Ass'n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).

Cochran v. Southern Co., Civil Action No. 14-0569-WS-N, 2015 WL 3508018, at *1 (S.D. Ala. June 3, 2015). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation and quotations omitted). "[O]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not `show[n]' — `that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)) (citations omitted). The Court looks to the pleading as a whole in determining whether the "plausibility standard" has been satisfied. See Speaker, 623 F.3d at 1382 ("Reading Speaker's Amended Complaint as a whole, we conclude that it both alleges the requisite statutory elements and marshals `enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S. Ct. at 1974."); Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1252 n.11 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (stating that, in a Rule 12(b)(6) context, "[w]e read the complaint as a whole").

II. Procedural Background and Well-Pleaded Factual Allegations

On July 27, 2015, Shepherd, a member and former employee of the Cooperative, initiated this action by filing a Complaint with this Court alleging various causes of action against the Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, state law, and local law. (Doc. 1). Per the well-pleaded allegations in the Complaint, Shepherd's claims arise out of an incident occurring "on or about" September 13, 2011, at the Washington County High School football field in Chatom, Alabama, during the Cooperative's annual meeting. Shepherd was "reported to the Washington County Sheriff" (Defendant Richard Stringer)1 and was "severely beaten" and arrested at the meeting, all "for simply desiring to speak and contest the minutes..." Criminal prosecution arising from this incident was subsequently brought against Shepherd by the Town of Chatom, which appears to have concluded on September 2, 2014, when Shepherd's appeal of an adverse decision by the Chatom Municipal Court was "DISMISSED or NOLLE PROSSED" by the Circuit Court of Washington County on motion of the Town. Shepherd alleges his arrest and prosecution were sought primarily by Defendant Stan Wilson, the Cooperative's "Executor Director," because Shepherd has consistently run for a position on the Cooperative's board but has been unsuccessful because of Wilson's "inappropriate conduct" and "unfair campaign and posting tactics."2

Counts 1, 2 and 3 the Complaint assert various causes of action under § 1983 for deprivation of federal constitutional rights. Count 1 alleges "abuse of governmental power by the wrongful arrest of the Plaintiff and the excessive use of force without just cause." (Doc. 1 at 6). Count 2 alleges violations of due process, claiming that the Defendants have interfered with and denied Shepherd his "right to run for and be elected to the [Cooperative's] Board without interference, thereby resulting in the `taking' of a constitutional right ... without due process of law[,]" as well as denying him "his constitutional rights f [sic] Free Speech and Free Association and caused him to be falsely arrested..." (Id. at 7). Count 3 alleges that the Defendants unlawfully retaliated against Shepherd in violation of "his First Amendment rights" for his "vocal criticism of the Defendant(s), along with impeding his Freedom of Association." (Id. at 8).

In addition to Shepherd's federal claims, Counts 1, 2, and 3 are sprinkled with references to deprivations of rights under Alabama and Washington County law, as well as allegations that the Cooperative has failed to follow its own standard practices and by-laws. (See id. at 6-8). Finally, Count 4 alleges a myriad of "state court torts": assault/excessive use of force in arrest; false arrest; defamation of character; harassment; slander; libel; wrongful personal restraint/false imprisonment; abuse of governmental power; mental anguish; intentional infliction of emotional distress; fraud; outrage; and "[p]erhaps, other municipal, state or federal law torts that []Shepherd is unaware of at this time that shall be added as necessary ... as the Discovery process progresses." (Id. at 9-10). Shepherd seeks monetary damages in excess of one million dollars, as well as attorneys' fees and court costs.

III. Analysis

A. Federal Claims

1. Aaron Carpenter

Defendant Aaron Carpenter moves for dismissal of all federal claims against him under § 1983 because "Shepherd makes no factual allegations at all about Carpenter, and certainly none which show an affirmative causal connection between any action by Carpenter and the alleged constitutional deprivations suffered by Plaintiff." (Doc. 27 at 8). Carpenter is correct. Shepherd's Complaint merely lists Carpenter as a defendant in the style (see Doc. 1 at 1) and alleges that he and the other individual defendants "work for governmental-type entities and [the Cooperative]." (Id. at 4, ¶ 4). The Complaint is devoid of any factual allegations indicating how Carpenter was involved in any of the constitutional deprivations alleged. Neither Shepherd's response brief (Doc. 32) nor his affidavit (Doc. 35) attempts to enlighten the Court as to Carpenter's involvement in the events underlying this action.

To the extent Carpenter is being sued in his official capacity, Shepherd has failed to identify what that capacity is, or even make clear what entity he is an officer/agent of.3 Moreover, the simple fact that Carpenter works for an entity involved in the actions underlying Shepherd's claims is insufficient to hold him liable under § 1983 in his individual capacity. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Van Tassell, 318 F. App'x 755, 760 (11th Cir. Jan. 27, 2009) (per curiam) (unpublished) ("In order to prevail on the merits in a § 1983 action against a defendant in his individual capacity, the plaintiff generally must show that he was personally involved in acts or omissions that resulted in the constitutional deprivation. Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995). `[S]upervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.' Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 1999)).").

Because Shepherd has failed to present any factual allegations plausibly suggesting that Carpenter is liable for any of Shepherd's § 1983 claims, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Carpenter's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) (Doc. 26) be GRANTED as to all of Shepherd's § 1983 claims against Carpenter.

2. Statute of Limitations

Defendants Carpenter and Richard Stringer have both moved for dismissal of Shepherd's § 1983 claims as time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations.4 "`All constitutional claims brought under § 1983 are tort actions, subject to the statute of limitations governing personal injury actions in the state where the § 1983 action has been brought.' Crowe v. Donald, 528 F.3d 1290, 1292 (11th Cir.2008) (quotation omitted). In Alabama, ... that limitations period is two years. See Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin, 876 F.2d 1480, 1483 (11th Cir. 1989) (`[T]he two-year limitations period ... applies to section 1983 actions in Alabama.')." Powell v. Thomas, 643 F.3d 1300, 1303 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).5 Stringer and Carpenter argue that the two-year statute of limitations for Shepherd's § 1983 claims against them began running on September 13, 2011, when Shepherd was beaten and arrested at the Cooperative's annual meeting. Shepherd did not file his Complaint until July 27, 2015, well over two years from that date.

Shepherd's omnibus response devotes but a lone sentence to addressing Stringer and Carpenter's statute of limitations argument, asserting: "The fact this matter involves continuing violations of federal law negates the Defendants' improper Statute of Limitations Defense." (Doc. 32 at 3). Shepherd cites no authority in support of this contention.

"It has long been the law of this Circuit that in § 1983 actions `the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the facts which would support a cause of action are apparent or should be apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights.'" McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1173 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Mullinax v. McElhenney, 817 F.2d 711, 716 (11th Cir. 1987) (internal quotations omitted)). "[T]he statute of limitations upon a § 1983 claim seeking damages for a false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment, where the arrest is followed by criminal proceedings, begins to run at the time the claimant becomes detained pursuant to legal process." Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 397 (2007). Here, Shepherd has not alleged when his municipal criminal prosecution began. However, Shepherd's appeal of his municipal court convictions to the Washington County Circuit Court commenced September 5, 2012 (see Washington County Circuit Court Case Nos. CC-2012-000144.00 & -000145.00);6 logic dictates that his municipal court prosecution began sometime before then. Because September 5, 2012, is still more than two years from the date Shepherd filed his Complaint, his claims for false arrest are time-barred. As for Shepherd's various other § 1983 claims against Stringer and Carpenter (excessive force, unconstitutional "taking," deprivation of First Amendment rights, retaliation for exercising First Amendment rights), the undersigned agrees with these Defendants that, accepting as true the well-pleaded factual allegations in Shepherd's Complaint, these causes of action accrued from his September 13, 2011 arrest and assault at the Cooperative's annual meeting.7

Because Shepherd's § 1983 claims against Carpenter and Stringer are time-dismiss barred,8 the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Carpenter's and Stringer's motions to under Rule 12(b)(6) (Docs. 18, 26) be GRANTED as to all of Shepherd's § 1983 claims against them.9

3. StateActors

The Cooperative and Wilson, who is being sued for actions taken in his capacity as a Cooperative board member, argue they cannot be held liable under § 1983 because they are not state actors. Rather, they assert, the Cooperative is a private, member-owned entity organized and regulated under Alabama Code § 37-6-1, et seq., which allows for the organization of "[c]ooperative, nonprofit membership corporations ... for the purpose of supplying electric energy and promoting and extending the use thereof..." Ala. Code § 37-6-2. Shepherd's Complaint acknowledges that the Cooperative is organized under this chapter of the Alabama Code. (See Doc. 1 at 4-5, ¶ 4).10

"To obtain relief under § 1983, [Shepherd] must show that he was deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law." E.g., Patrick v. Floyd Med. Ctr., 201 F.3d 1313, 1315 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing Willis v. Univ. Health Servs., Inc., 993 F.2d 837, 840 (11th Cir. 1993). "`[S]tate action requires both an alleged constitutional deprivation `caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person for whom the State is responsible,' and that `the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.'" Id. (quoting Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 119 S.Ct. 977, 985, 143 L. Ed. 2d 130 (1999) (citations omitted)) (alteration added). "Private conduct is not actionable under § 1983; rather, to state a claim for relief, the alleged deprivation of a constitutional right must occur `under color of state law.' See Focus on the Family v. Pinellas Suncoast Transit Auth., 344 F.3d 1263, 1277 (11th Cir. 2003). State action is not established merely because a private entity receives government funding or is subject to extensive government regulation. See, e.g., San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 542-47, 107 S.Ct. 2971, 2984-87, 97 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1987); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1003-11, 102 S.Ct. 2777, 2785-89, 73 L. Ed. 2d 534 (1982)." Shell v. Foulkes, 362 F. App'x 23, 27 (11th Cir. Jan. 19, 2010) (per curiam) (unpublished). See also Kearson v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 763 F.2d 405, 406 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) ("In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., the Supreme Court held that state regulation of a privately-owned utility company was not sufficient to make the utility a state actor for purposes of section 1983, even though the utility held a monopoly in providing electrical service to the area. 419 U.S. [345,] 358-59, 95 S. Ct. [449,] 457[ (1974)]. Kearson offers nothing to distinguish Southern Bell, a privately-owned telephone company, from the utility in Jackson.").

Rayburn ex rel. Rayburn v. Hogue, 241 F.3d 1341, 1347 (11th Cir. 2001).

Here, Alabama law is clear that the Cooperative is organized as a private, non-governmental entity, and Shepherd has offered neither factual allegations nor argument suggesting that the Cooperative can be considered a state actor under any of the three tests set forth in Rayburn. While the Cooperative is subject to government regulation, see generally Ala. Code § 37-6-1, et seq., and may receive government funds, see supra, n.10, neither of these make the Cooperative a state actor.11

Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Shepherd has failed to allege sufficient facts plausibly suggesting that the Cooperative is a state actor subject to liability under § 1983. As such, Wilson, who is being sued for actions taken in his capacity as "Executor Director" of the Cooperative's board, also cannot be considered a state actor liable under § 1983. Accordingly, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Cooperative's and Wilson's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) (Doc. 7) be GRANTED as to all of Shepherd's § 1983 claims against them.

In sum, and for the reasons stated above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Defendants' motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) (Docs. 7, 18, 26) be GRANTED as to all federal claims asserted in Shepherd's Complaint (Doc. 1).12

B. Requests for Leave to Amend or to Engage in Discovery

In the final sentence of his response brief, Shepherd requests that he be given leave to amend his Complaint should the Court determine that it is due to be dismissed on the Defendants' motions. (See Doc. 32 at 4-5). "It has long been established in this Circuit that a district court does not abuse its discretion by denying a general and cursory request for leave to amend contained in an opposition brief." Davidson v. Maraj, 609 F. App'x 994, 1002 (11th Cir. Apr. 15, 2015) (per curiam) (unpublished) (citing Rosenberg v. Gould, 554 F.3d 962, 967 (11th Cir. 2009); Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 542 (11th Cir. 2002) (en banc); Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., Ltd., 178 F.3d 1209, 1222 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (`Where a request for leave to file an amended complaint simply is imbedded within an opposition memorandum, the issue has not been raised properly.')."). See also Lord Abbett Mun. Income Fund, Inc. v. Tyson, 671 F.3d 1203, 1208 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) ("The Fund's request for leave to amend appeared in its response to the Defendants' motion to dismiss. The Fund failed, however, to attach a copy of this proposed amendment or set forth its substance. Therefore, the district court did not err by denying the Fund's request."). Shepherd's perfunctory request for leave to amend embedded in his response brief is "insufficient as a matter of law" and should be DENIED. Davidson, 609 F. App'x at 1002.

After filing his response brief (Doc. 32) and affidavit (Doc. 35), Shepherd unsuccessfully moved for leave to amend his complaint "to include all of his claims and complaints as set out in his affidavit..." (See Doc. 44). The affidavit provides additional factual matter regarding Shepherd's history with the Cooperative predating his 2011 arrest — specifically, that he worked for the Cooperative beginning in the early 1970s, was involved in an on-the-job accident in 1988, and was subsequently "forced to retire under a disability clause" by his "new manager," Defendant Wilson, after previous management told him he would always have a job with the Cooperative. (Doc. 35 at 1, ¶¶ 1-2). The affidavit also makes clear that Stringer was the individual who arrested and beat him at the 2011 annual meeting, allegedly striking in in the back and necessitating two back surgeries. (Id. at 2, ¶ 5). Finally, the affidavit sets forth a number of concerns and complaints with how the Cooperative conducts its business (e.g., the Cooperative "manager does not acknowledge my candidacy and does not include my bid for election in the area magazine where they post their appointed candidate;" the Cooperative's "manager is not closely watched by the Board;" "business is conducted in a conspiratorial manner;" the Cooperative's Board "is not being elected in accordance with state or federal law"). (Id. at 2, ¶¶ 4, 7-9).

Recently, Shepherd filed a motion for leave to amend his complaint (Doc. 47), with a proposed amended complaint (Doc. 47-1) attached. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), leave to amend should be freely given when justice so requires.13 (Doc. 47). However, leave to amend may be denied where amendment would be futile. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). The proposed amended complaint (Doc. 47-1), which is in the same organizational format as the initial complaint (Doc. 1), makes no substantive changes in the preamble paragraphs and the "prayer for relief," and no changes at all in the sections labeled "jurisdiction," "parties," "narrative statement of facts," and "Count I — 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 Violation(s)." Compare (Doc. 47-1 at 1-7) with (Doc. 1 at 1-7). The section labeled "Count II — Due Process Violation(s)" (in addition to now specifying that Count II is brought under "the combined tenets of the 5th and 14th Amendment's procedural due process provisions") adds the following allegations:

(Doc. 47-1 at 7-8, ¶ 13).

"Count III" has been relabeled from simply "Constitutional Violation(s)" to "1st Amendment Constitutional Violation(s)." The only change to the allegations in Count III (¶¶ 15-17) is the addition of a case citation, Kay v. N.H. Democratic Party, 821 F.2d 31 (1st Cir. 1987) (per curiam).14 "Count IV" of the initial complaint, alleging "State Court Torts," has become "Count VII" in the proposed amended complaint, with no substantive changes added except to now suggest that the Defendants may have acted either "singularly or in conspiracy" in the events underlying the state law causes of action. Counts IV, V, and IV of the proposed amended complaint assert claims for "4th," "8th," and "5th/14th Amendment Constitutional Violation(s)," respectively.15 All of these claims are based on the Defendants allegedly "arresting [Shepherd] without any provocation on the date at issue and continuing to hound him up to this most recent Co-op Board election in the fall of 2015 in violation of the" Constitution. (See Doc. 47-1 at 9-13).16

Neither the proposed amended complaint (Doc. 47-1) nor the additional factual assertions in Shepherd's affidavit (Doc. 35) save Shepherd's federal claims from dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for the reasons previously stated. The Cooperative and Wilson would still not be considered state actors subject to liability under § 1983; the Complaint would still fail to set forth any reasonably specific facts plausibly indicting how Carpenter was involved in any of the events underlying Shepherd's federal claims, or how Stringer was involved in Shepherd's criminal prosecution following his arrest; Shepherd's federal claims against Stringer and Carpenter would still be time-barred under Alabama's two-year statute of limitations;17 and the undersigned would still recommend dismissal of Shepherd's state law claims without prejudice, see infra. Accordingly, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Shepherd's motion for leave to amend his complaint (Doc. 47) be DENIED as futile.18

Shepherd also asks, as an alternative to amendment, that he be permitted additional time to "supply this Court with Affidavits, Depositions or Other Documents of Support." (Doc. 32 at 4-5). This essentially amounts to a request that he be allowed to engage in discovery prior to dismissal of any claims. However, "[f]acial challenges to the legal sufficiency of a claim or defense, such as a motion to dismiss based on failure to state a claim for relief, should ... be resolved before discovery begins. Such a dispute always presents a purely legal question; there are no issues of fact because the allegations contained in the pleading are presumed to be true. Therefore, neither the parties nor the court have any need for discovery before the court rules on the motion." Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1367 (11th Cir. 1997) (citation and footnote omitted). As such, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Shepherd's request to engage in discovery prior to dismissal of any claims under Rule 12(b)(6) be DENIED.

C. State Law, County Law, and Cooperative Rules Claims

This Court has original jurisdiction over Shepherd's federal claims under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.") and 1343 ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person...[t]o redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States; [or t]o recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote.") and is exercising supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) over his Alabama law, Washington County law, and Cooperative rules and by-laws claims.19

The undersigned has recommended that the Court dismiss all of Shepherd's federal claims, see supra, and a district court "may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim ... if ... the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction..." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). "The decision to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over pendant state claims rests within the discretion of the district court." Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1088-89 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (citing Mergens v. Dreyfoos, 166 F.3d 1114, 1119 (11th Cir. 1999)). However, the Eleventh Circuit has "encouraged district courts to dismiss any remaining state claims when ... the federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial." Id. (citing L.A. Draper & Son v. Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc., 735 F.2d 414, 428 (11th Cir. 1984)). Accordingly, in conjunction with the recommendation that Shepherd's federal claims be dismissed, the undersigned further RECOMMENDS that the Court decline to continue exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Shepherd's state law, county law, and Cooperative rules and by-laws claims and DISMISS those claims without prejudice.

IV. Conclusion and Recommendations

In accordance with the foregoing analysis, it is RECOMMENDED as follows:

V. Notice of Right to File Objections

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything in it must, within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this document, file specific written objections with the Clerk of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). The parties should note that under Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, "[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge's findings or recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice." 11th Cir. R. 3-1. In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the Magistrate Judge is not specific.