WILLIAM H. STEELE, Chief District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court sua sponte based on its review of the Answer (doc. 7) filed by defendants, Stuckey Management Services, Inc., Ray Gates and George Moss.
On March 2, 2016, defendants, by and through counsel, filed an Answer that, in lieu of admitting or denying each of the numbered paragraphs of the Complaint, simply states a blanket denial that defendants "deny each and every allegation contained in Plaintiffs' Complaint and demand strict proof thereof." (Doc. 7, at 1.) "General denials of all allegations in a complaint are almost never appropriate under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." United States v. $34,796.49, more or less, in U.S. Currency, 2015 WL 1643582, *3 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 13, 2015).
The source of the disfavor with which general denials are regarded is Rule 8(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under Rule 8(b)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P., denials set forth in an answer "must fairly respond to the substance of the allegation." Id. Moreover, a general denial such as that offered by Stuckey Management, Gates and Moss here is appropriate only when a party "intends in good faith to deny all the allegations of a pleading." Rule 8(b)(3). By contrast, "[a] party that does not intend to deny all the allegations must either specifically deny designated allegations or generally deny all except those specifically admitted." Id. The Answer filed in this case is a textbook example of a general denial; however, it is far from clear in this case that such a denial can be made in good faith in a manner that comports with defendants' obligations under Rules 8 and 11. For example, the Complaint includes allegations that defendant Stuckey Management is an entity subject to suit under the Fair Housing Act (doc. 1, ¶ 12); that defendants Gates and Moss are over the age of 19 and reside in Alabama (id., ¶¶ 13-14); that Stuckey Management manages Catawba Ridge Apartments in Monroeville, Alabama (id., ¶ 16); that Gates is the property manager at Catawba Ridge Apartments (id., ¶ 17); that Moss is the security officer at Catawba Ridge Apartments (id., ¶ 18); and that plaintiffs are current or former residents of Catawba Ridge Apartments (id., ¶ 19).
In its current form, the Answer (which denies everything and admits nothing) does not appear to comport with the strictures of Rules 8 and 11. By way of example, do defendants have a good-faith basis for denying that Stuckey Management is an entity subject to the Fair Housing Act, that the individual defendants are adult residents of Alabama, or that plaintiffs are current or former residents of Catawba Ridge Apartments? Of course, counsel's signature on the Answer constitutes a certification by counsel "that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances . . . the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence." Rule 11(b)(4), Fed.R.Civ.P.
In light of the foregoing, the Court invites defendants to file an Amended Answer that fairly meets the substance of the factual allegations of the Complaint and is otherwise consistent with this Order. Such an Amended Answer should be filed on or before
DONE and ORDERED.