ORDER

CALLIE V. S. GRANADE, Senior District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on the motion to alter or amend judgment filed by Plaintiff Michael Donald Rogers (Doc. 47) and opposition thereto filed by Defendants City of Selma, Police Chief William Riley, Officer Curtis Muhannad, and Investigator Ray Blanks (collectively, "Defendants") (Doc. 50). For the reasons stated below, the motion to alter or amend the judgment is due to be denied.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff brought suit against Defendants based on alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and various laws of the State of Alabama. (Doc. 1). Defendants' motion for summary judgment on all claims was granted by the Court on April 8, 2016. (Doc. 41). Plaintiff now asks the Court to alter or amend its earlier judgment based on four arguments.

Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59(e), a "motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment."1 The decision whether to alter or amend a judgment is "committed to the sound discretion of the district judge." Mincey v. Head, 206 F.3d 1106, 1137 (11th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). Reconsideration is characterized as an "extraordinary" remedy that the court should employ "sparingly." Gougler v. Sirius Products, Inc., 370 F.Supp.2d 1185, 1189 (S.D. Ala. 2005) (citations omitted). Generally courts have recognized three grounds that justify reconsidering an order: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; and (3) the need to correct clear error or manifest injustice. Summit Medical Center of Ala., Inc. v. Riley, 284 F.Supp.2d 1350, 1355 (M.D. Ala. 2003). In this case, Plaintiff timely filed his Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment but does not argue intervening change in controlling law or new evidence. Therefore, the Court reviews its prior decision for clear error or manifest injustice.

First, Plaintiff argues that "[t]he inadvertent failure to properly notarize the affidavits [offered in opposition to summary judgment] is excusable neglect" and his corrected versions should be reconsidered. (Doc. 47, p. 1). Plaintiff contends that Rule 60(b)(1) calls for relief and reconsideration. Defendants aver that this argument is meritless because Plaintiffs failed to show "good cause" for the errors in drafting the self-described "affidavits". (Doc. 50, p. 2). The Court agrees.

"On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party ... from a final judgment" when the judgment results from excusable neglect. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1); see also S.E.C. v. Simmons, 241 Fed. App'x 660, 663 (11th Cir. 2007) (finding "claims of attorney error must be made under the more specific Rule 60(b)(1)"). The Eleventh Circuit has "demonstrated its wariness of grants of Rule 60(b)(1) relief for excusable neglect based on claims of attorney error." Cavaliere v. Allstate Ins. Co., 996 F.2d 1111, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993); see also Revere v. McHugh, 362 Fed. App'x 993, 999 (11th Cir. 2010) (applying Cavaliere); Simmons, 241 Fed. App'x at 663 (same). As unfortunate as it may be, attorney "oversight" does not justify Rule 60(b) relief in the absence of good cause even though it may "penalize innocent clients for the forgetfulness of their attorney." Solaroll Shade and Shutter Corp. v. Bio-Energy Sys., Inc., 803 F.2d 1130, 1132 (11th Cir. 1986).

Here, Plaintiff does not show good cause for deficiencies in the self-described "affidavits". Instead, Attorney Toure provides another affidavit averring that she did not instruct the notary to insert the appropriate language and has "no experience in this type of litigation." (Doc. 47-1, p.1) Both arguments are unavailing. It strains reason that affidavits and declarations require a requisite level of experience in any one particular type of litigation to appropriately oppose summary judgment. Moreover, the exclusion of Plaintiff's affidavits "is not to be interpreted to say that a timely motion to correct such an error would be denied in every case." (Doc. 41, p. 5). Plaintiff had ample time correct the deficiencies before the Court entered summary judgment. That time has passed. Now, he failed to provide facts showing that he was "prevented ... from submitting" a motion to correct the deficiencies "in a timely manner" before the undersigned rendered a decision. First Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. California Pacific Life Ins. Co., 876 F.2d 877, 882 (11th Cir. 1989). Thus, the Court finds that no excusable neglect exists in the preparation of the affidavits and the earlier decision to exclude the affidavits is not clear error.

Plaintiff's second argument insists that "the Court did not consider whether Defendants met [their] burden of showing that Plaintiff's arrest for a misdemeanor was within their discretionary authority" when the misdemeanor was not committed in Defendant Officers' presence but captured by the Selma Police Department's video surveillance system. (Doc. 47, p. 3). As to his third argument, Plaintiff contends that § 11-47-992 of the Code of Alabama should have been considered in the Court's analysis of Count III because it provides that "a municipality [may] be held liable for an injury `suffered through neglect, carelessness[,] or unskillfulness." Id. at 2. Defendants respond that both arguments are improper for the same reason: they attempt to raise arguments Plaintiff has not previously made. (Doc. 50, p. 3).

The United States Supreme Court reasoned, "Rule 59(e) permits a court to alter or amend a judgment, but it may not be used to ... raise arguments ... that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment." Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 486 n.5 (2008); see also Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 740 (11th Cir. 2010) ("A motion for reconsideration cannot be used to relitigate old matters, raise argument or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.") Plaintiff's second and third arguments were not made prior to being raised in the present motion. Therefore, these new arguments are improper and do not call for alteration or amendment of the judgment.3

Plaintiff's final ground for alteration or amendment is that no evidentiary basis exists from which to infer that Defendant Officers were in a state of heightened alert when they went to Plaintiff's home. (Doc. 47, p. 4). As Defendants correctly posit, this part of the Court's analysis was not dispositive in concluding that Defendants were due summary judgment for Plaintiff's excessive force claim. (Doc. 50, p. 4). Instead, Plaintiff's excessive force claim turned on whether more than de minimis force was applied when officers placed Plaintiff in handcuffs then in the back of the police car. This answer remains in the negative.

Thus, Plaintiff failed to show that the summary judgment was the product of clear error or resulted in manifest injustice, and this Court finds no exceptional circumstances that warrant relief from the Court's previous order.

CONCLUSION

Based on the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment (Doc. 47) is DENIED.

DONE and ORDERED.