ORDER

WILLIAM H. STEELE, Chief District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on the National Labor Relations Board's Applications for Order Enforcing Subpoenas Duces Tecum (doc. 1; doc. 7, at 3-11). On May 10, 2016, the Magistrate Judge entered a Report and Recommendations (doc. 16), wherein she recommended that both Applications be granted, that respondent's objections be overruled, and that respondent's request for entry of a protective order be denied. Respondent, Lear Corporation EEDS and Interiors ("Lear"), has filed timely Objections (doc. 17) to the Report and Recommendations, along with a supporting memorandum of law (doc. 18).1

I. Background.

A. History of the Administrative Subpoenas.

The material facts and circumstances culminating in this dispute over enforcement of administrative subpoenas are uncontested. Lear operates a manufacturing facility in Selma, Alabama, where it makes automotive seats. In approximately May 2014, three employees at this facility (Kim King, Letasha Irby, and Denise Barnett) complained to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") about workplace exposure to an organic compound called toluene diisocyanate ("TDI"). These individuals also voiced their concerns publicly through various media, including an NBC News story, a YouTube video, and other news articles. Lear reassigned the three complaining employees to the warehouse (a different building at the Selma facility) in September 2014, prompting all three employees to file OSHA § 11(c) whistleblower complaints challenging their transfers as retaliatory. OSHA's investigation into those whistleblower complaints is apparently ongoing at this time.2

On or about November 3, 2014, nonparty International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, AFL-CIO ("UAW"), filed an unfair labor charge against Lear with the NLRB. The stated basis of the charge was that Lear had "interfered with, restrained and coerced employees Letasha Irby, Kim King and Denise Barnett in the exercise of their section 7 rights by threatening them with termination, transferring them to different positions because of their protected concerted activity regarding their working conditions and union activities, threatened them with and initiated discipline against them . . . and engaged in surveillance." (Doc. 7, at 132.) In early 2015, the NLRB received two other unfair labor practice charges against Lear, involving allegations that, inter alia, Lear had unjustly disciplined Irby and King. (Doc. 1-1, at 1-14.)

In its ensuing investigation of these three unfair labor practice charges (the "ULP Charges"), the NLRB issued a total of ten administrative subpoenas to Lear seeking production of books, records and documents, and commanding certain Lear supervisors to appear and testify before an NLRB representative concerning the subject incidents. The NLRB issued these subpoenas pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 161(1).3 Lear responded by petitioning the NLRB to revoke the subpoenas; however, that request was denied by a three-member panel of the Board. When Lear still declined to comply, the Board filed a pair of applications in this District Court to compel the enforcement of those subpoenas pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 161(2). Lear opposes those applications.

Lear's opposition to the NLRB's applications for enforcement hinges on a 1975 Memorandum of Understanding (the "MOU") between the NLRB and OSHA that was published in the Federal Register. The stated purpose of the MOU was "to avoid duplicate litigation and insure that the exercise by employees of their rights in the area of health and safety will be protected." 40 Fed.Reg. 26083. The MOU recognized that many employee safety and health activities may be protected under both the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") and the Occupational Safety and Health Act ("OSH Act"). To address that overlap, the MOU explained that "since an employee's right to engage in safety and health activity is specifically protected by the OSH Act and is only generally included in the broader right to engage in concerted activities under the NLRA, it is appropriate that enforcement actions to protect such safety and health activities should primarily be taken under the OSH Act rather than the NLRA." Id. On that basis, the MOU set forth an interagency "procedural agreement" that where the NLRB receives an unfair labor practice charge covering "the same factual matters" as a § 11(c) complaint filed with OSHA, the NLRB "will, absent withdrawal of the matter, defer or dismiss the charge." (Id.) Such procedural agreement also included a section under which the NLRB and the Office of the Solicitor of Labor "will consult in order to determine the appropriate handling" of an unfair labor practice charge including both issues covered by § 11(c) of the OSH Act and issues within the NLRB's exclusive jurisdiction. (Id.) Lear's position is that the subpoenas are void because the NLRB issued them in contravention of the "defer or dismiss" requirement of the MOU.

B. The Report and Recommendations.

In her Report and Recommendations, Magistrate Judge Nelson concluded that Lear's reliance on the MOU to oppose the administrative subpoenas was misplaced. In so doing, she examined case law distinguishing between substantive agency rules (which have the force and effect of law) and non-substantive/procedural agency rules (which are not judicially enforceable and do not create substantive rights enforceable in federal court). (Doc. 16, at 17-19.) The Magistrate Judge reasoned that the MOU is "most appropriately considered a non-substantive general statement of policy" because there is no evidence that the MOU was promulgated under the Administrative Procedure Act's notice-and-comment requirements, and nothing in the MOU purports to confer enforcement rights upon third parties. (Id. at 19.) As the Report and Recommendation observed, "the MOU is simply an interagency agreement that sets forth procedural steps to guide OSHA and the Board in exercise of their shared statutory authority to conduct investigations." (Id. at 21 (citation and internal marks omitted).) On that basis, the Magistrate Judge opined that Lear could not judicially compel the NLRB to adhere to the MOU.

The overarching theme in Lear's filings is that the NLRB's efforts to enforce the administrative subpoenas in this case are nothing more than a strong-arm tactic calculated "to advance the UAW's agenda [against Lear] through costly and protracted litigation." (Doc. 7, at 102.) Lear brands the NLRB as "serving as the litigation arm of the Union" and asserts that the NLRB's failure to abide by the MOU "casts suspicion on its true intentions." (Id. at 110-11.) The Magistrate Judge correctly acknowledged that the NLRB's motivations matter, and that enforcement of subpoenas issued for an illegitimate purpose may properly be denied. (Doc. 16, at 22-23.)4 Nonetheless, she concluded that Lear had failed to make a persuasive showing that the NLRB's actions here were "a capricious, oppressive, or otherwise illegitimate use of its subpoena power." (Id. at 23.)

Because the Magistrate Judge determined that the MOU was non-substantive and not judicially enforceable by Lear, and because she rejected Lear's assertion that the NLRB had issued the subpoenas for an improper purpose, the Report and Recommendations concluded that the NLRB's application for enforcement should be granted, and that Lear's objections should be overruled. (Id. at 24-25.)5 Lear's ensuing objections to the Report and Recommendations were referred to the undersigned for disposition.

II. Analysis.

A. Legal Standard.

Where, as here, a party objects to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation concerning a dispositive matter,6 the district judge "shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). "A judge of the court may also accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." Id. This Court's review of Lear's objections to the Report and Recommendations proceeds in recognition of these statutory directives. That said, the Court also hews to the principle that "[n]either the Constitution nor the statute requires a district judge to review, de novo, findings and recommendations that the parties themselves accept as correct." United States v. Woodard, 387 F.3d 1329, 1334 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).

B. Lear's Objection that the Subpoenas are a Clear Violation of the MOU.

The focal point of Lear's Objections is that the Magistrate Judge erred in "finding that the investigative subpoenas are enforceable, despite the NLRB's clear failure to follow its stated protocol published in the Federal Register." (Doc. 17, at 2.) In lieu of discussing the Report and Recommendations head-on in its Objections and explaining specifically why it believes the Magistrate Judge's findings are incorrect, Lear block-quotes (with only modest edits and without attribution) significant chunks of its previous briefing. (Compare doc. 18, at 6-12, with doc. 7, at 110-11 & 115-19.)

Nonetheless, the gravamen of Lear's argument is that the administrative subpoenas should not be enforced because the NLRB issued them in blatant disregard of the MOU's requirements. Upon de novo review, the Court is not persuaded that the MOU requires denial of the NLRB's applications for enforcement of the subject subpoenas. Simply put, Lear's contention that the NLRB subpoenas are incompatible with the Board's obligations under the MOU is unsupported by the text of the MOU, the NLRB's interpretations of same, or extant case authority. To be sure, the MOU provides that where, as here, an unfair labor practice charge filed with the NLRB covers "the same factual matters" as a § 11(c) complaint filed with OSHA, the NLRB "will, absent withdrawal of the matter, defer or dismiss the charge." Likewise, there can be no reasonable dispute that the ULP Charges filed with the NLRB against Lear overlap in significant factual respects with the three § 11(c) whistleblower complaints filed with OSHA against Lear; indeed, they all allege that Lear retaliated against employees Letasha Irby, Kim King and Denise Barnett for complaining about TDI exposure in the Selma manufacturing facility. It also appears undisputed that the ULP Charges touch on additional matters beyond the scope of the § 11(c) OSHA complaints.

The fatal flaw in Lear's argument lies in its unsupported logical leap from these uncontroversial propositions to its conclusion that the MOU prohibits the NLRB from taking any investigative steps as to covered matters. Here is why: Although the MOU does specify that the NLRB is to "defer or dismiss" an unfair labor practice charge involving the same factual matters as a § 11(c) complaint filed with OSHA, it does not say when the NLRB must defer or dismiss that charge. On its face, the MOU does not forbid the NLRB from conducting any investigation prior to such deferral or dismissal. Nor has Lear cited a single instance in which the Board or any court in the last four decades has ever construed the MOU as manifesting an absolute, per se ban on NLRB investigative activity.7 Thus, Lear's position is predicated on a reading of the MOU that neither courts nor the Board have ever embraced, and that would require additional restrictions and covenants to be judicially inserted into the MOU where they do not presently exist.

Far from being barred by the MOU, the NLRB maintains that its issuance of subpoenas to Lear is actually in furtherance of the NLRB's obligations under that agreement. After all, the MOU directs the NLRB to "defer or dismiss" a charge covering the same factual matters as a § 11(c) complaint to OSHA. On its face, then, the MOU gives the NLRB two options: (i) deferral, or (ii) dismissal. The NLRB's common-sense, reasonable position throughout this dispute has been that it cannot make an informed determination as to whether deferral or dismissal of the ULP Charges is the appropriate option in this case without first conducting its own investigation; therefore, its issuance of the subpoenas is proper, in good faith, and entirely consistent with the MOU.8 Lear belittles the NLRB's stance, but offers no meaningful rebuttal.

The foregoing considerations loom large here because of the narrowly circumscribed role that federal courts play in the context of enforcement of administrative subpoenas. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Kloster Cruise Ltd., 939 F.2d 920, 922 (11th Cir. 1991) ("It is well-settled that the role of a district court in a proceeding to enforce an administrative subpoena is sharply limited; inquiry is appropriate only into whether the evidence sought is material and relevant to a lawful purpose of the agency."). The appropriate question is not whether this Court would have seen fit to issue the challenged subpoenas were it standing in the NLRB's shoes. Instead, the narrow, limited question presented by the NLRB's Applications and Lear's Objections is whether the NLRB is abusing this Court's process by seeking enforcement of those administrative subpoenas for an improper purpose. See, e.g., United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 58, 85 S.Ct. 248, 13 L.Ed.2d 112 (1964) ("It is the court's process which is invoked to enforce the administrative summons and a court may not permit its process to be abused.").9

In opposing enforcement of the NLRB's subpoenas in federal court, Lear relies on the "improper purpose" rationale for denying enforcement. Indeed, Lear posits that the NLRB has been a "willing participant[] to advance the UAW's agenda through costly and protracted litigation," that the NLRB issued the subpoenas "as the litigation arm of the Union," that the "NLRB's clear disregard of its own defined protocol casts suspicions on its true intentions in this case and the application should be denied," and the NLRB is acting "in an arbitrary and capricious manner" by "ignor[ing] its own published protocols." (Doc. 7, at 102, 110-11; doc. 18, at 2.) In support of this charged rhetoric, Lear asserts that it is a "patently obvious fact that the NLRB's ongoing investigation" violates the MOU. (Doc. 9, at 2.) Lear also insists that the NLRB's position "defies legitimate explanation" and amounts to "abuse of process," thereby triggering this Court's duty "to ensure that administrative subpoenas are not the tools of an abuse [sic] process." (Id. at 4, 9.)

A respondent challenging administrative subpoenas bears a heavy burden to show an improper purpose. See, e.g., United States v. Whispering Oaks Residential Care Facility, LLC, 673 F.3d 813, 817 (8th Cir. 2012) ("The respondent bears a heavy burden to disprove the existence of a valid purpose for an administrative subpoena."); Doe v. United States, 253 F.3d 256, 272 (6th Cir. 2001) (affirming district court decision enforcing administrative subpoena where respondent had failed to meet "heavy" burden of "showing institutional bad faith," that DOJ had been motivated by improper purpose in issuing subpoena). To carry this burden, Lear points to the NLRB's purported disregard of the MOU.10 As demonstrated by the foregoing discussion, however, the MOU lends no support to Lear's accusations of bad faith. Again, nothing in the MOU (or judicial or administrative interpretations of same) would expressly bar the NLRB from investigating an unfair labor practice charge that overlaps with a § 11(c) OSHA complaint. The MOU gives the NLRB the option of deferring or dismissing the overlapping charges, and the NLRB has made a reasonable showing that it needed to conduct an investigation into the charges (and hence issue the administrative subpoenas) to inform its decision of whether they should be deferred or, instead, dismissed. As such, the language of the MOU, coupled with the NLRB's conduct in this case, does not satisfy Lear's heavy burden of showing that the Board was motivated by an improper purpose or institutional bad faith in issuing the administrative subpoenas.11

For all of these reasons, the undersigned finds that the NLRB's Applications for Order Enforcing Subpoenas Duces Tecum (doc. 1; doc. 7, at 3-11) against Lear are properly granted, and that Lear's objections to same are properly overruled.

C. Lear's Objection that a Protective Order is Appropriate.

Lear's Objections also seek de novo review of the Magistrate Judge's recommended denial of Lear's request for protective order, reasoning that such recommendation "does not take into account the pertinent facts and circumstances and is therefore incorrect." (Doc. 17, at 3.)

In its filings in opposition to the NLRB's Applications, Lear asserted that, if the subpoenas were to be enforced, the Court should exercise its discretion to enter a protective order "carving out the subjects clearly covered in the parallel OSHA proceeding" from the ambit of the NLRB's subpoenas. (Doc. 9, at 9; see also doc. 7, at 119-20 (requesting protective order "to clarify the information sought by the NLRB and necessarily limit it in order to eliminate the duplicate overlap with OSHA's § 11(c) whistleblower investigation").) The Report and Recommendations found that Lear's request for protective order was "simply another way of asking the Court to enforce Lear's view of the MOU" and therefore recommended that it be denied. (Doc. 16, at 24.)

In its ensuing Objections to the R & R, Lear for the first time recasts its request for protective order as seeking not exclusion of overlapping matters but a directive that the NLRB confer with OSHA before pursuing the subpoenas further. (Compare doc. 7 at 120 & doc. 9 at 9 with doc. 18, at 12.) The Court will exercise its discretion to decline to consider Lear's attempt to raise a new, previously available argument or to request new, previously available relief for the first time via objections to the Report and Recommendations. See, e.g., Williams v. McNeil, 557 F.3d 1287, 1291 (11th Cir. 2009) ("We conclude that the district court has broad discretion in reviewing a magistrate judge's report and recommendation, and, therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to consider Williams's timeliness argument that was not presented to the magistrate judge.").12

As originally formulated, Lear's request for protective order was simply that the Court "carv[e] out the subjects clearly covered in the parallel OSHA proceeding" from the scope of the subject subpoenas. Both Lear and the Magistrate Judge agree that protective orders are available in the administrative subpoena context upon a showing of good cause. See, e.g., In re Alexander Grant & Co. Litigation, 820 F.2d 352, 356 (11th Cir. 1987) ("the sole criterion for determining the validity of a protective order is the statutory requirement of `good cause'") (citations omitted); Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 1545, 1547 (11th Cir. 1985) (explaining that federal courts have adopted a "balancing of interests approach" to rule allowing protective orders for good cause).

Lear's only "good cause" argument presented in filings to the Magistrate Judge was that "good cause exists to require the NLRB to honor its MOU published limitations and prohibit it form [sic] continuing duplicate litigation." (Doc. 7, at 120.) The Court disagrees. As discussed supra, the NLRB has a valid, good-faith reason to conduct an investigation in order to comply with the MOU; otherwise, it will not be able to discern whether the appropriate disposition of the ULP Charges is deferral or dismissal. The proposed protective order would likely cripple the NLRB's investigation and prevent it from obtaining information it reasonably requires in order to make the deferral/dismissal decision. On the other side of the balance, Lear's only showing of harm is its stated, speculative fear of "contradictory fact findings and conclusions of law" if the NLRB investigation were allowed to proceed. In its discretion, the Court concludes upon balancing the parties' respective interests that good cause does not exist to justify entry of a protective order that effectively stifles the NLRB's ability to conduct an investigation of the ULP Charges and prevents it from complying with the MOU.13 As such, respondent's request for entry of a protective order is denied.

III. Conclusion.

For all of the foregoing reasons, it is ordered as follows:

DONE and ORDERED.