ORDER

WILLIAM H. STEELE, Chief District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint (doc. 66). Defendants have filed an Objection (doc. 70), to which plaintiff has submitted a Reply (doc. 72).

I. Background.

Plaintiff, SE Property Holdings, LLC ("SEPH"), brought this fraudulent transfer action against defendants, George S. Braswell and Vennie T. Braswell, by filing the Complaint on May 17, 2013. According to the First Amended Complaint (doc. 22), which has been the operative pleading since September 2013, defendant George Braswell ("Mr. Braswell") is indebted to SEPH pursuant to certain defaulted loans as to which Mr. Braswell executed guaranties, then refused to fulfill his repayment obligations when demand was made. The First Amended Complaint alleges that Mr. Braswell fraudulently transferred certain assets to his wife, defendant Vennie Braswell ("Ms. Braswell"), in May 2009. The purportedly fraudulently transferred assets include the Braswells' primary residence and a beach condominium unit. Well-pleaded facts reflect that, at the time of the subject transfers, Mr. Braswell was indebted to SEPH's predecessor in the principal amount of $1,155,000, and had been sued by SEPH's predecessor for failing to pay pursuant to those guaranties. It is further alleged that Mr. Braswell's indebtedness to SEPH's predecessor later swelled by an additional $900,000 based on further defaults. On that basis, SEPH sued the Braswells on theories of actual fraudulent transfer, in violation of Alabama Code § 8-9A-4(a); constructive fraudulent transfer, in violation of Alabama Code §§ 8-9A-4(c) and 8-9A-5(a); and conspiracy.

The original Rule 16(b) Scheduling Order (doc. 25) entered by Magistrate Judge Nelson on October 2, 2013 fixed pretrial and trial deadlines to govern the conduct of these proceedings. Paragraph 5 of the Scheduling Order provided as follows: "AMENDMENTS TO PLEADINGS AND JOINDER OF PARTIES. Any motions for leave to join additional parties or amend the pleadings are due no later than November 4, 2013." (Doc. 25, ¶ 5.)1 Although multiple revisions to the Scheduling Order were made, at no time before or after November 4, 2013 did the Magistrate Judge ever relax or extend that deadline.2 Thus, irrespective of what may have transpired later, the court-ordered deadline for amending the pleadings lapsed on November 4, 2013.

To be sure, these proceedings departed substantially from the standard litigation track following expiration of the November 4 deadline. On June 20, 2014, after several months of discovery and just weeks before the discovery cutoff date, the parties jointly moved for a stay of this case pending disposition of related litigation (the "Sundance Case"). (See doc. 45.) Recognizing that resolution of the Sundance Case could narrow or potentially even moot the issues joined in this case, the undersigned granted the joint motion to stay via Order (doc. 49) entered on July 3, 2014. The case remained in suspended animation until August 12, 2015, at which time the stay was lifted because the Sundance Case had been resolved, apparently without realizing the hoped-for efficiency benefits for this action. (See doc. 51.) The parties submitted multiple iterations of a supplemental Rule 26(f) report (docs. 55, 58); however, because of an oversight, no Amended Scheduling Order was entered until almost a year later, on July 13, 2016. (See doc. 69.)

During the protracted interval in which this case had been reactivated but no new pretrial and trial deadlines had been set, the parties apparently resumed discovery. On June 29, 2016, during this limbo period in which no new scheduling order was in place, SEPH filed the instant Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint. In particular, SEPH explained that it wishes to amend its pleading for the following purposes: (i) to assert new fraudulent transfer claims against the Braswells relating to Mr. Braswell's transfer of ownership of an annuity to Ms. Braswell in December 2010; (ii) to set forth additional facts alleging that Ms. Braswell had sold the residence and beach condo unit to third parties after Mr. Braswell fraudulently transferred them to her; and (iii) to clarify that SEPH is seeking all relief available under the Alabama Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. (See doc. 66, Exh. 1.)

II. Analysis.

In briefing the Motion for Leave to Amend, SEPH incorrectly focuses on the liberal amendment standard provided by Rule 15(a)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P., which sets forth the general rule that leave to amend a pleading should be freely given when justice so requires. SEPH's position is that this case is procedurally akin to McKinley v. Kaplan, 177 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 1999), in which the Eleventh Circuit applied the Rule 15(a) standard because the parties had proposed scheduling order deadlines, but the district court had never entered a joint scheduling order or otherwise established any binding deadlines in the case, such that the request for leave to amend did not contravene any scheduling order deadline. See id. at 1257 (noting that "the alleged joint scheduling order apparently never was entered and therefore never became binding," and explaining that "[i]n the absence of a dispositive scheduling order, whether leave to amend should be granted is governed by the more liberal standard set forth in Rule 15(a)"). The trouble with SEPH's reliance on McKinley is that the Magistrate Judge did enter a Rule 16(b) Scheduling Order in this case, and did establish a deadline for amending pleadings that was binding on the parties. That deadline expired by its terms on November 4, 2013, almost 32 months before SEPH filed its Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint. This case is therefore readily distinguishable from McKinley.3

Where, as here, a party endeavors to amend its pleading after the scheduling order deadline for doing so has passed, the movant may not rely on the relaxed standard of Rule 15(a)(2), but must instead comport with the more stringent standard of Rule 16(b)(4). See, e.g., Southern Grouts & Mortars, Inc. v. 3M Co., 575 F.3d 1235, 1241 (11th Cir. 2009) ("A plaintiff seeking leave to amend its complaint after the deadline designated in a scheduling order must demonstrate `good cause' under Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(b)."); Sosa v. Airprint Systems, Inc., 133 F.3d 1417, 1419 (11th Cir. 1998) ("[B]ecause Sosa's motion to amend was filed after the scheduling order's deadline, she must first demonstrate good cause under Rule 16(b) before we will consider whether amendment is proper under Rule 15(a).").4 Pursuant to that rule, "[a] schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the judge's consent." Rule 16(b)(4), Fed.R.Civ.P. The "good cause" standard "precludes modification unless the schedule cannot be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension." Sosa, 133 F.3d at 1418 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).5 The burden of establishing the requisite good cause/diligence rests on SEPH, the party seeking relief from the lapsed deadline in the original Scheduling Order. See, e.g., Race Tires America, Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 614 F.3d 57, 84 (3rd Cir. 2010) ("Rule 16(b)(4) focuses on the moving party's burden to show due diligence."); Northstar Marine, Inc. v. Huffman, 2014 WL 3720537, *3 (S.D. Ala. July 28, 2014) ("The burden of establishing good cause/diligence rests squarely on the party seeking relief from the scheduling order.").

SEPH has not even attempted to make a showing of diligence that might satisfy its burden under the Rule 16(b)(4) good cause standard. To be sure, SEPH indicates that the Braswells concealed the annuity transfer from SEPH at the time of its occurrence in December 2010; nonetheless, plaintiff acknowledges that it obtained information about the annuity transfer by subpoenaing records from nonparty Hartford Investment Management Company early in the lifespan of this litigation. (Doc. 66, ¶¶ 3-4, 7-8.) This subpoena was apparently issued on or about February 13, 2014. (See doc. 70, Exh. A.) Plaintiff offers no reason why it could not have issued the subject subpoena earlier, particularly given its awareness that the parties had agreed upon a November 4, 2013 deadline for amending pleadings. The same is true as to SEPH's proposed new factual allegations that Ms. Braswell subsequently sold the residence and beach condo unit to third parties. In short, SEPH has made no showing that, even with diligence, it could not reasonably have obtained the necessary discovery on which its proposed amendment is predicated prior to the agreed-upon Scheduling Order deadline for amending pleadings. Accordingly, the Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint is properly denied pursuant to Rule 16(b)(4).6

III. Conclusion.

For all of the foregoing reasons, SEPH's Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint (doc. 66) is denied.

DONE and ORDERED.