WILLIAM E. CASSADY, Magistrate Judge.
This cause is back before the undersigned on the plaintiffs' motion to stay briefing and consideration of the defendant's motion to compel arbitration and to dismiss and separate motion to dismiss pending resolution of all jurisdictional issues (Doc. 15), the defendant's response in opposition (Doc. 23), and the plaintiffs' reply (Doc. 26). Through their motion to stay briefing, the plaintiffs have confirmed the Court's impression that in response to the motion to dismiss (see Doc. 7) and the motion to compel arbitration and to dismiss (see Doc. 6), they will be filing motions to remand directed to the notice of removal (Doc. 15, at ¶ 1). Because the anticipated motions to remand will be directed to this Court's subject-matter jurisdiction (id. at ¶ 2), plaintiffs contend that "only after jurisdiction has been determined should the substance of the arguments raised in GE Energy's Motion to Compel Arbitration and Motion to Dismiss be addressed, be it in this federal district court or in the Alabama state court." (Id. at ¶ 3; see also Doc. 26, at 1-2 (stated somewhat differently, but making the same point).)
While the Court agrees with plaintiffs that determination of subject-matter jurisdiction in this case is of paramount importance, it cannot agree with the implicit suggestion that this determination can be made in a vacuum without any impact on (or consideration of) the defendant's motion to dismiss (Doc. 7) and motion to compel arbitration and to dismiss (Doc. 6). Indeed, for those reasons outlined in the defendant's response in opposition to plaintiffs' motion to stay (Doc. 23), the undersigned agrees that any and all motions to remand filed by plaintiffs, to at least some degree, will be inextricably intertwined with the substance of the defendant's pending motions (see Doc. 6, at 1-2 ("Defendant . . . moves this Court, pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act and the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 9 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., to compel Plaintiff Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC . . . and its insurer, Plaintiff Sompo Japan Insurance Company of America . . ., to arbitrate their claims against GE Energy and to dismiss those claims without prejudice. Arbitration of those claims is mandatory pursuant to the contracts under which GE Energy supplied the allegedly defective motors described in the complaint."); Doc. 7, at 1-2 ("Defendant GE Energy . . . moves the Court to dismiss the Complaint as to Plaintiffs Pohjola Insurance Limited, AIG Europe Limited, Tapiola General Mutual Insurance Company, Axa Corporate Solutions Assurance SA UK Branch, HDI Gerling UK Branch, MSI Corporate Capital Ltd as sole Corporate Member of Syndicate 3210, and Royal & Sun Alliance plc [] because they fail to state a plausible claim against GE Energy. Indeed, as set out in the Notice of Removal[], the OTK Oyj Subrogees have failed to state even the possibility of a claim against GE Energy.")), given the following separate and independent jurisdictional grounds for removal set forth by defendant: (1) federal question jurisdiction based upon the relationship between this action and an arbitration agreement falling under the ambit of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 9 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (Doc. 1, at ¶¶6-7 & 9-19); and (2) diversity jurisdiction based upon the fraudulent joinder of plaintiffs Pohjola Insurance Limited, AIG Europe Limited, Tapiola General Mutual Insurance Company, Axa Corporate Solutions Assurance SA UK Branch, HDI Gerling UK Branch, MSI Corporate Capital Ltd as sole Corporate Member of Syndicate 3210, and Royal & Sun Alliance plc (id. at ¶¶ 8 & 20-44).