ORDER

WILLIAM H. STEELE, Chief District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on plaintiff Pam Shedd's Motion to Amend and Certify for Interlocutory Review, or in the Alternative for Entry of Rule 54(b) Final Judgment (doc. 224). The Motion has been briefed and is now ripe.

I. Relevant Background.

This case is a mortgage-loan dispute, presenting a fact pattern not dissimilar from those in many actions that have been brought in this and other federal courts around the country in recent years. It has, however, followed a very different trajectory than those myriad other likeminded cases. Plaintiffs, George and Pamela Shedd, filed a Third Amended Complaint (doc. 152) that spans 128 pages and 16 causes of action asserted against three different defendants, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Barclays Capital Real Estate, Inc., and Monument Street Funding, II, LLC. In the 26 months it has been pending in this District Court, this action has been litigated quite aggressively, as there are already more than 225 docket entries. Unfortunately, this legacy of Sturm und Drang has not been accompanied by considerable tangible progress. Discovery remains ongoing, and the discovery period will not close until December 2016, with trial set for May 2017.

In April 2016, defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (doc. 176), seeking dismissal of, inter alia, Count Sixteen, a statutory claim for violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 et seq. ("FDCPA"). Among its arguments for Rule 12(c) dismissal of that claim, Wells Fargo invoked the exemption found at 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(A). That section provides that the term "debt collector" does not include "any officer or employee of a creditor while, in the name of the creditor, collecting debts for such creditor." 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(A). In support of its contention that the § 1692a(6)(A) exemption applies here, Wells Fargo cited several decisions interpreting the statute in that manner and pointed out that well-pleaded facts in the Shedds' Third Amended Complaint admit that Wells Fargo is the owner of the loan. (Doc. 177, at 8-9.) The sum total of plaintiffs' response to Wells Fargo's invocation of the § 1692a(6)(A) exemption was to quote the statutory language, then state as follows: "It is curious how an exemption solely for an officer or employee of a creditor collecting its own debts could be misconstrued to apply to the creditor itself; the other exemptions after (6)(A) provide escape routes for the creditor, but not (6)(A)." (Doc. 200, at 11.) Plaintiffs cited no authority lending support, either specifically or generally, to their reading of § 1692a(6)(A).1 Nor did the Shedds' response brief express objection to or dissatisfaction with Wells Fargo's interpretation of the well-pleaded allegations of the Third Amended Complaint casting it as a "creditor" for FDCPA purposes.

Despite the decidedly one-sided briefing on application of the § 1692a(6)(A) exemption, the undersigned did not simply take Wells Fargo's word for it; rather, the Court conducted its own research to examine how other courts have construed that provision. That research yielded a plethora of district court decisions (including many from this Circuit) interpreting § 1692a(6)(A) as covering creditors themselves, rather than simply their officers or employees. These authorities appeared unanimous. Thus, the Court was confronted with the following set of circumstances: (i) Wells Fargo's contention that the FDCPA claim at Count Sixteen was not cognizable as a matter of law because of the § 1692a(6)(A) exemption; (ii) repeated, undisputed assertions in the pleadings that Wells Fargo owns the Shedds' debt, such that Wells Fargo is a person to whom that debt is owed, rendering it a "creditor" under the FDCPA; (iii) extensive (and apparently unchallenged) authorities interpreting § 1692a(6)(A) as applying to creditors collecting debts in their own names; and (iv) a dearth of any supporting authority, reasoning or other development of plaintiffs' conclusory argument that § 1692a(6)(A) is limited to employees and officers of creditors.

Based on this universe of facts, law and argument presented by the parties and uncovered by the Court's own research, the undersigned entered an Order (doc. 220) on June 13, 2016 that, inter alia, granted Wells Fargo's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Count Sixteen. In so doing, the June 13 Order began with the premise that "[b]ased on the repeated, consistent allegations in both sides' pleadings that Wells Fargo owns the Shedds' debt, it cannot reasonably be disputed for Rule 12(c) purposes that Wells Fargo is a person to whom that debt is owed, thereby rendering it a `creditor' under the FDCPA." (Doc. 220, at 14.)2 The June 13 Order then noted the Shedds' conclusory argument that the § 1692a(6)(A) exemption is not available to a creditor entity itself, but rejected that contention because "abundant authority has construed this exemption as reaching creditors themselves, not just their officers or employees." (Id. at 14-15.) The June 13 Order cited no fewer than 11 district court decisions (including eight from this Circuit) that have interpreted the § 1692a(6)(A) exemption in such a manner. The June 13 Order explained that "Plaintiffs' objection, unsupported by any citations to case authorities, that the § 1692a(6)(A) exemption is confined to officers and employees of creditors, and does not cover creditors, is refuted by this extensive decisional authority." (Id. at 15.) Based on these determinations, the June 13 Order concluded that Count Sixteen was properly dismissed and granted the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to that issue. The June 13 Order did not dismiss all claims asserted by the Shedds against Wells Fargo; to the contrary, as they acknowledge, plaintiffs are still pursuing three federal statutory causes of action — two RESPA claims and a FCRA claim — against Wells Fargo, not to mention their multiple pending claims against the other defendants, Monument and Barclays.

On July 10, 2016, plaintiff Pamela Shedd filed a Motion for Interlocutory Review or for Entry of Rule 54(b) Final Judgment (doc. 224). In that Motion and her supporting memoranda, Shedd submitted nearly 30 pages of argument attacking the June 13 Order's application of the § 1692a(6)(A) exemption to this case. The vast majority of those arguments had never been presented to this Court for consideration while the Rule 12(c) Motion was pending. At any rate, Shedd proposes two alternative methods of addressing what she calls an error of law, to-wit: (i) certification of the June 13 Order for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); or (ii) entry of a final judgment under Rule 54(b), Fed.R.Civ.P., to allow her to take an immediate appeal from the June 13 Order. Either way, she proposes that this action be stayed "insofar as it involves Wells Fargo and Monument, but . . . allow her separate claims to proceed against Barclays, including discovery, as those claims are factually and legally independent of her claims against Wells Fargo and Monument, and to pursue discovery involving non-party witnesses not relevant to the FDCPA claim." (Doc. 224, at 1-2.)

II. Motion for Interlocutory Appeal.

A. Legal Standard.

Shedd's Motion for Interlocutory Appeal is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). That section allows certification of an issue for interlocutory review when the district court is "of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation." 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

The Eleventh Circuit has explained that "§ 1292(b) sets a high threshold for certification to prevent piecemeal appeals." OFS Fitel, LLC v. Epstein, Becker and Green, P.C., 549 F.3d 1344, 1359 (11th Cir. 2008). In that regard, "to obtain § 1292(b) certification, the litigant must show not only that an immediate appeal will advance the termination of the litigation but also that the appeal involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "Most interlocutory orders do not meet this test." Id.; see also McFarlin v. Conseco Services, LLC, 381 F.3d 1251, 1264 (11th Cir. 2004) (in exercising § 1292(b) discretion, appellate court "should keep in mind that the great bulk of its review must be conducted after final judgment, with § 1292(b) interlocutory review being a rare exception"); Camacho v. Puerto Rico Ports Authority, 369 F.3d 570, 573 (1st Cir. 2004) ("Section 1292(b) is meant to be used sparingly, and appeals under it are, accordingly, hen's-teeth rare."). "Because permitting piecemeal appeals is bad policy, permitting liberal use of § 1292(b) interlocutory appeals is bad policy." McFarlin, 381 F.3d at 1259. Indeed, "interlocutory appeals are inherently disruptive, time-consuming, and expensive. . . and consequently are generally disfavored." Prado-Steiman ex rel. Prado v. Bush, 221 F.3d 1266, 1276 (11th Cir. 2000). As the movant seeking interlocutory appeal, Shedd bears the burden of showing that all § 1292(b) prerequisites are satisfied and that this is one of the rare exceptions in which judicial discretion should be exercised to grant this disfavored remedy. See OFS Fitel, 549 F.3d at 1359; McFarlin, 381 F.3d at 1264 ("[t]he burden of persuading us that a question of law meeting the requirements of § 1292(b) clearly is presented is on the petitioning party").

B. The "Substantial Ground for Difference of Opinion" Requirement.

The Court agrees with Shedd that the June 13 Order involves a controlling question of law, to-wit: whether the FDCPA's exclusions from the scope of the term "debt collector" encompass creditors collecting their own debts in their own names.3 However, the mere presence of a controlling question of law is not sufficient to warrant § 1292(b) certification; rather, the statute requires "substantial ground for difference of opinion" as to that controlling question of law. Thus, "a court faced with a motion for certification must analyze the strength of the arguments in opposition to the challenged ruling to decide whether the issue is truly one on which there is a substantial ground for dispute." APCC Services, Inc. v. AT & T Corp., 297 F.Supp.2d 101, 107 (D.D.C. 2003). "The mere absence of binding authority does not constitute a showing sufficient to satisfy § 1292(b), where numerous federal decisions are adverse to the movants' position and movants have failed to cite a single case authority or legal argument" to the contrary. Williams v. Saxon Mortg. Co., 2007 WL 4105126, *2 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 15, 2007). Rather, "[t]o demonstrate the existence of a substantial ground for difference of opinion, the appellant must show that at least two courts interpret the legal principle differently." Ibrahim v. FINR III, LLC, 2016 WL 409630, *3 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 3, 2016) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

After careful examination of Shedd's briefs, the Court concludes that she has not satisfied her burden of demonstrating a substantial ground for difference of opinion as to whether the FDCPA covers a creditor collecting its own debt in its own name. In briefing the issue on Wells Fargo's Rule 12(c) Motion, Shedd failed to identify a single case interpreting the § 1692a(6)(A) exemption as not covering creditors. She repeats the omission on her Motion for Interlocutory Appeal. Despite all her rhetoric spanning dozens of pages, Shedd identifies no decisional authority from any jurisdiction that construes the § 1692a(6)(A) exemption in the manner she says it should have been interpreted here.

In an unsuccessful attempt to obscure this fundamental deficiency, Shedd engages in at least three tactics. First, she criticizes the June 13 Order as being "contrary to recent rulings of the Eleventh Circuit" (doc. 227, at 1) and says it "runs counter to Eleventh Circuit and Supreme Court precedent" (doc. 224, at 5); however, none of the cases she cites even mention the § 1692a(6)(A) exemption, much less apply it. In fact, one of the decisions on which Shedd relies cuts sharply and decisively against her position.4 In Davidson v. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., 797 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2015), the Eleventh Circuit observed, "Unlike debt collectors, creditors typically are not subject to the FDCPA." Id. at 1313 (emphasis added).5 The Davidson court identified only two circumstances in which a creditor may be subject to the FDCPA, to-wit: (i) a creditor who "receives an assignment or transfer of a debt in default solely for the purpose of facilitating collection of such debt for another" is not considered a FDCPA creditor and therefore may be liable; and (ii) a creditor who "in the process of collecting his own debts, uses any name other than his own which would indicate that a third person is collecting or attempting to collect such debts" may have FDCPA liability. Id. at 1313-14. Shedd has not argued — and the pleadings do not support an inference — that either of these circumstances is present here. Thus, the June 13 Order is fully consistent with the Davidson ruling that "creditors typically are not subject to the FDCPA." Plaintiffs' reliance on Davidson to satisfy the "substantial ground for difference of opinion" prong of the § 1292(b) certification standard thus fails.6

As a second means of steering the focus away from the dearth of authority interpreting the § 1692a(6)(A) exemption in the manner she advocates, Shedd implies that this Court derived its conclusions in the June 13 Order from thin air, with minimal supporting caselaw. Indeed, Shedd maintains that the June 13 Order "relies primarily on Kimber v. Federal Financial Corp., 668 F.Supp. 1480 (M.D. Ala. 1987)." (Doc. 224, at 6.) This statement is inaccurate. The June 13 Order did not rely "primarily" on Kimber; to the contrary, Kimber was one of nearly a dozen opinions (eight of which originated in this Circuit) cited in the Order that interpreted the § 1692a(6)(A) exclusion as reaching creditors themselves, not just their employees and officers. It is thus incorrect to paint Kimber as an isolated decision that stands alone in FDCPA jurisprudence, or to portray the June 13 Order as blindly adhering to a singular outlier trial court case that is out of step with the heartland of authorities.7 As shown by both the June 13 Order and this Order, court after court after court has held that the FDCPA does not apply to creditors attempting to collect their own debts in their own name. The well-pleaded facts in the Third Amended Complaint establish that Wells Fargo falls into this category. There can be no "substantial ground for difference of opinion" here, especially given Shedd's failure to identify any authorities holding that a creditor in Wells Fargo's position can be liable under the FDCPA.

Third, Shedd disguises her lack of supporting authority through use of misleading rhetoric that "courts are divided as to whether a finding that a party is a creditor under (6)(a) entitles it to per se exemption as a debt collector." (Doc. 224, at 9.) The only case that Shedd appears to cite for the proposition that a "circuit split" exists as to whether creditors collecting their own debt in their own name may be subject to the FDCPA is a Ninth Circuit decision captioned Schlegel v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 720 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 2013). In Schlegel, the court indicated in a footnote that it rejected an absolute rule that "a person who meets the FDCPA definition of `creditor' is per se not a `debt collector.'" Schlegel, 720 F.3d at 1208 n.2. But the cases on which the undersigned relies in this Order and in the June 13 Order do not hold that creditors can never be FDCPA debt collectors.8 Instead, what they establish — and what the June 13 Order found — is that creditors typically are exempt from the scope of the FDCPA, except in certain narrow exceptions (i.e., a creditor who receives a debt in default solely for the purpose of facilitating collection of such debt for another, or a creditor using a name other than its own in collecting its own debts) not present here. That is what the Eleventh Circuit explained just last year. See Davidson, 797 F.3d at 1313. And even courts in the Ninth Circuit post-Schlegel agree with that proposition.9 There is no circuit split here.

For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Shedd has not demonstrated a substantial ground for difference of opinion that might justify an interlocutory appeal as to the June 13 Order's determination that Wells Fargo is exempt from the FDCPA as a creditor collecting its own debt in its own name.10

C. The "Material Advancement" Requirement.

As noted, a separate criterion for certification of an issue for interlocutory review is that "immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation." 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). "This is not a difficult requirement to understand. It means that resolution of a controlling legal question would serve to avoid a trial or otherwise substantially shorten the litigation." McFarlin, 381 F.3d at 1259. Thus, in order for interlocutory appeal on a particular question to be appropriate, "the answer to that question must substantially reduce the amount of litigation left in the case." Id. "Unless a litigant can show that an interlocutory order of the district court might have a `serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence,' and that the order can be `effectually challenged' only by immediate appeal, the general congressional policy against piecemeal review will preclude interlocutory appeal." Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 84, 101 S.Ct. 993, 67 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981).

Shedd has not come close to meeting this stringent legal standard. In discussing the "material advancement" requirement, Shedd explains that in the absence of § 1292(b) certification, she will be "not entitled to depose Wells Fargo witnesses on issues related to her FDCPA claim," and that such a denial "will seriously circumscribe the scope of discovery." (Doc. 224, at 10.) True enough. The June 13 Order dismissed the FDCPA cause of action against Wells Fargo; therefore, plaintiffs will not be permitted to undertake extensive, irrelevant discovery targeted at that now-dismissed claim. But where is the "serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence"? There is none. Merely arguing that plaintiffs would not be able to take as much discovery now as they might like does nothing to satisfy Shedd's burden of showing that an immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. Based on the record and arguments before it, the Court readily concludes that granting an interlocutory appeal would not substantially reduce the amount of litigation. All of the Shedds' remaining claims that have not been dismissed will still have to be litigated through discovery and trial. The only difference is that, if interlocutory appeal is granted, the litigation of certain of those claims will grind to a halt for a potentially protracted period of time because of the partial stay that would necessarily accompany such interlocutory appeal.11 Thus, interlocutory appeal would delay, not expedite, the final outcome of these proceedings and would guarantee multiple trials and discovery periods. That fact renders this case ill-suited for certification under § 1292(b). See, e.g., Kennett v. Bayada Home Health Care, Inc., 2016 WL 374231, *4 (D. Colo. Feb. 1, 2016) ("When granting an interlocutory appeal will delay, rather than expedite, the ultimate outcome of the trial, federal courts have routinely declined to exercise their discretion to permit such appeals.").12

To understand the deficiencies in Shedd's position, it may be helpful to compare a "no-certification" scenario to a "certification" scenario. If no interlocutory appeal is allowed, then all of plaintiffs' remaining claims against Wells Fargo, Monument and Barclays will move forward through discovery and trial in accordance with the governing Rule 16(b) Scheduling Order (doc. 206). After trial on those claims concludes, plaintiffs may (if they wish) appeal the FDCPA issue — along with any other appealable issues that any party decides to pursue — to the Eleventh Circuit in a single consolidated appeal. If the appellate court were to grant relief on the FDCPA issue or any other, then the case may be remanded for further proceedings, including potentially FDCPA-focused discovery and trial. By contrast, if an interlocutory appeal is certified, then all of plaintiffs' claims against Wells Fargo and Monument will be stayed, with only their claims against Barclays proceeding through discovery and trial. At the conclusion of the interlocutory appeal, if the Eleventh Circuit grants relief, discovery would be reopened as to Wells Fargo and Monument and there would be a second trial involving plaintiffs' claims against those defendants. Such discovery and trial would embrace not only the newly-reactivated FDCPA claim, but also plaintiffs' other pending claims that were simply lying fallow in the interim. Following that second trial, any party wishing to appeal any issue could present a second appeal (this one as a matter of right) to the Eleventh Circuit, raising the potential of a third round of discovery or even a third trial if relief were granted on any of those issues. This latter scenario constitutes piecemeal litigation and piecemeal appeals at their worst.

The point is simple: Certifying interlocutory appeal of the FDCPA claim will not avoid a trial or otherwise substantially shorten the litigation. To the contrary, it will almost certainly delay the proceedings and will complicate and impede the orderly flow of this matter by creating multiple, staggered sets of proceedings with discovery and trial happening in waves as to different defendants at different times. Particularly given the fact that this case is well over two years old and has already been delayed far longer than reasonably necessary because of suspect litigation strategies, the Court has neither inclination nor appetite for exercising its discretion in a manner that will prolong them further, with no countervailing benefits in efficiency.

For all of these reasons, the Court finds that Shedd has not satisfied her burden of demonstrating that interlocutory appeal of the FDCPA ruling in the June 13 Order would materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. Thus, § 1292(b) certification is inappropriate because movant has established neither a substantial ground for difference of opinion on a controlling issue of law, nor a likelihood that interlocutory review will materially advance the ultimate termination of these proceedings. The Motion to Certify for Interlocutory Review is properly denied on both of these independent grounds.

III. Motion for Rule 54(b) Final Judgment.

In the alternative, Shedd moves for entry of final judgment on Count Sixteen pursuant to Rule 54(b), Fed.R.Civ.P.

"Ordinarily, . . . an order adjudicating fewer than all the claims in a suit, or adjudicating the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties, is not a final judgment from which an appeal may be taken." Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1288 (11th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). Rule 54(b) creates an exception to this general principle by establishing a mechanism through which the district court "may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay." Rule 54(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. Shedd invokes that rule here and requests that the Court make a "no just reason for delay" determination, thereby allowing her to take an immediate appeal of the portion of the June 13 Order that dismissed her FDCPA claim against Wells Fargo without awaiting final disposition of plaintiffs' remaining claims against all three defendants.

"A district court must follow a two-step analysis in determining whether a partial final judgment may properly be certified under Rule 54(b). First, the court must determine that its final judgment is, in fact, both `final' and a `judgment.' . . . Second, . . . the district court must then determine that there is no `just reason for delay' in certifying it as final and immediately appealable." Lloyd Noland Foundation, Inc. v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 483 F.3d 773, 777 (11th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). The second step is of crucial importance here. The Eleventh Circuit has emphasized that circumstances in which Rule 54(b) certification is appropriate "will be encountered only rarely." Ebrahimi v. City of Huntsville Bd. of Educ., 114 F.3d 162, 166 (11th Cir. 1997); see also In re Southeast Banking Corp., 69 F.3d 1539, 1547 (11th Cir. 1995) (Rule 54(b) certification is warranted only in the "infrequent harsh case"). In that regard, Rule 54(b) must be applied in a manner that "preserves the historic federal policy against piecemeal appeals," while also constraining its use to "instances in which immediate appeal would alleviate some danger of hardship or injustice associated with delay." Ebrahimi, 114 F.3d at 166 (citations omitted). What this means, then, is that "Rule 54(b) certifications must be reserved for the unusual case in which the costs and risks of multiplying the number of proceedings and of overcrowding the appellate docket are outbalanced by pressing needs of the litigants for an early and separate judgment as to some claims or parties." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

This is not such an "unusual case." Here, the dangers of piecemeal appeals and needless proliferation of proceedings are not offset by "pressing needs of the litigants." Indeed, there are no such "pressing needs." Shedd's only identified "hardship" is her belief that the June 13 Order got it wrong and that she does not want to wait to take discovery on her FDCPA claim against Wells Fargo. (Doc. 224, at 15.) That is not sufficient, as a matter of law. See, e.g., Morgan v. Bill Vann Co., 2013 WL 5445632, *2 n.2 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 30, 2013) ("Courts may not accommodate attorneys just because they want to appeal immediately . . . .") (citations omitted); McCann v. Mobile County Personnel Bd., 2006 WL 2355405, *3 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 14, 2006) (to qualify under Rule 54(b), "[a]ny such hardship must be `unusual,' extending beyond the inevitable consequence of awaiting resolution of one's case") (citation omitted). To be sure, Shedd complains that "the events in question occurred years ago and she is presently facing a balloon note in August 2016." (Id.) But granting a Rule 54(b) certification would neither change that fact nor alter that hardship. To the contrary, such a certification would introduce new, extensive and unnecessary delay to 75% of her claims against Wells Fargo to enable her to pursue an immediate (and in this Court's view, patently futile) appeal of an adverse ruling as to the other 25%. (See doc. 224, at 15 ("resolving this threshold issue now . . . will indeed resolve at least 25 percent of the case against Wells Fargo").)

Simply put, the Court is convinced that this is not one of the rare cases in which Rule 54(b) certification is appropriate. There is no indication and no reason to believe that immediate appeal of the June 13 Order would alleviate some danger of hardship or injustice to Shedd. As such, her alternative Motion for Entry of Rule 54(b) Final Judgment is properly denied.

IV. Conclusion.

For all of the foregoing reasons, plaintiff Pam Shedd's Motion to Amend and Certify Order for Interlocutory Review, or in the Alternative for Entry of Rule 54(b) Final Judgment (doc. 224) is denied in its entirety.

DONE and ORDERED.