CALLIE V. S. GRANADE, Senior District Judge.
This matter is before the court on Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 27), Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and opposition to Defendant's motion (Doc. 31), Plaintiff's second motion for summary judgment and additional opposition to Defendant's motion (Doc. 38), Defendant's response to Plaintiff's filings (Doc. 39), and Plaintiff's reply (Doc. 40). For reasons that will be explained below, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not established a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge and has not shown that Defendant's proffered non-discriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff was merely pretext. Accordingly, Defendant's motion for summary judgment will be granted and Plaintiff's motions for summary judgment will be denied.
Plaintiff, William I. Marshall, filed this action pro se, stating that he had filed an EEOC complaint against his employer, Quincy Compressor, LLC, when he was terminated from his job on June 27, 2014, while he had a shoulder injury. (Doc. 1). The Complaint in this case states that Plaintiff's doctor had limited him to lifting 15 pounds and Plaintiff was put in a position where he would have to lift 45 to 50 pounds. The Complaint alleges that another employee, "Robert Lee", was asked to help Plaintiff, but refused and went to the office and complained that Plaintiff did not want to work with him. Plaintiff alleges that he told them he had documentation that he was limited to lifting 15 pounds, but they told him to sign a statement that he needed counseling to be able to get along with people. Plaintiff's Complaint states that he refused to sign the document and was told by "the Plant Manager, John Dow,"
Plaintiff's EEOC charge, dated July 14, 2014, alleged that he was discriminated against on the basis of his disability. (Doc. 29-3, p. 37). In his EEOC charge, Plaintiff stated that he experienced pain in his shoulder while at work on Wednesday, June 25, 2016, and he told his supervisor and the safety director about it. (Doc. 29-3, p. 38). The pain was in the same shoulder Plaintiff previously had surgery on in 2011. (Doc. 29-3, p. 38). The EEOC charge then details the incident between Plaintiff and the other employee that occurred the next day, on June 26, 2016, and describes how he was terminated for not signing a document that was created by the company and that warns Plaintiff to go to counseling. (Doc. 29-3, p. 38).
In support of its motion for summary judgment, Defendant submitted portions of Plaintiff's deposition testimony and the declaration of Elizabeth Byrd, the Materials Manager for Quincy Compressor at its facility in Bay Minette, Alabama. (Docs. 29-1, 29-2, 29-3, 29-4). Plaintiff submitted no deposition or affidavit evidence, but provided copies of correspondence and court notices regarding the scheduling of Plaintiff's deposition, correspondence with Liberty Mutual, and medical records dating from July 2011—March 2012 and February 2015—August 2015. As will be discussed further below, the information contained in the documents submitted by Plaintiff is irrelevant to the merits of Plaintiff's ADA claim for discriminatory discharge on June 27, 2014. Thus, the following facts were supplied entirely from the evidence submitted by Defendant.
Plaintiff began working for the Defendant Company, Quincy Compressor in 2005. (Doc. 29-1, pp. 9-10). On numerous occasions during his employment there, Plaintiff asked to be moved from one position to another because of conflicts with co-workers and he continued to have problems working with others. (Doc. 29-1, pp. 24-25, 33-35; Doc. 29-2, pp. 3-4; Doc. 29-4, ¶ 3). Performance reviews in 2007 and 2013 noted Plaintiff's inability to cooperate or work with others and in July of 2013, Plaintiff was verbally counseled for arguing with a coworker and Team Leader. (Doc. 29-4, ¶ 4). Plaintiff acknowledges there were many disputes but denies any wrongdoing. (Doc. 29-1, p. 39; Doc. 29-2, pp. 16-20, 35, 37-39). Plaintiff's co-workers claimed that Plaintiff was the problem. (Doc. 29-2, p. 18).
Plaintiff suffered an injury to his right shoulder in 2011 and had surgery on the shoulder in 2011. (Doc. 29-1; Doc. 29-3, p. 28). After the surgery, on September 29, 2011, Plaintiff's doctor released him to light duty, restricting Plaintiff from lifting more than 15 pounds and from overhead lifting. (Doc. 29-1, p. 54, Doc. 29-3, p. 29). On January 12, 2012, Plaintiff was released to full duty by his physician on a trial basis. (Doc. 29-3, pp. 30-31). At Plaintiff's follow up visit on February 9, 2012, the doctor noted Plaintiff was doing well, his pain was controlled, his wound was benign, his range of motion was full, his strength was normal, and that he had tolerated his return to duty. (Doc. 29-3, p. 32). Plaintiff's physician sent a work status report stating that Plaintiff was released to full duty. (Doc. 29-1, p. 78; Doc. 29-3, p. 33). Plaintiff never presented any medical restrictions for his shoulder after February 2012 and according to supervisor Byrd, Plaintiff was assumed to be fully capable to perform all duties. (Doc. 29-4, ¶ 14).
In June 2014, Plaintiff was working as a Wirer with another employee, Robert Lee Jones. (Doc. 29-2, pp. 25-27). Jones was a better Wirer because he had been doing it longer and had trained Plaintiff. (Doc. 29-2, pp. 36, 40). Plaintiff deferred to Jones to determine the best approach to wire the compressor units. (Doc. 29-2, p. 36).
On June 25, 2014, Plaintiff told his supervisor, Ron House, that he needed help lifting some heavy objects because he had some pain in his shoulder. (Doc. 29-2, p. 47). Plaintiff did not ask for any medical attention, but Mr. House notified Safety Director Cyndi Dees about the incident. (Doc. 29-2, p. 47, Doc. 29-4, ¶ 130). Plaintiff did not go to a physician and did not provide any documentation of any work restrictions he had at the time. (Doc 29-2, p. 51, 54; Doc. 29-4, ¶ 13). On the morning of November 27, 2014, Safety Director Dees, Elizabeth Byrd and Ron House had a follow up meeting with Plaintiff. (Doc. 29-4, ¶13). During the meeting Plaintiff stated that he believed he had medical restrictions in place from his surgery in 2011 and he asked to see his doctor's records about the lifting restrictions on his arm. (Doc. 29-2, pp. 55-56, 59; Doc. 29-4, ¶ 13). They told Plaintiff that he had been released to full duty and that if he felt that had changed he should see a physician. (Doc. 29-4, ¶ 13). Plaintiff said he did not need to see a physician and that he was fit for duty. (Doc. 29-2, pp. 50-51, 58; Doc. 29-4, ¶ 13).
The next day, on June 26, 2014, Plaintiff was involved in a conflict with Robert Lee Jones. (Doc. 29-2, pp. 46-47). Elizabeth Byrd heard Plaintiff and Jones engaged in a heated discussion and saw Jones leave the area. (Doc. 29-4, ¶ 7). Byrd spoke to Jones about the incident. (Doc. 29-4, ¶ 8). Jones reported that Plaintiff had unilaterally decided that he would do one task on each of three units and leave the other tasks to be completed by Jones rather than both men working together on the same unit until it was completed, as was standard practice. (Doc. 29-4, ¶ 8). Byrd spoke to Plaintiff about the incident and Plaintiff informed Byrd that he did not want to do wiring anymore. (Doc. 29-4, ¶ 9). Byrd decided to give Plaintiff a written Employee Counseling Record to counsel him on the behavior that he needed to improve. (Doc. 29-4, ¶ 10). Byrd did not feel an Employee Counseling Record was necessary for Robert Lee Jones because Jones did not have a history of difficulties with co-workers and Jones had been trying to work in the normal teamwork method that the company encourages. (Doc. 29-4, ¶ 10).
The following day, Plaintiff again met with Byrd, along with the Vice President of Human Resources, Emily Jones, and the Vice President of Manufacturing, John Daw. (Doc. 29-4, ¶ 11). Plaintiff was verbally counseled about concerns over his lack of teamwork, communication, and cooperation in working with others. (Doc. 29-4, ¶ 11). Plaintiff was presented with the Employee Counseling Record, but he refused to read, sign, or add any written comments to the document. (Doc. 29-4, ¶ 11). Ms. Byrd and Mr. Daw explained to Plaintiff that participation in the counseling session and signing the form acknowledging his understanding of the expectation that he work well with others was required for his continued employment. (Doc 29-4, ¶ 12). Plaintiff still refused to cooperate or to sign the document. (Doc. 29-4, ¶ 12). Mr. Daw advised Plaintiff that if he continued to refuse he would not be allowed to continue working at the facility and that they would view his refusal as Plaintiff's decision to resign. (Doc. 29-3, p. 5; Doc. 29-4, ¶ 12). Plaintiff refused to sign the document and was asked to leave the premises. (Doc. 29-3, pp. 6-7).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment shall be granted: "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The trial court's function is not "to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial."
The basic issue before the court on a motion for summary judgment is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-252. The moving party bears the burden of proving that no genuine issue of material fact exists.
Once the movant satisfies his initial burden under Rule 56(c), the non-moving party "must make a sufficient showing to establish the existence of each essential element to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial."
Plaintiff is proceeding
Reading Plaintiff's
The Americans with Disability Act ("ADA") 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) prohibits discrimination "against a qualified individual on the basis of disability . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The Eleventh Circuit has explained that to establish a
Defendant asserts that Plaintiff has not established a
42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).
Plaintiff appears to assert that he is disabled because of his shoulder. However, the evidence demonstrates that at the time of his discharge, Plaintiff's shoulder did not limit his ability to do his job. Plaintiff had been released to full duty on a trial basis beginning in January 2012. Plaintiff's doctor noted on Plaintiff's follow up visit in February 2012, that Plaintiff was doing well, his pain was controlled, his wound was benign, his range of motion was full, his strength was normal, and that he had tolerated his return to duty. Plaintiff's physician then released Plaintiff to full duty. There is no record of Plaintiff having any impairment after February 2012 and no evidence that Plaintiff's supervisors or other personnel at Quincy Compressor regarded Plaintiff as having an impairment after February 2012. Plaintiff never presented any medical restrictions for his shoulder after February 2012 and according to supervisor Byrd, Plaintiff was assumed to be fully capable to perform all duties.
Plaintiff suggests that the Defendant Company knows about Plaintiff's condition by pointing to medical records and insurance correspondence or records of which he contends Quincy Compressor should be aware. However, the records and documents Plaintiff references appear to be of Plaintiff's condition prior to February 2012 and/or after his discharge. Plaintiff's condition prior to February 2012 or after his discharge is not relevant to Plaintiff's claim for discriminatory discharge. For Plaintiff's discharge to be "because of his disability," the Plaintiff must have been disabled or perceived as disabled at the time of his discharge. See Cash v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1301, 1306 n. 5 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that subsequent change in plaintiff's medical condition was "irrelevant" to her ADA claim because courts "evaluate her disability as manifested at [the time of the alleged adverse employment action]").
Plaintiff complained of shoulder or arm pain on June 25, 2014, two days before he was discharged. However, Plaintiff did not ask for any medical attention, he did not go to a physician and did not present any documentation of any work restrictions he had at the time. Plaintiff was advised that if he felt he should have restrictions he should see a physician, but Plaintiff stated that he did not need to see a physician and that he was fit for duty.
There is no evidence that Plaintiff was disabled or regarded as disabled at the time of his discharge and there is no evidence that Plaintiff's discharge was because of a disability. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not established a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge.
Even if Plaintiff could establish a prima facie case, Defendant has proffered a non-discriminatory reason for the employment decision and Plaintiff has not shown that the proffered reason was merely pretext. "At the pretext stage, in order to survive summary judgment, plaintiff must provide sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable fact finder to conclude, at a minimum, that the proffered reasons were not actually the motivation for the employer's decision."
In satisfying the ultimate burden of proving that the adverse employment action was on account of discrimination, a plaintiff need not establish that discrimination was the sole reason for the action, but that it was a determinative factor in the employer's decision.
In the instant case, Quincy Compressor contends that it terminated Plaintiff because he refused to participate in the counseling session or sign an Employee Counseling Record acknowledging that he understood that he was expected to work well with others. Plaintiff was advised that he must sign the form if he wanted to continue working there, but he refused. Plaintiff's own testimony, as well as the allegations of his Complaint, asserts that he was told that if he did not sign the document he would be considered to have quit his job. Plaintiff admits that he refused to sign the document and he was thereupon escorted off the premises.
Plaintiff may dispute whether the counseling session or an Employee Counseling Record was warranted. However, it is undisputed that Plaintiff had a history of conflicts with his co-workers and there is no evidence that other employees were treated differently under similar circumstances. The employee Plaintiff had a conflict with on June 26, 2014, did not receive an Employee Counseling Record, but that employee did not have a history of difficulties with co-workers. Even if the Court believed Quincy Compressor was wrong to conclude that Plaintiff deserved counseling or a written Employee Counseling Record,
For the reasons stated above, Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 27) is
