MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

KATHERINE P. NELSON, Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff Kendret Walls has brought this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Defendant Commissioner of Social Security ("the Commissioner") denying his applications for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401, et seq., and supplemental security income ("SSI") under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381, et seq. With the consent of the parties, the Court has designated the undersigned Magistrate Judge to conduct all proceedings and order the entry of judgment in this civil action, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73, and S.D. Ala. GenLR 73. (See Docs. 19, 20).

Upon consideration of the parties' briefs (Docs. 12, 13, 16), those portions of the administrative record (Doc. 11) (hereinafter cited as "(R. [page number(s) in lower-right corner of transcript])") relevant to the issues raised, and the oral argument of the parties made May 25, 2016, the Court finds that the Commissioner's decision is due to be AFFIRMED.

I. Background

On February 6, 2012, Walls filed applications for a period of disability, DIB, and SSI with the Social Security Administration ("SSA"),1 alleging disability beginning January 31, 2009, later amended to December 30, 2011.2 After his applications were initially denied, Walls requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") for the SSA, which was held on June 25, 2013. On September 13, 2013, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on Walls's applications, finding him "not disabled" under the Social Security Act and thus not entitled to benefits. (See R. 19-33).

Walls requested review of the ALJ's decision by the SSA's Appeals Council. The Commissioner's decision on Walls's applications became final when the Appeals Council denied the request for review on April 7, 2015. (R. 1-6). On June 3, 2015, Walls filed this action under §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) for judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision. (Doc. 1). See 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) ("The final determination of the Commissioner of Social Security after a hearing [for SSI benefits] shall be subject to judicial review as provided in section 405(g) of this title to the same extent as the Commissioner's final determinations under section 405 of this title."); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) ("Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such decision or within such further time as the Commissioner of Social Security may allow."); Ingram v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1262 (11th Cir. 2007) ("The settled law of this Circuit is that a court may review, under sentence four of section 405(g), a denial of review by the Appeals Council.").

II. Standards of Review

"In Social Security appeals, [the Court] must determine whether the Commissioner's decision is `"supported by substantial evidence and based on proper legal standards. Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion."'" Winschel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439 (11th Cir. 1997))). However, the Court "`may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute our judgment for that of the [Commissioner].'" Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178 (quoting Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983))). "`Even if the evidence preponderates against the [Commissioner]'s factual findings, we must affirm if the decision reached is supported by substantial evidence.'" Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)).

"Yet, within this narrowly circumscribed role, [courts] do not act as automatons. [The court] must scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence[.]" Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239 (citations and quotation omitted). See also Owens v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 1511, 1516 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) ("We are neither to conduct a de novo proceeding, nor to rubber stamp the administrative decisions that come before us. Rather, our function is to ensure that the decision was based on a reasonable and consistently applied standard, and was carefully considered in light of all the relevant facts."). "In determining whether substantial evidence exists, [a court] must . . . tak[e] into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the [Commissioner's] decision." Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986).

However, the "substantial evidence" "standard of review applies only to findings of fact. No similar presumption of validity attaches to the [Commissioner]'s conclusions of law, including determination of the proper standards to be applied in reviewing claims." MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1053 (11th Cir. 1986) (quotation omitted). Accord, e.g., Wiggins v. Schweiker, 679 F.2d 1387, 1389 (11th Cir. 1982) ("Our standard of review for appeals from the administrative denials of Social Security benefits dictates that `(t)he findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. . . .' 42 U.S.C.A. s 405(g) (West Supp. 1982) (emphasis added). As is plain from the statutory language, this deferential standard of review is applicable only to findings of fact made by the Secretary, and it is well established that no similar presumption of validity attaches to the Secretary's conclusions of law, including determination of the proper standards to be applied in reviewing claims." (footnote and some citations and quotation marks omitted)). This Court "conduct[s] `an exacting examination' of these factors." Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (quoting Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)). "`The [Commissioner]'s failure to apply the correct law or to provide the reviewing court with sufficient reasoning for determining that the proper legal analysis has been conducted mandates reversal.'" Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991)). Accord Keeton v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994).

In sum, courts "review the Commissioner's factual findings with deference and the Commissioner's legal conclusions with close scrutiny." Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). See also Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) ("In Social Security appeals, we review de novo the legal principles upon which the Commissioner's decision is based. Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). However, we review the resulting decision only to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence. Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158-59 (11th Cir. 2004).").

Thornton v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 597 F. App'x 604, 609 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (unpublished).3

Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v); Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1237-39).4

"These regulations place a very heavy burden on the claimant to demonstrate both a qualifying disability and an inability to perform past relevant work." Moore, 405 F.3d at 1211 (citing Spencer v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 1090, 1093 (11th Cir. 1985)). "In determining whether the claimant has satisfied this initial burden, the examiner must consider four factors: (1) objective medical facts or clinical findings; (2) the diagnoses of examining physicians; (3) evidence of pain; and (4) the claimant's age, education, and work history." Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001, 1005 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (citing Tieniber v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 1251, 1253 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam)). "These factors must be considered both singly and in combination. Presence or absence of a single factor is not, in itself, conclusive." Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1240 (citations omitted).

If, in Steps One through Four of the five-step evaluation, a claimant proves that he or she has a qualifying disability and cannot do his or her past relevant work, it then becomes the Commissioner's burden, at Step Five, to prove that the claimant is capable—given his or her age, education, and work history—of engaging in another kind of substantial gainful employment that exists in the national economy. Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999); Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 836 (11th Cir. 1985). Finally, although the "claimant bears the burden of demonstrating the inability to return to [his or] her past relevant work, the Commissioner of Social Security has an obligation to develop a full and fair record." Shnorr v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 578, 581 (11th Cir. 1987). See also Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) ("It is well-established that the ALJ has a basic duty to develop a full and fair record. Nevertheless, the claimant bears the burden of proving that he is disabled, and, consequently, he is responsible for producing evidence in support of his claim." (citations omitted)). "This is an onerous task, as the ALJ must scrupulously and conscientiously probe into, inquire of, and explore for all relevant facts. In determining whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ must consider the evidence as a whole." Henry v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 802 F.3d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (citation and quotation omitted).

Where, as here, the ALJ denied benefits and the Appeals Council denied review of that decision, the Court "review[s] the ALJ's decision as the Commissioner's final decision." Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1278. "[W]hen the [Appeals Council] has denied review, [the Court] will look only to the evidence actually presented to the ALJ in determining whether the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence." Falge v. Apfel, 150 F.3d 1320, 1323 (11th Cir. 1998). If the applicant attacks only the ALJ's decision, the Court may not consider evidence that was presented to the Appeals Council but not to the ALJ. See id. at 1324.

III. Analysis

At Step One, the ALJ determined that Walls had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date. (R. 24). At Step Two, the ALJ determined that Walls had the following severe combination of impairments: herniated lumbar disc; hypertension; L5-S1 moderate right paracentral disc extrusion causing right S1 nerve root impingement and mild neuroforminal stenosis; and obesity. (R. 24). At Step Three, the ALJ found that Walls did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or equals the severity of one of the specified impairments in the relevant Listing of Impairments. (R. 178).

At Step Four,

Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1238-39 (footnote omitted).

The ALJ determined that Walls had the RFC "to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b)[,]" with the following limitations:

(R. 25-26).

Based on this RFC, the ALJ determined that Walls was unable to perform any past relevant work. (R. 31). At Step Five, the ALJ, after taking testimony from a vocational expert, found that there exist significant numbers of jobs in the national economy that Walls can perform given his RFC, age, education, and work experience. (R. 32-33). Thus, the ALJ found that Walls was not disabled under the Social Security Act. (R. 33).

A. Treating Physician's Opinion

Evidence considered by the Commissioner in making a disability determination may include medical opinions. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)(2) & 416.927(a)(2). "`Medical opinions are statements from physicians and psychologists or other acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of [the claimant's] impairment(s), including [the claimant's] symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what [the claimant] can still do despite impairment(s), and [the claimant's] physical or mental restrictions.'" Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178-79 (quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)(2), 416.927(a)(2)). "There are three tiers of medical opinion sources: (1) treating physicians; (2) nontreating, examining physicians; and (3) nontreating, nonexamining physicians." Himes v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 585 F. App'x 758, 762 (11th Cir. Sept. 26, 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(1)-(2), 416.927(c)(1)-(2)). "In assessing medical opinions, the ALJ must consider a number of factors in determining how much weight to give to each medical opinion, including (1) whether the physician has examined the claimant; (2) the length, nature, and extent of a treating physician's relationship with the claimant; (3) the medical evidence and explanation supporting the physician's opinion; (4) how consistent the physician's opinion is with the record as a whole; and (5) the physician's specialization. These factors apply to both examining and non-examining physicians." Eyre v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 586 F. App'x 521, 523 (11th Cir. Sept. 30, 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c) & (e), 416.927(c) & (e)).

The ALJ "may reject the opinion of any physician when the evidence supports a contrary conclusion." E.g., Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1240. However,

Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179.

"A `treating source' (i.e., a treating physician) is a claimant's `own physician, psychologist, or other acceptable medical source who provides[], or has provided[],[ the claimant] with medical treatment or evaluation and who has, or has had, an ongoing treatment relationship with [the claimant].'" Nyberg v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 179 F. App'x 589, 591 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (unpublished) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502). "Absent `good cause,' an ALJ is to give the medical opinions of treating physicians `substantial or considerable weight.'" Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179 (quoting Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1440). That is so because treating sources are likely in a better position "to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of [a claimant's] medical impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the objective medical findings alone or from reports of individual examinations, such as consultative examinations or brief hospitalizations." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2). "Good cause exists `when the: (1) treating physician's opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3) treating physician's opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor's own medical records.' With good cause, an ALJ may disregard a treating physician's opinion, but he `must clearly articulate [the] reasons' for doing so." Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179 (quoting Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240-41) (internal citation omitted). See also, e.g., Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1240 ("[T]he opinion of a treating physician may be rejected when it is so brief and conclusory that it lacks persuasive weight or where it is unsubstantiated by any clinical or laboratory findings. Further, the Secretary may reject the opinion of any physician when the evidence supports a contrary conclusion." (citation omitted)).

Walls asserts that the ALJ erred in assigning less than substantial weight to the opinion of treating physician Dr. Maruice Fitz-Gerald provided in a Medical Source Statement ("MSS") completed June 4, 2012 (R. 327-331 [SSA Ex. 7F]), which "opin[ed] that [Walls] was incapable of performing even sedentary work." (R. 29). Fulfilling his duty to state with particularity the weight given to the medical opinion and the reasons therefore, the ALJ "afforded little weight" to "Dr. Fitz-Gerald's conclusions in his MSS[,]" explaining as follows:

(R. 29-30 (emphasis in original)).

Considering the above, it is reasonably clear that the ALJ assigned "little weight" to Dr. Fitz-Gerald's opinion because it was internally inconsistent (i.e. "inconsistent with the doctor's own medical records") and "was not bolstered by the evidence," both of which are sufficient "good cause" to disregard at treating physician's opinion. Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179. While Walls protests that "[t]here is significant objective medical evidence to substantiate Dr. Fitz-Gerald's opinion" (Doc. 13 at 6), an ALJ's decision need only be supported by substantial evidence, even if the evidence preponderates against it. Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260. Moreover, in pressing this argument, Walls simply points to other evidence indicating that Walls has been treated for back and hip pain and suffers from a herniated disc causing impingement on his nerves. (Doc. 13 at 6). In rejecting Dr. Fitz-Gerald's opinion, however, the ALJ did not find that Walls suffers from no pain at all, only that the record evidence did not support the severity of the limitations Dr. Fitz-Gerald assigned to Walls based on that pain. The ALJ's decision contains a thorough discussion of the objective medical evidence of record that supports his determination that the evidence did not bolster Dr. Fitz-Gerald's opinion, and Walls has cited no record evidence that undermines this determination.5

Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Walls's claim that the ALJ committed reversible error in assigning less that substantial or considerable weight to Dr. Fitz-Gerald's opinion.

B. Dr. Harris

Walls claims the ALJ also erred in assigning "significant weight" to the opinion of consultative examining physician Dr. R. Rex Harris. In his examination notes, Dr. Harris remarked that Walls "states that he has been told that he has a disc rupture but that he decided against surgery" and "that he has had x-rays which show degenerative change of the lumbar spine." Dr. Harris, however, stated that he had no records supporting these representations. He then went on to state that "[r]ecords do show that he has been to a chiropractic clinic and has apparently had decompression therapy and manipulations." (R. 480).

Based on these statements, Walls concludes that Dr. Harris was only provided "chiropractic records" and that he was not provided all "necessary background information" before rendering his opinion. (Doc. 13 at 4-5). Walls asserts that the medical records allegedly withheld from Dr. Harris—"[t]he MRI reports, the records from Dr. Boston, and the records from Dr. Givhan" — would have confirmed "the severity of his lumbar spine." (Id. at 5). Unfortunately, the Commissioner's brief omits discussion of this argument. However, the undersigned is not convinced that this argument amounts to anything more than Walls's disagreement with Dr. Harris's view of the medical records.6

Noting that Dr. Harris opined that Walls "is capable of light to sedentary work in the work place" (R. 480), Walls also argues that the ALJ gave no explanation why he "accepted a light RFC over a sedentary RFC." (Doc. 13 at 5). Charitably assuming that Dr. Harris's opinion was ambiguous, the ALJ reasonably interpreted it to mean that Walls could perform both light and sedentary work; thus, the ALJ properly assigned Walls a light RFC. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b), 416.967(b) ("If someone can do light work, we determine that he or she can also do sedentary work, unless there are additional limiting factors such as loss of fine dexterity or inability to sit for long periods of time."). Moreover, as the Commissioner points out, at the hearing the ALJ asked the VE a hypothetical limiting Walls to "at a less full range of sedentary-level work," with the VE responding that Walls would still be able to find other jobs. (R. 74-75). Thus, any error by the ALJ in not assigning a sedentary RFC at Step Four appears to be harmless. See Diorio v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 726, 728 (11th Cir. 1983) (an error is harmless if it does not affect the ALJ's ultimate decision).

Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Walls's claims of reversible error regarding Dr. Harris's opinion.

C. Pain Standard

Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210-11 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). "[C]redibility determinations are the province of the ALJ, Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1212 (11th Cir. 2005), and [a court] will not disturb a clearly articulated credibility finding supported by substantial evidence, Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1562 (11th Cir. 1995)." Mitchell v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 771 F.3d 780, 782 (11th Cir. 2014).

Along with his discussion of the record medical evidence, the ALJ assessed Walls's testimony of pain as follows:

he indicated that his conditions did not cause him to make changes in his work activity (Id. at pg. 2) (emphasis added). In a narrative statement of his application, the claimant clarified that he "hurt his back in 2008" but continued to work "without a break" until he was laid off (Id. at pg. 10) (emphasis added).

(R. 26, 28, 30-31 (emphasis in original)).7

In the face of this clearly articulated credibility finding, Walls simply claims, in conclusory fashion, that the ALJ "cherry picked [evidence] from the medical records to support his position Mr. Walls' complaints of pain are not credible" and "ignore[d] all other records in Mr. Walls' claim providing objective medical evidence to substantiate his complaints of pain." (Doc. 13 at 2). Walls's discussion of these "other records" (spanning over 100 pages) is minimal, and "contrary to [Walls]'s contention that the ALJ ignored evidence favorable to [him], `there is no rigid requirement that the ALJ specifically refer to every piece of evidence in his decision, so long as the ALJ's decision . . . is not a broad rejection which is not enough to enable [a reviewing court] to conclude that the ALJ considered [the claimant's] medical condition as a whole.' Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1211 (quotation and brackets omitted). The ALJ's decision in this case was not a broad rejection and [i]s sufficient to enable . . . this Court to conclude the ALJ considered [Walls]'s medical condition as a whole. See id." Mitchell, 771 F.3d at 782. Walls has failed to make any argument showing how the ALJ's "clearly articulated credibility finding" is not supported by at least "substantial evidence," thus giving this Court no reason to "disturb" the ALJ's credibility determination. Id.8

Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Walls's claims of reversible error regarding the pain standard.

D. Obesity

Finally, Walls argues that the ALJ failed to indicate whether or how he considered Mr. Walls' obesity in evaluating his residual functional capacity" in accordance with Social Security Ruling (SSR) 02-1p.

Lewis v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 487 F. App'x 481, 483 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (unpublished).

It is true, as the Commissioner concedes in her brief, that the ALJ did not specifically discuss obesity at Step Four. However, the ALJ found obesity to be a "severe" impairment at Step Two but found at Step Three that it did not result in an impairment or combination of impairments that equaled a listed impairment. The ALJ then determined at Step Four that Walls had the RFC to perform a reduced range of light work, and at Step Five he determined that, while Walls could not perform his past relevant work, there were jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Walls would be able to perform. The Eleventh Circuit found no error in the ALJ's consideration of obesity in similar circumstances. See id.; Solomon v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 532 F. App'x 837, 841 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (unpublished) ("Contrary to Solomon's argument, his obesity was properly considered in his RFC. To be precise, his obesity was considered by [medical sources] in their assessments, which the Appeals Council evaluated, and it was also considered independently by the Appeals Council, which concluded that his obesity was `severe' but not symptomatic enough to qualify him for disability."); Castel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 355 F. App'x 260, 264 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (unpublished) ("The record reflects that the ALJ considered Castel's obesity . . . The ALJ determined that Castel's obesity was a severe impairment.[] However, the ALJ's decision reflects that Castel's obesity was ultimately determined not to result in any specific functional limitations.").9

Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Walls's claims of reversible error regarding the ALJ's consideration of obesity. There being no other claims of error asserted,10 the Court finds that the Commissioner's final decision denying Walls benefits is due to be AFFIRMED.

IV. Conclusion

In accordance with the foregoing analysis, it is ORDERED that the Commissioner's April 7, 2015 final decision denying Walls's applications for a period of disability, DIB, and SSI is AFFIRMED under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Final judgment shall issue separately in accordance with this Order and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58.

DONE and ORDERED.