SONJA F. BIVINS, Magistrate Judge.
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Alabama State Port Authority's Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting brief (Docs. 15, 16), Plaintiff International Longshoremen's Association, Local 1984's Response in Opposition (Doc. 18), and Defendant's Reply (Doc. 19). Upon careful review of the motion, briefs, supporting materials and the applicable case law, the Court concludes that no material facts are in controversy, and that Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Alabama State Port Authority (hereafter "ASPA" or "Defendant") is a state agency which operates port facilities, including the Terminal Railway in Mobile, Alabama. (Doc. 1 at ¶5). Plaintiff International Longshoremen's Association, Local 1984 (hereinafter "Plaintiff" or "Union") is a labor organization representing certain hourly employees at the ASPA Terminal Railway in Mobile. (
Summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a);
As a carrier operating in interstate commerce, ASPA must comply with the provisions of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 ("RLA").
Under the RLA, a court may overturn a Board's award only if one of three circumstances exists: (1) the Board has failed to comply with the requirements of the RLA; (2) the Board's order does not conform, of confine itself, to matters within the scope of the Board's jurisdiction; or (3) a member of the Board has engaged in fraud or corruption.
Under the RLA, the range of judicial review in enforcement cases is among "the narrowest known to the law."
Award 1 involves the Union's grievance concerning barge-cleaning duties at ASPA's McDuffie Terminal. (Doc. 16 at 6). According to the Union, under Article 1 §§ 1 of the parties' CBA, "the Port Authority recognized Local 1984 as the exclusive collective bargaining representative of all hourly paid production and maintenance employees who are employed at all public Port facilities operated by the Port Authority, excluding salaried merit system and terminal railroad employees." (Doc. 1 at 5-6). The Union contends that ASPA's sub-contracting of the barge cleaning duties at the McDuffie Terminal violated the exclusivity provisions of the parties' CBA. (
In this case, the Board expressly considered the CBA provisions relied upon by the parties, and determined that neither the exclusivity provision nor the management provision addressed the specific issue before the Board. (Doc. 15-3). The Board found that at one time, bargaining unit employees performed the cleaning duties on vessels that had been unloaded as well as the vessels that had been loaded; that the Coast Guard began enforcing a regulation that provided that loaded barges have no more than one gallon of coal dust on their decks; that this resulted in the cleaning work on the loaded barges being performed in an area exposed to tides and currents and wave action; that this change in work environment created a safety hazard for ASPA employees, thus, ASPA began contracting with barge owners to perform the work; that the Union did not voice any objection until the work was subcontracted out; and that the two bargaining unit employees who had once performed the cleaning work at issue suffered no loss in pay. (
Upon review, the Court finds that the Board's ruling was not "wholly baseless and completely without reason". Indeed, it is well settled that an arbitrator can review the parties' past practice, usage and custom in interpreting their CBA.
In Award 3, the Board determined that the CBA was not violated when the Carrier allowed an employee (who had retained the classification of Coal Machine Operator (CMO) but had been working in the Equipment Operator (EO) position as an accommodation) to perform overtime work, as the Carrier had attempted to assign overtime to other employees in the EO classification but no employees were available. (Doc. 15-5). The Union argues that in issuing this award, the Board failed to conform or confine itself to matters within the scope of its jurisdiction, as the Board relied on an extemporaneous agreement between the ASPA and one of its employees, not the clear, unambiguous terms of the CBA. (Doc. 1 at 8-9). ASPA counters that the Board's decision did not exceed it's jurisdiction, and even if the Board made a factual error or failed to credit some information, that would not be reason to consider the award in excess of their jurisdiction. (Doc. 16 at 9-10). They further argue that the Union's contention that the award failed to rely on the CBA is clearly contradicted by the award itself. (
Notwithstanding the Union's assertions to the contrary, the Board did not exceed its jurisdiction in resolving this claim. The Board expressly found that pursuant to Article 18, Section 8 of the parties' CBA, ASPA was required to offer EO overtime within the EO overtime classification; however, on the day in question, ASPA attempted to follow the overtime distribution priority rules but no employee holding the EO classification was available. (Doc. 15-5 at 3). Thus, ASPA utilized an employee with a special work accommodation to perform the EO overtime as it was the work that he normally performs on his regular shift. (
In Award 4, the Board determined that the CBA was not violated when two employees were permitted to work a 8 hour overtime shift performing preventive maintenance on conveyor belts during the weekend of February 11-12, 2012, though the claimant had requested and been denied the same opportunity. (Doc. 15-7). The Union argues that the Board's award was wholly baseless and completely without reason and that the Board completely ignored the clear and unambiguous provisions of CBA, particularly, Article 20, Section 1 of the CBA, which provides that "[w]hen required in case of emergency, an 8 hour shift may be started at any time." (Doc. 1 at 10-11). The Union contends that the Board ignored this language as the claimant properly requested to be allowed to work an 8-hour overtime shift, instead of the required 10, and his request was denied while two other employees were permitted to leave work after 8 hours of the overtime work. (
In denying Award 4, the Board noted that it was unrefuted that the Carrier had an approximately 40-year practice of scheduling longer shifts to perform maintenance under similar circumstances, and that Article 20 Section 1 of the parties CBA permitted an increase in shift hours from 8 to 10 not just for emergencies, but also in order to accommodate operational and maintenance requirements. (Doc. 15-7). The Board further found that the claimant disqualified himself from performing the overtime work, and that the two comparators who were permitted to leave after 8 hours were actually working on a different maintenance project and had more seniority than the claimant. The undersigned finds that the Board did not exceed its authority in interpreting the contract provision, and its rationale was not wholly without reason. Accordingly, the Union has not presented a valid ground for vacating the award.
Award 5 involved the Union's assertion that during a safety meeting, a management employee spoke to a shop steward in a disrespectful manner after the shop steward, who was attending the meeting as a member of the work crew, questioned whether the supervisor's statements regarding the notice required before absences complied with the parties' CBA. (Doc. 1 at 11-12). Following the meeting, the shop steward wrote a letter to Human Resources complaining about the supervisor's behavior. (Doc. 1-13). Nearly two months later, the shop steward filed a written grievance form. (Doc. 1-14). The shop steward classified his grievance as a "step 2" grievance, and asserted that he had not received any response to his formal harassment complaint filed with Human Resources. (
The parties submitted the following statement of claim to the Board:
"Union member Brandon Harris alleged discrimination against union officials and harassment."
The Board determined that it had jurisdiction over the dispute, and "[a]fter review of the submissions", concluded that "no issues remain in this dispute that require resolution by the Board." (Doc. 15-9 at 2). Therefore, the Board dismissed the claim. (
The Union contends that the arbitrator did more than just interpret the parties' agreement, "he flat out went rouge in suggesting that there was not a valid grievance." (Doc. 18 at 8). According to the Union, in the parties' CBA, at Article 3, § 2, the parties set a pretty low standard with respect to defining what constitutes a grievance. (
The clear gist of the Union's argument is that in concluding that there were no issues to resolve, the Board implicitly found that there was no valid grievance under the CBA, and this finding is wrong. The Court finds that, assuming arguendo that the Union is correct in its assertion that the Board did not properly construe the shop steward's letter as a grievance under Article 3 § 2, that does not provide a basis for setting aside the award. The law is firmly established that courts must defer entirely to the arbitrator's interpretation of the underlying contract no matter how wrong the Court believes it to be.
In this case, it is undisputed that the shop steward initially wrote a letter to Human Resources complaining about the alleged disrespectful treatment he received during a safety meeting. He did not contend that any tangible action had been taken against him nor did he request any specific remedy. Nearly two months later, he submitted a formal grievance form complaining that the Company had not responded to his letter. Against this backdrop of facts, the Board considered the Union's challenge, and concluded that "no issues remain in this dispute that require resolution by the Board." (Doc. 15-9). There is nothing before the Court that suggests that the Board simply ignored the parties' CBA, and this Court cannot second guess the Board's implicit finding that the shop steward's letter did not rise to the level of a grievance under the CBA. Thus, the award is due to be upheld.
Award 6 involved a challenge by the Union alleging unjust discipline based on "counseling" issued to employees for purportedly failing to timely notify the company of absences. (Doc. 15-11). Award 7 involved a discipline in the form of counseling and a letter that was placed in the personnel file of employee Tracy Higgins, who at the request of the Port police chief, entered a confined space in violation of the Company's confined space entry program and OSHA training. (Doc. 1 at 15). In its award, the Board noted that the parties agreed that letters of counseling do not constitute discipline, and the Board urged the carrier and the union to make clear to all supervisors of hourly employees and all hourly employees represented by the Union that counseling is not to be considered discipline and will not be considered as part of progressive discipline at the Port. (Doc. 15-11 at 3). The Board then concluded that the claim was resolved in accordance with the finding. (
Plaintiff argues that Award 6 only partially resolved one dispute, but did not address the removal of the counseling letters from employees' files, and that ASPA did not unilaterally agree to do so. (Doc. 1 at 14). The Union contends that this fails to comply with the requirements of the RLA and that the Board failed to confine itself to matters within its jurisdiction; thus, the award should be remanded to the Board for further consideration. (Doc. 1 at 14-15). In Award 7, the Board dismissed Case 7 on the basis that Case 6 had addressed the underlying issue present in both cases by stating counseling is not considered discipline. (Doc. 15-13). Plaintiff asserts that the board failed to address the Union's requested remedy in Case 7; therefore, the Board failed to conform or confine itself to matters within the scope of the Board's jurisdiction in violation of the RLA. (Doc. 1 at 15-16). Defendant counters that both parties agreed that letters of counseling do not constitute discipline under well-settled labor law, and the Board found that the claims were therefore resolved by agreement. (Doc. 16 at 12). According to Defendant, the Board was not required to expressly address each argument of the Union, or, indeed, give any reason for an award at all. (Doc. 16 at 12-13).
Generally, arbitrators are not required to include explanations, much less detailed ones, and they often do not.
The Union's challenge to Awards 6 and 7 is essentially that the Board provided an incomplete award, and left unresolved some issues. Given the undisputed evidence that the Board (along with the parties) found that the letters of counseling do not constitute discipline, and that the Board concluded that all issues were resolved, one can rationally interpret the Board's decision to include an implicit finding that ASPA did not violate the CBA. Thus, the Board award must be upheld.
Having reviewed the record and the parties' arguments at length, the Court finds that none of the criteria to trigger judicial review under the Railway Labor Act § 3 First (p), 45 U.S.C. § 153 have been met. Accordingly, the undersigned finds the Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be