MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

KATHERINE P. NELSON, Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff Jason A. Caffey has brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Defendant Commissioner of Social Security ("the Commissioner") denying his application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401, et seq. With the consent of the parties, the Court has designated the undersigned Magistrate Judge to conduct all proceedings and order the entry of judgment in this civil action, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73, and S.D. Ala. GenLR 73. (See Docs. 15, 16).

Upon consideration of the parties' briefs (Docs. 11, 12) and those portions of the administrative record (Doc. 10) (hereinafter cited as "(R. [page number(s) in lower-right corner of transcript])") relevant to the issues raised,1 the Court finds that the Commissioner's decision is due to be REVERSED and REMANDED under sentence four of § 405(g) for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

I. Procedural Background

On May 29, 2012, Caffey filed an application for a period of disability and DIB with the Social Security Administration ("SSA").2 Caffey initially alleged disability beginning October 3, 2003, but subsequently amended his alleged onset date to January 1, 2008.3 After his application was initially denied, Caffey requested a hearing, which was held before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") for the SSA's Office of Disability Adjudication and Review on August 7, 2013, with a supplemental hearing held on February 3, 2014. On March 20, 2014, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on Caffey's application, finding him "not disabled" under the Social Security Act and thus not entitled to benefits. (See R. 54 - 79).

The Commissioner's decision on Caffey's application became final when the Appeals Council for the Office of Disability Adjudication and Review denied Caffey's request for review of the ALJ's decision on August 20, 2015. (R. 1 - 6). On October 2, 2015, Caffey filed this action under § 405(g) for judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision. (Doc. 1). See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) ("Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such decision or within such further time as the Commissioner of Social Security may allow."); Ingram v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1262 (11th Cir. 2007) ("The settled law of this Circuit is that a court may review, under sentence four of section 405(g), a denial of review by the Appeals Council.").

II. Standard of Review

"In Social Security appeals, [the Court] must determine whether the Commissioner's decision is `"supported by substantial evidence and based on proper legal standards. Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion."` " Winschel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439 (11th Cir. 1997))). However, the Court "`may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute our judgment for that of the [Commissioner].'" Id. (quoting Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983))). "`Even if the evidence preponderates against the [Commissioner]'s factual findings, we must affirm if the decision reached is supported by substantial evidence.'" Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)).

"Yet, within this narrowly circumscribed role, [courts] do not act as automatons. [The court] must scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence[.]" Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239 (citations and quotation omitted). See also Owens v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 1511, 1516 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) ("We are neither to conduct a de novo proceeding, nor to rubber stamp the administrative decisions that come before us. Rather, our function is to ensure that the decision was based on a reasonable and consistently applied standard, and was carefully considered in light of all the relevant facts."). "In determining whether substantial evidence exists, [a court] must...tak[e] into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the [Commissioner's] decision." Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986).

However, the "substantial evidence" "standard of review applies only to findings of fact. No similar presumption of validity attaches to the [Commissioner]'s conclusions of law, including determination of the proper standards to be applied in reviewing claims." MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1053 (11th Cir. 1986) (quotation omitted). Accord, e.g., Wiggins v. Schweiker, 679 F.2d 1387, 1389 (11th Cir. 1982) ("Our standard of review for appeals from the administrative denials of Social Security benefits dictates that `(t)he findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive ....' 42 U.S.C.A. s 405(g) (West Supp. 1982) (emphasis added). As is plain from the statutory language, this deferential standard of review is applicable only to findings of fact made by the Secretary, and it is well established that no similar presumption of validity attaches to the Secretary's conclusions of law, including determination of the proper standards to be applied in reviewing claims." (footnote and some citations and quotation marks omitted)). This Court "conduct[s] `an exacting examination' of these factors." Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (quoting Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)). "`The [Commissioner]'s failure to apply the correct law or to provide the reviewing court with sufficient reasoning for determining that the proper legal analysis has been conducted mandates reversal.'" Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991)). Accord Keeton v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994).

In sum, courts "review the Commissioner's factual findings with deference and the Commissioner's legal conclusions with close scrutiny." Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). See also Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) ("In Social Security appeals, we review de novo the legal principles upon which the Commissioner's decision is based. Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). However, we review the resulting decision only to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence. Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158-59 (11th Cir. 2004).").

Thornton v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 597 F. App'x 604, 609 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (unpublished).4

Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v); Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1237-39).5

"These regulations place a very heavy burden on the claimant to demonstrate both a qualifying disability and an inability to perform past relevant work." Moore, 405 F.3d at 1211 (citing Spencer v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 1090, 1093 (11th Cir. 1985)). "In determining whether the claimant has satisfied this initial burden, the examiner must consider four factors: (1) objective medical facts or clinical findings; (2) the diagnoses of examining physicians; (3) evidence of pain; and (4) the claimant's age, education, and work history." Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001, 1005 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (citing Tieniber v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 1251, 1253 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam)). "These factors must be considered both singly and in combination. Presence or absence of a single factor is not, in itself, conclusive." Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1240 (citations omitted).

If, in Steps One through Four of the five-step evaluation, a claimant proves that he or she has a qualifying disability and cannot do his or her past relevant work, it then becomes the Commissioner's burden, at Step Five, to prove that the claimant is capable—given his or her age, education, and work history—of engaging in another kind of substantial gainful employment that exists in the national economy. Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999); Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 836 (11th Cir. 1985). Finally, although the "claimant bears the burden of demonstrating the inability to return to [his or] her past relevant work, the Commissioner of Social Security has an obligation to develop a full and fair record." Shnorr v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 578, 581 (11th Cir. 1987). See also Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) ("It is well-established that the ALJ has a basic duty to develop a full and fair record. Nevertheless, the claimant bears the burden of proving that he is disabled, and, consequently, he is responsible for producing evidence in support of his claim." (citations omitted)). "This is an onerous task, as the ALJ must scrupulously and conscientiously probe into, inquire of, and explore for all relevant facts. In determining whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ must consider the evidence as a whole." Henry v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 802 F.3d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (citation and quotation omitted).

Where, as here, the ALJ denied benefits and the Appeals Council denied review of that decision, the Court "review[s] the ALJ's decision as the Commissioner's final decision." Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1278. "[W]hen the [Appeals Council] has denied review, [the Court] will look only to the evidence actually presented to the ALJ in determining whether the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence." Falge v. Apfel, 150 F.3d 1320, 1323 (11th Cir. 1998). If the applicant attacks only the ALJ's decision, the Court may not consider evidence that was presented to the Appeals Council but not to the ALJ. See id. at 1324.

III. Claims on Judicial Review

(Doc. 11 at 2).6

IV. Analysis

At Step One, the ALJ determined that Caffey had "not engaged in substantial gainful activity during the period from his amended alleged onset date of January 1, 2008 through his date last insured of December 31, 2012..." (R. 59). At Step Two, the ALJ determined that Caffey had the following severe impairments: arthritis in the wrists, knees, hips, and lower back; anxiety; depression; and polysubstance dependence. (R. 59 - 60). At Step Three, the ALJ found that Caffey did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or equals the severity of one of the specified impairments in the relevant Listing of Impairments. (R. 60 - 61).

At Step Four,

Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1238-39 (footnote omitted).

The ALJ determined that Caffey had the RFC "to perform a range of light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b),[7] in function by function terms (SSRs 83-10 and 06-8p, with certain non-exertional restrictions associated with that level of exertion. The claimant's specific capabilities during the period of adjudication have been the ability to lift 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; sit at least 6 hours in an 8 hour workday; and stand/walk in combination with at least 6 hours in an 8 hour workday. The claimant would have manipulative limitations resulting in the ability to frequently handle bilaterally. He would have postural limitations resulting in the ability to occasionally climb ramps/stairs, stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl and never climb ladders/ropes/scaffolds. The claimant should never work at unprotected heights or with dangerous machinery. The claimant would have residual mental restrictions resulting in a need for simple tasks with short simple instructions; occasional contact with the general public; and only casual supervisors and coworkers with casual meaning the claimant could work in proximity to others but should avoid team type work activity." (R. 61 - 77).

Based on this RFC, the ALJ determined that Caffey was unable to perform any past relevant work. (Doc. 77). At Step Five, the ALJ determined that there exist significant numbers of jobs in the national economy that Caffey can perform given his RFC, age, education, and work experience. (R. 77 - 78). Thus, the ALJ found that Caffey was not disabled under the Social Security Act. (R. 78).

In her Step Four RFC assessment, the ALJ considered a good deal of evidence, consisting of Caffey's subjective testimony given in his administrative filings and at his administrative hearings (his "statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of [his] symptoms" were found "not entirely credible"), the reports of two state agency consultants ("little weight" given to both), and the treatment notes and medical opinions of:

(See R. 61 - 77).

A. Claim 1 (Mental RFC)

A mental RFC determination includes an assessment of mental abilities such as the ability to understand, remember, and carry out instructions, and to respond appropriately to supervision, coworkers, and work pressure. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(c); Luterman v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 518 F. App'x 683, 689 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (unpublished). See also SSR 96-8P, 1996 WL 374184, at *6 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996) ("Work-related mental activities generally required by competitive, remunerative work include the abilities to: understand, carry out, and remember instructions; use judgment in making work-related decisions; respond appropriately to supervision, co-workers and work situations; and deal with changes in a routine work setting."). Claim 1 asserts that the ALJ's mental RFC determination failed to account for key portions of the medical opinions of Dr. Starkey and Dr. Davis, despite giving them "significant weight" (R. 76).

Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178-79.

At Step Four, after discussing the record evidence relevant to Caffey's mental impairments, including the notes and opinions of Dr. Starkey and Dr. Davis, the ALJ made the following determinations:

(R. 73 - 74).

The ALJ then proceeded to weigh "the opinion evidence," discussing the opinions of Dr. Starkey and Dr. Davis as follows:

(R. 76 - 77).

Caffey argues that the ALJ reversibly erred in failing to sufficiently explain "the reasons therefore" in assigning "significant weight" to the opinions of Dr. Starkey and Dr. Davis. Caffey notes that the RFC "provides no specific limitation regarding Mr. Caffey's ability to deal with work pressure[,]" which Dr. Starkey opined was "marginal," and his ability "to respond appropriately to usual work situations and changes in routine settings[,]" which Dr. Davis opined was "moderately impaired." (Doc. 11 at 9). Caffey also asserts that the RFC's limitation to tasks with "casual supervisors and coworkers with casual meaning the claimant could work in proximity to others but should avoid team type work activity" is inconsistent with Dr. Starkey's opinion that Caffey's ability to work independently (versus with close supervision) was "marginal." (Id.). He further argues that, because these limitations were not included in the ALJ's hypothetical questions to the vocational expert ("VE") at Step Five, the VE's testimony that there exist significant numbers of jobs that Caffey can perform does not constitute substantial evidence.8 See (id. at 9, 11 - 12); Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1180 ("In order for a vocational expert's testimony to constitute substantial evidence, the ALJ must pose a hypothetical question which comprises all of the claimant's impairments." (quotation omitted)).

As Caffey notes in his brief, the undersigned, observing that "medical opinions are generally multifaceted" and that, "in the course of determining a plaintiff's residual functional capacity (`RFC'), an ALJ may choose to accept some conclusions-or recommended related restrictions-made within an opinion while rejecting others[,]" has stated:

Smith v. Colvin, Civil Action No. 2:13-00275-N, 2014 WL 518057, at *3 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 10, 2014) (citations, quotations, and footnote omitted).9

Nevertheless, the RFC assessment is ultimately the ALJ's responsibility.10 At least where the opinion is not from a treating source,11 the Eleventh Circuit imposes no rigid requirement that an ALJ, in crediting a medical opinion, must repeat it word for word in the RFC determination. See Lewen v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 605 F. App'x 967, 968-69 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (unpublished) ("Lewen's contention, that the ALJ did not properly consider the medical opinions, lacks merit. The mental limitations imposed in the ALJ's determination of Lewen's residual functional capacity were consistent with the medical opinions, even the portions that the ALJ did not specifically quote in her order. The ALJ limited Lewen to simple tasks and instructions, occasional interaction with the public, and occasional routine interaction with supervisors. Lewen was further limited to tasks and instructions that were `consistent with unskilled work.' There is no indication that these limitations do not account for the doctors' opinions in their entireties. Rather, any need to limit Lewen's ability to concentrate, deal with stress, or maintain a regular schedule on the job—opinions that Lewen argues are omitted from the ALJ's decision—is accounted for by the ALJ limiting her to simple tasks and unskilled work with little interaction with the public and supervisors. Moreover, there is no indication that the doctors, by opining that Lewen might have difficulties dealing with stress, concentrating, or maintaining a schedule, meant that these limitations would limit her ability to work a full work day/week. These doctors opined that, despite these limitations, she could perform simple routine tasks. Finally, while the ALJ is required to state the weight afforded to each medical opinion, the ALJ is not required to discuss every piece of evidence." (citations omitted) (emphasis added)); Adams v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 586 F. App'x 531, 534 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished) ("[T]he ALJ did not err by failing to specifically address Adams's neurologist's opinion that she should avoid frequent overhead reaching, and that she needed to take 5-minute breaks every 45 minutes, as his written decision made clear that he considered both the neurologist's opinion and Adams's medical condition as a whole." (citing Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam))); Hunter v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 609 F. App'x 555, 558 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (unpublished) ("To the extent that an administrative law judge commits an error, the error is harmless if it did not affect the judge's ultimate determination. See Diorio v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 726, 728 (11th Cir. 1983) (applying the harmless error doctrine in a Social Security appeal after finding that an administrative law judge made `erroneous statements of fact')."); Shaw v. Astrue, 392 F. App'x 684, 687 & n.1 (11th Cir. 2010) ("Shaw argues that the ALJ did not address Dr. Muller's opinion that she had poor abilities to interact with supervisors or to deal with work stress when making the RFC finding. []The ALJ did not reject Dr. Muller's opinions explicitly or implicitly. Rather, he made two references to Dr. Muller's opinions, both of which were positive. The ALJ noted that he found several statements made by Shaw to Dr. Muller that were in direct conflict with statements made to Dr. Naqvi, and therefore not credible. Ultimately, however, he relied on Dr. Muller's opinions in making an RFC limiting Shaw to light exertional work, including work with simple instructions and no more than limited public contact. Although he did not specifically address the findings regarding poor functionality in dealing with supervisors or stress, his RFC finding was not inconsistent with this ... Thus, even if the ALJ erred in failing to mention every finding made by Dr. Muller, any such error was harmless. See Diorio v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 726, 728 (11th Cir. 1983)." (record citations omitted)); Brothers v. Colvin, No. 3:14-CV-108 (CAR), 2015 WL 4977300, at *1 & n.1 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 20, 2015) (Royal, J.) ("Plaintiff argues the Magistrate Judge did not address the ALJ's failure to account for the examining psychologist's finding that Plaintiff is extremely limited in her ability to deal with supervisors, and the ALJ's failure to do so constitutes reversible error. The Court disagrees. As noted by the Magistrate Judge, the record shows the ALJ limited Plaintiff's RFC to work with only occasional interaction with the public and coworkers and gave weight to the examining psychologist's opinion. Indeed, the ALJ's RFC assessment is not inconsistent with the opinion that Plaintiff is limited in her ability to get along with supervisors." (citing Shaw, 392 F. App'x at 686)), aff'd, Brothers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 648 F. App'x 938 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (unpublished).

Though Caffey does not specifically identify this issue, the undersigned initially observes that the ALJ's stated reason for assigning "significant weight" to these opinions was because they were "generally consistent with [Caffey's] mental residual functional capacity above." (Doc. 76). Indeed, the very sequence of the ALJ's written decision indicates that she formulated the mental RFC prior to weighing the medical opinions of record. See supra. However, an RFC is to be "assess[ed] based on all the relevant evidence in [a claimant's] case record." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1), (3). Thus, medical opinions, which are relevant evidence, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(b)(1)(ii), 404.1527(a)(2), are to be examined and weighed as part of the RFC assessment, rather than as post hoc justification for an RFC pre-determined without consideration of "all the relevant evidence." In other words, at Step Four the evidence is supposed to justify the RFC, not vice versa.

Moreover, it is not clear how, or why, the ALJ synthesized the specific mental limitations in the two opinions into the more general determination that Caffey "would have moderate difficulties in maintaining social functioning and concentration, persistence or pace," especially when such limitations were not stated in the RFC. These factors appear to be more relevant at Steps Two and Three, as "social functioning" and "concentration, persistence, or pace" are two of the "four broad functional areas" used to "rate the degree of [a claimant's] functional limitation" as part of the Psychiatric Review Technique ("PRT") used to evaluate the severity of mental impairments. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c)(3).12 Indeed, the Commissioner has recognized that PRT findings "are not an RFC assessment" and that "[t]he mental RFC assessment used at steps 4 and 5 of the sequential evaluation process requires a more detailed assessment by itemizing various functions contained in the broad categories" of the PRT. Social Security Ruling (SSR) 96-8P, 1996 WL 374184, at *4 (July 2, 1996).13

The record supports the conclusion that the ALJ reversibly erred in failing to clearly address Dr. Starkey's opinion assigning Caffey a marginal ability to work independently. As noted previously, Caffey had two hearings with the ALJ. At his initial administrative hearing on August 7, 2013, the ALJ asked the VE whether jobs were available for a hypothetical individual with similar age, education, and prior work history as Caffey "who had a marginal ability to work with supervisors, co-workers or the general public and who would have a marginal ability to work independently" (both limitations included in Dr. Starkey's opinion), with such limitations resulting "in an inability to sustain activity, remain on task, remain on target for two hour periods at a time eight hours during each work day 40 hours during each work week." (R. 119 (emphasis added)). Notably, the ALJ did not incorporate any of Caffey's RFC into this hypothetical, as she did with the first two hypotheticals. The first VE responded that no jobs would be available for such an individual. (R. 119).

A different VE gave testimony at the supplemental hearing held February 3, 2014. The ALJ's third hypothetical to the second VE again asked whether jobs were available for a hypothetical individual with similar age, education, and prior work history as Caffey who is "unable to sustain activity, remain on task, remain on target for two hour periods of a time over the course of an eight hour work day for 40 hours during each work week either given residual side effects from medication, residual pain or residual psychiatric symptoms." Again, the ALJ did not incorporate any of Caffey's RFC into this hypothetical. (R. 94 - 95). The second VE also responded that no jobs would be available for such an individual. (R. 94 - 95).

The ALJ did not specifically mention Caffey's "marginal ability to work independently" in her third hypothetical to the second VE. However, the third hypothetical to the first VE reveals the ALJ's reasoning that such a limitation would result in the limitations of being "unable to sustain activity, remain on task, remain on target for two hour periods of a time over the course of an eight hour work day for 40 hours during each work week either given residual side effects from medication, residual pain or residual psychiatric symptoms[,]" which was included in the third hypothetical to both VEs. (Compare R. 94 - 95 with R. 119). Moreover, the third hypothetical to the second VE included the additional detail that limitations would be based on the "residual side effects of medication, residual pain or residual psychiatric symptoms." Dr. Starkey's opinion attributed Caffey's marginal ability to work independently "to adverse effects of too much addictive medication." (R. 572 - 573).

At Step Five in her decision, the ALJ made note of her third hypothetical to the second VE, and that VE's answer, but conclusorily stated that she "has accounted for these factors in the residual functional capacity, as explained in detail above." (R. 78). It is unclear, however, how "account[ing] for these factors" at Step Four somehow renders them non-disabling at Step Five when two VEs each testified that the presence of those factors, and indeed only those factors (that is, without any of the other limitations in his RFC), rendered Caffey unable to find work.

An ALJ is "not required to include findings in the hypothetical that the ALJ had properly rejected as unsupported." Crawford v. Comm'r Of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1161 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam). Here, however, the ALJ, in assigning "significant weight" to Dr. Starkey's opinion, specifically mentioned the limitation that Caffey had a "marginal" ability to work independently. (See R. 76). The ALJ's decision gives no indication that she gave less weight to this particular limitation than to the others mentioned in Dr. Starkey's opinion. Rather, the ALJ aggregated those limitations into the general determination that Caffey would have "moderate difficulties in maintaining social functioning and concentration, persistence or pace." (R. 76 - 77).

"An administrative law judge may not ask a vocational expert a hypothetical question based on substantial evidence and then ignore unfavorable answers." Campbell v. Bowen, 822 F.2d 1518, 1523 n.6 (10th Cir. 1987). Accord Angel v. Barnhart, 329 F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th Cir. 2003) ("In performing his step four analysis, the ALJ ignored and failed to address Dr. Schneider's testimony at the hearing, which is supported by her medical records, that Angel needs a sterile environment in which to catheterize herself due to the risk of infection. This omission is significant because, following Dr. Schneider's testimony, the vocational expert (VE) testified, in response to a hypothetical question posed by Angel's counsel, that the requirement of providing Angel with a sterile environment, which would basically require that she have a personal, or private, bathroom, `would have a negative impact ... [and] would [not] preclude all employment, but it would be rather significant in reducing the occupational base.' []Dr. Schneider's testimony, and the related testimony of the VE, is supported by substantial medical evidence in the record showing that Angel is at high risk of contracting recurrent urinary tract infections. We therefore agree with Angel that the ALJ's failure to address the testimony is reversible error." (citing, inter alia, Campbell, 822 F.2d at 1523 n.6) (record citations omitted)); Arrington v. Apfel, 185 F.3d 873 (10th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (unpublished) ("[T]he hypothetical questions posed to the VE were problematic. The first question, based on Dr. Standefer's findings and plaintiff's condition as of shortly after plaintiff's accident, elicited a series of jobs the VE thought plaintiff could perform, most of which were at least semiskilled. With the additional restrictions of numbness in her dominant hand, however, the VE in his answers to the second and third questions stated there were no jobs she could perform. We have held that an ALJ may not ask a VE a hypothetical question based on substantial evidence and then ignore unfavorable answers. See Campbell v. Bowen, 822 F.2d 1518, 1523 n. 6 (10th Cir. 1987).")).14

Accordingly, the Court SUSTAINS Caffey's assertion in Claim 1 that the ALJ reversibly erred in failing to address with particularity Dr. Starkey's opinion that his ability to work independently was marginal. Thus, the Court need not decide whether the ALJ's alleged failure to sufficiently address the other aspects of Dr. Davis and Dr. Starkey's opinions identified by Caffey in Claim 1 also constitute reversible error. On remand, however, the Commissioner should consider the need to further explain with particularity the weight given to those portions of the medical opinions and the reasons therefor. Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179.

B. Claim 2 (Physical RFC)

Caffey's assertions of error in Claim 2 are similar to those in Claim 1, alleging that, despite giving "considerable weight to the findings and opinion of [examining orthopedist] Dr. Kim" (R. 74), the ALJ's physical RFC "differs from the assessment of Dr. Kim in several important ways" with regard to Caffey's wrist and knee impairments (Doc. 11 at 15).

After a thorough discussion of Dr. Kim's report (SSA Ex. 15F), as well as medical records from several other physicians regarding Caffey's physical impairments, including treating physicians Dr. Rowland and Dr. Wrights, the ALJ then discussed how this evidence influenced the various physical limitations in her RFC assessment. Discussing Caffey's wrist and knee impairments, among others, the ALJ stated as follows:

(R. 68 - 69). Considering the foregoing, the Court disagrees with Caffey's assertion that the decision "does not link the conclusions about Mr. Caffey's assessed capabilities to medical any opinions in the record evidence." (Doc. 11 at 17).

Caffey argues the ALJ's determination that Caffey could stand and/or walk for at least 6 hours per 8-hour workday is inconsistent with Dr. Kim's opinion that Caffey should engage in "no prolonged weightbearing" (R. 547). (See Doc. 11 at 16). Similarly, Caffey asserts that the ALJ's allowance for frequent bilateral handling in the RFC (R. 61) is inconsistent with Dr. Kim's opinion that "precluded Mr. Caffey from repeated gripping and grasping activities."15 (Doc. 11 at 15 (citing (R. 545)). However, the ALJ made reasonably clear that she considered the opinions of Dr. Kim, derived from a one-time examination in 2011, in conjunction with the more recent treatment notes of Caffey's two treating physicians.

Moreover, any alleged inconsistencies between the RFC and Dr. Kim's opinions identified by Caffey appear to be harmless. Caffey argues that his bilateral wrist limitations and hand impairments "significantly impact Mr. Caffey's ability to engage in work at the `light' level of physical exertion," and that "no prolonged weightbearing" would not allow for standing/walking for six hours in an eight hour workday. (See Doc. 11 at 15 - 16). However, at Step Five, the ALJ noted that she had ask the VE a hypothetical limiting Caffey to "the sedentary exertion level with the ability [to] stand/walk in combination for 2 hours in an 8 hour workday[,]" for which the VE "identified a representative sample of jobs..." (R. 78). Thus, even if Caffey were limited to "sedentary" work instead of "light" work, and even if his ability to stand/walk was significantly reduced, substantial evidence indicates that Caffey would still be able to find work despite his physical impairments.

Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Caffey's assertions of reversible error in Claim 2.

C. Claim 3 (Credibility Determination)

Finally, Caffey asserts that the ALJ reversibly erred in failing to sufficiently credit his testimony regarding his medications' side effects.

Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210-11 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). "[C]redibility determinations are the province of the ALJ, Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1212 (11th Cir. 2005), and [a court] will not disturb a clearly articulated credibility finding supported by substantial evidence, Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1562 (11th Cir. 1995)." Mitchell v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 771 F.3d 780, 782 (11th Cir. 2014).

At his first administrative hearing, Caffey testified that "he has looked for work and has had job offers; however, he has not been hired because his medications cause drowsiness." Caffey also testified that his medications (Lortab, Xanax, muscle relaxers, anti-inflammatories) were "`knock out meds' that make him drowsy or put him to sleep" and that "he is asleep from his medications for 7 hours a day between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m." Additionally, he reported that his "doctors told him not to drive due to his medications[,] that he has fallen asleep at red lights before and burned himself the last time he cooked because he was on Lortab and fell asleep." At his supplemental administrative hearing, Caffey "reiterated his previous testimony that his medications sedate him and make him sleep 70% of the day. Otherwise, he is groggy, stays to himself and does not like to be around a lot of people." (R. 62 - 63).

The ALJ found that Caffey's "statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of [his] symptoms are not entirely credible..." (R. 63). The ALJ then explained:

(R. 69 - 70).

Considering the above, the Court disagrees with Caffey's assertion that "the ALJ failed to provide a reasoned explanation for discrediting [his] testimony..." (Doc. 11 at 19). Caffey also argues "the limitation to only unskilled work fails to adequately allow for Mr. Caffey's medication side effects." (Doc. 11 at 17 - 18). However, he cites no authority in support this contention, nor does he directly address the ALJ's stated reasons for declining to fully credit Caffey's testimony (i.e. that it was not bolstered by Dr. Nudleman's report or by evidence of Caffey's reported life activities), instead insisting that his testimony must be accepted as true because other record evidence supports it.17 These "contentions misinterpret the narrowly circumscribed nature of [judicial] review, which precludes [the Court] from `re-weigh[ing] the evidence or substitut[ing] our judgment for that [of the Commissioner] ... even if the evidence preponderates against' the decision." Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1213 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (quoting Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239). See also Mitchell v, 771 F.3d at 782 ("The ALJ made a clearly articulated credibility finding and pointed to specific reasons for discrediting Mitchell's subjective complaints of disabling pain. That finding was supported by substantial evidence in the record. Furthermore, contrary to Mitchell's contention that the ALJ ignored evidence favorable to Mitchell, `there is no rigid requirement that the ALJ specifically refer to every piece of evidence in his decision, so long as the ALJ's decision ... is not a broad rejection which is not enough to enable [a reviewing court] to conclude that the ALJ considered [the claimant's] medical condition as a whole.' Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1211 (quotation and brackets omitted).").

Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Caffey's assertions of reversible error in Claim 3.

V. Conclusion

Caffey has requested that his case be remanded to the Commissioner with instructions that he be awarded benefits, while alternatively requesting remand for further proceedings on his application for benefits. Generally, remand to the Commissioner "is warranted where the ALJ has failed to apply the correct legal standards." Davis v. Shalala, 985 F.2d 528, 534 (11th Cir. 1993). This Court may enter an order "awarding disability benefits where the [Commissioner] has already considered the essential evidence and it is clear that the cumulative effect of the evidence establishes disability without any doubt." Id. See also Carnes v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1215, 1219 (11th Cir. 1991) ("The credibility of witnesses is for the Secretary to determine, not the courts...The decision of the Secretary here, however, rests not so much on the credibility of the `history of pain' presented by Carnes, as on the adoption of a legal standard improper under Listing 10.10(A). []The record in this case is fully developed and there is no need to remand for additional evidence. Based on the facts adduced below and after application of the proper legal standard, we hold that claimant met the requirements of Listing 10.10(A) as early as 1982."). Here, however, reversal is based upon the Commissioner's failure to adequately explain her reasoning in weighing different aspects of medical opinions. It is not clear that the cumulative effect of the evidence establishes disability without any doubt.18 Thus, the Court will reverse and remand this action to the Commissioner for further proceedings.

In accordance with the foregoing analysis, it is ORDERED that the Commissioner's August 20, 2015 final decision denying Caffey's application for a period of disability and DIB is REVERSED and REMANDED to the Commissioner under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), see Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89 (1991), for further proceedings consistent with this decision. This remand under sentence four of § 405(g) makes Caffey a prevailing party for purposes of the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, see Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292 (1993), and terminates this Court's jurisdiction over this matter.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2)(B), should Caffey be awarded Social Security benefits on the subject application following this remand, the Court hereby grants Caffey's counsel an extension of time in which to file a motion for fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) until thirty days after the date of receipt of a notice of award of benefits from the SSA.19 Consistent with 20 C.F.R. § 422.210(c), "the date of receipt of notice ... shall be presumed to be 5 days after the date of such notice, unless there is a reasonable showing to the contrary." If multiple award notices are issued, the time for filing a § 406(b) fee motion shall run from the date of receipt of the latest-dated notice.

Final judgment shall issue separately in accordance with this Order and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58.

DONE and ORDERED.