MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

KATHERINE P. NELSON, Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff Michael F. Dees, Sr. brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Defendant Commissioner of Social Security ("the Commissioner") denying his application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401, et seq. With the consent of the parties, the Court has designated the undersigned Magistrate Judge to conduct all proceedings and order the entry of judgment in this civil action, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73, and S.D. Ala. GenLR 73. (See Docs. 19, 21).

Upon consideration of the parties' briefs (Docs. 14, 17) and those portions of the administrative record (Docs. 8-13) (hereinafter cited as "(R. [page number(s) in lower-right corner of transcript])") relevant to the issues raised, and with the benefit of oral argument held April 13, 2017, the Court finds that the Commissioner's final decision is due to be AFFIRMED under sentence four of § 405(g).

I. Background

On April 9, 2014, Dees filed an application for a period of disability and DIB with the Social Security Administration ("SSA"), alleging disability beginning February 1, 2012.1 After his application was initially denied, Dees requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") with the SSA's Office of Disability Adjudication and Review. Ultimately, three hearings were held on Dees's application, on November 3, 2014, July 20, 2015, and February 3, 2016. On June 2, 2016, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on Dees's application, finding his "not disabled" under the Social Security Act and thus not entitled to benefits. (See R. 13-29). The Commissioner's decision on Dees's application became final when the Appeals Council for the Office of Disability Adjudication and Review denied Dees's request for review of the ALJ's decision on August 2, 2016. (R. 1-5). On August 25, 2016, Dees filed this action under § 405(g) for judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision. See (Doc. 1); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) ("Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such decision or within such further time as the Commissioner of Social Security may allow."); Ingram v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1262 (11th Cir. 2007) ("The settled law of this Circuit is that a court may review, under sentence four of section 405(g), a denial of review by the Appeals Council.").

II. Standards of Review

"In Social Security appeals, [the Court] must determine whether the Commissioner's decision is "`supported by substantial evidence and based on proper legal standards. Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion."'" Winschel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439 (11th Cir. 1997))). However, the Court "`may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute our judgment for that of the [Commissioner].'" Id. (quoting Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983))). "`Even if the evidence preponderates against the [Commissioner]'s factual findings, [the Court] must affirm if the decision reached is supported by substantial evidence.'" Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)).

"Yet, within this narrowly circumscribed role, [courts] do not act as automatons. [The Court] must scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence[.]" Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239 (citations and quotation omitted). See also Owens v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 1511, 1516 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) ("We are neither to conduct a de novo proceeding, nor to rubber stamp the administrative decisions that come before us. Rather, our function is to ensure that the decision was based on a reasonable and consistently applied standard, and was carefully considered in light of all the relevant facts."). "In determining whether substantial evidence exists, [a court] must . . . tak[e] into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the [Commissioner's] decision." Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986).

However, the "substantial evidence" "standard of review applies only to findings of fact. No similar presumption of validity attaches to the [Commissioner]'s conclusions of law, including determination of the proper standards to be applied in reviewing claims." MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1053 (11th Cir. 1986) (quotation omitted). Accord, e.g., Wiggins v. Schweiker, 679 F.2d 1387, 1389 (11th Cir. 1982) ("Our standard of review for appeals from the administrative denials of Social Security benefits dictates that `(t)he findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. . . .' 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g). . . As is plain from the statutory language, this deferential standard of review is applicable only to findings of fact made by the Secretary, and it is well established that no similar presumption of validity attaches to the Secretary's conclusions of law, including determination of the proper standards to be applied in reviewing claims." (some quotation marks omitted)). This Court "conduct[s] `an exacting examination' of these factors." Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (quoting Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)). "`The [Commissioner]'s failure to apply the correct law or to provide the reviewing court with sufficient reasoning for determining that the proper legal analysis has been conducted mandates reversal.'" Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991)). Accord Keeton v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994).

In sum, courts "review the Commissioner's factual findings with deference and the Commissioner's legal conclusions with close scrutiny." Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). See also Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) ("In Social Security appeals, we review de novo the legal principles upon which the Commissioner's decision is based. Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). However, we review the resulting decision only to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence. Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158-59 (11th Cir. 2004).").

Thornton v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 597 F. App'x 604, 609 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (unpublished).2

The Social Security Regulations outline a five-step, sequential evaluation process used to determine whether a claimant is disabled:

Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v); Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1237-39).3

"These regulations place a very heavy burden on the claimant to demonstrate both a qualifying disability and an inability to perform past relevant work." Moore, 405 F.3d at 1211 (citing Spencer v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 1090, 1093 (11th Cir. 1985)). "In determining whether the claimant has satisfied this initial burden, the examiner must consider four factors: (1) objective medical facts or clinical findings; (2) the diagnoses of examining physicians; (3) evidence of pain; and (4) the claimant's age, education, and work history." Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001, 1005 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (citing Tieniber v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 1251, 1253 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam)). "These factors must be considered both singly and in combination. Presence or absence of a single factor is not, in itself, conclusive." Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1240 (citations omitted).

If, in Steps One through Four of the five-step evaluation, a claimant proves that he or she has a qualifying disability and cannot do his or her past relevant work, it then becomes the Commissioner's burden, at Step Five, to prove that the claimant is capable—given his or her age, education, and work history—of engaging in another kind of substantial gainful employment that exists in the national economy. Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999); Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 836 (11th Cir. 1985). Finally, although the "claimant bears the burden of demonstrating the inability to return to [his or] her past relevant work, the Commissioner of Social Security has an obligation to develop a full and fair record." Shnorr v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 578, 581 (11th Cir. 1987). See also Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) ("It is well-established that the ALJ has a basic duty to develop a full and fair record. Nevertheless, the claimant bears the burden of proving that he is disabled, and, consequently, he is responsible for producing evidence in support of his claim." (citations omitted)). "This is an onerous task, as the ALJ must scrupulously and conscientiously probe into, inquire of, and explore for all relevant facts. In determining whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ must consider the evidence as a whole." Henry v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 802 F.3d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (citation and quotation omitted).

Where, as here, the ALJ denied benefits and the Appeals Council denied review of that decision, the Court "review[s] the ALJ's decision as the Commissioner's final decision." Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1278. "[W]hen the [Appeals Council] has denied review, [the Court] will look only to the evidence actually presented to the ALJ in determining whether the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence." Falge v. Apfel, 150 F.3d 1320, 1323 (11th Cir. 1998). If the applicant attacks only the ALJ's decision, the Court may not consider evidence that was presented to the Appeals Council but not to the ALJ. See id. at 1324.

III. Analysis

At Step One, the ALJ determined that Dees had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged disability onset date, February 1, 2012. (R. 18). At Step Two, the ALJ determined that Dees had the following severe impairments:

Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1238-39 (footnote omitted).

The ALJ determined that Dees had the RFC "to perform a limited range of sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b).[4] Specifically, the claimant can lift and/or carry 10 pounds occasionally and items of negligible weight frequently. The claimant can stand and/or walk or two hours, no more than 30 minutes at a time. The claimant can sit for six hours. The claimant can frequently push and/or pull with the upper extremities, bilaterally, occasionally push and/or pull with the lower extremities, bilaterally. The claimant can occasionally balance, occasionally stoop, occasionally kneel, occasionally crouch and occasionally climb ramps and stairs. The claimant can frequently crawl. The claimant cannot climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. The claimant can frequently reach, bilaterally; frequently handle, bilaterally; and frequently finger, bilaterally. The claimant can continuously feel. The claimant can tolerate occasional exposure to vibration and occasional exposure to pulmonary irritants. The claimant can have exposure to no more than moderate noise. The claimant must avoid all exposure to unprotected heights and avoid all exposure to dangerous machinery. The claimant would have one unplanned absence per month. The claimant can perform simple routine tasks involving no more than simple, short instructions and simple work-related decisions with minimal work place changes. The claimant can tolerate occasional and non-transactional interaction with the public, non-transactional interactional interaction with co-workers, and occasional interaction with supervisors. He cannot work in close proximity to others. The claimant is able to sustain attention for two-hour periods with customary breaks." (R. 20-27).

Based on this RFC, the ALJ determined that Dees was unable to perform any past relevant work. (R. 28). At Step Five, the ALJ, after taking testimony from a vocational expert, found that there exist significant numbers of jobs in the national economy that Dees can perform given his RFC, age, education, and work experience. (R. 28-29). Thus, the ALJ found that Dees was not disabled under the Social Security Act. (R. 29). Dees asserts four claims of reversible error by the ALJ.

A. First Claim of Error — VA Disability Decision

Dees's first claim of error is that the ALJ failed to fully consider the disability ratings assigned him by the Department of Veterans Affairs ("VA").

Boyette v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 605 F. App'x 777, 779 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (unpublished).

Here, the ALJ considered "the VA ratings in which [Dees] has been awarded 50% disability for obstructive sleep apnea, 30% disability for anxiety/PTSD/depression, 20% disability for diabetes mellitus, 10% for degenerative disc disease, 10% for tinnitus, 10% for non-obstructive coronary artery disease or constocondritis, 10% for GERD, 0% for gout, 0% for residuals from closed right finger fracture, 0% for bilateral hearing loss, 0% for allergic rhinitis, 0% for hypertension, 0% for erectile dysfunction, and 0% for right multinodular goiter status post hemithyroidectomy." (R. 26 (citing SSA Ex. B16F [R. 1622-1628])). After discussing the Eleventh Circuit's applicable precedent in Brady and the differing standards between the SSA and the VA for determining disability, the ALJ then stated:

(R. 27).

Dees argues that the ALJ's decision to assign the VA disability findings "no weight" is not supported by substantial evidence because it is inconsistent with Dees's hearing testimony that, while "he had been attending classes at ITT Technical School three days per week from 6:00 p.m. until 11:00 p.m. for nine months[,]" he "got a tutor through the VA to help him with his homework and help him keep up in classes" and "has missed 5 or 6 days of classes in the last three months due to sleep and anxiety." (Doc. 14 at 3 (citing R. 62-63)). He also testified "that he has completed an intensive program for PTSD in 2013[,] was currently in intensive therapy for a sleeping disorder and anxiety with Dr. Aikens[, and] sees three different medical professionals for treatment at the VA." (Id. (citing R. 67-69)). Dees also notes he "has continued to be seen regularly by the VA since September 21, 2011." (Id. at 4).5

At most, this testimony only calls into question some of the reasons the ALJ articulated for rejecting the VA ratings, and the undersigned agrees with the Commissioner that Dees's mere citation to evidence supporting the VA's disability ratings fails to demonstrate that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ's decision to reject them. See Crawford, 363 F.3d at 1158-59 ("Even if the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner's findings, we must affirm if the decision reached is supported by substantial evidence." (quotation omitted)); Moore, 405 F.3d at 1213 ("To the extent that Moore points to other evidence which would undermine the ALJ's RFC determination, her contentions misinterpret the narrowly circumscribed nature of our appellate review, which precludes us from re-weighing the evidence or substituting our judgment for that of the Commissioner. . . even if the evidence preponderates against the decision." (quotation and footnote omitted)). Here, the ALJ specifically cited to relevant record evidence, as noted above, that was "adequate to support a conclusion" that the VA's disability ratings should be rejected. Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178. Moreover, as will be discussed in greater detail herein, the ALJ found that Dees's subjective testimony as to the effect of his impairments was "not entirely consistent" with the record evidence. (R. 21). Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision to assign no weight to the VA's disability ratings, and the Court OVERRULES Dees's first claim of error.

B. Second Claim of Error (Subjective Testimony)

Dees next argues that the ALJ failed to consider his subjective testimony, given at the third ALJ hearing held February 3, 2016, "that he still wakes up through the night even when using his CPAP machine[;] that he has four to five bad days per week and, on a bad day, it is hard for him to stay focused[; and] that he has an unexpected sleep pattern, and on a bad day, will fall asleep three to four times and sleep for about an hour each time." (Doc. 14 at 5 (citing R. 99-100)). In Dees's view, it was particularly incumbent upon the ALJ to give special consideration to this testimony in light of the fact that Dees "has received treatment from the VA since 2011 for his obstructive sleep apnea and has a 50% service connected rating for obstructive sleep apnea." (Doc. 14 at 5).

"If a claimant testifies as to his subjective complaints of disabling pain and other symptoms,. . . the ALJ must clearly `articulate explicit and adequate reasons' for discrediting the claimant's allegations of completely disabling symptoms." Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (quoting Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1561-62 (11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam)). However, "there is no rigid requirement that the ALJ specifically refer to every piece of evidence in his decision, so long as the ALJ's decision. . . is not a broad rejection which is `not enough to enable [the district court or this Court] to conclude that [the ALJ] considered her medical condition as a whole.'" Id. at 1211 (quoting Foote, 67 F.3d at 1561 (internal quotation omitted)). The Court "will not disturb a clearly articulated credibility finding supported by substantial evidence . . ." Mitchell v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 771 F.3d 780, 782 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Foote, 67 F.3d at 1562).

The ALJ's decision notes that Dees claimed an inability to work as a result of, among other impairments, "obstructive sleep apnea," and that Dees "testified that he is disabled by. . . an inability to sleep. . ." (R. 21 (citing "Hearing Testimony")). The ALJ found that Dees's "statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of [his] symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record . . ." (R. 21). After summarizing the objective medical evidence of record, which primarily consisted of VA treatment records, the ALJ found that Dees's subjective physical complaints were "not fully consistent" because "his objective findings have been mild, and he has required only conservative treatment." (R. 25-26). In rejecting the VA's 50% disability rating for sleep apnea, the ALJ cited VA records indicating that Dees's "sleep apnea was well controlled and did not impact his ability to work" and that he "is able to work a range of sedentary work . . ." (R. 27). "The ALJ's decision in this case was not a broad rejection and was sufficient to enable. . . this Court to conclude the ALJ considered [Dees]'s medical condition as a whole." Mitchell, 771 F.3d at 782.6 Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Dees's second claim of error.

C. Third Claim of Error (RFC)

Dees's third claim of error, related to his first, is that, in rejecting the VA disability ratings, the ALJ "clearly `cherry picks' limitations so as to correspond with his residual functional capacity" and "essentially used his own interpretation of the medical records in assigning [Dees]'s residual functional capacity." (Doc. 14 at 7). While "[a]n ALJ has the obligation to consider all relevant medical evidence and cannot simply cherry-pick facts that support a finding of non-disability while ignoring evidence that points to a disability finding[,] an ALJ need not mention every piece of evidence, so long he builds a logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion." Denton v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 419, 425 (7th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).7 See also Cooper v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 521 F. App'x 803, 808 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (unpublished) ("An ALJ is not required to refer specifically to each piece of evidence in the record, but must sufficiently explain the weight given to `obviously probative exhibits.' Cowart v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731, 735 (11th Cir. 1981).").

Apart from the evidence cited in his first two claims of error, which the undersigned has rejected, see supra, Dees cites no other record evidence purportedly ignored by the ALJ that calls the ALJ's RFC determination into question. To the extent Dees argues that an ALJ cannot rely on "his own interpretation of the medical records in assigning the Plaintiff's residual functional capacity" (Doc. 14 at 7), that argument is without merit. See Fritts v. Colvin, No. CV 15-00209-N, 2016 WL 3566866, at *8 (S.D. Ala. June 24, 2016) ("The task of determining a claimant's residual functional capacity and ability to work rests with the administrative law judge, not a doctor. The ALJ carries out this task by assessing all of the relevant medical and other evidence . . ." (citations and quotations omitted)); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c) ("If your case is at the administrative law judge hearing level. . ., the administrative law judge. . . is responsible for assessing your residual functional capacity."). Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Dees's third claim of error

D. Fourth Claim of Error (Step Five)

Dees's fourth and final claim of error asserts that the ALJ's Step Five determination that there exist significant numbers of jobs in the national economy that Dees can perform, given his RFC, age, education, and work experience, is not supported by substantial evidence because the vocational expert's testimony on which the ALJ relied is contradicted by data from Job Browser Pro by SkillTRAN computer program. Dees represents that the "date source for Job Browser Pro. . . is the U.S. Department of Labor, Dictionary of Occupational Title 4th Edition, Revised (1991), (including subsequent amendments by the U.S. Department of Labor)." (Doc. 14 at 8 n.1).

Even assuming that the VE's testimony did not accurately reflect the DOT, binding precedent in this Circuit holds "that when the VE's testimony conflicts with the DOT, the VE's testimony `trumps' the DOT." Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1229-30 (11th Cir. 1999). See also Jones v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 423 F. App'x at 939 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (unpublished) ("Even assuming arguendo that the ALJ incorrectly found that the VE's testimony was consistent with the DOT, such error was harmless. See Diorio v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 726, 728 (11th Cir. 1983) (applying harmless error analysis to ALJ's incorrect statements that were irrelevant to whether claimant had a severe impairment). In this Circuit, a VE's testimony trumps the DOT to the extent the two are inconsistent. See Jones, 190 F.3d at 1229-30. The VE opined that the ALJ's hypothetical person could perform these three jobs. The ALJ was permitted to base his findings about these three jobs exclusively on the VE's testimony, irrespective of any inconsistency with the DOT, and was not required to seek further explanation. See id.");8 Leigh v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 496 F. App'x 973, 975 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (unpublished) (similar). Dees offers no substantive argument why this clear precedent is inapplicable here.9 Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in relying on the VE's testimony as to the numbers of jobs existing in the national economy, and the undersigned OVERRULES Dees's fourth claim of error. There being no other claims of error asserted,10 the Court finds that the Commissioner's final decision denying Dees benefits is due to be AFFIRMED.

IV. Conclusion

In accordance with the foregoing analysis, it is ORDERED that the Commissioner's final decision issued May 12, 2016, denying Dees's application for a period of disability and DIB is AFFIRMED under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Final judgment shall issue separately in accordance with this Order and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58.

DONE and ORDERED.