WILLIAM E. CASSADY, Magistrate Judge.
Social Security Claimant/Plaintiff Mary B. McCloud brought this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Defendant Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner") denying his applications for a period of disability ("PoD") and disability insurance benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401, et seq. The parties have consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Magistrate Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), for all proceedings in this Court. (Doc. 26 ("In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 73, the parties in this case consent to have a United States Magistrate Judge conduct any and all proceedings in this case, including the trial, order the entry of a final judgment, and conduct all post-judgment proceedings.")).
Upon consideration of the briefs of the parties, (Docs. 18 & 23), the administrative record, (Docs. 14-15), (hereinafter cited as "(R. [page number(s) in lower-right corner of transcript])"), and the arguments presented during the hearing held on February 22, 2017, it is determined that the Commissioner's decision is due to be
McCloud was born on February 21, 1961, (R. 238 [SSA Ex. 1E]). McCloud completed two years of college. (R. 248 [SSA Ex. 2E]). McCloud was employed as a secretary at a business called Country Store, (R. 55), as a secretary for the Adult Education Division at Wallace Community College, (R. 56), and as an office administrator for the State of Alabama, Department of Post-Secondary Education, for approximately thirteen (13) years, from 1998 to 2011, (R. 57; R. 243 [SSA Ex. 3E]).
McCloud filed applications for PoD and DIB with the Social Security Administration (the "SSA")
McCloud requested review of the ALJ's decision by the Appeals Council for the SSA's Office of Disability Adjudication and Review. (R. 15-16). The Appeals Council denied McCloud's request for review on April 28, 2016, which made the ALJ's the final decision of the Commissioner. (R. 1-6). On May 2, 2016, McCloud filed this action pursuant to § 405(g)
"In Social Security appeals, [the Court] must determine whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence and based on proper legal standards. Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Winschel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (citations and internal quotations omitted). The Court "may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner]." Id. (citations omitted). "Even if the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner's findings, [the Court] must affirm if the decision reached is supported by substantial evidence." Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Sewell v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 1065, 1067 (11th Cir. 1986); MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1053 (11th Cir. 1986); and Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983)). "Yet, within this narrowly circumscribed role, [the Court does] not `act as automatons.'" Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983) (citing Ware v. Schweiker, 651 F.2d 408, 411 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 912, 102 S.Ct. 1263, 71 L. Ed. 2d 452 (1982)). The Court "must scrutinize the record as a whole, [Ware, 651 F.2d at 411]; Lewis v. Weinberger, 515 F.2d 584, 586-87 (5th Cir. 1975), to determine if the decision reached is reasonable, Simmons v. Harris, 602 F.2d 1233, 1236 (5th Cir. 1979), and supported by substantial evidence, Scharlow v. Schweiker, 655 F.2d 645, 648 (5th Cir. 1981)." Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239.
"In contrast to the deferential review accorded to the [Commissioner's] findings of fact, the [Commissioner's] conclusions of law, including applicable review standards are not presumed valid." Martin, 894 F.2d at 1529 (citing MacGregor, 786 F.2d at 1053; Smith v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 1284, 1285 (11th Cir. 1983), Wiggins v. Schweiker, 679 F.2d 1387, 1389 (11th Cir. 1982); Smith v. Schweiker, 646 F.2d 1075, 1076 (5th Cir. Unit A June 1981). "The [Commissioner's] failure to apply the correct legal standard or to provide the reviewing court with sufficient basis for a determination that proper legal principles have been followed mandates reversal." Martin, 894 F.2d at 1529 (citing Gibson v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 619, 622 (11th Cir. 1986); Bowel v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 629, 635-36 (11th Cir. 1984); Smith, 707 F.2d at 1285; Wiggins, 679 F.2d at 1389; Ambers v. Heckler, 736 F.2d 1467, 1470 (11th Cir. 1984)).
Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v); Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, at 1237-39 (11th Cir. 2004)).
1. "Ms. McCloud has a `severe' psychological impairment, the [ALJ] erred in his evaluation[.]" (Doc. 18, at 1).
2. "The [ALJ] erred in his evaluation of psychological medical source opinions[.]" (Doc. 18, at 1).
3. "The [ALJ] did not conduct a full and fair hearing[.]" (Doc. 18, at 1).
4. "The [ALJ]'s [RFC] finding is not rooted in the record[.]" (Doc. 18, at 1).
"At the first step, the ALJ must consider the claimant's current working situation. If the claimant is `doing substantial gainful activity, [the ALJ] will find that [the claimant is] not disabled.'" Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1237 (alterations in original) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i) & (b)). "If however, the claimant is not currently `doing gainful activity' then the ALJ moves on to the second step." Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1237. At the first step, the ALJ determined McCloud had "not engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 1, 2011, the alleged onset date." (R. 29).
Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1237 (alterations in original). At Step Two, the ALJ determined McCloud had the following non-severe impairments, which are severe in combination:
(R. 29).
Phillips, 257 F.3d at 1238 (alterations in original). At Step Three, the ALJ found that McCloud "does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments" in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, and 404.1526. (R. 34).
Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1238-39 (alterations in original) (footnote omitted). At the fourth step, the ALJ assessed that McCloud had the RFC:
(R. 34). The ALJ determined McCloud is "capable of performing past relevant work as an administrative clerk (light, semiskilled) Dictionary of Occupational Titles #219.361-010; and secretary (sedentary, skilled) Dictionary of Occupational Titles #201.362-030. This work does not require the performance of work-related activities precluded by the claimant's [RFC]." (R. 42). The ALJ concluded McCloud was not "under a disability as defined in the [SSA], from January 1, 2011, through the date of this decision." (R. 42).
At step two of the Social Security Regulations' five-step, sequential evaluation process, which is used to determine whether a claimant is disabled:
Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1237 (alterations in original).
McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1031 (11th Cir. 1986).
At step two, the ALJ is only tasked with determining whether the claimant has a severe impairment. At step two, the ALJ determined McCloud's numerous non-severe impairments were severe in combination, and moved on to the third step. (R. 29). Therefore, the question of whether the ALJ erred in evaluating McCloud's psychological impairments, as McCloud claims, is irrelevant since the ALJ found McCloud's impairments were severe.
For these reasons, the Court
Under Social Security Ruling 96-6p:
SSR 96-6p, rescinded and replaced by SSR 17-2p.
On June 3, 2013, McCloud reported to psychologist Richard S. Reynolds, Ph. D., for a disability determination evaluation. (R. 418-21 [SSA Ex. 7F]). Dr. Reynolds concluded:
(R. 421 [SSA Ex. 7F]). On July 10, 2013, McCloud completed the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, Fourth Edition (the "Wechsler AIS"), which was administered by Dr. Reynolds. (R. 423-24 [SSA Ex. 8F]). From McCloud's results from the Wechsler AIS, Dr. Reynolds concluded:
(R. 424 [SSA Ex. 8F]).
The ALJ assigned Dr. Reynolds's opinion from the June 3, 2013, evaluation "no weight" and Dr. Reynolds's opinion from the July 10, 2013, evaluation "some, but not great weight" because:
(R. 33).
The evidence of McCloud's medical problems before her consultative examination with Dr. Reynolds does not substantiate his opinions. The only evidence of an inability to remember and carry out instructions due to Mood Disorder, NOS, Anxiety Disorder, NOS, or Obsessive Cognitive Disorder that predates McCloud's examination with Dr. Reynolds were reported by her on May 9, 2013, during a consultative examination at the Selma Family Medicine Center at which she complained of "OCD," "manic depression," "insomnia," and "fatigue" in addition to "carpal tunnel syndrome" and "bilateral foot pain." (R. 411 [SSA Ex. 6F]).
The evidence of McCloud's medical problem after her consultative examination with Dr. Reynolds also does not substantiate his opinions. McCloud visited the Selma Doctor's Clinic, P.C., between September 5, 2013, and January 20, 2015. (See R. 439-53 [SSA. Ex. 11F]). On September 5, 2013, it was noted McCloud's "[j]udgment and insight appropriate," she was "[a]lert and oriented to person, place, and time," and "[l]ong term and short term memory intact," (R. 448 [SSA Ex. 11F]); on October 14, 2013, it was noted McCloud had "[n]o [a]nhedoia, [f]eelings of [e]xcessive [g]uilt or [g]randeur, [e]xcesive [a]lcohol or [d]rug use," she had "[a]ppropriate [o]ptimism," and she was "[a]lert and [o]riented," (R. 446 [SSA Ex. 11F]); on September 16, 2014, it was, again, noted McCloud had "[n]o [a]nhedoia, [f]eelings of [e]xcessive [g]uilt or [g]randeur, [e]xcesive [a]lcohol or [d]rug use," she had "[a]ppropriate [o]ptimism," her "[j]udgment and insight [were] appropriate," she was "[a]lert and oriented to person, place, and time," and her "[l]ong term and short term memory [were] intact," (R. 443-44 [SSA Ex. 11F]); and on January 20, 2015, it was noted McCloud was "obsessed with guilt," she felt "hopeless," was "[a]lert and [o]riented," but had "[d]epression," "[a]nxiety," and a "[f]lat effect," (R. 442 [SSA Ex. 11F]).
Between November 11, 2013, and February 27, 2015, McCloud visited the Neurology Consultants of Central Alabama where Walid Freij, M.D, treated her. (See R. 465-80 [SSA Ex. 14F]). On December 11, 2013, Dr. Freij noted McCloud's "episodes of zooming out, forgetfulness and erratic behavior could be related to partial complex seizures," "encephalomalacia of [her] left frontal temporal and parietal regions," "[m]ild mixed sensory motor peripheral neuropathy," and "left carpal tunnel syndrome affecting the sensory and motor components without evidence of denervation," (R. 473 [SSA Ex. 14F]); on December 23, 2014, Dr. Freij assessed McCloud with forgetfulness, (R. 471 [SSA Ex. 14F]); and on January 3, 2014, an electroencephalogram (EEG) was performed on McCloud the results of which were normal, and Dr. Freij noted there were "[n]o focal, diffuse or generalized abnormalities," and concluded "[t]he absence of epile[p]tiform discharge during the EEG recording [did] not rule out the diagnosis of a seizure disorder," (R. 469 [SSA Ex. 14F]).
Between January 9, 2015, and July 8, 2015, McCloud visited Behavioral Health of Selma for treatment with Dr. Reynolds. (See R. 457-64 [SSA Ex. 13F]; R. 481-90 [SSA Ex. 15F]). On January 9, 2015, Dr. Reynolds diagnosed McCloud with bipolar disorder, NOS, major depression, and agoraphobia and noted:
(R. 459 [SSA Ex. 13F]).
On January 28, 2015, Dr. Reynolds's diagnoses changed to bipolar 1, current or most recent episode depressed, moderate; agoraphobia; and panic disorder. Dr. Reynolds noted:
(R. 461 [SSA Ex. 13F]).
On February 25, 2015, Dr. Reynolds's diagnoses remained the same, and he noted:
(R. 463 [SSA Ex. 13F]).
On March 11, 2015, Dr. Reynolds's diagnoses remained the same, and he noted:
(R. 481 [SSA Ex. 15F]).
On April 1, 2015, Dr. Reynolds's diagnoses remained the same, and he noted:
(R. 483 [SSA Ex. 15F]).
On May 13, 2015, Dr. Reynolds's diagnoses remained the same, and he noted:
(R. 485 [SSA Ex. 15F]).
On June 10, 2015, Dr. Reynolds's diagnoses remained the same, and he noted:
(R. 487 [SSA Ex. 15F]).
Finally, on June 10, 2015, Dr. Reynolds's diagnoses remained the same, and he noted:
(R. 489 [SSA Ex. 15F]).
The medical evidence does not substantiate Dr. Reynolds's opinion McCloud had an inability to remember and carry out instructions due to Mood Disorder, NOS, Anxiety Disorder, NOS, or Obsessive Cognitive Disorder. McCloud's reported daily activities, also, do not substantiate Dr. Reynolds's opinions. At McCloud's examination with Dr. Reynolds on June 3, 2013, he noted:
(R. 420 [SSA Ex. 7F]).
Also, McCloud reported she feeds and waters her dogs; prepares simple meals; loads the washer, dryer, and dishwasher; sits on the porch to bird and squirrel watch; drives a vehicle; shops in stores; has an interest in bird watching; enjoys being outdoors; visits with friends twice a month to cook out and play cards or board games; attends church; when going to places, she does not need to be reminded to go places and does not need someone to accompany her; does not have any problems getting along with family, friends, neighbors, or others; is able to walk for approximately thirty (30) minutes; is able to pay attention for thirty (30) minutes; does not have a problem following written instructions; and is able to follow simple spoken instructions. (R. 265-72 [SSA Ex. 7E]). Substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision to assign little weight to Dr. Reynolds's opinions.
On July 22, 2013, Harold R. Veits, M.D., a non-examining state agency consultant, completed a Psychiatric Review Technique Form of McCloud. (R. 98-100 [SSA Ex. 2A]). Dr. Veits assessed McCloud under listings 12.04 and 12.06 for affective disorders anxiety-related disorders, respectively, and determined McCloud had mild restriction of activities of daily living; mild difficulties in maintaining social functioning; moderate difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace; and no episodes of decompensation. (R. 99 [SSA Ex. 2A]). Dr. Veits, also, completed a Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment of McCloud in which he opined she "has the ability to understand, remember and carry out very short and simple instructions" and "can attend for two hour periods." (R. 103-04 [SSA Ex. 2A]). The ALJ assigned Dr. Veits's opinions no weight because they were inconsistent with the remainder of the record. (R. 41).
Dr. Veits's opinions were, in part, based on the medical evidence provided by Dr. Reynolds, (R. 98-99 [SSA Ex. 2A]), which the Court found unsupported by the medical evidence of record, see supra at 11-21, and Dr. Veits's opinions are inconsistent with the remainder of the medical evidence of record, see supra at 12-21. Therefore, the ALJ did not commit error by assigning no weight to Dr. Veits's opinions.
For these reasons, the Court
"The contention that the combination of investigative and adjudicative functions necessarily creates an unconstitutional risk of bias in administrative adjudication has a much more difficult burden of persuasion to carry." Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 1464, 43 L. Ed. 2d 712 (1975). There is a "presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators." Id. "[A]n allegation of ALJ unfairness, prejudice, partiality, or bias . . . [is reviewed] under the abuse of discretion standard." SSR 13-1p. An ALJ will be found to have abused her discretion when "there has been an improper exercise, or a failure to exercise, administrative authority." Id. An ALJ abuses her discretion "if the record shows that the ALJ failed to conduct a full and fair hearing by refusing to allow the claimant to testify or cross-examine witnesses." Id.
McCloud takes exception to certain interactions with the ALJ during the hearing, (see Doc. 18, at 14-15)-those interactions are included in the hearing transcript excerpt that follows:
(R. 59-63).
The statements to which McCloud directs the Court's attention, in context, show the ALJ interrupting McCloud when her answers diverged from or elaborated on the question the ALJ asked her, but, as the ALJ explained, "Ma'am, I'm going to ask the questions, and you please try to keep your answers focused [on] that specific question. Again, your counsel will get to the other thing. I'm trying to make sure that I have the record straight, then I can give the mike to your counsel." (R. 59-60). Indeed, McCloud was able to elaborate on her condition after the ALJ received answers to his questions, (see R. 63), and counsel for McCloud was able to question McCloud at length to fully flesh out her condition and complete the record, (see R. 63-77). At no point throughout the hearing, did the ALJ express an explicit bias against McCloud. (See R. 50-85). McCloud infers bias from the ALJ's interruptions but such does not rise to an abuse of discretion. See Litecky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555-56, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1157, 127 L. Ed. 2d 474 (1994) ("[J]udicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge. They may do so if they reveal an opinion that derives from an extrajudicial source; and they will do so if they reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible. . . . Not establishing bias or partiality, however, are expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger, that are within the bounds of what imperfect men and women, even after having been confirmed as federal judges, sometimes display. A judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom administration-even a stern and short-tempered judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom administration-remain immune."). In sum, the ALJ did not abuse his discretion.
For these reasons, the Court
In Claim 4, McCloud asserts that, because the ALJ assigned little weight to Drs. Chittom's and Freij's opinions, and failed to assign weight to the opinions of the state agency single decision maker ("SDM"), Suzanne Manley, in violation of SSR 96-6p and 96-8, the ALJ's RFC "was not rooted in the record." (Doc. 18, at 8). McCloud, also, argues the ALJ "did not consider the combined impact of physical and psychological impairments." (Doc. 18, at 19).
Preliminarily, SSR 96-6p pertains to state agency medical and psychological consultants and not to SDMs. See SSR 96-6p ("At the [ALJ] and Appeals Council levels, RFC assessments by State agency medical or psychological consultants or other program physicians or psychologists are to be considered and addressed in the decision as medical opinions from nonexamining sources about what the individual can still do despite his or her impairment(s)."); Siverio v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 461 F. App'x 869, 871 (11th Cir. 2012) ("[T]he `SDM' designation connotes no medical credentials. See [20 C.F.R.] § 404.906(a), (b)(2). Indeed, the SSA's Program Operations Manual System ("POMS") explicitly distinguishes RFC assessments produced by an SDM from those produced by a medical consultant, and states that `SDM-completed forms are not opinions evidence at the appeals level.'" (citation omitted)).
The Court construes McCloud's remaining arguments to assert (1) the ALJ is required to adopt at least one medical opinion in formulating an RFC, and (2) the ALJ did not sufficiently show her work in formulating McCloud's RFC.
The Court rejects both assertions. While the Social Security regulations require ALJs to consider all medical opinions in the record when making a disability determination, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(b) & 416.927(b), "[n]othing in the regulations requires the ALJ to accept at least one medical opinion before rendering a decision—indeed, an ALJ may make a disability determination without any medical opinion in the record." Hale v. Colvin, Civil Action No. 14-00222-CG-N, 2015 WL 3397939, at *11 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 24, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, 2015 WL 3397628 (S.D. Ala. May 26, 2015); see also Packer v. Astrue, Civil Action No. 11-0084-CG-N, 2013 WL 593497, at *3 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 14, 2013) (Granade, J.) ("[T]he ALJ is not precluded from making a proper RFC determination in the absence of an opinion from an acceptable medical source." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)), aff'd, Packer v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 542 F. App'x 890 (11th Cir. Oct. 29, 2013) (per curiam); Chapo v. Astrue, 682 F.3d 1285, 1288 (10th Cir. 2012) ("[T]here is no requirement in the regulations for a direct correspondence between an RFC finding and a specific medical opinion on the functional capacity in question. The ALJ, not a physician, is charged with determining a claimant's RFC from the medical record." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)(2) & 416.927(a)(2) ("Evidence that you submit or that we obtain
"A clear articulation of both fact and law is essential to our ability to conduct a review that is both limited and meaningful." Owens v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 1511, 1514-15 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); see also Freeman v. Barnhart, 220 F. App'x 957, 959-60 (11th Cir. Mar. 23, 2007) (per curiam) ("The ALJ has a duty to make clear the weight accorded to each item of evidence and the reasons for the decision so that a reviewing court will be able to determine whether the ultimate decision is based on substantial evidence." Cowart v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731, 735 (11th Cir. 1981)). Nevertheless, "there is no rigid requirement that the ALJ specifically refer to every piece of evidence in his decision, so long as the ALJ's decision . . . is not a broad rejection which is not enough to enable the district court . . . to conclude that the ALJ considered her medical condition as a whole." Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). In formulating the RFC at Step Four, the ALJ thoroughly discussed and weighed the evidence of record and drew conclusions from that evidence. Apart from the weight the ALJ assigned the above-mentioned medical opinions and the opinion of the SDM, McCloud points to no evidence the ALJ allegedly incorrectly or insufficiently assessed. Rather, McCloud appears to assert only that the ALJ failed to adequately show his work in applying Social Security Ruling 96-8p. However, both this Circuit and others have repeatedly rejected similar contentions that an ALJ's failure to expressly show his or her work under SSR 96-8p is automatic grounds for reversal. See Freeman, 220 F. App'x at 959-60 ("Freeman contends that the ALJ failed to identify her functional limitations and work-related abilities on a function-by-function basis. . . . While the ALJ could have been more specific and explicit in his findings, he did consider all of the evidence and found that it did not support the level of disability Freeman claimed. Only after he determined that she failed to carry her burden of showing that she had become disabled from performing any of her work-related activities did he state that she could perform light exertional activity. Therefore, the ALJ complied with SSR 96-8p by considering Freeman's functional limitations and restrictions and, only after he found none, proceeded to express her residual functional limitations in terms of exertional levels. Furthermore, the ALJ's analysis of the evidence and statement that Freeman could perform light work indicated how much work-related activity she could perform because `light work requires standing or walking, off and on, for a total of approximately 6 hours of an 8-hour workday.' SSR 83-10."); Castel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 355 F. App'x 260, 263 (11th Cir. Nov. 30, 2009) ("Castel argues that the ALJ reached an RFC determination without going through a function-by-function analysis. Specifically, Castel claims that the ALJ did not perform the function-by-function analysis to determine Castel's ability to handle strength demands. This argument is unfounded. The ALJ made a determination of Castel's RFC at step four of the function-by-function analysis. The ALJ considered two disability examiners' reports, Castel's testimony, and two Disability Determination Services' (`DDS') reports in arriving at Castel's RFC. See SSR 96-8p . . . (advising that the RFC assessment must consider all relevant evidence, including medical history, medical evaluations, daily activities, and lay evidence). The ALJ ultimately decided that Castel was capable of medium exertion level work and thus was capable of performing past relevant work. . . . We do not require the ALJ to `specifically refer to every piece of evidence in his decision,' so long as the decision is sufficient to allow us to conclude that the ALJ considered the claimant's medical condition as a whole. Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). The ALJ found that the medium level work determination was consistent with the medical evidence and found Castel's RFC to be at a medium level of work. The ALJ performed a proper RFC function analysis, based on substantial evidence, and we shall defer to his conclusions."); Carson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 440 F. App'x 863, 864 (11th Cir. Sept. 21, 2011) (per curiam) ("Following [SSR 96-8p's `function-by-function'] rubric, the ALJ fully discussed and evaluated the medical evidence, Mr. Carson's testimony, and the effect each impairment has on his daily activities. While, the ALJ did not specifically refer to Mr. Carson's ability to walk or stand, the ALJ did limit Mr. Carson's exertional level of work to `light work.' `Light work' by definition limits the amount an individual can walk or stand for approximately six hours in an eight-hour work day. See SSR 83-10, 1983 WL 31251 (S.S.A.). Furthermore, the ALJ's thorough evaluation of Mr. Carson's case led the ALJ to adopt additional limitations to Mr. Carson's ability to perform light work. Simply because the ALJ chose not to adopt further limitations on Mr. Carson's ability to walk or stand, does not mean the ALJ did not properly consider the alleged limitations."); Cichocki v. Astrue, 729 F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 2013) ("Where an ALJ's analysis at Step Four regarding a claimant's functional limitations and restrictions affords an adequate basis for meaningful judicial review, applies the proper legal standards, and is supported by substantial evidence such that additional analysis would be unnecessary or superfluous, we agree with our sister Circuits that remand is not necessary merely because an explicit function-by-function analysis was not performed." Zatz v. Astrue, 346 F. App'x 107, 111 (7th Cir. Oct. 5, 2009) (per curiam); Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005); Depover v. Barnhart, 349 F.3d 563, 567-68 (8th Cir. 2003); Delgado v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 30 F. App'x 542, 547 (6th Cir. Mar. 4, 2002) (per curiam)); Chavez v. Astrue, 276 F. App'x 627, 627-28 (9th Cir. May 1, 2008) (per curiam) ("Chavez claims that the ALJ committed legal error by determining his mental residual functional capacity without performing a function-by-function assessment as required by Social Security Ruling 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *3 (July 2, 1996). This claim fails because the ALJ considered and noted `all of the relevant evidence' bearing on Chavez's `ability to do work-related activities,' as required by the function-by-function analysis. See Soc. Sec. Ruling 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *3."); Hendron v. Colvin, 767 F.3d 951, 956-57 (10th Cir. 2014) (rejecting claimant's contention that the ALJ's "RFC is not in the proper form" because the ALJ did not "separately discuss and make findings regarding her abilities to sit, stand, walk, lift, carry, push, or pull" (citing Keyes-Zachary v. Astrue, 695 F.3d 1156, 1166 (10th Cir. 2012) ("Where, as here, we can follow the adjudicator's reasoning in conducting our review, and can determine that correct legal standards have been applied, merely technical omissions in the ALJ's reasoning do not dictate reversal. In conducting our review, we should, indeed must, exercise common sense. . . . [W]e cannot insist on technical perfection."))).
Accordingly, the Court
In accordance with the foregoing analysis, it is
Final judgment shall issue separately in accordance with this Order and Rule 58, FED. R. CIV. P.