KATHERINE P. NELSON, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff, an Alabama prison inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72(a)(2)(R), and is now before the undersigned on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 23). After careful review of the pleadings, and for the reasons set out below, it is ordered that the motion be
Plaintiff Maurice Gladys brings this suit against Officer Vincent Norman with claims of retaliation and excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment. In his complaint, Gladys alleges that while housed at Holman Correctional Facility, on February 6, 2016,
According to Gladys, on February 6, 2016, he was involved in minor and quickly ended altercation with another inmate. (Id. at 4). Following the incident, Sergeant Christopher Earl ordered Gladys be taken to the infirmary to receive a body chart. (Id.). Defendant Vincent Norman and Officer Chris Quarles escorted Gladys to the infirmary, and it is during this escort that Gladys alleges Defendant Norman used excessive force against him in retaliation for the "longstanding beef" between the two men. (Id. at 4-5).
Gladys submits that inmates taken to the infirmary "must be handcuffed in the front," but that on this escort, Defendant Norman attempted to handcuff Gladys to the rear by screaming, "hands behind your back motherfucker". (Id. at 5). Gladys claims that as he questioned Defendant Norman regarding the words he used and the necessity of being cuffed behind the back, and Defendant Norman responded, "shut up bitch" and went "into a rage," using further profanity. (Id.). Defendant Norman radioed for the population gate to be closed and then turned toward Gladys with a pocketknife or box cutter in his hand. (Id.). Gladys claims Officer Quarles, who had been attempting to secure handcuffs on Gladys' left hand, released him and Defendant Norman "picked the Plaintiff up in the air and slammed the Plaintiff face down to the floor, stomping the plaintiff in the back of the head, and neck area," and at some point during the incident, Defendant Norman cut Gladys with the blade he was holding in his hand. (Id.). According to Gladys, additional officers arrived at the scene and witnessed the force used by Defendant Norman, and the responding officers restrained Defendant Norman, and Gladys was taken to the infirmary where he received a body chart. (Id.). Gladys claims he suffered pain from the assault as well as a cut on his neck and a "close black eye." (Id.).
Gladys brings this suit against Defendant Norman, in his individual capacity and seeks a jury trial and relief in the amount of $150,000.00 in the form of punitive, compensatory, and mental damages. (Id. at 7).
Defendant Norman has answered the suit, denied all allegations against him, and further asserted the defenses of absolute and qualified immunity.
In analyzing the propriety of a motion for summary judgment, the Court begins with these basic principles. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure grant this Court authority under Rule 56 to render "judgment as a matter of law" to a party who moves for summary judgment. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that "[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The party moving for summary judgment bears the "initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for [their] motion, and identifying those portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which [they] believe[] demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991) (bracketed text added) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986)). If the moving party does not have the burden of proof at trial, they may show that "there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." United States v. Four Parcels of Real Property, 941 F.2d 1428, 1437 (11th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). Alternatively, the moving party may support its "motion for summary judgment with affirmative evidence demonstrating that the nonmoving party will be unable to prove its case at trial." Id. If the moving party meets this burden, the non-movant, as the party bearing the burden of proof at trial, must set forth specific facts, supported by citation to the evidence, to support the elements of the case at trial, and therefore, establish that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986).
Overall, the Court must "resolve all issues of material fact in favor of the [non-movant], and then determine the legal question of whether the [movant] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law under that version of the facts." McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1288 (11th Cir. 2004) citing Durruthy v. Pastor, 351 F.3d 1080, 1084 (11th Cir. 2003). "[A]ll reasonable doubts about the facts and all justifiable inferences are resolved in favor of the non-movant." Citizens Trust Bank v. Lett, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90849, 2015 WL 4254561, at *1 (N.D.Ala. 2015). The Court is obligated to construe the record, including all evidence and factual inferences, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Skop v. City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130, 1136 (11th Cir. 2007).
However, the mere existence of any factual dispute will not automatically necessitate denial of a motion for summary judgment; rather, only factual disputes that are material preclude entry of summary judgment. Lofton v. Secretary of Dept. of Children and Family Services, 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11th Cir. 2004). "An issue of fact is material if it is a legal element of the claim under the applicable substantive law which might affect the outcome of the case. It is genuine if the record taken as a whole could lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party." Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 594 F.3d 798, 807 (11th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). A genuine dispute of material fact exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Allen v. Bd. of Public Education for Bibb County, 495 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2007).
"In order for a plaintiff to establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he must prove (1) a violation of a constitutional right, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law." Martinez v. Burns, 459 Fed.Appx. 849, 850-851 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Holmes v. Crosby, 418 F.3d 1256, 1258 (11th Cir. 2005)). The parties do not dispute that Defendant, as a correctional officer for the State of Alabama was acting under color of law.
"The Eighth Amendment, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, governs the conditions under which convicted prisoners are confined and the treatment they receive while in prison." Id. (citing Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1242 (11th Cir. 2003); Bass v. Perrin, 170 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 1999)). The Amendment states that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. Const. amend. VIII. "`[T]he unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain . . . constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.'" Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 89 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1986) (some internal quotation marks omitted). "Among `unnecessary and wanton' inflictions of pain are those that are `totally without penological justification.'" Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 2399, 69 L. Ed. 2d 59 (1981); Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S.Ct. 995, 998, 503 U.S. 1, 5, 117 L. Ed. 2d 156 (1992) (`[T]he unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain . . . constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.'") (citations omitted). "Therefore, the "Eighth Amendment prohibits prison officers from using excessive force against prisoners." Pearson v. Taylor, 665 F. App'x 858, 863 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d at 1303-04). Thus, "[t]he `core judicial inquiry' for an excessive-force claim is `whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.'" Id. (quoting Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37, 130 S.Ct. 1175, 175 L. Ed. 2d 995 (2010) (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7).
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has "identified five factors to help evaluate whether force was applied maliciously or sadistically." Id. (citing Danley v. Allen, 540 F.3d 1298, 1307 (11th Cir. 2008), overruled on other grounds as recognized by Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 709 (11th Cir. 2010)): "(1) the need for force; (2) the relationship between that need and the amount of force used; (3) the extent of the resulting injury; (4) the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably perceived by the responsible official on the basis of facts known to that official; and (5) any efforts made to temper the severity of the use of force."
Defendant Norman declares:
(Doc. 20-1 at 2). Officer Quarles corroborates the facts laid out by Defendant but articulates that Gladys was being escorted to the shift office after fighting with another inmate.
Similarly, responding officer Nathan McQuirter declares by affidavit that on February 6, 2016, he heard Gladys yelling and cussing down the hall and witnessed Gladys' refusal to be handcuffed and further observed Defendant Norman and Gladys "standing up tussling." (Doc. 20-3 at 1). Officer McQuirter asserts that he ran to assist Defendant Norman and Officer Quarles in placing Gladys on the ground and securing handcuffs on him. (Id. at 2). Likewise, Officer Gary Scarbrough
After the use of force, a formal Incident Report was prepared at the prison. It states that on February 6, 2016, at approximately 4:45 p.m.,
(Doc. 21-3 at 5). Additionally, the Duty Officer Report drafted by Defendant Norman following the incident details and provides the same facts contained in the Incident Report. (See Doc. 21-3 at 6).
Subsequent to the incident, Captain Darryl Fails conducted an investigation into the force used against Gladys. The unsigned Use of Force Investigative Report states:
(Doc. 21-3 at 7). The investigating officer concluded the force used by Officer Norman was "justified" to prevent further assault against him and was "minimal" in nature. (Id.). Furthermore, it was opined that the scratch on the left side of Gladys neck was "possibly" received while being restrained. (Id.).
The Disciplinary Report regarding the incident reveals that Gladys was charged with assaulting Defendant Norman, on February 6, 2016, at 4:45 p.m., in the Main Hall, but Gladys was found not guilty of the charges based on a procedural violation (that the disciplinary was not served within the proper time frame). (Doc. 21-3 at 2-3).
The body chart Gladys received on February 6, 2016, indicated that Gladys suffered a scratch to the left side of his neck and a bleeding left nostril. (Doc. 21-3 at 9). The medical record further indicates that Gladys reported to the examining nurse, "Officer Norman stomped me in my face." (Id.).
The record before the court also includes four photographs that were submitted for the court's review. The photographs depict different views of Gladys' body: (1) a frontal view of Gladys' face (primarily the left side), (2) a rear view of Gladys' upper back, neck, and head, (3) a profile view of the right side of Gladys' face and neck, and (4) the left side of Gladys' neck. (Doc. 21-3 at 10-13).
As the moving party, Defendant bears the initial burden on summary judgment of "identifying those portions of `the pleadings, . . . admissions on file, together with the affidavits, . . . which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. In support of his motion for summary judgment, Defendant Norman has presented evidence both that: 1) Gladys swung at him after refusing to be handcuffed (Doc. 20-1) and 2) Gladys swung at him after refusing to report to his assigned dorm (Doc. 21-3 at 5, 6).
Once the moving party has satisfied its responsibility, the burden shifts to the non-movant, Gladys to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Stabler v. Fla. Van Lines, Inc., Civ. A. No. 11-0103-WS-N, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1637, 2012 WL 32660, at *5 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 6, 2012) (citing Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991)).
Id. Additionally, "[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor. Id. at 254 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-159 (1970)).
Plaintiff reaffirms the allegations of his complaint in an unsworn statement that is self-styled as an affidavit.
In considering this motion for summary judgment, the undersigned has reviewed the record and concludes that based on the specific facts there was a need for force to be used. The record evidences that Gladys' behavior ranged somewhere between noncompliant and violent. Gladys admits in his pleadings that he "questioned the Defendant of the words used and the behind the back handcuffing." (Doc. 10 at 5). "Strict adherence to rules and orders within a penal institution's walls are necessary for discipline, and even more importantly, for the safety and security of inmates, guards, and visitors alike." West v. Sconyers, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123573, 2010 WL 4822084, *7 (M.D. Ala. 2010) (unpublished). An inmate "is not at liberty to ignore or disobey, without consequence, the lawful orders of his custodians or the rules and regulations of a jail." Id. Moreover, Defendant Norman claims, and Gladys fails to dispute, that Gladys also attempted to punch Defendant Norman. Consequently, either act of defiance permits the use of some force; however, "government officials may not use gratuitous force against a prisoner who has been already subdued or . . . incapacitated." Skrtich v. Thornton, 280 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). However, "[t]he use of force must stop when the need for it to maintain or restore discipline no longer exists." Id. at 1304 (citations omitted).
Defendant Norman insists, and witnessing officers confirm, that Defendant Norman used only the minimum amount of force necessary to gain control of Plaintiff Gladys and the situation. Gladys, however, disputes this claim and alleges Defendant Norman cut him with some type of blade, slammed him into the floor, and stomped him in the back, neck, and face while he was lying on the ground. Both parties rely on the medical records and photographs to support their claims; however, these objective records fail to solidly support either parties' version of the events.
The medical records reflect that Gladys did suffer a bloody nose and cut to the neck, as alleged in the complaint. These injuries, however, could have been sustained during the struggle to restrain Gladys as argued by Defendant Norman. The photographic evidence also fails to provide a definitive answer. The scanned photographs are of such poor quality that it is difficult to discern the extent of the alleged injuries. Indeed, it is plausible that upon review of the photographs that a reasonable juror could observe that Gladys received a black eye from the incident from the darker coloration under Plaintiff's left eye in the photograph; whereas, another juror may just as easily detect only shadows and bad angled photography. (See Doc. 21-3 at 10)
Consequently, the movant, Defendant Norman, has failed to carry his burden of showing that there is an absence of evidence to support Gladys' case. Interpreting the evidence and drawing all justifiable inferences in favor of the nonmovant, Gladys, there remains a question of fact as to whether or not the force was applied maliciously or sadistically to cause harm as he alleges. Specifically, it is unclear from the record before the court the relationship between the need and amount of force used and the extent of the resulting injury. The record taken as a whole could lead a rationale trier of fact to find for Gladys. As such, summary judgment on this claim should be denied at this time.
In his complaint, Gladys further alleges a claim of retaliation against Defendant Norman. Gladys alleges that there was "longstanding beef" between the two, which caused Defendant Norman to use excessive force against him on February 6, 2016. (Doc. 10 at 4). Gladys claims Defendant Norman previously "threatened [him] with bodily harm." (Id.).
Defendant Norman denies the retaliation allegations and further submits that prior to the incident subject of this compliant, he "did not know inmate Gladys, other than the fact that he appeared to spend a lot of time in and out of lock-up." (Doc. 20-1 at 2).
Flynn v. Scott, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28280, at *14-16, 2006 WL 1236718 at *5-6 (M.D. Ala. May 8, 2006) (citations omitted). A prisoner "must allege facts showing that the allegedly retaliatory conduct would not have occurred but for the retaliatory motive." Hempstead v. Carter, 2006 WL 2092383, *5-6 (N.D. Fla. 2006) (emphasis added) (citing Jackson v. Fair, 846 F.2d 811, 820 (1st Cir. 1988)). "[A] causal connection may be alleged by a chronology of events that create a plausible inference of retaliation. Id. (citing Cain v. Lane, 857 F.2d 1139, 1143 n. 6 (7th Cir. 1988)). However, "[t]he relevant showing . . . must be more than the prisoner's `personal belief that he is the victim of retaliation.'" Id. (citing Johnson v. Rodriguez, 110 F.3d 299, 310 (5th Cir. 1997)). The prisoner must present with more than "general attacks" upon a defendant's motivations and must produce "affirmative evidence" of retaliation from which a jury could find that plaintiff had carried his burden of proving the requisite motive. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 600 (1998) (citations omitted). While a plaintiff may not be held to a heightened burden of proof, see id. at 580-86 (holding that in retaliation claim prisoner could not be required to show "clear and convincing" evidence of defendant's unconstitutional motives), courts should approach prisoner claims of retaliation "with skepticism and particular care" due to the "near inevitability" that prisoners will take exception with the decisions of prison officials and "the ease with which claims of retaliation may be fabricated." Dawes v. Walker, 239 F.3d 489, 491 (2nd Cir. 2001), overruled in part on other grounds by Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
Gladys provides no facts to the Court evidencing a prior relationship with Defendant Norman, nor does he articulate any actual threat ever made against him by Defendant Norman. Gladys has also failed to show or even allege a causal connection between any past event and the February 6, 2016 incident. Defendant Norman, on the other hand, provides a legitimate reason for the force used against Gladys. As such, the record is completely void of evidence supporting a claim of retaliation, and Gladys has failed to carry his burden of establishing such a claim. For this reason, the undersigned determines that summary judgment should be granted in favor of Defendant Norman on this claim.
Plaintiff Maurice Gladys has failed to show an Eighth Amendment constitutional violation on the part of Defendant Vincent Norman for retaliation against him. Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that summary judgment should be
Additionally, the undersigned concludes there remain issues of material fact regarding the Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment constitutional claim of excessive force. Accordingly, it is recommended that Defendant Norman is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this claim. Therefore, it is recommended that Defendant Norman's motion for summary judgment, as to the excessive force claim, be
It is further recommended that an evidentiary hearing be scheduled to address this claim.
The instructions below contain important information regarding objections to the report and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.
A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything in it must, within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this document, file specific written objections with the Clerk of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED.R.CIV.P. 72(b); S.D. ALA. L.R. 72(c). The parties should note that under Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, "[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge's findings or recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice." 11th Cir. R. 3-1. In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the Magistrate Judge is not specific.
In an Eighth Amendment excessive force case, "`the subjective element required to establish [the constitutional violation] is so extreme that every conceivable set of circumstances in which this constitutional violation occurs is clearly established to be a violation of the Constitution." Bowden v. Stokely, 576 F. App'x 951, 954-955 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Johnson v. Breeden, 280 F.3d 1308, 1321-22 (11th Cir.2002)). Therefore, if Gladys is able to establish his claim as laid out in his complaint, Defendant Norman cannot avail himself of the protection of qualified immunity from this action.
The documents compiled subsequent to the incident indicate that Defendant Norman ordered inmates to report to their dorms, but Gladys refused the order and attempted to strike Officer Norman. (See Doc. 21-3 at 5, 6). Defendant Norman now claims that he and Officer Quarles were escorting Gladys to the shift office after another officer asked that Gladys be removed from his dorm—a version which corresponds to the allegations of this suit. (Doc. 20-1 at 2). Additionally, Officers Quarles and Scarbrough affirm that Gladys was removed from his dorm for fighting with another inmate, which also corresponds to Plaintiff's claims. (Docs. 21-1).
