KATHERINE P. NELSON, Magistrate Judge.
This action is before the Court on the "Motion to Stay Discovery and Quash Relator's Subpoena Duces Tecum to Lou Paravate" (Doc. 182) filed by Defendant Castle Medical, LLC ("Castle"). The Court has referred the motion to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for appropriate action under 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)-(b), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72, and S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(a). See S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(b); (8/3/2017 & 4/16/2018 electronic referral). Relator Lori L. Carver has filed a response (Doc. 185) to the motion, Castle has filed a reply (Doc. 187) to the response, and the motion is now under submission (see Doc. 183).
On October 27, 2017, the Court granted judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) in favor of Castle on all claims against it in Carver's second amended complaint. (See Doc. 146). However, on April 3, 2018, the Court, over Castle's opposition, vacated that grant of judgment on the pleadings and granted Carver leave to file a third amended complaint. (See Doc. 175). Castle's subject motion requests that discovery in this action be stayed until the Court has ruled on Castle's Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the third amended complaint (Doc. 184). In response, Carver believes that she should be entitled to engage in discovery just as if no motion to stay had been filed," but alternatively asserts she is willing "to pursue only the taking of Mr. Paravate's deposition and to pursue any responsive documents that her lawyers believe have not yet been produced" to discovery responses served prior to the previous grant of judgment on the pleadings. (Doc. 185 at 1). In reply, Castle continues to insist for a stay of all discovery pending a ruling on its Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
The Court has wide discretion in setting discovery limits. See, e.g., Liese v. Indian River Cty. Hosp. Dist., 701 F.3d 334, 354 (11th Cir. 2012). Previously, the undersigned denied Castle's motion to stay discovery pending the Court's ruling on its motion for judgment on the pleadings, concluding that Castle had unreasonably delayed in both filing its Rule 12(c) motion and requesting a stay of discovery, and had failed to show at the time that its Rule 12(c) motion was so clearly meritorious as to warrant a stay of discovery pending disposition of the motion. (See Doc. 139).
Unlike when Castle previously attempted to short-circuit discovery after voluntarily allowing it to commence and significantly proceed, discovery between Castle and Carver has been at a standstill for over five months between the grant of judgment on the pleadings and the filing of the third amended complaint. This will likely necessitate amending the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b) schedule; indeed, Carver has indicated her intent to file a motion to do so. (See Doc. 106; Doc. 185 at 1 n.1). Moreover, this time Castle has promptly sought dismissal of the operative complaint under Rule 12.
Carver has already received a second chance to plead her claims against Castle after choosing to defend, unsuccessfully, the sufficiency of her allegations in the second amended complaint on the merits, rather than attempting to amend her complaint prior to dismissal under Rule 15(a)(2) to address the deficiencies noted in Castle's Rule 12(c) motion with the discovery she had already received (as she has apparently done in her third amended complaint). Generally, "[d]iscovery should follow the filing of a well-pleaded complaint. It is not a device to enable a plaintiff to make a case when his complaint has failed to state a claim." Kaylor v. Fields, 661 F.2d 1177, 1184 (8th Cir. 1981) (quoted favorably in Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1367 (11th Cir. 1997)). Given that Castle successfully obtained dismissal of Carver's second amended complaint for failure to adequately plead its claims, and given the significant amount of time discovery between Castle and Carver has been at a stand-still since the third amended complaint was filed — a delay which will likely require extending discovery and related deadlines anyway — the undersigned concludes that Castle should be given the chance to obtain dismissal once more before being subjected to further discovery in this action, and that Carver will not be significantly prejudiced by any such delay.
Accordingly, it is