P. BRADLEY MURRAY, Magistrate Judge.
This cause is before the Magistrate Judge for issuance of a report and recommendation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(a)(2)(S), on Defendant State of Alabama's motion to dismiss (Doc. 20) and Plaintiff's response in opposition (Doc. 24).
In his amended complaint filed January 18, 2018 (Doc. 4), the operative pleading in this case, see, e.g., Rosa v. Florida Dep't of Corrections, 522 Fed.Appx. 710, 714 (11th Cir. Jun. 26, 2013) ("Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, `an amended complaint supersedes the initial complaint and becomes the operative pleading in the case.'" (quoting Krinsk v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., 654 F.3d 1194, 1202 (11th Cir. 2011)), Plaintiff briefly sets forth six or seven instances of bullying, harassment or abuse he allegedly suffered while attending various public schools in Mobile County from approximately 1993 through 2001. (Doc. 4, at 2-3). And though Plaintiff averred in the amended complaint that most of his claims arise under 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, with two arising under 20 U.S.C. § 1703 (see id.), the undersigned has construed the majority of Plaintiff's claims as arising under 42 U.S.C. § 2000c, which prohibits discrimination in public schools, as opposed to § 2000a (Doc. 5, at 1 n.1). Plaintiff seeks the following relief from Defendants the State of Alabama and the Mobile County Public School System in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-8: "$3,000,000.00 for the psychological and physical damages endured during my time in attendance with the Mobile County Public School System from the years 1996-2001." (Doc. 4, at 4.)
The State of Alabama filed its motion to dismiss on March 26, 2018 where it asserts that Plaintiff's complaint is due to be dismissed, in accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim against it upon which relief can be granted. (See Doc. 20, at 1.) The State of Alabama also argues that it is immune from any federal or state claims asserted by Fick (see id. at 2). The State of Alabama then reasserts its more general assertion that this Court should dismiss the claims asserted against it because the complaint "is nothing more than a recitation of events that allegedly occurred while Plaintiff was enrolled in the Mobile County School System,
In his opposition in response, Fick contests the State's reliance on the Eleventh Amendment for dismissal of his complaint given the contents of the Fourteenth Amendment, particularly the guarantee of equal protection of the laws, and it being clear, according to Plaintiff, that Alabama's "`Model Anti-Harassment Policy' did not, and still does not, protect students from harassment due to sexual-orientation." (Doc. 24, at 1-2.) The Plaintiff then proceeds to clarify his claims as follows:
(Id. at 2-3.)
Post Twombly, "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the `grounds' of his `entitlement to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]" Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. at 1965. The Court made clear that to satisfy the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P 8(a) "something beyond the mere possibility [of an entitlement to relief] must be alleged, lest a plaintiff with a largely groundless claim be allowed to take up the time of a number of other people[.]" Id. at 557-58, 127 S.Ct. at 1966 (internal quotation marks omitted; citations omitted). "This necessarily requires that a plaintiff include factual allegations for each essential element of his or her claim." GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1254 (11th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1088, 133 S.Ct. 856, 184 L.Ed.2d 656 (2013).
The Court directed that "when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief, this deficiency should be exposed at the point of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the court." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558, 127 S.Ct. at 1966 (internal quotations marks and ellipses omitted; citations omitted). "It is no answer to say that a claim just shy of a plausible entitlement to relief can, if groundless, be weeded out early in the discovery process[.]" Id. at 559, 127 S.Ct. at 1967. "[T]he threat of discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases . . . [;]it is only by taking care to require allegations that reach the level [of showing a plausible entitlement to relief] that we can hope to avoid the potentially enormous expense of discovery[.]" Id.
The Eleventh Circuit has likewise emphasized the importance of only allowing plausible claims to proceed beyond the pleading stage: "Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and 12(b)(6) together establish a notice-pleading standard that is applied, in a context-specific manner, with the recognition that the imposition of litigation costs must be justified at the threshold by the presence of factual allegations making relief under the governing law plausible, not merely speculative." ABB Turbo Sys. AG v. Turbousa, Inc. 774 F.3d 979, 984 (11th Cir. 2014); see Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1367 & 1367-68 (11th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that "[d]iscovery imposes several costs on the litigant from whom discovery is sought[]" and "discovery imposes burdens on the judicial system; scarce judicial resources must be diverted from other cases to resolve discovery disputes."); Fed.R.Civ.P. 1 (recognizing that the Rules of Civil Procedure "should be construed, administered, and employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.").
In Iqbal, the Supreme Court gave additional definition to the Rule 8(a) analysis framed in Twombly. The Court explained that under Twombly, "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (internal citations omitted). "While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations." Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. at 1950. Courts do not "`accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation[.]'" Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1950 (citation omitted); see also id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 ("[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions[.]").
The Iqbal Court made clear that "[t]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces . . . demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers `labels and conclusions' or `a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.' Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders `naked assertion[s]' devoid of `further factual enhancement.'" Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (internal citations omitted). Consequently, "where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged — but it has not `shown' — `that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. at 1950 (brackets and citation omitted). Therefore, dismissal of a factually insufficient complaint is required because "Rule 8 . . . does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions." Id. at 678-79, 129 S.Ct. at 1950.
In American Dental Ass'n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2010), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals distilled the Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard into a functional "two-prong approach" for the evaluation of the sufficiency of a plaintiff's pled allegations: "1) eliminate any allegations in the complaint that are merely legal conclusions; and 2) where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, `assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.'" Id. at 1290 (citation omitted). The Eleventh Circuit also explained: "Importantly, the Court held in Iqbal, as it had in Twombly, that courts may infer from the factual allegations in the complaint `obvious alternative explanation[s],' which suggest lawful conduct rather than the unlawful conduct the plaintiff would ask the court to infer." Id. (citation omitted).
Additionally, it is well-established that dismissal is required when the factual averments in a complaint affirmatively foreclose the existence of a plausible entitlement to relief. See, e.g., Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958, 971 (11th Cir. 2016) ("A plaintiff nonetheless can plead himself out of court by alleging facts that foreclose a finding of diligence or extraordinary circumstances, both of which are required for equitable tolling."), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 137 S.Ct. 2292, 198 L.Ed.2d 724 (2017); Best Canvas Prods. & Supplies, Inc. v. Ploof Truck Lines, Inc., 713 F.2d 618, 621 (11th Cir. 1983) ("[A] party is bound by the admissions in his pleadings."). "[A] plaintiff can plead himself out of court. If he alleges facts that show he isn't entitled to a judgment, he's out of luck." Early v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 959 F.2d 75, 79 (7th Cir. 1992) (internal citations omitted).
Here, the State of Alabama contends that: (1) "[n]either [it] nor Congress has waived Eleventh Amendment immunity under § 1983[;]" (Doc. 20, at 2, citing Carr v. City of Florence, 916 F.2d 1521, 1524-25 (11th Cir. 1990)); (2) "the Alabama Constitution bars any waiver of immunity granted to it by the Eleventh Amendment[;]" (id., citing Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978)); and (3) "claims under § 1983 do not allow claims against a state because [a state] do[es] not qualify as a `person' under § 1983." (Id., citing Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 26 (1991)). As a result, the movant contends that it is immune from suit. (Id.)
In asserting that it is protected by the Eleventh Amendment's grant of immunity for claims seeking monetary damages, the State of Alabama relies solely on case law arising in the context of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See Doc. 20, at 2.) More specifically, the movant cites to no case law establishing that it is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity based upon claims asserted and arising under either 20 U.S.C. § 1703 or 42 U.S.C. § 2000c (see id.), and, indeed, what little case law exists seems to suggest that the State of Alabama may not be entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity for Plaintiff's claims under 20 U.S.C. § 1703 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000c, compare Board of Public Educ. for City of Savannah and County of Chatham v. State of Georgia, 1990 WL 608208, *6 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 24, 1990) (finding that plaintiffs could "proceed against the state and its agencies under two statutes in which Congress has abrogated the states' immunity, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000d et seq. [] (`Title VI'); and the Equal Educational Opportunities Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et seq.. . . ." (footnote omitted)) with Gomez v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 811 F.2d 1030, 1037 & 1038 (7th Cir. 1987) (determining, with reference to the EEOA, that "Congress abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity to the extent necessary to effectuate the purposes of the Act[]" but also indicating that though there was nothing to suggest that Congress abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity with the passage of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court could not decide the issue since there was nothing before it establishing whether or not the State of Illinois waived its immunity for purposes of Title VI). Accordingly, since the State of Alabama, as the movant, has the burden of establishing its entitlement to a dismissal of Plaintiff's claims on Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity grounds and has not cited to controlling authority in support, its motion to dismiss on the basis of Eleventh Amendment immunity should be
In addition, 20 U.S.C. § 1703 prohibits the denial of equal educational opportunity to individuals based upon their race, color, sex or national origin and, in particular as to students, the EEOA prohibits the deliberate segregation of students on the basis of race, color, or national origin, 20 U.S.C. § 1703(a). The § 1703 claims in Plaintiff's amended complaint (Doc. 4, at 2-3) simply contain allegations regarding bullying or sexual harassment Fick endured from other students and the reactions of faculty and administrative staff to the actions of his fellow students but no allegations suggesting that he was
As for Plaintiff's § 2000c claims (compare Doc. 4, at 2-3 with Doc. 5, at 1 n.1 (notifying the parties that the undersigned was construing the majority of Plaintiff's claims as arising under 42 U.S.C. § 2000c)), though it is clear that § 2000c prohibits discrimination in public schools, see, e.g., Brewer v. Nelson, 2015 WL 7076028, *3 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 6, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, 2015 WL 7015320 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 12, 2015), particularly segregation in public schools, compare Hopson v. Berry, 2012 WL 6115395, *3 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 10, 2012) (recognizing that § 2000c of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 "deals with the desegregation of public schools") with Gilmore v. Amityville Union Free School District, 305 F.Supp.2d 271, 279 (E.D. N.Y. 2004) (recognizing that "2000c-8 was enacted to remedy the problem of segregation in public schools"), those claims contain no allegations that he was subject to discrimination or segregation on account of his race, color, religion, sex or national origin. Therefore, Fick has no plausible claim against the State of Alabama under 42 U.S.C. § 2000c.
For these reasons, Plaintiff's Complaint does not state a claim for relief against the State of Alabama and is properly
Based upon the foregoing, it is
A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything in it must, within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this document, file specific written objections with the Clerk of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED.R.CIV.P. 72(b); S.D.ALA. GenLR 72(c). The parties should note that under Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, "[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge's findings or recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice." 11th Cir. R. 3-1. In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the Magistrate Judge is not specific.
