MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

P. BRADLEY MURRAY, Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff Carlynda Dickinson brings this action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1383(c)(3), seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her claim for supplemental security income. The parties have consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Magistrate Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), for all proceedings in this Court. (Doc. 21 ("In accordance with provisions of 28 U.S.C. §636(c) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 73, the parties in this case consent to have a United States magistrate judge conduct any and all proceedings in this case, . . . order the entry of a final judgment, and conduct all post-judgment proceedings."); see also Doc. 23 (endorsed order of reference)). Upon consideration of the administrative record, Plaintiff's brief, and the Commissioner's brief,1 the Court concludes that the Commissioner's decision denying benefits should be reversed and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this decision.2

I. Procedural Background

Plaintiff protectively filed an application for supplemental security income on January 9, 2015, alleging disability beginning on December 17, 2014. (Compare Tr. 167-72 with Tr. 15.) Dickinson's claim was initially denied on April 2, 2015 (Tr. 93 & 97-100) and, following Plaintiff's April 23, 2015 written request for a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") (see Tr. 101-04), a hearing was conducted before an ALJ on August 15, 2016 (Tr. 39-78). On November 21, 2016, the ALJ issued a decision finding that the claimant was not disabled and, therefore, not entitled to supplemental security income. (Tr. 15-34.) More specifically, the ALJ proceeded to the fifth step of the five-step sequential evaluation process and determined that Dickinson retains the residual functional capacity to perform those light jobs identified by the vocational expert ("VE") during the administrative hearing (compare id. at 33 with Tr. 72-73). And, after the Plaintiff appealed the ALJ's unfavorable decision to the Appeals Council, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review on September 15, 2017 (Tr. 1-3). Thus, the hearing decision became the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security.

Plaintiff alleges disability due to peripheral neuropathy, low back pain, knee pain, calluses on her feet, depression and anxiety, intellectual disability, and obesity. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) made the following relevant findings:

(Tr. 17, 22, 32 & 33 (emphasis in original)).

II. Standard of Review and Claims on Appeal

A claimant is entitled to an award of supplemental security income benefits when she is unable to engage in substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.905(a) (2016). In determining whether a claimant has met her burden of proving disability, the Commissioner follows a five-step sequential evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. At step one, if a claimant is performing substantial gainful activity, she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b). At the second step, if a claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that significantly limits her physical or mental ability to do basic work activities (that is, a severe impairment), she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). At step three, if a claimant proves that her impairments meet or medically equal one of the listed impairments set forth in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of Part 404, the claimant will be considered disabled without consideration of age, education and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d). At the fourth step, if the claimant is unable to prove the existence of a listed impairment, she must prove that her physical and/or mental impairments prevent her from performing any past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(f). And at the fifth step, the Commissioner must consider the claimant's residual functional capacity, age, education, and past work experience to determine whether the claimant can perform other work besides past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(g). Plaintiff bears the burden of proof through the first four steps of the sequential evaluation process, see Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5, 107 S.Ct. 2287, 2294 n.5, 96 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987), and while the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner at the fifth step of the process to establish other jobs existing in substantial numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform,3 the ultimate burden of proving disability never shifts from the plaintiff, see, e.g., Green v. Social Security Administration, 223 Fed.Appx. 915, 923 (11th Cir. May 2, 2007) ("If a claimant proves that she is unable to perform her past relevant work, in the fifth step, `the burden shifts to the Commissioner to determine if there is other work available in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant is able to perform.' . . . Should the Commissioner `demonstrate that there are jobs the claimant can perform, the claimant must prove she is unable to perform those jobs in order to be found disabled.'").4

The task for the Magistrate Judge is to determine whether the Commissioner's decision to deny claimant benefits, on the basis that she can perform those light jobs identified by the VE during the administrative hearing, is supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is defined as more than a scintilla and means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971). "In determining whether substantial evidence exists, we must view the record as a whole, taking into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the [Commissioner's] decision." Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986).5 Courts are precluded, however, from "deciding the facts anew or re-weighing the evidence." Davison v. Astrue, 370 Fed. Appx. 995, 996 (11th Cir. Apr. 1, 2010) (per curiam) (citing Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005)). And, "`[e]ven if the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner's findings, [a court] must affirm if the decision reached is supported by substantial evidence.'" Id. (quoting Crawford v. Commissioner of Social Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158-1159 (11th Cir. 2004)).

On appeal to this Court, Dickinson asserts two reasons the Commissioner's decision to deny her benefits is in error (i.e., not supported by substantial evidence), namely, that the ALJ committed reversible in that his RFC determination is not supported by substantial evidence and the ALJ erred in finding that she does not have mental retardation as diagnosed by consultative examiner Dr. Donald W. Blanton. Because the undersigned finds that the ALJ erred to reversal with respect to Plaintiff's first assignment of error, the Court has no reason to address Dickinson's other assignment of error. See Pendley v. Heckler, 767 F.2d 1561, 1563 (11th Cir. 1985) ("Because the `misuse of the expert's testimony alone warrants reversal,' we do not consider the appellant's other claims.").

The responsibility for making the residual functional capacity determination rests with the ALJ. Compare 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c) ("If your case is at the administrative law judge hearing level . . ., the administrative law judge . . . is responsible for assessing your residual functional capacity.") with, e.g., Packer v. Commissioner, Social Security Admin., 542 Fed. Appx. 890, 891-892 (11th Cir. Oct. 29, 2013) (per curiam) ("An RFC determination is an assessment, based on all relevant evidence, of a claimant's remaining ability to do work despite her impairments. There is no rigid requirement that the ALJ specifically refer to every piece of evidence, so long as the ALJ's decision is not a broad rejection, i.e., where the ALJ does not provide enough reasoning for a reviewing court to conclude that the ALJ considered the claimant's medical condition as a whole." (internal citation omitted)). A plaintiff's RFC—which "includes physical abilities, such as sitting, standing or walking, and mental abilities, such as the ability to understand, remember and carry out instructions or to respond appropriately to supervision, co-workers and work pressure[]"—"is a[n] [] assessment of what the claimant can do in a work setting despite any mental, physical or environmental limitations caused by the claimant's impairments and related symptoms." Watkins v. Commissioner of Social Security, 457 Fed. Appx. 868, 870 n.5 (11th Cir. Feb. 9, 2012) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)-(c), 416.945(a)-(c)); see also Davison, supra, 370 Fed.Appx. at 996 ("An ALJ makes an RFC determination by considering the claimant's ability to sit, stand, walk, lift, carry, push, pull, stoop, crouch, and reach."); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3) (in assessing RFC, the Commissioner is required to consider "descriptions and observations of [the claimant's] limitations from [] impairments, including limitations that result from [] symptoms, such as pain, provided by [the claimant]. . . .").

To find that an ALJ's RFC determination is supported by substantial evidence, it must be shown that the ALJ has "`provide[d] a sufficient rationale to link'" substantial record evidence "`to the legal conclusions reached.'" Ricks v. Astrue, 2012 WL 1020428, *9 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 27, 2012) (quoting Russ v. Barnhart, 363 F.Supp.2d 1345, 1347 (M.D. Fla. 2005)); compare id. with Packer v. Astrue, 2013 WL 593497, *4 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 14, 2013) ("`[T]he ALJ must link the RFC assessment to specific evidence in the record bearing upon the claimant's ability to perform the physical, mental, sensory, and other requirements of work.'"), aff'd, 542 Fed. Appx. 890 (11th Cir. Oct. 29, 2013); see also Hanna v. Astrue, 395 Fed. Appx. 634, 636 (11th Cir. Sept. 9, 2010) (per curiam) ("The ALJ must state the grounds for his decision with clarity to enable us to conduct meaningful review. . . . Absent such explanation, it is unclear whether substantial evidence supported the ALJ's findings; and the decision does not provide a meaningful basis upon which we can review [a plaintiff's] case." (internal citation omitted)).6 However, in order to find the ALJ's RFC assessment supported by substantial evidence, it is not necessary for the ALJ's assessment to be supported by the assessment of an examining or treating physician. See, e.g., Packer, supra, 2013 WL 593497, at *3 ("[N]umerous court have upheld ALJs' RFC determinations notwithstanding the absence of an assessment performed by an examining or treating physician."); McMillian v. Astrue, 2012 WL 1565624, *4 n.5 (S.D. Ala. May 1, 2012) (noting that decisions of this Court "in which a matter is remanded to the Commissioner because the ALJ's RFC determination was not supported by substantial and tangible evidence still accurately reflect the view of this Court, but not to the extent that such decisions are interpreted to require that substantial and tangible evidence must—in all cases—include an RFC or PCE from a physician" (internal punctuation altered and citation omitted)); but cf. Coleman v. Barnhart, 264 F.Supp.2d 1007 (S.D. Ala. 2003).

In this case, the Court finds that the ALJ's RFC assessment cannot be found to be supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ does not explain, when summarizing the evidence of record and attempts to articulate the required linkage, how the medical evidence related to each of Plaintiff's impairments supports each component of his RFC assessment. Indeed, while the ALJ uses very general linkage language (see Tr. 29 ("The medical records demonstrate some ongoing problems with neuropathy and other physical issues, but the undersigned has provided several physical and mental limitations in the established residual functional capacity to encompass symptoms related to her impairments. Even with these restrictions, the vocational expert testified there is other work existing in significant numbers that the claimant is capable of performing.")), he nowhere specifically links each component of his RFC assessment to medical (and other) evidence in the record. And such linkage was of paramount importance in a case, like the instant one, where the ALJ rejected every physical RFC assessment completed by a treating, examining or non-examining physician. (Compare Tr. 30-31 (the ALJ's assessment of "physical" opinion evidence of record) with Tr. 83-84 & 86-88 (physical RFC assessment by non-examining, reviewing physician Dr. Gregory Parker); Tr. 579-583 (examination and physical assessment by examining physician Dr. Ashleigh Butts); Tr. 664 (physical medical source statement completed by treating neurologist Dr. Walid Freij); & Tr. 727 (physical medical source statement completed by treating physician Dr. Huey R. Kidd)).

Of particular import to this Court, the ALJ acknowledges that Plaintiff's peripheral neuropathy is a severe impairment (Tr. 17) and recognizes during the course of his opinion that part and parcel of Dickinson's peripheral neuropathy is her carpal tunnel syndrome (see id. at 26-27 (discussing nerve conduction studies on Plaintiff's hands and lower extremities and referencing the diagnoses of Dr. Freij, including carpal tunnel syndrome)), see http://peripheralneuropathycenter.uchicago.edulearnaboutpn/yypes (last visited, September 25, 2018) ("Carpal tunnel syndrome is a localized peripheral neuropathy that affects the hands."). In addition, the ALJ goes so far as to accord "full weight" to the "opinion" of Plaintiff's treating neurologist, Dr. Walid Freij, that Dickinson was "to exercise, wear a brace,7 take medications and avoid bending, stooping, heavy lifting and carrying, and other recommendations." (Tr. 27 (footnote added); see also Tr. 713 (Plaintiff's office visit with Dr. Freij dated February 9, 2015); see Tr. 702-21 (office records from Dr. Freij)). According to the ALJ, this "opinion" by Dr. Freij "is consistent with the evidence at the time and not inconsistent with the residual functional capacity." (Tr. 27 (emphasis supplied)). This Court can simply not agree, however, both because the ALJ did not identify all elements of Dr. Freij's opinion that he accorded full weight (that is, the "other recommendations") and indicate specifically how those recommendations were consistent with his RFC assessment and because he "leaves out" of his RFC assessment findings regarding manipulative functions that are normally made when a claimant has carpal tunnel syndrome. Initially, the undersigned notes that one of Dr. Freij's "other recommendations" regarding Plaintiff's carpal tunnel syndrome was that she avoid repetitive motion at the wrists, in addition to wearing wrist braces (see, e.g., Tr. 707), yet the ALJ failed to specifically "link" these particular plan recommendations/opinions—to which he purportedly accorded "full weight"—to his RFC findings that Plaintiff can frequently reach, as well as lift and carry up to 20 pounds occasionally (see generally Tr. 22-29). More importantly, despite his acceptance of Dr. Freij's "opinion," as outlined above, the ALJ's RFC determination contains no findings regarding all the manipulative functions found attendant to carpal tunnel syndrome, namely, for instance, handling and fingering, see, e.g., Quinones-Santos v. Commissioner of Social Security, 2016 WL 3344793, *2 & *4 (M.D. Fla. June 16, 2016) (noting the ALJ's specific RFC findings that the claimant could perform no more than occasional reaching overhead bilaterally and no more the frequent reaching bilaterally, as well as no more than frequent fingering and handling bilaterally and then finding that the evidence of record relating to Plaintiff's carpal tunnel syndrome supported the manipulative functional limitations found by the ALJ), and obviously did not "link" these non-existent findings to any evidence in the record bearing upon Dickinson's abilities to handle and finger objects in a work setting.

Without a full appreciation of the limitations of manipulative functions attendant to Plaintiff's carpal tunnel syndrome and a "tying" of those limitations to evidence in the record, this Court cannot find that the ALJ's RFC assessment provides an articulated linkage to substantial medical evidence of record,8 and, therefore, this case must be remanded to the Commissioner of Social Security for further consideration not inconsistent with this decision.9 Stated somewhat differently, the ALJ has failed to provide this Court with sufficient reasoning for determining that the proper legal analysis has been conducted.10

CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, it is ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff benefits be reversed and remanded pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g),11 see Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 111 S.Ct. 2157, 115 L.Ed.2d 78 (1991), for further proceedings not inconsistent with this decision. The remand pursuant to sentence four of § 405(g) makes the plaintiff a prevailing party for purposes of the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 113 S.Ct. 2625, 125 L.Ed.2d 239 (1993), and terminates this Court's jurisdiction over this matter.

DONE and ORDERED.