MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

KATHERINE P. NELSON, Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff Anthony C. Smith brought this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Defendant Commissioner of Social Security ("the Commissioner") denying his applications for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401, et seq., and for supplemental security income ("SSI") under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381, et seq. Upon consideration of the parties' briefs (Docs. 13, 20) and those portions of the administrative record (Doc. 12) (hereinafter cited as "(R. [page number(s) in lower-right corner of transcript])") relevant to the issues raised, and with the benefit of oral argument, the Court finds that the Commissioner's final decision is due to be AFFIRMED under sentence four of § 405(g).1

I. Background

On October 22, 2014, Smith filed applications for a period of disability, DIB, and SSI with the Social Security Administration ("SSA"), alleging disability beginning October 23, 2009.2 After his applications were initially denied, Smith requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") with the SSA's Office of Disability Adjudication and Review, which was held on March 26, 2015. On February 7, 2017, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on Smith's applications, finding him not disabled under the Social Security Act and thus not entitled to benefits. (See R. 84 — 108).

The Commissioner's decision on Smith's applications became final when the Appeals Council for the Office of Disability Adjudication and Review denied his request for review of the ALJ's decision on October 27, 2017. (R. 1 — 6). Smith subsequently filed this action under § 405(g) and § 1383(c)(3) for judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) ("The final determination of the Commissioner of Social Security after a hearing [for SSI benefits] shall be subject to judicial review as provided in section 405(g) of this title to the same extent as the Commissioner's final determinations under section 405 of this title."); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) ("Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such decision or within such further time as the Commissioner of Social Security may allow."); Ingram v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1262 (11th Cir. 2007) ("The settled law of this Circuit is that a court may review, under sentence four of section 405(g), a denial of review by the Appeals Council.").

II. Standards of Review

"In Social Security appeals, [the Court] must determine whether the Commissioner's decision is "`supported by substantial evidence and based on proper legal standards. Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion."'" Winschel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439 (11th Cir. 1997))). However, the Court "`may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute our judgment for that of the [Commissioner].'" Id. (quoting Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983))). "`Even if the evidence preponderates against the [Commissioner]'s factual findings, [the Court] must affirm if the decision reached is supported by substantial evidence.'" Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)).

"Yet, within this narrowly circumscribed role, [courts] do not act as automatons. [The Court] must scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence[.]" Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239 (citations and quotation omitted). See also Owens v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 1511, 1516 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) ("We are neither to conduct a de novo proceeding, nor to rubber stamp the administrative decisions that come before us. Rather, our function is to ensure that the decision was based on a reasonable and consistently applied standard, and was carefully considered in light of all the relevant facts."). 3 "In determining whether substantial evidence exists, [a court] must . . . tak[e] into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the [Commissioner's] decision." Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986).

However, the "substantial evidence" "standard of review applies only to findings of fact. No similar presumption of validity attaches to the [Commissioner]'s conclusions of law, including determination of the proper standards to be applied in reviewing claims." MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1053 (11th Cir. 1986) (quotation omitted). Accord, e.g., Wiggins v. Schweiker, 679 F.2d 1387, 1389 (11th Cir. 1982) ("Our standard of review for appeals from the administrative denials of Social Security benefits dictates that `(t)he findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. . . .' 42 U.S.C.A. s 405(g) . . . As is plain from the statutory language, this deferential standard of review is applicable only to findings of fact made by the Secretary, and it is well established that no similar presumption of validity attaches to the Secretary's conclusions of law, including determination of the proper standards to be applied in reviewing claims." (some quotation marks omitted)). This Court "conduct[s] `an exacting examination' of these factors." Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (quoting Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)). "`The [Commissioner]'s failure to apply the correct law or to provide the reviewing court with sufficient reasoning for determining that the proper legal analysis has been conducted mandates reversal.'" Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991)). Accord Keeton v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994).

In sum, courts "review the Commissioner's factual findings with deference and the Commissioner's legal conclusions with close scrutiny." Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). See also Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) ("In Social Security appeals, we review de novo the legal principles upon which the Commissioner's decision is based. Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). However, we review the resulting decision only to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence. Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158-59 (11th Cir. 2004).").

Thornton v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 597 F. App'x 604, 609 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (unpublished).4

Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v); Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1237-39).5

"These regulations place a very heavy burden on the claimant to demonstrate both a qualifying disability and an inability to perform past relevant work." Moore, 405 F.3d at 1211 (citing Spencer v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 1090, 1093 (11th Cir. 1985)). "In determining whether the claimant has satisfied this initial burden, the examiner must consider four factors: (1) objective medical facts or clinical findings; (2) the diagnoses of examining physicians; (3) evidence of pain; and (4) the claimant's age, education, and work history." Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001, 1005 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (citing Tieniber v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 1251, 1253 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam)). "These factors must be considered both singly and in combination. Presence or absence of a single factor is not, in itself, conclusive." Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1240 (citations omitted).

If, in Steps One through Four of the five-step evaluation, a claimant proves that he or she has a qualifying disability and cannot do his or her past relevant work, it then becomes the Commissioner's burden, at Step Five, to prove that the claimant is capable—given his or her age, education, and work history—of engaging in another kind of substantial gainful employment that exists in the national economy. Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999); Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 836 (11th Cir. 1985). Finally, although the "claimant bears the burden of demonstrating the inability to return to [his or] her past relevant work, the Commissioner of Social Security has an obligation to develop a full and fair record." Shnorr v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 578, 581 (11th Cir. 1987). See also Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) ("It is well-established that the ALJ has a basic duty to develop a full and fair record. Nevertheless, the claimant bears the burden of proving that he is disabled, and, consequently, he is responsible for producing evidence in support of his claim." (citations omitted)). "This is an onerous task, as the ALJ must scrupulously and conscientiously probe into, inquire of, and explore for all relevant facts. In determining whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ must consider the evidence as a whole." Henry v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 802 F.3d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (citation and quotation omitted).

When the ALJ denies benefits and the Appeals Council denies review of that decision, the Court "review[s] the ALJ's decision as the Commissioner's final decision." Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1278. But "when a claimant properly presents new evidence to the Appeals Council, a reviewing court must consider whether that new evidence renders the denial of benefits erroneous." Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1262. Nevertheless, "when the [Appeals Council] has denied review, [the Court] will look only to the evidence actually presented to the ALJ in determining whether the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence." Falge v. Apfel, 150 F.3d 1320, 1323 (11th Cir. 1998).

III. Summary of the ALJ's Decision

At Step One, the ALJ determined that Smith met the applicable insured status requirements through December 31, 2014, and that he had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 23, 2009, the alleged disability onset date. (R. 89 — 90). At Step Two, the ALJ determined that Smith had the following severe impairments: major depressive disorder, anxiety, posttraumatic stress disorder, and history of cannabis and alcohol abuse. (R. 90 — 91). At Step Three, the ALJ found that Smith did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or equaled the severity of one of the specified impairments in the relevant Listing of Impairments. (R. 91 — 93).

Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1238-39 (footnote omitted).

The ALJ determined that Smith had the RFC "to perform medium work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c) and 416.967(c)[6] except that he could have no exposure to unprotected heights or hazardous machinery; no operating motor vehicles; can perform simple, routine tasks in 2 hour increments with normal breaks for the duration of an 8 hour workday; occasional change in the routine work setting; occasional interaction with the public; and can work in close proximity to others, but must work independently, not in a team. However, on a frequent basis (defined as up to 2/3 of the day), [Smith] would be unable to complete [his] job duties in a timely manner." (R. 93 — 103).

Based on this RFC and the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ determined that Smith was unable to perform any past relevant work. (R. 103). At Step Five, based on additional testimony from the vocational expert, the ALJ found that there were no jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy that Smith could perform given his RFC, age, education, and work experience. (R. 103 — 104.). However, at a subsequent step the Court will hereinafter refer to as "the Substance Use Step," the ALJ found that Smith's substance abuse disorder was a contributing factor material to the determination of disability because Smith would not be disabled if he stopped the substance use.7 (R. 104 — 108). Thus, the ALJ found that Smith was not disabled. (R. 108).

IV. Analysis

Smith claims that the ALJ was wrong to assign no weight to the medical opinion of Smith's treating psychiatrist, Dr. Gregory Cummings,8 while assigning great weight to the medical opinion of a non-examining medical expert, psychologist Dr. John Davis.9 The undersigned disagrees.

Evidence considered by the Commissioner in making a disability determination may include medical opinions. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)(2), 416.927(a)(2). "`Medical opinions are statements from physicians and psychologists or other acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of [the claimant's] impairment(s), including [the claimant's] symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what [the claimant] can still do despite impairment(s), and [the claimant's] physical or mental restrictions.'" Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178-79 (quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)(2), 416.927(a)(2)). "There are three tiers of medical opinion sources: (1) treating physicians; (2) nontreating, examining physicians; and (3) nontreating, nonexamining physicians." Himes v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 585 F. App'x 758, 762 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(1)-(2), 416.927(c)(1)-(2)). "In assessing medical opinions, the ALJ must consider a number of factors in determining how much weight to give to each medical opinion, including (1) whether the physician has examined the claimant; (2) the length, nature, and extent of a treating physician's relationship with the claimant; (3) the medical evidence and explanation supporting the physician's opinion; (4) how consistent the physician's opinion is with the record as a whole; and (5) the physician's specialization. These factors apply to both examining and non-examining physicians." Eyre v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 586 F. App'x 521, 523 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c) & (e), 416.927(c) & (e)). While "the ALJ is not required to explicitly address each of those factors[,]" Lawton v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 431 F. App'x 830, 833 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (unpublished), "the ALJ must state with particularity the weight given to different medical opinions and the reasons therefor." Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179.

"Absent `good cause,' an ALJ is to give the medical opinions of treating physicians `substantial or considerable weight.'" Id. (quoting Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1440). "Good cause exists `when the: (1) treating physician's opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3) treating physician's opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor's own medical records.' With good cause, an ALJ may disregard a treating physician's opinion, but he `must clearly articulate [the] reasons' for doing so." Id. (quoting Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240-41) (internal citation omitted). See also, e.g., Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1240 ("[T]he opinion of a treating physician may be rejected when it is so brief and conclusory that it lacks persuasive weight or where it is unsubstantiated by any clinical or laboratory findings.").

It is true that "[t]he opinions of nonexamining, reviewing physicians, . . . when contrary to those of the examining physicians, are entitled to little weight, and standing alone do not constitute substantial evidence." Sharfarz v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 278, 280 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam). As such, "[t]he good cause required before the treating physicians' opinions may be accorded little weight is not provided by the report of a nonexamining physician where it contradicts the report of the treating physician." Lamb v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 698, 703 (11th Cir. 1988). However, "the ALJ may reject any medical opinion if the evidence supports a contrary finding." Sharfarz, 825 F.2d at 280. Thus, "[i]f an ALJ has shown good cause to reject the opinion of a treating or examining physician, the ALJ may then properly rely on the opinion of a non-examining medical source if it is consistent with the objective evidence of record." Ethridge v. Berryhill, No. 1:16CV788-WC, 2017 WL 4780619, at *5 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 23, 2017) (Capel, M.J.) (citing cases).10 See also Social Security Ruling 96-6P, 1996 WL 374180, at *3 (July 2, 1996) ("In appropriate circumstances, opinions from State agency medical and psychological consultants and other program physicians and psychologists may be entitled to greater weight than the opinions of treating or examining sources. For example, the opinion of a State agency medical or psychological consultant or other program physician or psychologist may be entitled to greater weight than a treating source s medical opinion if the State agency medical or phychological [sic] consultant's opinion is based on a review of a complete case record that includes a medical report from a specialist in the individual's particular impairment which provides more detailed and comprehensive information than what was available to the individual's treating source."). Accordingly, Smith is incorrect that an ALJ can never properly give greater weight to the opinion of a non-examining physician than that of a treating physician.

Moreover, at both Step Four and the Substance Use Step, 11 the ALJ thoroughly explained her reasons for giving no weight to Dr. Cummings's opinion and great weight to Dr. Davis's. These stated reasons were not substantively addressed in Smith's brief or at oral argument. At most, Smith's brief cites two pages of medical records in disputing the conclusions the ALJ drew from evidence that Smith's alcohol abuse was in remission. (Doc. 13 at 4 (citing R. 692, 694)). In particular, Smith highlights a July 12, 2016 treatment note by Dr. Cummings stating that Smith's alcohol abuse was in "partial remission" and that Smith reported that he was "doing alright," but also documenting Smith's subjective complaints that "he still struggles with intermittent nightmares and flashbacks from the convoy explosion that he experienced in Iraq." (Doc. 13 at 4 (citing R. 694)).

However, the ALJ expressly discussed this evidence in her decision (see R. 99, 105), concluding that "if [Smith] stopped the substance use, [his] medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to produce some of the alleged symptoms[,]" but that "[t]he objective exam findings and [Smith]'s report of his activities during this period of remission show a significant improvement in his condition when substance abuse is not a factor." (R. 105). The ALJ then proceeded to discuss Smith's longitudinal history of substance use prior to stating that she gave Dr. Cummings's opinion "little weight" because, inter alia, it was "not consistent with the record as a whole . . ." (R. 105 — 106). The fact that Smith can point to a single notation in the record that could be interpreted as not supporting the ALJ's determination does not render the ALJ's determination erroneous for purposes of judicial review. See Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260 ("Even if the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner's factual findings, the Court must affirm if the decision reached is supported by substantial evidence." (quotation omitted).

Moreover, the ALJ expressly considered the very evidence that Smith cites in support of his claim that the ALJ erred, and Smith's bare assertions that the ALJ should have drawn a different conclusion from that evidence amount to an invitation for the Court to impermissibly "decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute our judgment for that of the Commissioner." Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178 (quotation omitted). See also Barnes v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1356, 1358 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) ("The court need not determine whether it would have reached a different result based upon the record."); Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001), as amended on reh'g (Aug. 9, 2001) ("If the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner.").12

Because Smith has failed to show that the ALJ committed any reversible error in her consideration of the medical opinion evidence of record, the Court OVERRULES those claims of error. There being no other claims of error raised, the Court finds that the Commissioner's final decision denying Smith benefits is therefore due to be AFFIRMED.

V. Conclusion

In accordance with the foregoing analysis, it is ORDERED that the Commissioner's final decision denying Smith's October 22, 2014 applications for a period of disability, DIB, and SSI is AFFIRMED under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Final judgment shall issue separately in accordance with this order and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58.

DONE and ORDERED.