MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

TERRY F. MOORER, District Judge.

Pending before the Court is the Motion to Consolidate Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 42 ("motion to consolidate"). See Doc. 31. The motion is filed by Plaintiff Eugenio De La Cruz and Movants James Martin, Marcus V. Richardson, James Ramsey, Brandon W. Martir, Mark E. Seaman, Sr., Gilberto Navarro, William E. Batchelder, Richard L. McKensie, and Jeffery Beatty. Movants are the Plaintiffs in the other Back-End Litigation Option ("BELO") cases that were filed by the same counsel. For the purposes of this motion, the Court will refer to them collectively as "Plaintiffs." Defendants timely responded in opposition to the motion to consolidate. See Doc. 35. The matter is ripe for disposition and for the reasons discussed below, the motion to consolidate (Doc. 31) is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

This matter is a BELO lawsuit for Later Manifested Physical Conditions ("LMPCs") that was filed pursuant to the terms and requirements of the Medical Settlement Agreement ("MSA") that was amended on May 1, 2012; preliminarily approved by the court on May 2, 2012; and entered on May 3, 2012, in the case of In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, No. 2:10-md-02179-CJB-JCW, Doc. 6427-1 (E.D. La. May 3, 2012).

The motion to consolidate involves ten (10) BELO actions for LMPCs, which were transferred from the United District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana to the Southern District of Alabama and are styled as follows:1

The instant case came before the Court for a scheduling conference on January 10, 2019, at which the Magistrate Judge discussed with the parties the issue of consolidation of the BELO actions that have been filed in the Southern District of Alabama. Counsel for Plaintiffs expressed his client was in favor of consolidation, while counsel for Defendants expressed his clients were not in favor of consolidation. The Court did not reach any conclusions at that time.2

Plaintiffs timely filed their motion to consolidate. See Doc. 31. The Court entered a briefing schedule and directed the Clerk of Court to docket the motion to consolidate in all ten cases along with a copy of the briefing schedule so the undersigned could consider the matter.3 Defendants timely responded in opposition to the motion to consolidate (see Doc. 35), and Plaintiffs timely filed their reply (see Doc. 38). Though Defendants requested oral argument (Doc. 35, at 1) and Plaintiffs state it may be beneficial (Doc. 38, at 4), the Court has reviewed the briefs and determined that oral argument is unnecessary.

II. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state: "[i]f actions before the court involve a common question of law or fact, the court may: (1) join for hearing or trial any or all matters at issue in the actions; (2) consolidate the actions; or (3) issue any other orders to avoid unnecessary cost or delay." FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a). Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a) "is a codification of a trial court's inherent managerial power `to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.'" Hendrix v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 776 F.2d 1492, 1495 (11th Cir. 1985) (citing In re Air Crash Disaster at Fla. Everglades, 549 F.2d 1006, 1012 (5th Cir. 1977)). However, as noted by the plain language in the use of the word "may," the Court's decision under Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a) is purely discretionary. See also Eghnayem v. Boston Sci. Corp., 873 F.3d 1304, 1313 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Hendrix, 776 F.2d at 1495) (emphasizing decision is "purely discretionary."). In exercising that discretion, the Court must take into account the following factors: (1) whether the specific risks of prejudice and possible confusion are overborne by the risk of inconsistent adjudications of common factual and legal issues; (2) the burden on parties, witnesses and available judicial resources posed by multiple lawsuits; (3) the length of time required to conclude multiple suits as against a single one; and (4) the relative expense to all concerned of the single-trial, multiple-trial alternatives. Id. Finally, the Court may decide to consolidate for pretrial, trial, or both.

Turning to the situation at hand, Plaintiffs' motion and brief states, "Each case presents similar allegations and require resolution of parallel issues, including the amount, location, timing, duration, and levels of oil and spill-response chemicals discharged or released into the environment of which Plaintiffs were exposed, as well as the fact of diagnosis, alternative causes, causation, and the amount of compensatory damages Plaintiffs are entitled." Doc 31-1 at 2, ¶ 2. They argue "[t]he instant cases present precisely the kind of tort claims courts routinely consolidate based on a desire to save the parties from wasteful re-litigation, avoid duplication of judicial effort, and not materially prejudice anyone's rights." Id. at 4. Plaintiffs further contend, of the six (6) issues that can be litigated pursuant to the MSA,4 only two (2) require an individualized inquiry (Doc. 38) at 6, and the need for individualized inquiry of each plaintiff to determine certain of the litigable issues would not be necessary if Defendants had made adequate disclosures and will not be necessary if Defendants respond to Plaintiffs' discovery requests (see Doc. 38, at 6-8). The Court does not find these arguments persuasive and believes there will be more extensive individual inquiry of Plaintiffs' claims.

Defendants are far more on point. They aptly point to the Multi-District Litigation (MDL) court's own acknowledgment that:

See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, No. 2:10-md-2179, Doc. 14099 at 1 (E.D. La. Jan. 30, 2015); see also id. at Doc. 23785 (stating same and reiterating, "No BELO lawsuit may be filed as a class, mass, or aggregate action").

The Court also agrees with the Defendants' statement that "BELO lawsuits are focused on litigation of individual rather than common issues." Doc. 35 at 4. The singular commonality in these ten cases is they are represented by the same counsel. All the other factors preponderate against consolidation — plaintiffs were at different worksites, had different levels of exposure, have different medical claims, and have different damages claims.

Based on the above, the Court does not find consolidation is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a).

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons articulated above, it is ORDERED the Motion to Consolidate Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 42 (Doc. 31) is DENIED. The Clerk of Court is directed to docket this Memorandum Opinion and Order and terminate the corresponding motion to consolidate in the following cases:

DONE and ORDERED.