Ben Barry, United States Bankruptcy Judge.
This case has a long and rich history. On August 31, 2015, the debtor filed a skeletal chapter 7 petition in which she indicated that her debts were primarily "consumer/non-business." On September 14, 2015, the debtor filed her first set of schedules and statements, as well as her Chapter 7 Statement of Current Monthly Income and Means Test Calculation [initial means test]. The debtor's initial means test indicated a presumption of abuse. On November 25, 2015, the United States Trustee [UST] filed a motion to dismiss the debtor's case pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1). On December 14, 2015, the debtor filed her response to the UST's motion to dismiss. On December 10, 2015, the UST filed a complaint for denial of the debtor's discharge (adversary proceeding 4:15-ap-1112). On January 6, 2016, chapter 7 trustee Frederick S. Wetzel, III [Wetzel] filed an objection to the UST's motion to dismiss based upon his determination that this was an asset case.
On January 8, 2016, Wetzel filed a complaint for turnover and determination of fraudulent conveyance (adversary proceeding 4:16-ap-1001). On May 20, 2016, the UST and Wetzel filed a joint motion asking the Court to hold the UST's motion to dismiss in abeyance pending the resolution of the two adversary proceedings. At the
The Court held a hearing on the UST's motion to dismiss and amended motion to dismiss [collectively, the UST's motion to dismiss] on July 25, 2019. Joseph A. DiPietro [DiPietro] appeared on behalf of the UST. Donald K. Campbell, III [Campbell] appeared on behalf of the debtor. Based on Wetzel's non-appearance at the hearing, the Court deemed his objection to the dismissal of the debtor's case withdrawn. At the beginning of the hearing, the UST orally amended his motion to dismiss to include a count under § 707(b)(3); the debtor did not object. In closing, the UST stated that he was no longer moving under § 707(a). At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court took the matter under advisement. For the reasons stated below, the Court grants the UST's motion to dismiss under § 707(b)(3).
The debtor is a physician. She graduated from medical school in 2009 and established Amy Garrison, M.D., PLLC [the PLLC] in 2011. In June 2012, the debtor took a job as an emergency room physician in Batesville, Arkansas. Around the same time, she purchased a home in Cushman, Arkansas—near Batesville—with financing that she had obtained from First Community Bank. In June 2013, the debtor, through her PLLC, opened a cash-only "concierge" medical practice in Greenbrier, Arkansas. She subsequently set up similar practices through her PLLC in Conway, Maumelle, and Little Rock.
Debtor's Ex. 1.
The August 20 email was the apparent culmination of a dispute between the debtor and BCBS that had begun a few months earlier. At the hearing on the UST's motion to dismiss, the debtor testified that when she was going through the credentialing process to work at St. Vincent's, BCBS advised her that she could not maintain her cash-only practice while under contract with BCBS in connection with her employment at St. Vincent's and other facilities. As a result, BCBS informed the debtor that in order to work at St. Vincent's—or any other medical facility—she would be required to close her cash-based concierge practice or, alternatively, bring the practice under contract with BCBS. Because the debtor did not want to change the way she operated her practice, she opted to terminate her contract with
At the hearing on the UST's motion to dismiss, the parties focused on promoting their respective means tests.
At the hearing, the debtor established that the UST had "double counted" two of the debtor's MedExpress checks—attributing the income once to the debtor personally and once to the PLLC as business income. Similarly, the UST demonstrated that the debtor's figures were flawed because the debtor had included the expenses associated with her BMW twice— once as a personal expense and once as a business expense. Although both parties successfully demonstrated that the other side's means test calculations were unreliable, neither party disputed the accuracy of the income stated on the debtor's tax returns. In fact, the debtor confirmed that the income stated on her tax returns for 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017 was correct. According to the debtor's tax returns, in 2014, the debtor earned no income from wages and her business operated at a loss of $10,428 that year. In 2015, the debtor earned wages of $74,628 and her net business income was $33,318 for total income of $107,946. In 2016, the debtor earned wages of $46,593 and her net business income was $37,322 for total income of $83,905. In 2017, the debtor earned no income from wages but her net business income was $216,850.
A party seeking the dismissal of a debtor's case under § 707(b)(1) "may elect to proceed under § 707(b)(2) or § 707(b)(3) or both as the UST has done in this matter. In either instance, the party bringing the action for dismissal carries the burden of proof." In re Witek, 383 B.R. 323, 326 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007) (citation omitted). Section 707(b)(2) sets out a "`means test' formula under which abuse may be presumed in instances where an ability to pay threshold is exceeded." Id. at 327. If the presumption of abuse does not arise under the means test—or is successfully rebutted—then "the Court may consider whether the case was filed in bad faith or whether `the totality of the circumstances. . . of the debtor's financial situation demonstrates abuse.'" See In re Gourley, 549 B.R. 210, 216 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2016) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3). Here, the UST moved for dismissal of the debtor's case under § 707(b)(2) based upon his means test calculation of the debtor's income and expenses—which he contends raised an unrebutted presumption of abuse—and under § 707(b)(3) based on the totality of the circumstances.
Regarding the UST's motion to dismiss under § 707(b)(2), Baber testified that he calculated the debtor's current monthly income based on only five months' worth of financial information for the PLLC because the debtor did not provide the UST
However, after considering the totality of the circumstances of the debtor's financial situation, the Court finds that the debtor's case should be dismissed under § 707(b)(3). Section 707(b) "focuses on whether the granting of a Chapter 7 discharge would be an abuse, not whether the filing of the case was an abuse." In re Penninger, No. 10-52061, 2011 WL 2709321, at *2 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. July 8, 2011). Therefore, when analyzing the totality of the circumstances for purposes of dismissal under § 707(b)(3), "it is proper to consider the [debtor's] financial circumstances at the time of the hearing." Id. In the Eighth Circuit, a debtor's "`ability to pay, standing alone, constitutes abuse under the totality of the circumstances.'" In re Gourley, 549 B.R. at 216 (quoting In re Williams, No. 10-03620-ALS7, 2011 WL 10468090, at *3 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa July 14, 2011) (citing U.S. Trustee v. Harris, 960 F.2d 74, 76 (8th Cir. 1992)). In this case, the Court finds that the debtor has the ability to pay her creditors. Although the debtor testified that her only source of income is currently the PLLC, the evidence before the Court reflects that the PLLC has become quite profitable in the four years since the debtor filed her chapter 7 case. In fact, the debtor's most recent tax returns show annual net business income of $216,850, which equates to monthly income of $18,070. After subtracting the debtor's monthly expenses of $1577—which includes $981 per month for the debtor's BMW payment
Although a debtor's ability to pay is the primary factor considered by the Eighth Circuit in determining whether a chapter 7
In re Gourley, 549 B.R. at 216 (quoting In re Honkomp, 416 B.R. 647, 649-50 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2009)). Here, the Court finds that the debtor's bankruptcy filing was precipitated, as least in part, by the debtor's decision to maintain her cash-based practice to the exclusion of maintaining her outside employment. Although the debtor's choice to stop working at St. Vincent's and MedExpress in favor of keeping her cash-only practice resulted in a temporary decrease to her income, her voluntary choice is not tantamount to sudden unemployment. Similarly, although the debtor and her counsel alluded to the debtor experiencing health problems that were ostensibly brought on by the stress of working shifts at outside medical facilities while also running her medical practice through the PLLC, the Court has no evidence that the debtor was ever diagnosed with an actual illness or disease that would rise to the level of a catastrophic event. The Court further finds that the debtor is eligible for chapter 13 relief based on the amount of unsecured and secured debt that she had on the date she filed bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(e). In the same vein, the Court finds that the debtor could make a meaningful distribution to her creditors in a chapter 13 case—as the Court stated above, she could pay her unsecured creditors in full in about eight months. Finally, the Court finds that the debtor has a stable source of future income—she is a physician with a successful practice.
For all of these reasons, the Court finds that the granting of relief under chapter 7 would be an abuse of the provisions of the chapter pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3). Therefore, the Court grants the UST's motion to dismiss, subject to the debtor converting her case to a case under chapter 13 within 14 days of the date of the entry of this order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
See UST Ex. 4. The means test allows "debtors to deduct various monthly expenses from their current monthly income, including certain expenses specified in the collection standards of the Internal Revenue Service." In re Justice, 404 B.R. 506, 512 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2009) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I)).