JOE J. VOLPE, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff, Karla Newboles, appeals the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration denying her claims for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act and for supplemental security income benefits under Title XVI of the Act. For reasons set out below, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED.
On September 10, 2008, Ms. Newboles protectively filed for benefits due to back problems, a herniated and bulging disc, elbow surgery, anxiety, and panic attacks. (Tr. 321, 415) An Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") denied Ms. Newboles's claims in an October 15, 2010, decision, but the ruling was remanded by the Appeals Council. (Tr. 108-134) A second ALJ denied her claims on April 9, 2012, but the Appeals Council again remanded the case. (Tr. 135-166)
At Ms. Newboles's request, an ALJ held a third hearing on September 9, 2013, where Ms. Newboles appeared with her lawyer. At the hearing, the ALJ heard testimony from Ms. Newboles and a vocational expert ("VE"). (Tr. 82-105)
The ALJ issued a decision on November 8, 2013, finding that Ms. Newboles was not disabled under the Act. (Tr. 10-22) The Appeals Council denied Ms. Newboles's request for review, making the ALJ's decision the Commissioner's final decision. (Tr. 1-3)
Ms. Newboles, who was forty-six years old at the time of the third hearing, has a high school education and past relevant work as an assembly line worker and telemarketer. (Tr. 14, 86-87)
The ALJ found that Ms. Newboles had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 10, 2008, and she had the following severe impairments: COPD, degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, obesity, right lateral epicondylitis, depression, and anxiety. (Tr. 12) However, the ALJ found that Ms. Newboles did not have an impairment or combination of impairments meeting or equaling an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
According to the ALJ, Ms. Newboles has the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform sedentary, unskilled work. However, she is limited to work that does not involve climbing ladders, ropes or scaffolds, does not expose her to hazards or concentrated exposure to odors, fumes, or gases, and allows her to occasionally perform all remaining postural functions. The work may involve no more than occasional right upper extremity overhead reaching and occasional right hand fingering and gross dexterity activities. She can perform work that involves only occasional changes to the work place setting; where interpersonal contact is no more than incidental to the work performed; supervision is simple, direct, and concrete; and the complexity of one or two step tasks is learned and performed by rote with few variables and little judgment. The VE testified that the jobs available with these limitations were call out operator and surveillance system monitor. (Tr. 102-103) Accordingly, the ALJ determined that Ms. Newboles could perform a significant number of jobs existing in the national economy, and found she was not disabled.
In reviewing the Commissioner's decision, this Court must determine whether there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the decision.
In reviewing the record as a whole, the Court must consider both evidence that detracts from the Commissioner's decision and evidence that supports the decision; but, the decision cannot be reversed "simply because some evidence may support the opposite conclusion."
Ms. Newboles asserts that the Commissioner's decision should be reversed because it is not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, she contends that the ALJ erred by giving her treating physician's opinion less weight than other opinions in the records. (Doc. No. 13) Ms. Newboles points out that her treating physician's 2012 and 2013 Medical Source Statements indicate that she cannot perform even sedentary work. (Tr. 1716-1717, 1784-1785)
An ALJ may discount or even disregard the opinions of a treating physician, when they are inconsistent or where other medical assessments are better supported.
In March 2009, a second neurosurgeon determined that Ms. Newboles's "neurologic exam is essentially normal except for some pain on the straight leg raising of either leg." (Tr. 1231) He did not believe that surgery was necessary and recommended "non-narcotic analgesic pain medication and avoidance of activities that cause pain." (Id.) In September 2009, yet another neurologist concluded that there was "nothing that requires surgical intervention." (Tr. 1339) Importantly, each of these assessments involved an in-patient visit as well as review of the MRIs.
Additionally, though Ms. Newboles claims she can only see her general practitioner to treat her back because she has no insurance, she has been smoking between one and two packs of cigarettes a day for the past twenty years. (Tr. 97, 1057, 1315, 1618, 1770) Smoking is an expensive, ongoing habit that can be considered when weighing Ms. Newboles's credibility.
Two other activities are also worth noting. In 2009, Ms. Newboles reported that she "[w]ent to the casino to get out of the house" and "shops independently but needs assistance loading and unloading items." (Tr. 1176) In February 2011, Ms. Newboles went on a trip to Harrison, Arkansas, "4 1/2 hours away [from] Corning" where she lives. (Tr. 1524) This extensive travel is inconsistent with the severity of restrictions indicated by Ms. Newboles's treating physician. The Court recognizes that the assessment was made over a year after the trip to Harrison, but again, the MRI results indicate that Ms. Newboles's condition had not worsened.
While there may be evidence that Ms. Newboles continues to have limitations related to her impairments, the ALJ's finding that she could perform sedentary work is supported by the record.
The Court has reviewed the entire record, including the briefs, the ALJ's decision, the transcript of the hearing, and the medical and other evidence. There is sufficient evidence in the record as a whole to support the Commissioner's decision.
THEREFORE, the Court hereby affirms the final determination of the Commissioner and dismisses Plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice.