D.P. MARSHALL, Jr., District Judge.
The back story is a family's attempt to pass a business from one generation to the next. Bailey says she gave her son the reins in 2007, then sold him the assets of the business in 2008, and only then found out he'd neglected to pay more than a million dollars in employment taxes. She contends she couldn't have known about his omission: her Arkansas bank wired funds to the company's Arkansas account to pay the IRS; her son's people used tricky accounting to hide the nonpayment; and she wasn't getting the bank statements that would've revealed the truth. No. 32 at ¶¶ 15, 17, 23, 35, 37, 44-47, 59, 61-62, 80.
Bailey's son disputes all this. He insists Bailey never turned loose of the business before the sale. No. 42 at 4. He maintains that Bailey had final authority over money, including taxes. No. 42 at 9-10. (She admittedly remained Rig-Up's president and majority stockholder until the sale. No. 42 at 1-2.) Bailey's daughter, Melissa Andrews, worked for Rig-Up in 2003 or 2004 and was in and out of the Arkansas office in the couple of years before the sale. No. 38-2 at 9-10 & 38 (deposition pagination). Andrews testified that Bailey knew more about the Texas operations than she lets on. No. 42 at 30-31. And Bailey's son says Bailey knew about some 2008 IRS notices about unfiled tax returns. No. 42 at 35.
These disputed material facts preclude summary judgment. It's true, as Bailey notes, that this isn't Bradbury v. United States, where this Court found responsible-person status and willfulness as a matter of law. No. 4:11-cv-810-DPM (E.D. Ark. 24 March 2014). But it's not Barton v. United States, 988 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1993) or Colosimo v. United States, 707 F.Supp.2d 926 (S.D. Iowa 2010) either. There's more than just a corporate title, check-writing authority, and knowledge of past unpaid taxes. Rig-Up employees say Bailey retained control of the business in 2007-2008. So there's a real dispute on responsible-person status. Willfulness is a closer question. But willfulness isn't a bad heart; it's reckless disregard of an obvious risk that taxes aren't being paid. Colosimo v. United States, 630 F.3d at 753. And ordinarily it's a fact question. Ibid. Here there's evidence that, while she retained control of Rig-Up, Bailey should've known about the unremitted taxes. A jury might not believe that evidence, but a jury must be the one to weigh it. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Bailey's motion, No. 30, is therefore denied.
So Ordered.